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This thesis focuses on the the study of insider trading based on three main economic 
regions- the U.K, the U.S and China. This is a key aspect of corporate governance and 
one where the regulatory systems differ substantially in the three countries analysed. 
Four filters have been developed in helping the regulatory authority detect the 
existence of insider trading. The first filter is to analyse the Average Abnormal Return 
(AR) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). If there are no unusual 
price movements prior to the announcement date, one would expect both the AR and 
CAAR to fluctuate randomly about zero. However, if there is leakage of, and trading 
on, inside information just prior to the announcement date, this should show up in the 
form of positive daily average residuals as t approaches 0 and a corresponding build 
up in CAAR. Dummy variables are also included in the first filter.  This filter captures 
unusual stock price run-ups on a series of days but may miss the ones on single days. 
As a result, more filters are developed. The second filter is the news search. 
Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971) found that those who possess 
privileged information have an inventive to take market positions on the basis of their 
information and then announce their information publicly. I consider two situations in 
this thesis-firstly, the public news released before the problematic day and secondly, 
the public news released after the problematic day. The investigation of outliers is 
used as the third filter in this thesis. The residuals which are 3.5 or 4 times greater 
than the standard deviation are considered as the outliers. I developed my fourth filter 
of detecting insider trading based on the Abnormal Turnover (AT). Apart from the 
four-filter approach, a day 0 AR hypothesis is also developed as a main contribution 
of this thesis. The day 0 abnormal return hypothesis suggests that on day 0, the day 
the merger is announced, there will be a substantial abnormal return for the targets 
due to the substantial trade volume in the stock market. But with the existence of 
insider dealing, the abnormal return may be partially absorbed prior to the 
announcement date and as a result, on day 0, the abnormal return will be expected to 
be lower than in the normal situation. In other words, the firms which are suspected of 
insider dealing activities may have a comparatively lower average abnormal return on 
day 0 than the firms which are not. In the conclusion we examine the implications for 
both corporate governance and also the regulatory regime. We do indeed find 
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widespread evidence for insider trading and this is a matter of concern-After utilizing 
the three data samples of the U.K, the U.S and China, we can be fairly confident that 
relatively few of the clean firms will be anything other than clean. Not all of the 
suspected firms will be ‘guilty of insider trading’, but there is substantial reason to 
suppose that they should be examined in further detail to identify the nature of the 
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Chapter 1        Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are undertaken by companies to achieve certain 
strategic and financial objectives. Many companies take M&A as a means of 
corporate expansion and growth. From time to time, companies have preferred the 
external means of growth through acquisitions to internal growth.  
 
The terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’ and ‘takeover’ are the three usual parlances in 
M&A while there are still some differences between them. In a merger, the common 
objectives bring corporations together sharing their resources. The shareholders of the 
combining corporations often remain as joint owners of the combined entity.  An 
acquisition resembles more of an arm’s-length deal. When the acquiring firm has 
purchased the assets or shares of the target firm, the acquired firm’s shareholders 
would cease to be owners of that firm. In a merger a new entity may be formed 
subsuming the merging firms, whereas in an acquisition the acquired firm becomes 
the subsidiary of the acquirer (Sudarsanam, 1995). A ‘takeover’ is similar to an 
acquisition and also implies that the acquirer is much larger than the acquired. 
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, only the strong form of market 
efficiency means that all information, no matter public or private can be reflected by 
the market. However, the strong form of market efficiency is highly theoretical. In 
this context, the possession of inside information means the potential to make large 
profits from a firm’s stock. Insider trading1, also known as insider dealing, is the 
trading of a corporation’s stock or other securities such as bonds or stock options by 
insiders who have potential access to non-public information about the company. 
Nowadays, insider trading comes more and more frequently into people’s lives. For 
example, according to a recent BBC news on 23 July 2012, six people have been 
convicted of insider dealing in a case brought by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). It is reported that they obtained information from the London printers of Swiss 
                                                          
1




bank UBS and UK brokerage JP Morgan Cazenove on takeovers by firms such as 
Reuters. They then use the confidential data to place spread bets which generated 




In Agrawal and Nasser (2009), one of the principal findings is that target stock goes 
up dramatically, on average by about 30%, upon takeover announcement. The 
substantial and almost instantaneous increase in stock price provides a tempting 
trading opportunity to corporate insiders, who often have knowledge of takeover 
negotiations months in advance of its public announcement. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that a great deal of insider trading takes place before takeover 
announcements. For example, in August 2006, the New York Times reported that 
securities of over 40% of the companies receiving buyout bids exhibited suspicious 
trading in the weeks before the deals became public (see Morgenson, 2006). 
Consequently, takeovers have been a major focus of regulatory efforts against insider 
trading. For instance, of the two biggest insider trading cases ever prosecuted in the 
U.S., almost all of the charges in the Levine-Boesky-Milken case in the late 1980s 
and many of the charges in the Galleon hedge fund case in 2009, relate to insider 
trading in takeovers (see, e.g., Frantz, 1987; Strasburg and Bray, 2009; Sharma and 
Pulliam, 2009 and Bray, 2010). Furthermore, about 80% of the cases in Meulbroek’s 
(1992, p. 1669) sample of insider trading cases prosecuted by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) during 1980-1989 are takeover-related (Agrawal and 
Nasser, 2009).  
 
Among economists, however, there are still debates on insider trading. It is argued 
that unrestricted insider trading will lead to a breakdown of capital markets which are 
unable to perform their role efficiently. This argument states that insider trading 
works to the disadvantage of outsiders who would then exit the marketplace, taking 
their capital with them. But for those who are in favour of allowing insider trading, it 
can lead to more informative security prices (Agarwal and Singh, 2006) and it 
increases the informational efficiency of markets by contributing to the existing 
information set held by investors (Ross (1978); John and Mishra (1990); John and 





Lang (1991); Zhang (2001) and Chau and Vayanos (2008)). With the above as a 
backdrop, the aim of this thesis is to empirically investigate the possible existence of 
insider trading prior to and after merger announcements in the U.K, U.S and China 
and to develop a feasible methodology in helping the regulators and the policy-makers. 
The study examines the impact of inside information on trading in advance of planned 
merger announcements by focusing on the daily stock price movements of both target 
and bidder firms prior to the first public announcement of their proposed mergers. 
 
Section 1.1 Objective of the thesis 
The first objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of inside information prior to 
the planned merger announcements and to investigate the possibility of the insider 
trading in U.K, U.S and China from 2006 to 2010. The second objective of this thesis 
is to develop a series of filters which can help detect the existence of insider trading. 
Measuring the prevalence of insider trading is of interest to policy-makers and 
regulators who are highly concerned with the effectiveness of existing insider trading 
regulations. Because of the financial crisis in 2008 after which the regulation of 
insider trading becomes tougher, this thesis also aims to provide new methods for the 
policy makers and regulators to regulate insider trading.  
 
Section 1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is the literature review and is divided 
into two main parts: (i) the M&As, and (ii) the insider trading part. The M&As 
section in chapter 2 discusses the possible motivation for firms to undertake M&As. 
In the first part of this section, the neoclassical profit maximisation model, the “hubris” 
hypothesis and synergy are discussed. In the managerial motives part, the M&A 
motives are divided into the self-fulfilment motive and the self-protection motive and 
both of these motives are explained in detail.  In the second section of chapter 2, 
namely the insider trading one, the definition of, as well as the regulations of, insider 
trading in three countries-U.K, U.S and China are presented respectively. Apart from 
this, the agency theory and the signalling theory are also discussed followed by the 
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market efficiency theory. Finally, summaries of the previous studies of insider trading 
before merger announcement are shown in tables, and discussed in detail.  
 
Chapter 3 gives the methodology and the models. In this chapter, the method applied 
in this study is given which is the event study approach. The methods of calculating 
the average abnormal return (AR) and the Cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) are also given. Apart from the method, the most commonly used models in 
evaluating returns are discussed in detail. The models include the market model, the 
market-adjusted model, the CAPM and the FF (Fama-French) three factors model. In 
applying all the models, the market model and the market-adjusted models are chosen 
as the most appropriate two in this study. Furthermore, the modified market model 
with significant lagged market return as an explanatory variable is also used for the 
consideration of inertia. The CAPM is not used in this thesis because it includes the 
error term squared as an explanatory variable. As we discuss later, if there are positive 
outliers, then the error term will be positive and large and its square very large which 
will therefore affect the identification of the positive outliers.  
 
Chapter 4 gives the four filter approach which is a major contribution of this thesis. 
Firstly, the rationale of the models applied in this thesis is explained. In addition, the 
four filters of investigating insider trading are presented one after another in detail. 
The four filters are the dummy variable approach, the news search, the investigation 
of outliers and the analysis of the abnormal turnover (AT). After the discussion of the 
four filters, the day 0 hypothesis is also explained as a verification of the filters being 
effective. 
 
Chapter 5 gives the data analysis and empirical results for the U.K. Firstly, the sample 
and data collection are given. Secondly, the four filters discussed in Chapter 3 are 
applied with the U.K data. Furthermore, A Granger causality test is then applied 
aiming to find out if there is causality between the targets and the bidders. Lastly, the 
conclusions of the U.K analysis are given. 
 
Chapter 6 gives the data analysis and empirical results for the U.S. The organization is 
similar with that in Chapter 5. The major difference is that in this chapter, a 
comparison of the results from U.K and U.S data is given. This supports other 
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scholars’ conclusions on the difference between the U.K and U.S regulations on 
insider trading. The conclusions come as the last part in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 is the data analysis and empirical results of China. The organization is also 
similar with that in Chapter 5. Because of the imperfection of the database, only a 
small number of Chinese listed firms are collected. The major difference is that the 
news search is not included in this chapter due to the imperfection of the database as 
well as the confidential reasons. The conclusions of the Chinese analysis are given at 
the end of this chapter.  
 
Finally Chapter 8 is the conclusion and discussion of policy implications. In this 
chapter, a brief summary of the four filters is given as well as a comparison of the 
results from this work with those from the previous ones. The results from this study 
are consistent with those from the previous works. The thesis also suggests that the 














Chapter 2        Literature Review 
Section 2.1 Introduction 
Merger activity around the world has increased dramatically in recent years. The 
numbers of announced M&A increase from less than 5,000 in 1985 to 40,000 in 2012 
globally and the value of transactions has increased from less than 500 billion US 
dollars in 1985 to about 2,500 billion US dollars in 2012 worldwide. Furthermore, the 
value of transactions reached about 4,000 billion US dollars in 1999 and then peaked 
at roughly 5,000 billion US dollars in 2007.
3
 And with mergers running at this pace, 
many national regulators such as the SEC in the U.S and its counterparts abroad are 
getting tougher on insider trading, since high takeover activity generally spawns bouts 
of insider trading, or at least rumours of such. 
 
The first section of this chapter is the M&As. In this section, the motives for mergers 
are discussed. The reason why these motives are so stressed is because the motives of 
getting involved in insider trading can be explained at least partly by the motives of 
M&As. For example, in the managerial motives, the managers can achieve both 
physical and psychological fulfilment through mergers, -and one possible way is to 
trade on inside information to make substantial profit. The second section of this 
chapter is the insider trading part. In this section, the issues about insider trading are 
discussed. These issues include the definition, the regulation, the agency theory, the 
signalling theory and market efficiency theory. Moreover, two tables are given to 
show the insider trading performance and the former studies concerning insider 
trading before the M&A’s announcement. 
 
Section 2.2 Merger’s Motives 
“Mergers and acquisitions represent massive change in the ownership and control of 
resources. Not surprisingly, the causes and effects of M&A have been subjects of 
intense interest.”( Kiymaz and Barker, 2008, p1) However, the way of categorizing 
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the motives are various. Normally, acquisition motives may be defined in terms of the 
acquirer’s corporate and business strategy objectives. For instance, a large, worldly 
known vehicle company with well-established distribution network may acquire a 
small, less famous target so as to achieve marketing and distribution synergies. Other 
motives could be the desire for increased market power, the consolidation of excess 
production capacity, control of a supplier so on and so forth.  Although the merger’s 
motives are diversified, they can be categorized into two main parts- the 
maximization of the shareholder’s profit and the managerial perspective. The 
managerial perspective can also be explained as the motives of doing insider trading 
and meanwhile, the substantial potential profit which can be gained through insider 
trading leads to ‘bad’ merger. 
 
“Strategies are formulated and acquisition decisions are made by the managers of the 
acquiring firm. Managers may be taking these decisions to further the interest of the 
owners of the firm, i.e. the shareholders.” (Sudarsanam, 1995) Neoclassical theory 
[represented by Manne (1965)] views corporate acquisitions as value-enhancing 
activities in which managers work to maximize shareholder wealth. In the 
neoclassical profit maximisation model, the interest of the shareholders is paramount 
and the managerial interests are subordinated. To put it another way, in case the 
interest of the former conflicts the latter, managerial interests may give place to the 
former. The interest of the shareholders dominates that of the managers. 
 
In contrast, managerial theories represented by Mueller (1969) conclude takeovers are 
an extension of managers’ own personal interests, undertaken for the purpose of 
increasing their own wealth or prestige by managing a large post-merger entity 
(Franks and Harris, 1989). In the managerialism concept, the managers have 
considerable power and discretion to pursue their own interest, at the cost of the 
shareholders’. In other words, in the managerial motive perspective, mergers driven 
by managerial self-interest may be carried out with wealth losses for shareholders. 
 




Neoclassical profit maximization model 
 
The concept of maximising the profit of shareholders as an M&A motive is suggested 
by traditional economists, especially those of a neoclassical persuasion. The 
maximization of profit involves an appreciation of competitive strategies which 
entails M&A in the search for efficiency gains or synergies, market power, or to 
combat problems of excess capacity in mature or declining industries. (Peck and 
Temple, 2002; Halpern, 1983, p. 314; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993, p. 29) 
 
In the neoclassical profit maximization model, the merger’s motive is to maximise the 
wealth of the shareholders. “This means that the incremental cash flows from the 
decision, when discounted at the appropriate discount rate, should yield zero or 
positive net present value.” (Sudarsanam, 1995) The discount rate is the risk-adjusted 
rate with a market-determined risk premium.  
 
Table 2.1: The maximizing of the shareholders’ wealth definitions:  
 
Added value from 
acquisition  
= Value of acquirer and 
the acquired after 
acquisition 
- Their aggregate 
value before 
Increase in acquirer share 
value 
= Added value - Cost of acquisition 




Source: Sudarsanam, 1995 
The above table illustrates how and when the target of maximizing the shareholders’ 
wealth is achieved, i.e., when the added value of the acquisition exceeds the cost. 
 
Acquisition transaction cost is the cost incurred when an acquisition is made, in the 
form of regulator’s fees, stock exchange fees, cost of underwriting management time 
and so on. The acquisition premium, which is also called control premium, is the 
excess of the offer price paid to the target over the target’s pre-bid price. Where 
managers seek to enhance shareholder wealth, they must not only add value, but also 
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ensure that the cost of the acquisition does not exceed that value.  Value creation 
could come from the target only or come from synergies between both the acquirer 
and the acquired firm. Since the cost of acquisition has two aspects, namely the 
acquisition transaction cost and the acquisition premium, it is feasible to reduce either 
or both of them to reduce the cost of acquisition. One of the ways of merger cost 
saving is to avoid falling into problems caused by the “hubris” hypothesis. 
 
 “Hubris” Hypothesis 
The “hubris” hypothesis suggests: “decision makers in acquiring firms pay too much 
for their targets due to ‘hubris’, which means they over-estimate their ability and/or 
make mistakes in evaluating potential targets. …the ‘hubris’ hypothesis implies: (1) 
the added value of the target and bidding firms could be zero or negative; (2) the 
value of the bidding firm should decrease; (3) the value of the target should increase.” 
(Roll, 1986) 
 
The “Hubris” hypothesis describes a situation which is against the neoclassical profit 
maximisation model. In the M&A market, the bidding firm identifies a potential target 
firm and makes a “valuation” of the equity of the target firm. Only when the 
“valuation” exceeds the cost of taking over the target firm, is an M&A offer made, 
otherwise there is no offer. Critical for the neoclassical approach is that this valuation 
is correct. However, there is the possibility that no potential synergies exist but some 
bidding firms believe that such gains exist. In short, “Hubris” hypotheses are often 
associated with negative wealth effects for bidder shareholders in the M&A. 
 
Section 2.2.2 Managerial motives 
 
The problem of managerial power and discretion when ownership and management 
are separated has been analysed as an “agency problem” because “The relationship 
between shareholders and managers may be viewed as one between a principal and 
his or her agent.” (Sudarsanam, 1995) In this agency model, managers as agents may 
not always act in the best interest of the principal. Instead, they act regardless of their 
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principal’s interest in order to promote their own self-interest and such self-interest 
pursuit may result in bad acquisitions and loss of shareholder value. (e.g. Taffler and 
Holl, 2006; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Mahoney and Mahoney, 1991; Mahoney and 
Mahoney, 2006; Firth, 1991; Amit, Livnat and Zarowin, 1989). Here one question 
may be raised, since the firm is owned by the shareholders, would they allow the 
managers to do harm to their benefit? Nonetheless, due to the asymmetrical 
information problem, the shareholders cannot have full information on the agents and 
this enables managerial utility driven activity being relevant in M&As.  
 
The reasons for managers to carry out mergers are briefly two. They are not mutually 





 The first type of motive, namely the desire for physical fulfilment is the most natural 
one. It is highly related to the original desire of human beings. When the firm size 
increases, tangible benefits are gained by the managers. For example, they can have 
bigger offices, more luxurious cars, and higher perquisites. Managers may pursue 
growth if their compensation is a function of sales growth even when there is no 
corresponding increase in shareholder’s wealth. (Jensen, 1986) 
 
Psychological self-fulfilment 
The second type mentioned above is the psychological self-fulfilment motive. An           
industry, sometimes, is more than an industry; it is also a stage for the young 
managers to act. As a result, managers have the psychological need to deploy their 
currently underused managerial talents and skills. Moreover, managers may derive 








Amihud and Lev (1981) using the agency cost model have shown the plausibility of 
this motive for managers who are striving to decrease their “employment risk.” The 
research results show two aspects. Firstly, manager-controlled firms engage in more 
conglomerate acquisitions than owner-controlled firms. Secondly, regardless of the 
means by which a firm achieves diversification, the operations of manager-controlled 
firms are more diversified than those of owner-controlled firms. Comparing with the 
owners, managers are more exposed to risks with respect to the firm’s earnings, even 
when both have identical wealth and utility functions. This is because managers are 
often overinvested in their own firms. This overinvestment arises from three sources. 
Firstly, they depend on their firms for their income in the form of salaries and bonuses. 
Apart from this, they may have developed firm-specific human capital which outside 
their present firm may not be valued as highly. Finally, where they receive 
compensation in the form of stock options, they increase their investment in their own 
firms. (Sudarsanam, 1995; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Terry, Callan and Sartoti, 1996) 
 
It may be argued that owners, holding a large share of a firm’s equity, may also 
benefit from a reduction in the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy through 
corporate diversification. However, the more stable cash flows of the combined firm 
resulting from a diversifying merger may strengthen the security available to the debt 
holders of the firm. Thus the debt holders, rather than shareholders, may be the 
beneficiaries of risk reduction. Therefore, managers seek for an efficient way to 
diversify the risks they are confronted with and, M&A is one of the ways because 
“Risk diversification may be achieved when the acquiring and the acquired firm’s 
cash flows are not highly positively correlated, thereby reducing the overall variability 
of the combined entity’s cash flows.” (Sudarsanam, 1995) 
 
Avoiding being taken over or being bankrupt. 
According to Sudarsanam (1995), in order to get their careers secured, the managers, 
especially the target managers often go to extraordinary lengths to defeat hostile 
12 
 
takeover bids to achieve immunity. However, quite often as well, their decisions of 
being involved in M&A are proved to be wrong. 
 
This motive is very common among banking firms. As recent experience shows, 
banks that grow very large are eventually viewed as TBTF (too big to fail) or ‘too big 
to discipline adequately’ and may have the opportunity to exploit safety net subsidies 
(Kane, 2000; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Mishkin, 2006). Shull and Hanweck (2001) 
also argued that the 10 largest U.S. banks enjoyed advantages of TBTF implicit 
guarantees, because they paid less for funds than did smaller banks and operated with 
lower capitalization rates. 
 
Section 2.2.3 Insider trading as a motive for M&A 
Insider trading is not, when judged by the literature focusing on the motives of the 
M&As, considered as a potential motive. Instead, the M&A motives are categorized 
into the groups discussed previously. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
great deal of insider trading takes place before takeover announcements. For example, 
in August 2006, the New York Times reported that securities of over 40% of the 
companies receiving buyout bids exhibited suspicious trading in the weeks before the 
deals became public (see Morgenson, 2006). Morever, of the two biggest insider 
trading cases ever prosecuted in the U.S., almost all of the charges in the Levine-
Boesky-Milken case in the late 1980s and many of the charges in the Galleon hedge 
fund case in 2009, relate to insider trading in takeovers (see, e.g., Frantz, 1987; 
Strasburg and Bray, 2009; Sharma and Pulliam, 2009 and Bray, 2010). Apart from the 
above facts, about 80% of the cases in Meulbroek’s (1992, p. 1669) sample of insider 
trading cases prosecuted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
during 1980-1989 are takeover-related (Agrawal and Nasser, 2009). As a result, the 
possibility of gaining a substantial profit from insider trading before the merger 






Section 2.3 Insider Trading 
Insider trading has been a particular interest to society in the past decades because of 
series of schemes that have netted insiders millions of profit (Doffou, 2003). For 
preventing the market manipulation and market abuse, trading based on monopolistic 
information to generate abnormal returns is stipulated as illegal. However, unlike 
other illegal activities, insider trading remains, at least among economists and legal 
scholars, one of the most controversial economic transactions. In this section, firstly, 
the definition is given followed by the regulation, the agency theory, the signalling 
theory, the market efficiency and other scholars’ researches.  
 
Section 2.3.1 Definition of Insider trading 
Insider trading, also known as insider dealing, is the trading of a corporation’s stock 
or other securities such as bonds or stock options by insiders who have potential 
access to non-public information about the company. Corporate officers, directors and 
large stockholders are commonly called insiders. Moreover, any employee who, in the 
course of his or her employment, acquires material, non-public information about a 
publicly traded corporation is also considered as an insider. In addition, outsiders can 
be temporary insiders in the case that they are given information in confidence solely 
for a corporate purpose. Attorneys, investment bankers, financial printers and so on 
are examples of temporary insiders who may be involved in insider trading. 
 
Section 2.3.2 Insider Trading and Regulation 
Information is not equally accessible to everyone. Corporate insiders may have extra 
access to non-public information and they may take advantage of this information to 
make profits or to avoid a loss. For example, the purchase by a director of shares of 
his or her firm’s stock just before the release of surprisingly good earnings 
information, and because of his/her status he/she can get the inside information. A 
common type of insider trading involves trading on knowledge of potential M&As. 
However, because of the public perception of the immorality and corrupt nature of the 
practice, insider trading was criminalized in 1934 by the Congress and insider trading 
14 
 
in the United States has been regulated by the SEC since that time. The United States 
is also by far the earliest country to adopt insider trading laws. Rule 10b-5 of the 
Security Exchange Act of 1934 regulates trading by insiders and requires trading by 
corporate officers, directors, and substantial owners to be reported to the SEC. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the regulatory authorities in the U.S. began to pursue 
insider traders. Major regulatory actions include: (1) the promulgation of Rule 14e-3, 
aimed at those trading on information related to impending tender offer 
announcements; (2) the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984; (3) the 
1988 passage of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act. 
 
In the U.K, bids and related transactions are regulated by a combination of non-
statutory and statutory provisions. The main control is ‘The City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers’ (The City Code) which is included by ‘The City Panel on Takeover and 
Mergers’ (The Panel). The principal aim of the City Code is to ensure fair and equal 
treatment of all shareholders in relation to bids and provides an orderly framework 
within which bids are conducted. However, stake-building is not regulated by the City 
Code. Instead, stake-building is regulated by ‘The Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares’ (SARs), a non- statutory regulation issued by The Panel, and 
The Companies Act 1985 (Section 198) (Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994). The 
relevant laws are the Criminal Justice Act 1993 Part V Schedule 1 and the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, which defines an offence of Market Abuse.  
 
In addition to country-level regulation on insider trading, firms also have policies and 
restrictions on trading by their company employees in order to reduce litigation risks. 
Bettis et al. (2000) find that 92% of their sample firms have policies that restrict the 
trading by their insiders. Apart from this, 78% of firms have explicit blackout periods
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during which trading is prohibited. In countries such as the Netherlands and the U.K., 
blackout periods are imposed at the country-level rather than the firm-level (Kabir and 
Vermaelen, 1996; Hillier and Marshall, 2002b). 
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The essential difference between the U.S and the U.K is that the U.S only bars trading 
when it is based on confidential information that is being ‘misappropriated’, that is 
stolen or misused, while the U.K ban is broader,  involving market-moving inside 
information (Masters, 2009). As a result, the U.K definition is argued to be superior in 
form to that defined by the U.S law (Tridimas, 1991; Watson, 1995). Apart from this, 
another difference between the U.S and the U.K is the period within which trading by 
insiders must be reported. The U.K Code requires much faster reporting of director’s 
dealings. The directors must inform their company of the transaction as soon as 
possible and no later than the fifth business day after a transaction for their own 
account or on behalf of their spouses and children (Hillier and Marshall, 2002). In the 
U.S., insiders only have to report their holdings within the first ten days of the month 
following the month of the trade (Persons, 1997).  
 
In China, in 1990 and 1991, two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen came 
into being in succession and two years later, in October 1992, two national regulatory 
bodies, the Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) were established to perform regulatory 
functions. Before the establishment of the SCSC and the CSRC, the local government 
of Shanghai and Shenzhen were authorized to administer the stock exchanges 
respectively (Huang, 2006). Both local governments promulgated a series of 
regulations for the stock markets. In relation to insider trading regulation there were 
Articles 39, 39, 40 of the Measures for Regulating Securities Trading in Shanghai 
(1990) and Article 43 of the Provisional Measures for Regulating Securities Issuance 
and Trading in Shenzhen (1991). Moreover, insider trading provisions can also be 
found in Articles 93, 103 of the Provisional Measures for Regulating Listed 
Companies in Shenzhen (1992). However, these local regulations were argued to be 
ineffective. In response, a string of important regulations regarding the stock market 
were promulgated in quick succession in 1993, after the 1993 bull market in which 
widespread fraudulent misconduct was witnessed (Huang, 2006). In October 1997, 
the NPC (National People’s Congress) revised the Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China to include insider trading. Since then, insider trading has been able 




Since the 1990s, countries worldwide have put into practice regulations against 
trading based on private information, from what it seems a consensus within the 
regulatory bodies that insider trading should be banned. The decade of the 1990s has 
indeed witnessed an explosion in the number of nations adopting laws prohibiting 
insider trading. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find that in 103 countries they 
surveyed, only 34 had laws in place before 1990 of which only 9 countries enforced 
those laws. These figures increase rapidly during the 1990s to 87 and 38 in 1998, 
respectively. However, not all countries have followed the U.S example, and the 
debate continues: some countries without regulation are now considering it, whereas 
in academic circles, the benefits of regulating insider trading are still being contested. 
(e.g., Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Easterbrook, 1985; Glosten, 1988; 
Bajeux and Rochet, 1989; Manove, 1989) The arguments against insider trading can 
be classified into three parts: (1) insider trading is unfair, people with confidential 
information are more likely to be able to avoid failures in the market (Akerlof, 1970); 
(2) insider trading violates certain property rights (Wergane, 1991); (3) insider trading 
undermines the information’s usefulness to the market (Cho and Shaub, 1991). For 
these reasons, it is argued that regulation is necessary. In addition, we have suggested 
that the potential for insider trading distorts incentives with respect to engaging in 
M&A activity. 
 
The focus of regulation is the use and nature of price sensitive information.  However, 
generally, it is the nature of economic activity that traders seek out ‘special’ 
information. Even in an efficient market, the traders do so to minimize their forecast 
errors and justify dealing with specialist market makers (Jaffe, 1974a). Moreover, 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) also find that because the insiders have to seek out 
‘special’ information, search and data processing costs are incurred and these costs in 
equilibrium just offset the expected gains. 
 
It also has been argued that insider trading might instead be regarded as a desirable 
activity in capital markets for the following two reasons: (1) managerial incentives, 
and hence decisions, might improve if insider trading is a possibility (Manne, 1966); 
and (2) such trading may have a positive impact on the allocational efficiency of 
securities markets. This latter would result because more information would be 
reflected in prices, both directly to reflect insiders’ own trading activities, and 
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indirectly when their trading is observed and interpreted by dealers as information 
signalling (Ross, 1978 and Kripke, 1985).  
 
The regulatory authorities, however, are confronted with many problems, one of 
which is the wide circle of people, all of whom possess material inside information. J. 
William Robinson, a principal in Georgeson&Co., which solicits shareholder proxies 
for companies engaged in takeover battles remarks, “You start with a handful of 
people, but when you get close to doing something the circle expands pretty quickly. 
You have to bring in directors, two or three firms of lawyers, investment bankers, 
public relations people, and financial printers, and everybody’s got a secretary. If the 
deal is a big one, you might need a syndicate of banks to finance it. Every time you let 
in another person, the chance of a leak increases geometrically.” (quoted in Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981). It appears that the leakage of inside information actually takes 
place and is in fact quite common. Seyhun (1992a) also reports that despite the 
increasingly restrictive regulatory environment, the profitability of insiders’ 
transactions has increased overtime. 
 
Section 2.3.3 Insider Trading and the Agency Theory 
Some authors argue that one of the main problems with insider trading is that it 
inherently goes hand-in-hand with agency problems.  Assume that insider trading is 
not subject to public regulation and the firms are free to make their decisions either to 
allow or forbid insider trading. Under this circumstance, there will be two types of 
firms - one to allow insider trading and the other to contractually prohibit it. However, 
the argument goes, agency problems emerge irrespective of these contractual 
stipulations. 
 
On one hand, in the firms which allow their insiders to trade from non-public 
information, insider trading cannot help but create a moral hazard problem. This is 
because insiders can benefit from both bad news and good news. Therefore, they are 
indifferent to working to make the firm prosper or working to bankrupt it.  They may 
engage in ‘discretionary’ behaviour (Levmore, 1982, p. 149; Mendelson, 1969, pp. 
489-90; Posner 1977, p. 308; Schotland, 1987, p.1451). The opportunity to gain from 
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insider trading also may stimulate managers to select risker projects than the 
shareholders would prefer and this increases the volatility of the firm’s stock prices. 
Because the insiders are comparatively safe: if the risk pays off, they can capture a 
portion of the gains in insider trading and if the project flops, the shareholders bear 
the loss (Easterbrook, 1981, p. 312). Insiders can also conceal or disseminate false 
information in order to profit by buying and selling mispriced securities (Posner, 1977, 
p.308). Finally, insiders, and particularly, lower-level managers can delay transmitting 
important corporate information to their superiors in order to trade on it and make a 
profit (Haft, 1982, p.1051).  
 
On the other hand, firms that contractually prohibit their insiders from trading on 
inside information are confronted with an adverse selection problem. Because insider 
trading is difficult to detect, the firms will never know whether their employees can 
be trusted or not when they claim that they will respect their contract. For the 
dishonest agents, they will get their salaries and be able to engage in insider trading as 
well; they will be overcompensated. To avoid overcompensating the dishonest agents, 
the firm must reduce salaries across the board. But for the honest agents - those who 
do not trade on inside information-will be underpaid and will leave. Thus, bad agents 
drive out the good (Easterbrook, 1985, p.94). Consequently, the major problem with 
insider trading is that, whether shareholders allow their agents or prohibit their agents 
from using non-public information, they are confronted with agency problems. 
 
Section 2.3.4 Insider Trading and the Signalling Theory  
Along with agency theory, signalling theory also has a role to play. Much information 
pertaining to a firm’s value is made publicly available by the firm through 
announcements, press conferences, and filings with regulatory agencies. However, 
managers still have important private information that bears on firm value by virtue of 
their positions within their firms (See Buckley, 1998, p.317-19). This private 
information may sometimes indicate that firm value is higher than that reflected in the 
stock price or the managers may know that future cash flows will be less volatile and 
therefore that the systematic risk of the stock will decline. In order to maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth, the managers will wish to communicate the good news to the 
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market so as to boost the stock price. However, they could not disclose the news 
directly due to some competitive or confidential reasons. As a result, the market uses 
signals. A firm with unfavourable prospects would want to finance with stock, which 
would bring in new investors to share the losses. In a nutshell, the announcement of a 
stock offering is generally taken as a signal that the firm’s prospects as seen by its 
management are not bright (Brigham&Houston, 2009). Signals used include earnings 
announcements, mergers and acquisitions announcements, accounting changes 
announcements, cash dividend announcements, sell-off announcements, bankruptcy 
announcements, and securities issuance announcements.  
 
Elliot, Morse and Richardson (1984) investigate insider transactions around several 
events including annual earnings announcements and find strong evidence that 
information-related trading occurs around unexpected earnings changes, particularly 
for small firms. Seyhun (1992a), however, has different findings. In his examination 
of the changes in the nature of insider transaction during the 1980s, he finds that the 
tendency for insiders to trade prior to earnings announcements was marginal at the 
beginning of the period involved, and decreased with the imposition of increasingly 
severe penalties over time. 
 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) analyse the market model residuals for a sample of 194 
listed and non-listed firms immediately prior to or after the announcement of a 
takeover bid and find significant positive abnormal returns one month prior to the 
announcement.  Then the abnormal return accelerates in the last five to seven days. A 
significant increase in the total volume of trading in the shares of the sample firms 
over the same period is also detected. Keown and Pinkerton then conclude that 
‘impending merger announcements are poorly held secrets, and trading on this non-
public information abounds’ (p.866). 
 
Meulbroek (1992) examines the direct effect of insider trading on share prices and his 
results support the contention that stock price run-ups before takeover announcements 
reflect widespread insider trading (p. 43). Seyhun (1990a) finds that insiders in bidder 
firms tended to trade heavily prior to the announcement of a takeover bid. He also 
finds that in takeover bids with positive (negative) excess returns, insiders tended to 
purchase (sell) their firm’s shares in the months leading up to the announcements. 
20 
 
Seyhun’s results support the hypothesis that insiders use their access to non-public 
information in order to maximize their own profit. Seyhun also suggests that the form 
of financing employed in a merger provides a signal to the market regarding 
managerial expectations on the bidder firms’ prospects.  
 
Section 2.3.5 Insider Trading and Market Efficiency 
The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) assumes that securities 
prices reflect all publicly and privately held information, the weak form of the EMH 
postulates that securities prices reflect all past trading data and the semi-strong form 
efficiency maintains that publicly available information is reflected in current market 
prices. 
 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) analyse if the type of market may affect the role 
insider trading has on market efficiency and their finding gives a positive answer. 
They find that there is less trader anonymity on the NYSE than the NASDAQ based 
on the impact of insider trading on market maker behaviour. Specialists in the NYSE 
are able to elicit information regarding trader identity from floor brokers and are more 
likely to protect themselves on insider trades than non-insider trades. On the other 
hand, the electronic dealer market of NASDAQ presents a more anonymous 
atmosphere that leads itself to more passive trader behaviour regarding insider trades 
(Garfinkel, Jon and Nimalendran, 2003). They conclude that less anonymity and more 
attention to insider trading on the NYSE suggests that it may be more efficient 
because it will more quickly adapt to new information (Garfinkel, Jon and 
Nimalendran, 2003). 
 
According to Rozeff and Zaman (1988), numerous earlier studies have stated that 
both corporate insiders and outsiders can earn abnormal returns even after correcting 
for risk differentials and transaction costs (e.g. Jaffe, 1974b; Pratt and DeVere, 1978; 
Kerr, 1980). Corporate insiders earn abnormal return based on insider transactions 
and the outsiders earn similar abnormal returns based on the publicly disclosed 
information required by the SEC.  The first belief that the insiders can earn abnormal 
returns discounts the strong form of market efficiency, which states that the stock 
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price fully reflects all public and private information. The second belief that the 
outsiders can earn abnormal returns discounts the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency which states that stock price fully reflects all publicly available information. 
If the outside investors mimicking insider trades can earn an abnormal return, the 
market is not semi-strong efficient. Pratt and DeVere (1978) show that investors who 
purchase shares following a publicly available buy signal may earn excess returns 
even after a two-month lag.  Their finding shows contrary evidence to the semi-strong 
form of the EMH. A study done by Jeng, Metrick and Zenghauser (2003) is consistent 
with Pratt and DeVere (1978)’s. Jeng, Metric and Zenghauser (2003) in their study 
question market efficiency hypothesis in regards to return. They performed a market 
efficiency test by analysing the return to the insider instead of the returns to the 
investor. They find that insider purchases do earn above normal returns of 
approximately 6% per year, while for insider sales, no evidence of significant above 
normal returns is detected. This evidence discredits some aspects of the market’s 
efficiency, since insiders are able to make above normal returns on public information 
(Jeng, Metrick and Zenghauser, 2003). However, Rozeff and Zaman (1988) show 
opposite evidence. They attribute the anomaly in the argument that outsiders can also 
use publicly available information for excess returns to miscalculation of return due to 
size and P/E ratio effects. Using their adjusted abnormal return measures, they found 
that the profits of outsiders essentially disappear and that the profits of insiders still 
exist, but insubstantially. This finding upholds that the market is semi-strong efficient 
and no one can receive abnormal returns on a routine basis due to insider trading. 
Seyhun (1986) also shows that only insiders can predict abnormal future stock price 
changes using their superior information. According to Seyhun, markets are efficient 
and outsiders cannot use publicly available information about insiders’ transactions to 
earn abnormal profits, net of bid-ask spread plus the commission fee. Benesh and Pari 
(1987) report that ‘while the stocks listed in the newsletter displayed positive 
abnormal returns in the months preceding the listing, there is only weak evidence of 
abnormal returns to non-insiders who buy shares in response to open market 
purchases by insiders.’ 
 
A study by Fishman and Hagerty (1992) on insider trading regulation supports 
regulation over the efficient-market hypothesis.  While some argue that insider trading 
leads to more efficient stock prices, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) instead state that the 
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opposite may be true. Insider trading has two adverse affects on market competition: 
firstly, deterring others from gathering information and secondly participating and 
skewing the distribution of information to reflect one trader. They argue that insider 
trading lowers the number of informed market participants. Moreover, the advantage 
of the insider with superior information leads to less competition within the market. 
As a result, they conclude that insider trading lessens the efficiency of stock price and 
creates a less informed market overall (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). 
 
Another study by King, Roell, et al. (1988) focusing on the public policy and 
regulation concerns of insider trading, states that there are both benefits and costs 
associated with insider trading. Their study discredits the semi-strong form efficiency 
hypothesis in the U.S market due to insider gains for long periods of time even after 
disclosure and considers regulation more important than upholding the efficient 
market hypothesis. The obvious benefit of insider trading is quicker information 
dissemination, while costs occur when bidding spreads increase, creating in essence a 
tax on trading (King, Roell, et al, 1988).  
 
Section 2.3.6 Former Studies in Insider Trading 
1. Summary of corporate insider trading performance 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of insider trading abnormal performance estimates from 
early studies in the area. Unless otherwise stated, all studies in this table refer to 
insider trading in firms listed on NYSE. 
 
                  Table 2.2 :Summary of insider trading performance 
Author/Sample Buy (the return 
gained by taking 
the buy side) 
Sell (the return 
gained by taking 
the short side) 
Definition of 
buy/sell trades 
Pratt and DeVere 
(1970)/ NYSE 
19.5% over 6 
months (raw 
return) 
8.4% over 6 
months (raw 
return) 





8.61% over 11 
months (excess 





















-4.62% over the 
event period 
-0.47% over the 
event period 
All trades 
Cheuk et al 
(2005)/HongKong 
0.58% over 20 days 
after trading 
-0.41% over 20 
days after trading 
All trades 




























Cheng et al. 
(2007)/ S&P500 
-0.15% over 100 
days after trading 
-0.43% over 100 
days after trading 
Delayed disclosure 
trades 
Source: Clacher, Hillier and Lhaopadchan (2009) 
 








Table 2.3 presents a summary of insider trading studies before the takeover 
announcement.  
 
         Table 2.3 :Summary of insider trading studies before takeover announcement 
Author Main Findings 
Keown and 
Pinkerton (1981) 
Information leakage prior to announcement. No insider trading 
data so can only infer that insiders may be trading in this period 
Elliott et al (1984) No significant relationship between timing of insider trading 
and information announcements 
Gupta and Misra 
(1988) 
No relationship between insider trading and price run-ups prior 
to takeover announcement 
Meulbroek (1992) Almost one-half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up in 
takeover targets occurs on insider trading days 
Meulbroek and 
Hart (1997) 
Illegal insider trading causes increases in takeover premia 
Jabbour et al. 
(2000) 
Abnormal stock price performance at an early stage before the 
acquisition announcement is due to actual trading by corporate 
insiders 
Madison et al. 
(2004) 
The target bank insiders significantly decrease both share 
purchases and share sales before merger announcements. These 
findings suggest the effectiveness of law 
Agarwal and Sigh 
(2006) 
Six companies in India in their sample may have involved in 
conducting insider trading 
Agrawal and 
Nasser (2009) 
No evidence that insiders increase their purchases before 
takeover announcements; instead, they decrease them 
King (2009) Illegal insider trading creates both abnormal returns (ARs) and 
abnormal turnover (AT) ahead of the announcement 
Source: Author’s Summary 
A major focus of research concerns insider trading activity around merger 
announcements. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) examined insider trading prior to 
merger announcements and found significant information leakage in the run-up to the 
event. Elliot et al (1984) extended the work of Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and 
found that insiders bought more shares and sold less, twelve months prior to a merger. 
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Meulbroek and Hart (1997) report that the illegal
5
 insider trading has a significant 
impart on the prices of securities around M&As; however this does not seem to be the 
case when legal corporate insider trading occurs. 
 
Agarwal and Singh (2006) investigate the merger announcement and insider trading 
activity in India. In their study, apart from the average abnormal return (AR) and the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) approach, the analysis based on volume 
pattern is also applied. They examine whether the daily average volume
6
 calculated 
for a month (-20 to -1 trading days) prior to merger announcement and two weeks (-
10 and -1 trading days) prior to the merger announcement give any signal of presence 
of any possible insider trading. The methodology applied is to calculate the daily 
average volume from -60 to -41 trading days prior to the announcement date and treat 
it as the benchmark in the sense of short term. The daily average volume calculated 
from -150 to -51 trading days prior to the announcement date is taken as the 
benchmark for the long term. Then the daily average volume for each firm is 
compared with these two benchmarks and the percentage of firms showing a higher 
volume is ascertained. In their study, they have defined as ‘significant’, if the daily 
average volume is higher by 100% or more when compared with a particular 
benchmark. Finally, they found 6 out of 42 firms which are suspected to have been 
involved in conducting insider trading activity. 
 
A more recent study done by King (2009) examines the price-volume dynamics in a 
target firm’s share ahead of the first public announcement of takeover. He studies 399 
Canadian firms from 1985 to 2002 and finds that illegal insider trading creates both 
abnormal returns (ARs) and abnormal turnover (AT) ahead of the announcement. He 
also finds that the rise in AT begins far ahead of the actual announcement, 
accompanied by ARs in the last five trading days. His work confirms the importance 
of AT for triggering an insider trading investigation (King, 2009). Apart from King 
                                                          
5
 Insider trading is legal once the material information has been made public, at which time the 
insider has no direct advantage over other investors. 
 
6
 In some scholar’s articles, they use the terminology ‘abnormal turnover (AT)’ which is the same as 
the abnormal trading volume. 
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(2009), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Conrad and Niden (1993), Chae (2005) and 
Graham, Koski and Loewenstein (2006) also find that the pre-announcement run-up 
of the target firm’s shares is accompanied by higher than normal trading volume that 
may lead the price run-up by several weeks or months. Moreover, work by DeMarzo, 
Fisherman and Hagerty (1998) and Bris (2005) suggests that AT ahead of public news 




















Chapter 3        Models and Methodology 
 
Section 3.1 Introduction 
The most commonly used approaches to examine the abnormal return of both the 
target and acquiring firms around the announcement date of M&A are event studies 
and accounting studies. In this thesis, an event study is used. In this chapter, firstly, 
the event study approach is introduced, briefly followed by the market model, the 
market-adjusted model and the CAPM. Then, the Franks and Harris finding is 
discussed to support that both market model and CAPM can be used in the 
examination of abnormal returns for target firms in M&A. Also, the French three 
factor model (the FF model) is discussed as an alternative to the CAPM. In this thesis, 
the market model, the market-adjusted model and the modified market model are 
chosen to do the analysis. The CAPM is not used in this thesis because it includes the 
error term squared as an explanatory variable. If there are positive outliers, then the 
error term will be positive and large and its square very large which will therefore 
affect the identification of the positive outliers.  
 
Section 3.2 Event Study Approach 
The Structure of Event Study 
The common approach to measure shareholder’s wealth changes is the abnormal 
return methodology. This methodology compares the returns to both bidders and 
targets during a period surrounding the takeover announcement to ‘normal’ returns 
which is the core of an event study from a period unaffected by the event. In this 
thesis, the event is the takeover announcement. The event study approach has been 
introduced by Fama et al. (1969) and reviewed by Firth (1980), Conn (1985) and 
Mackinlay (1997). The event study approach has been used in a large variety of 
studies, including M&As, earnings announcements, debt or equity issues, corporate 
reorganisations, investment decisions and corporate social responsibility (Mackinlay, 
1997; McWilliams& Siegel, 1997). 
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The initial task of conducting an event study is to define the event of interest and 
identify an event window-a period over which the event occurs. (In this study, the 
event window is the period over which the M&As take place). Usually, it is preferred 
to define the event window to be larger both prior to and after the event period 
because this permits an examination of the period surrounding the event. 
 
The second task is to measure the ‘normal’ return which is the core of an event study. 
The assessment of the ‘normal’ return is based on the application of a certain pricing 
model. The abnormal return (    ) is the actual ex-post return of the security (   ) over 
the event window minus the ‘normal’ return of the firm over the event window. 
 
                                                           (   |  )                                           (3.1) 
Where  (   |  ) is the expected ‘normal’ return given the conditioning information X 
for time period    
 
 To assess the ‘normal’ returns, the estimation window (L) (The estimation window is 
a period over which parameters are estimated.) and the event window (τ) need to be 
defined. Taking the market model as an example, the following figure provides a 
graphic illustration for the time periods used in the event study. 
 
Figure 3.1: Formal Definition of Event Window 
                                                                Time=0 
1                                                                                                             
Estimation window 





  Post-event window 




The event window (τ) is often calculated for some time before and after the event in 
order to control for information leakage (market anticipation) and the possible slow 
price adjustment. Firth (1979) finds that the market begins to anticipate a merger one 
month prior to the announcement. It is common to choose a period such as (-5D, +5D), 
(-10D, +10D) or (-2M, +2M).  
 
where D is days and M is months.                                                                            
The predicted returns are therefore a proxy for what would be expected to happen in 
the absence of the event. The basic market model is 
 
                                                                                                    (3.2) 
with  (   )    and    (   )   
 . This is estimated on the estimation window and 
then used to predict beyond this window. Thus the differences between the predicted 
and actual returns are: 
 
 ̂       ( ̂   ̂    )                                                      (3.3) 
Averaging these prediction errors across all securities yields what has been termed the 
‘average abnormal return’ for day t: 











                                                                           (3.4) 
Clearly, the equation above is nothing more than a series of average prediction errors, 
and while the term ‘abnormal return’ has been readily adopted in the event study 
literature, it must be stressed that this terminology is problematic (Frankfurter and 
McGoun, 1993). 
 
Problems arise from uncertainty regarding the event day and also because, even if the 
event day is known precisely, it is not always clear when the information content of 
the event, usually associated with its announcement, became available (Coutts, Mills 
and Roberts, 1997). A common way of overcoming these problems is to compute the 
‘cumulative average abnormal returns’ (Fama et al., 1969). Summing average 
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abnormal returns for various periods around the event gives the cumulative average 
abnormal returns.  
 
1 ttt CAAReCAAR                                                                                                (3.5)                              
where   is the event period. 
 The standard event study is to examine the market reaction to the event in question 
by testing the significance of the       for a specified event period. It can be 
interpreted as meaning there has been no market reaction to the event if both 
      and  ̅  are to fluctuate stochastically about zero; i.e. that the returns around the 
event are not abnormal in comparison to those that would have occurred had the event 
not happened. 
 
The value of this method is indubitable. Although many researchers have challenged 
traditional approaches on various grounds, empirical evidence in several studies (e.g. 
Brown and Warner(1980, 1985), Malatesta (1986) and Henderson (1990)) has 
concluded that the event-study approach is quite robust for detecting abnormal mean 
returns (Cyree and DeGennaro, 2001). 
 
Section 3.3 Market Model 
The basic market model is developed by Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1963). The 
market model stands for the relationship between an individual stock’s return and the 
return on ‘the market’ (e.g. the FTSE all share index or the S&P 500). The market 
model is specified as: 
 
                                                                                                                  (3.2) 
 
where, as before,     and     are the returns during t on the company i’s stock and on a 
broad-based stock market index, proxying for ‘the market’.   is the intercept and   is 
the systematic risk.     is the random error which averages out to zero. The model’s 
parameters,    and    are estimated by running a regression of     on     over an 
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appropriate estimation period. The estimated parameters are then used to calculate a 
predicted normal return     for each company i and the abnormal return as: 
 
                                                                                                                                     (3.6) 
           ̂   ̂      
 
If the takeover event is expected to create additional value for the shareholders of i 
company, then the abnormal return will be positive before the merger announcement. 
It will be zero if the effect of the takeover is neutral and negative if the shareholders 
suffer loss. 
 
Section 3.3.1 The measurement and statistical analysis of abnormal 
returns using the Market Model 
 
Fama, Finsher, Jensen and Roll (1969) examine the effect of the announcement of a 
stock split
7
 on stock prices. To capture the effect of the event on stock i, they control 
for the normal relation between the return on i during month t,     and the return on a 
broad stock market index (they use CRSP NYSE Market Portfolio) during month t, 
   . In their study, a sample of monthly return data from 1926 to 1960 including the 
period containing the event is used. They estimate the parameters using the market 
model. 
 
                                                                                                          (3.7) 
In the FFJR (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll) study, the event period is from 29 months 
before the split is announced to 30 months after. The month of the split is defined as 
s=0 in event time and the event period then runs from s=-29 to s=30. Redefining time 
relative to the event month is useful since they examine the average stock price 
                                                          
7 Division of already issued (outstanding) shares of a firm into a larger number of shares, to make 
them more affordable and thus improve their marketability while maintaining the current 
stockholders' proportional ownership of the firm. The aggregate value of the shares remains the same 




movement for the sample stocks during specific months around the event month 
(Binder, 1998). 
 
FFJR use the residual  ̂   from the market model for the calendar month 
corresponding to month s as an estimator of the abnormal return for stock i during 
event month s. For example, if stock i announced a split during June 1952 this is the 
event month (s=0) and the estimated abnormal return during s= -6 (six months 
preceding the split) is the residual for the calendar month December 1951. This 
method removes the effects of economy wide factors from the return on i’s stock, 
leaving the portion of the return attributable to firm specific information (Binder, 
1998). 
 
The estimator of the average abnormal return during month s,    , is defined as 
    ∑
    
  
  
                                                                                                     (3.8) 
Where       is the estimator of the abnormal return for stock i and    is the number of 
firms in the sample during month s. The estimates of the average abnormal returns are 
summed across months to measure the average cumulative effect on the sample 
securities of company specific information reaching the market from month    to 
month   . That is,  
 
          ∑    
  
    
                                                                                    (3.9) 
The previous literature assumes that if there are no unusual price movements prior to 
the announcement date, one would expect both the     and           to fluctuate 
randomly about zero. However, if there is leakage of, and trading on, inside 
information just prior to the announcement date, this should show up in the form of 
positive daily average residuals as t approaches 0 and a corresponding build up in 
         . 
 
However, this commonly applied method can only give a general idea of the pre-bid 
performance of the share prices. In other words, it obscures which exact share(s) has 
caused a certain pattern. As a result, rather than modelling abnormal returns as 
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prediction errors from the market model equation, the sample period can be extended 
to contain the event period and (when there is only one event) a zero-one variable    
can be included in the return equation (Binder, 1998): 
 
                                                                                                   (3.10) 
The coefficient    is the abnormal return for security i during period t and is directly 
estimated in the regression. That is, this approach parameterizes the abnormal returns 
in the market model regression equation. This method was apparently first used by 
Izan (1978). She examines a portfolio of firms, all of which experienced the events, 
i.e., regulatory announcements, during the same calendar periods, by using the equally 
weighted portfolio return as the dependent variable in the equation: 
 
             ∑       
 
                                                                     (3.11) 
Equation (3.11) contains one dummy variable     for each announcement period a. 
When an equally weighted portfolio return is used as the dependent variable,  ̂   is 
the estimator of the average abnormal return across the stocks in the portfolio (Binder, 
1998). 
 
Section 3.4 Market-adjusted Model 
The market model has some estimation shortcomings such as low-volume (thin) 
trading and size disparity between sample firms and the market proxy. The market-
adjusted model avoids one or the other of these problems the market model suffers 
from. The market-adjusted model uses the return on the market    as the normal 
return. In other words, the market-adjusted model avoids the necessity of estimating α 
and β (It sets α = 0 and β = 1 on 3.2).  An assumption sufficient for using such a 
performance measure is that all the firms follow the market strictly. In that case, the 
expected value of the difference between the return on a security and the return on the 
34 
 
market index should, in an asset pricing model framework, be equal to zero.
8
 It can be 
considered a constrained version of the market model. 
 
The market-adjusted model is presented as follows: 
                                                                                                                 (3.12) 
where     = rate of return on asset i time t 
                = rate of return on the market index at time t 
               = residual error 
 
Section 3.5 CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Markowitz (1959), 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965b, 1969) and Mossin (1966) and reviewed by Sharp 
(1991), and Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997). The CAPM is an equilibrium model 
for ‘normal’ returns and it is based on six assumptions: 
 
1. No transaction costs or taxes. 
2. Investors are price-takers. No individual’s buying and selling behaviour is 
influential enough to affect the price of the stock. The capital market is in 
perfect competition condition. 
3. All investors are assumed to be risk-averse and they make their portfolio 
decisions relying on expected values and standard deviations of the return on 
their portfolios. 
4. Each investor has access to unlimited short sales and unlimited lending and 
borrowing at risk-free rate. 
5. All investors possess the same information of the distribution of returns 
among all assets. All investors plan to invest over the same horizon. 
6. The market portfolio consists of all publicly traded assets. 
                                                          
8
 For the average difference to be zero, it is not necessary for all sample securities to have β=1. It is 
required only that the average β be equal to 1 (Brown and Warner/1980). 
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Given these assumptions, the Sharpe and Lintner version of the CAPM in terms of 
expectations states that: 
 
 (   )          (   )                                                                                 (3.13) 
where 
  (   ) is the expected return of security i at time t, and 
       [
        
      
] , where        is the price of security i at time t and     is cash 
dividend paid per share of firm i at time t.  
 (   ) is the expected return on the efficient market portfolio at time t, and 
        
    
      
 , where    is the price of the market and is adjusted for dividends 
and capital gains/losses. 
    is rate of return on risk-free asset 
   
   (     )
   (  )
, which measures the systematic risk between security i and the 
efficient market portfolio 
 
 CAPM says that    is the only factor which determines the difference in expected 
return. Moreover, CAPM describes the linear relationship between the expected return 
and market return. When β is high, the asset is very sensitive to market movements 
and therefore is more risky. On the contrary, when β becomes lower, the asset 
becomes accordingly less sensitive to the market movement. 
 
Section 3.5.1The way of estimating CAPM 
Most of the early empirical tests of the CAPM consist of two parts- the use of a time 
series regression on estimating  s and the use of a cross-sectional regression to test 
the hypotheses we derived from the CAPM model (Elton and Gruber/1981). A very 
early empirical study of the CAPM was performed by Lintner(1965b, 1969) and 
reproduced in Douglas (1968). Lintner first estimated  for each of the 301 common 
stocks in his sample. He estimated   by regressing each stock’s yearly return against 
the average return for all stocks in the sample using data from 1954-1963. The 
process is as follows:  
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Step1: Estimate the following market model and get   and   individually. 
                                                                                                         (3.14) 
 
Step2:  Estimate 
               
                                                                                  (3.15)    
 
where    is collected in the market model for individual companies,   
  is the variance 
of    collected in the market model for each company to reflect the risk and    is the 
stock return of the individual firms. Douglas(1968) employed a similar methodology 
and found results that were similar to Lintners (Elton and Gruber/1981). 
 
Section 3.5.2 Relationship between the Market Model and the CAPM 
The market model and the CAPM have different theoretical motivations. Unlike 
CAPM, which is an equilibrium model, the market model is not. The basic market 
model does not make any assumptions about how investors optimize their portfolio. 
Instead, the market model makes the assumption about the statistical relationship 
within the market. The CAPM uses the value-weighted market portfolio. The market 
portfolio is the portfolio of all risky assets which is completely diversified. In 
practice, a market index is used because ‘all risky assets’ are not observable (Elton 
and Gruber/1981). 
 
The CAPM is related to the market model as follows. First, consider the market model 
regression: 
 
                                                                                                          (3.2) 
 
Let    denote the risk-free rate. Subtract    from both sides of the equation above: 
                                
                                                                                              (3.16) 
 
Next, add and subtract      from the right-hand-side: 
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               (    )    (      )      
                  =  
    (      )                                                                         (3.17) 
 
where   
       (    ) 
 
This re-expressed market model is called the market model in excess return form (or 
the excess return market model). One of the empirical tests of Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
is the hypothesis as follow (Elton and Gruber/1981): 
                       
       (    )    
                       
    
 
When the null hypothesis      = 0 is not rejected, the excess return market model is 
equivalent to the CAPM in the Sharpe-Lintner version. 
 
Section 3.5.3 The Drawbacks of CAPM 
Despite the existence of a large academic literature which discusses implementation 
of CAPM, in particular in relation to estimation of the key parameter β, there is no 
consensus in relation to how a best estimate should be obtained (Blume/1975, 
Carleton and Lakonishok/1985, Klemkosky/1975 and Reilly and Wright/1988). There 
is no consensus with respect to the index, time frame, and data frequency that should 
be used for estimation. Previous researches mainly focused on reasons for differences 
in estimated β between periods and the ability of historical βs to predict future βs 
(Blume/1975, Carleton and Lakonishok/1985, Klemkosky/1975 and Reilly and 
Wright/1988). This lack of consensus manifests itself in different β estimates for the 
same company. Such differences result in significantly different expected returns 
(cost of equity) for individual companies leading potentially to conflicting financial 
decisions, in capital budgeting for example.  
 
Section 3.6 Franks and Harris’s finding 
Simulations by Brown and Warner (1980) suggest that although infrequent trading 
will produce some bias in measured parameters in the market model and CAPM based 
model, the impact on the result is small. In the study done by Franks and Harris 
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(1989), the company abnormal returns              are aggregated to form a 
portfolio abnormal return     defined as 
 
    
 
 
∑     
 
                                                                                                      (3.18)                                        
where       is the individual i firm’s abnormal return at time t  
           N is the number of companies in a particular portfolio.  
 
The statistical significance of     is assessed with the statistic         , where   
is the standard error of the    ’s (assumed to be normally distributed) for a period 
assumed to be unaffected by the merger. In reported results,   is calculated for the 60-
month period beginning at t=-71 months and ending at t=-11 months.    follows 
Student’s distribution with 59 degree of freedom. (Brown and Warner, 1980)  
Franks and Harris, however, argue that, the AR accumulation cannot satisfy the 
situation when companies disappear from the analysis as a result of non-reading, 
delisting or suspension close to the bid date. As a result, company-specific ‘total 
abnormal return’ (    ) is constructed. This is defined as: 
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                                                           (3.19) 
 
where the accumulation process begins at time    and includes those monthly 
abnormal returns that are observed up to and including month t, and N is the number 
of companies in a sample. Apart from the equally weighted TAR shown in the 
equation above, TAR on a market-value-weighted basis is also calculated. Franks and 
Harris, then assess the statistical significance of      using the statistic       
         , where      √   and M is the average (across companies) number of 
months for which return data are available to form      . The statistic        is 
approximately standard normal under the assumptions that      has a zero mean and 
    are independent. Because of the similar results for targets applying in the market 





Section 3.7 MV and MTBV Adjusted Approaches 
The main alternative to CAPM is the three factor model suggested by Fama and 
French (1992, 1993). They find that the combination of MV (market value) and 
MTBV (market-to-book value) provides a good explanation of the average return. 
Usually, MV and MTBV approaches are used in the short run analysis.  
 
Section 3.7.1 Fama-French Three-factor Model 
 
Some previous work establishes that although the CAPM assumes the β coefficient 
captures all cross-sections of average returns, average returns are related to firm 
characteristics such as MV (stock price times numbers of shares in issue), the price-
earnings ratio (P/E), MTBV (the ratio of market value to book value of common 
equity), past sales growth, etc. However, these patterns in average returns are not 
explained by CAPM (Fama and French, 1996). 
 
In an influential paper, Fama and French (1992) study the joint roles of MV, leverage, 
P/E, MTBV and β in the cross-sectional of average stock returns. They find for the 
US market in the period 1962-1989 (p.445): ‘(1). When we allow for variation in beta 
that is unrelated to MV, there is no reliable relation between beta and average return. 
(2) The opposite roles of market leverage and book leverage in average returns are 
captured well by the combination of MV and MTBV. (3) The relation between E/P 
and average return seems to be absorbed by the combination of MV and MTBV.’ 
Subsequently, Fama and French (1993) develop the Fama French three-factor model 
(the FF model for convenience). The FF model regresses the post-event monthly 
excess returns for firm i on the market premium factor, a MV factor and a MTBV 
factor. Fama and French claim that many of the CAPM average-return anomalies are 
captured by this model. Moreover, Fama and French (1996) show that the FF model 
performs well to portfolios formed on the cash-flow/price ratio, P/E, and sales growth. 
The model is shown as follows: 
 




where    = the simple return on the common stock of firm i at time t 
   = the risk-free rate of return 
   = the return on a value-weighted market index at time t 
    = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of big stocks at time t 
    = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high MTBV stocks minus the 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of low MTBV stocks at time t 
  ,  ,    and    are the regression parameters  
   = residual error 
  
The FF model tends to produce significant coefficients on all three factors, and 
regression    values are close to 1 for most portfolios in their tests. Portfolios of 
value stocks
9
 tend to have a high value of h, while growth portfolios have a negative h. 
Large portfolios tend to load negatively on SMB and small portfolios have a large 
positive value for s. 
 
The FF model has generally two advantages. Firstly, unlike the MV/MTBV-matched 
model, FF model does not require MV or MTBV data for sample firms and this 
implies that firms whose MV or MTBV data is unavailable can also be included in the 
analysis. Secondly, FF model does not require pre-event data. As a result, FF model 
may sacrifice the advantage if it is used in short-run study because in short-run study, 
the coefficients of the three factors have to be estimated using a pre-event estimation 
window (see Barber and Lyon, 1997, p.372, footnote 5), analogous to a conventional 
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Chapter 4   The Four-Filter Approach 
 
Section 4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the rationale of the models used and the four filter approach are both 
discussed in detail. The models applied in this these are the market model, the market-
adjusted model and a modified market model. The reasons are presented in detail later 
in this chapter. In terms of the four filter approach, the first filter is the dummy 
variable approach. Daily dummy variables were used to detect the problematic day(s) 
on which the firms experience positive abnormal return. The second filter is the news 
search and this is to help rule out the possible deliberately released inside information 
or the publicly released rumours. The third filter is the detection of the outliers 
because positive outliers need to be identified. The fourth filter is a study of the 
abnormal turnover. Through the four filters, the firms are categorized in six groups – 
the absolute clean, the obscure, the suspected, the ultra-suspected and the ultra-ultra-
suspected. 
 
The rationale behind this is that no one filter appears capable of satisfactorily 
identifying all possible insider trading. For different reasons each filter misses 
capturing certain aspects of insider trading because of the complicated activities 
behind such trading. In addition, it may be that focusing on single outliers misses 
insider trading, because it spreads over adjacent days in order to minimize visibility. 
This is something the dummy variable approach will capture. 
 
Section 4.2 Rationale of the models used 
The models applied in this thesis are the market model, the market-adjusted model 
and a modified market model. The market model is potentially superior as it controls 
for the portion of the return that is related to the movement in the market,
10
 hence the 
                                                          
10
 Newspaper reports typically report pence per share falls and rises, and sometimes percentages, but 
rarely attempt to isolate the effect of the particular event being reported from general market 
movements (Beverley, 2007). 
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variance of any abnormal returns detected should be reduced (Beverley, 2007). Since 
the use of the market model generally improves the chances of being able to isolate 
the effect of specific events, it is this model that has been adopted in the thesis. The 
market-adjusted model is also applied as another means to examine the results given 
by the market model. The reason for this is because the market model has some 
estimation shortcomings such as low volume trading and size disparity between 
sample firms and the market proxy (also mentioned in Section 3.4). However, the 
market-adjusted model assumes that α=0 and β=1 which indicates that all of the 
sample in a research follow the market strictly. In reality, the fact is that some firms 
would follow the market strictly while others would not. As a result, a test is used to 
justify that the assumptions made by the market-adjusted model are true. The data 
used is the target firms in the U.K. 2006. In the test, I run 19 regressions to get the 
estimated  ̂  and then I use the t-test to find out whether it is significantly different to 
1. The results are collected and presented as following: 
 
Table 4.1: The results of the t-test for β=1 
 
Firm number   :     P-value for   :     
1 fail to reject 0.0000 
2 fail to reject 0.0000 
3 fail to reject 0.0000 
4 fail to reject 0.0000 
5 fail to reject 0.0000 
6 fail to reject 0.0000 
7 fail to reject 0.0000 
8 fail to reject 0.0000 
9 fail to reject 0.0000 
10 fail to reject 0.0000 
11 fail to reject 0.0000 
12 fail to reject 0.0000 
13 fail to reject 0.0000 
14 fail to reject 0.0000 
15 fail to reject 0.0000 
16 fail to reject 0.0000 
17 fail to reject 0.0000 
18 fail to reject 0.0000 
19 fail to reject 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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As is shown in the table, all the estimated  ̂s are highly significant and equal to 1. 
Therefore, the assumption made by the market-adjusted model is accepted. 
 
The CAPM is not used in this thesis because of the way it is estimated. As is 
discussed in Section 3.5, the estimation of CAPM is divided into two parts-firstly with 
the use of a time series regression and secondly with the use of a cross-sectional 
regression (Elton and Gruber, 1981). In the cross-sectional regression, the variance of 
the error term collected in the time series regression for each individual is included as 
an explanatory variable. Since the error term in the market model is defined as the 
abnormal return, then if there are positive outliers, the error term will be positive and 
large and its square very large which will therefore affect the identification of the 
positive outliers. Apart from the above reasons, neither the CAPM nor the Fama-
French Three-factor Model is chosen in this thesis because they tend to be estimated 
with different shares in the same sample. However, my approach is to do this share by 
share, because the additional factors they are capturing in the analysis (risk, etc.) are 
share specific and hence by doing separate regressions, I can explicitly capture these 
differences. 
 
Section 4.3 The event study approach and the four filters 
The seven steps approach in this thesis: 
 
Step1: Model chosen 
The models applied in this thesis are the market model, the market-adjusted model 
and a modified market model. (the first two are mentioned in chapter 3 section 3.3 
and 3.4) 
 
Because of the possible inertia in the market model, a lagged explanatory variable is 
added to account for the partial adjustment. The model is defined as below: 
                                                                                                      (4.7)                                                                                                
where    = rate of return on asset i time t 
   = rate of return on the market index at time t 
     = rate of return on the market index at time t-1 
   = residual error 
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In this thesis,       is kept in the regression only when it is significant (at the 5% 
level).  
 
Step2: Event window chosen (mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.2) 
In this chapter, I choose a 71 trading day period as the event window. I take the 
announcement day for each acquisition as the day 0 and collect the stock price for an 
acquisition firm from the 60
th
 trading day prior to the announcement day to 10
th
 
trading day after the announcement day. 
 
Step3: Defining the Estimation Window (when applying the market-adjusted model, 
this stage is omitted.)  
 
Generally, in an event study using daily data and the market model, the market model 
parameters could be estimated over 120 trading days prior to the event and the event 
period itself is not included in the estimation period to prevent the event from 
influencing the normal performance model parameter estimates (Keown and 
Pinkerton, 1981). In this chapter, an interval from -61 trading day to -180 trading day 
before announcement day is chosen as the estimation window. 
 
Table 4.2 The definition of the estimation window and the event window 
 
-180 trading day to -61 trading day -60 trading day to +10 trading day 
Estimation window (    ) Event window (τ) 
 
Step4: Estimation of α, β and the daily dummy variables (when applying the market-
adjusted model, this stage is omitted.) ( literatures of the market-adjusted model were 
mentioned in chapter 3 section 3.3) 
 
The daily return for each acquisition firm is calculated by using the equation below: 
 
    
       
    
                                                                             (4.8)                      
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where     is the stock price in the day r. This forms the left hand side variable in the 
equation 
 
                      11           i=1, 2, 3.., 14                (4.9) 
where    is the interval dummy variable. In this chapter, I divide the daily dummy 
variables into 14 groups with a 5-day interval (dummy1= day>-60& day<-55, 
dummy2= day>-55& day<-50...dummy14= day>5 & day<10). 
 
Then, for those firms which have significant (5% significance level) interval dummy 
variables, I add in daily dummy variables in the certain interval(s) to monitor the 
exact day on which abnormal return exists. Both significant positive residuals and 
significant negative residuals are picked out because it might be the case that the 
insiders deliberately leak negative information to drive the share price down before 
they intend to buy. 
 
                                 i= -60, -59…, +10        (4.10) 
where    is the daily dummy variable. 
 
I use the dummy variables purely to identify outliers and I calculate the errors with no 
dummies using equation 4.11. 
 
The estimated abnormal return is given by 
 ̂       ( ̂   ̂    )                        t= -180, -179…, -61                                 (4.11) 
where   ̂  and  ̂  are the ordinary least squares estimates of    and   . 
Step5: The news search 
 
The publicly released news before the announcement day is another concern in this 
thesis, for the possibility that the takeover rumours or the news of the director trading 
                                                          
11
 The dummy variable approach is also applied with the market-adjusted model and the modified 
market model and the results are identical. As a result, only the market model is presented here.  
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on the shares can influence the stock prices. If the spikes of the clean firms are caused 
by the publicly released news, then the clean firms should not be re-classified as 
‘suspected’. However, Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971) argued that 
those who possess privileged information have an incentive to take market positions 
on the basis of their information and then announce their information publicly. In this 
sense, the investigation of insider trading would be challenging because isolating 
trading based on private information is difficult. Moreover, it is difficult to know 
whether the public released news is truly ‘public released news’ or is released after 
the insiders have taken advantage and then released to the public to cover up their 
insider trading activity. As a result, I categorize the suspected firms with news release 
less than or equal to five days before the problematic
12
 days as ‘obscure’ and the 
suspected firms with news release less than or equal to five days after the problematic 
days as ‘obscure with lagged news’. (e.g. If Firm A has a problematic day on -30 and 
a news release on -35, then Firm A is categorized as ‘obscure firm’. If Firm B has a 
problematic day on -30 and a news release on -25, then Firms B is categorized as 
‘obscure with lagged news’). The latter represents a possible problem of insider 
trading accompanied by deliberate information release and the former may or may not 
represent a problem. In this thesis, the news search is done only for the target firms.  
Step6: Detection of  the outliers 
The detection of outliers is essential in investigating the existence of insider trading. 
In this analysis we identify those positive residuals which are 3.5 or 4 times greater 
than the standard deviation. If the positive residuals identified were not 4 times 
greater than the standard deviation then they would be compared to 3.5 times standard 
deviation. I use both 3.5 and 4 as an increasingly stringent test of outliers. When one 
or several outliers are found, the daily dummy variable(s) is included in the regression 
to find out if the outlier(s) is significant in a regression context: 
 
                                                                                     (4.12) 
 
                                                          
12
 The problematic days are identified by the dummy variable approach in the first filter and then later 




where  t= -180, -179…-61 
 
 n is the specific day(s) on which the positive residual(s) is 3.5 or 4 times greater than                      
the standard deviation.  
                
For the firms with significant outliers, the results of the news search are also used for 
re-categorizing the firms which will be explained in detail later. 
 
Step7: The analysis of the abnormal turnover (AT) 
 
Previous research (see, e.g., Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) and King (2009)) indirectly examine the prevalence of 
illegal insider trading by examining abnormal returns and the abnormal turnovers (AT) 
prior to takeover announcement for stocks. The daily turnover in the context of this 
thesis is the same as the daily trading volume and the reason of using this terminology 
is because it is used in Datastream where I collected my data. The methodology 
applied in this thesis is based on the methodology used in Agarwal and Singh (2006) 
(mentioned in chapter 2 section 2.4.6). Here, I examine whether the daily average 
turnover calculated for two months (-60 to -11 trading days) prior to merger 
announcement and two weeks (-10 to -1 trading days) prior to the merger 
announcement gives any signal of presence of any possible insider trading. In order to 
carry out the analysis I use the average turnover calculated for a period from -180 to -
61 day as the benchmark for average turnover in normal days. 
 
The daily average turnover for each firm is compared with 1.25 multiplied by the 
benchmark, 1.50 multiplied by the benchmark and 2.0 multiplied by the benchmark. 
In order to define the significance of the two means, I use the t-test which is presented 
as follows: 
 
 (     )  









                                                                                          (4.13) 
where         is the difference between two means, in context of this research,  ̅  
represent the average turnovers calculated from -60 to -11 trading day and from -10 to 
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    are the variance of the two samples 
 
If there is no difference between the average turnover for each firm and 1.25 
multiplied by the benchmark, or the average turnover for each firm and 1.50 
multiplied by the benchmark or the average turnover for each firm and 2.0 multiplied 
by the benchmark, I categorize them as firms with abnormal turnovers (AT). I used 
three different comparators as these as they represent increasingly stringent tests of 
abnormality. 
 
Step8: collect day 0 return and compare 
 
The day 0 abnormal return hypothesis suggests that on day 0, there will be a 
substantial abnormal return for the targets due to the substantial trade volume in the 
stock market. According to the findings of the takeover researches, the target stock 
goes up dramatically, on average by about 30%, upon takeover announcement 
(Agrawal and Nasser, 2011). But with the existence of insider dealing, the abnormal 
return may be partially absorbed prior to the announcement date and as a result, on 
day 0, the abnormal return will be expected to be lower than in the normal situation. 
In other words, the firms which are suspected of insider dealing activities may have a 
comparatively lower average abnormal return on day 0 than the firms which are not. 
In order to calculate the day 0 return, firstly, based on the categorized firms according 
to the previous four filters, I collect the day 0 abnormal return from Equation 4.14 for 




 ̂         ( ̂   ̂     )                                                       (4.14) 
 
                                                          
13
 The categorization of the six groups will be discussed and presented later in Section 4.4 
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Secondly, I cumulate the day 0 abnormal returns for all the six groups and then take 











                                                                                     (4.15) 
 
Apart from collecting the day 0 abnormal return for each group, the ratio of the 
increase on day 0 to that from day -60 to day 0 is also calculated. The ratio is based on 
the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) which is mentioned in chapter 3, 
Section 3.2. The first step is to calculate the CAAR from -60 day to 0 day for each 
group using Equation 4.16 and then calculate the ratio of the increase on day 0 to that 
from -60 to 0 day using Equation 4.17. 
 
       ̅                                                t= -60, -59,…0.               (4.16) 
      
            
     














Section 4.4 Summarising the four filter approach 
























The clean firm The suspected firm 
Plot the AR of all the firms 
pass fail 
 
The clean firm 
                                             Filter 2-The news search 
The clean firm The suspected firm The obscure firm The obscure firm with 
lagged news 
                                        Filter 3-The investigation of outlier 
The clean firm The obscure firm The obscure with lagged news The suspected The ultra-suspected 
















Filter1-The dummy variable approach: Categorize the firms to be clean or 
suspected and plot the average abnormal return and the cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) of both groups 
 
All the firms are categorized into two groups-the clean firms and the suspected firms 
according to the results of the dummy variable approach. The firms with significant (5% 
significance level) daily dummy variable during a period from -60 day to -1 are 
classified as ‘suspected’ otherwise ‘clean’. Here, both significant positive residuals 
and significant negative residuals are picked out because it might be the case that the 
insiders deliberately leak negative information to drive the share price down before 
they intend to buy. Then the average abnormal returns of both groups are calculated 
and plotted. However, the line plots of the clean groups of some years (e.g. 2007) 
show obvious spikes prior to the announcement day. This is an indication that the 
daily dummy variable approach might not be able to capture everything that happened. 
In other words, the ‘clean’ firms are not definitively clean. A possible reason for this 
is that insider trading is not necessary an activity of some specific separate days but of 
a series of days. To support the daily dummy variable approach, a news search and 
the detection of outliers are applied. 
 
Filter2- The news search: Categorize the firms to be clean, obscure, obscure with 
lagged news and suspected and plot the average abnormal return of all groups 
 
Based on filter1 and the news search, the firms are re-classified into four new 
categories-the clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news and the suspected. 
The clean firms are those which pass the daily dummy variable approach and do not 
have unusual spikes when the daily abnormal returns are plotted. The obscure firms 
refer to those which do not pass the daily dummy variable approach or experience 
unusual spikes in the abnormal return plot and at the same time, have public released 
news less than or equal to five days prior to the problematic days. I choose five days 
because they form a full trading week. The obscure firms with lagged news are the 
firms which have the same situation with the obscure firms except that they have a 
public news release less than or equal to five days after the problematic days. The 
reason for this category is that firstly, there might be a time lag between the news 
being released to the public and the news being reported by the media and secondly, 
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the insiders might release the news after taking advantage of it. The suspected firms 
are those do not pass the daily dummy variable approach and meanwhile do not have 
a report of any publicly released news. 
 
Filter3-The investigation of outliers: Categorize the firms to be clean, obscure, 
obscure with lagged news, suspected and ultra-suspected based on the Filter 3 and the 
previous filters.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the description of the five categories after the third filter: 
Table 4.3: The description of the five categories after three filters 
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third filter, 
but have news 
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Source: Author’s summation 
 
Filter4-The abnormal turnover (AT) investigation: Categorize the firms to be 
absolute clean, obscure, obscure with lagged news, suspected and ultra-suspected and 







Table 4.4: The description of the six categories after four filters 
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Chapter 5    Insider trading in domestic U.K M&As 
from 2006 to 2010 
 
Section 5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on domestic M&As in the U.K from 2006 to 2010. The 
objective is to determine whether there is any evidence of insider trading. Firstly, the 
source of the data is given—all the data ranging from 2006 to 2010 in the U.K are 
collected with Datastream. A table following shows the names, the M&A 
announcement dates and the industries of the targets and bidders. Secondly, the 
models and method used in this thesis are presented—the models used in this study 
are the market model, the market-adjusted model and the modified market model, 
which provide identical results, and an event study. While regulators regularly 
scrutinize trading in a target firm’s shares after the fact, establishing illegal14 insider 
trading using solely econometric techniques is a difficult and often impossible task 
(Minenna, 2003). As a result, I developed four filters to detect the possible insider 
trading
15
. The first filter is based on a dummy variable approach. In order to examine 
the exact day of the abnormal return made by the targets and bidders, dummy 
variables are included in the regression. However, the results of dummy variable 
approach indicate a problem that some of the clean firms identified by the dummy 
variables turn out to be ‘not so clean’. In addition suspect firms may not reflect insider 
trading, but some other form of news event. In order to detect what really is going on 
with these firms, a news search is presented as a second filter apart from the dummy 
variable approach. Since the public rumours released prior to the takeover event 
would possibly affect the stock price movements, looking into the news can explain 
why some of the clean firms appear ‘not so clean’. All English language news on all 
the targets is searched with Nexis, which is a world-wide information database. Apart 
from the daily dummy variable and the news search, a third filter is used based on the 
                                                          
14
 The terminology ‘insider trading’ used in this thesis stands for illegal insider trading unless 
otherwise stated. 
15
 The study mainly focuses on the merger target and the analysis of the bidder firms ends up with the 
first filter.  
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detection of outliers. Finally, an analysis based on abnormal turnovers (AT) is 
included as a fourth filter in this study. In addition the empirical work will use a 
Granger causality test to analyse the ‘causality’ between the targets and the bidders in 
a merger. 
 
Additionally, the day 0 returns are calculated separately for six different categories of 
firms. The theory is that on day 0, there will be massive abnormal return for the 
targets, but with the existence of insider dealing, the abnormal return will, at least 
partially, be absorbed prior to the announcement date. In other words, the firms which 
are suspected of insider dealing will have a comparatively lower average abnormal 
return on day 0 than the absolute clean firms. The hypothesis is supported by the 
empirical results in this study.  
 
Section 5.2 Data and Model 
Section 5.2.1The sample and data collection 
All the M&A firms were firstly chosen and then their daily stock prices obtained. In 
order to examine the price movements of stocks of firms which were eventually taken 
over, a sample of 87 stocks listed on the FTSE 100 is gathered in total for a five year 
period. The sample size varies (19 in 2006, 16 in 2007, 18 in 2008, 16 in 2009 and 18 
in 2010) because these are the maximum numbers of firms which could be collected 
with full daily returns. Initially, all M&A firms during the five-year period from 2006 
to 2010 were collected, then, some of them are dropped from the sample due to two 
reasons - firstly, the bidder is taking over itself and secondly, some of the daily 
returns are missing. The remaining sample contains 87 target firms and 87 acquirers 
in the U.K from 2006 to 2010. Tables 5.36-40 in the appendix show both the 87 target 
firms and the 87 acquiring firms. The sample is collected with Thomson One Banker 
which is a database providing access to global financial data on both public and 
private companies including company accounts, scanned filings and annual reports, 
shareholder data, mergers and acquisitions, equities, bonds, syndicated loans and 
earnings estimates. Mergers not included in the sample are (a) unlisted private U.K 
companies, (b) unlisted nationalized U.K companies, (c) companies with transactions 
which are not complete, (d) non-U.K companies, or (e) companies which are doing 
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cross-border acquisition. In this chapter, therefore (a) both target firms and acquiring 
firms are public, (b) both target firms and acquiring firms are U.K firms, (c) 
announcement dates lie between 1
st
 January and 31
st
 December for each year sample. 
For each acquisition, the announcement date is the date on which particular news 
(M&A) concerning a given company (target firm) is announced to the public.  
 
The daily prices of the stocks for both target firms and acquiring firms were collected 
by Datastream. The process of collecting the stock prices was in two steps. Firstly, the 
stock prices for each target and acquiring firm from -180 trading day (announcement 
day as day 0) to -61 trading day were collected and secondly, the stock prices for each 
target and acquiring firm from -60 trading day to +10 trading day were collected. The 
stock prices are documented in pence. The market return (  ) is also collected from 
Datastream from the FT All Share index for each target and acquiring firm. For some 
firms, the daily price movement seems small or sometimes unchanged because they 
were small stocks which were thinly traded. 
 
The turnover is collected from Datastream from the Turnover by volume (VO) which 
is explained by Datastream as the aggregation of the number of shares for each stock 
in the index traded on a particular day. The figure is always expressed in thousands. 
However, there are still some firms whose daily volumes cannot be found in 
Datastream. This might due to the imperfection of the database. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics for the sample of 87 target firms and the volume of 85 
target firms in U.K. acquisitions for the period 2006-2010  
 
Year The number of target firms The number of the firms whose daily 
turnover is obtained 
2006 19 19 
2007 16 16 
2008 18 18 
2009 16 16 
2010 18 16 
Total 87 85 





Section 5.3 Empirical results 
Section 5.3.1The analysis of AR and CAAR before the four-filter 
approach 
 
The previous literature assumes that if there are no unusual price movements prior to 
the announcement date, one would expect both the AR and the CAAR to fluctuate 
randomly about zero. However, if there is leakage of, and trading on, inside 
information just prior to the announcement date, this should show up in the form of a 
positive AR as day approaches zero and a corresponding build up in CAAR (Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981). In Graph 5.1-5.5, both the ARs and CAARs are plotted together 
from 2006 to 2010 to give an overview of the U.K stock market before the four filters. 
 




Graph 5.1 shows that before announcement, the AR of the total firm is fluctuating 
randomly about zero and increases sharply to about 10% on day 0 which is an 
indication that the firms are clean in the U.K in 2006. However, the buildup in CAAR 
begins from day -35 relative to the date of announcement. From this day onwards, an 





























from day -5 onwards the buildup in CAAR is more perceptible as after this day the 
downward trend in the curve is less pronounced than that observed before day -5. 
Consequently, there is possible insider trading in the U.K in 2006. 
 
 




According to Graph 5.2, the AR is fluctuating randomly about zero before merger 
announcement. However, the CAAR increases sharply on -55 day and then nothing 
until -5 day relative to the merger announcement. From -5 day onwards, the CAAR 
buildup is substantially pronounced. Therefore, there is possible insider trading in the 
U.K in 2007 because according to the previous literature, only when the AR fluctuates 
randomly around zero alongside with no CAAR buildup before the merger 





































Graph 5.3 is the pattern of CAAR and AR from day -60 to day +10 relative to the 
announcement date. The AR is fluctuating randomly about zero though with 
occasional run-ups and dips. For the CAAR, it decreases sharply to -10% during a 
period from day -43 to day -34 and then starts to increase steadily. From day -34 
onwards, an increased trend in the CAAR is observed and therefore, the CAAR has an 
obvious buildup before the merger announcement which indicates possible insider 










































According to Graph 5.4, the CAAR has a pattern which is similar to that in Figure 5.5, 
it decreases sharply to -10% and then increases rapidly back to 10% before day -40. 
From day -40 onwards, the CAAR has a steadily increasing trend. Moreover, from -15 
day onwards, the increasing in CAAR is accelerating with no perceptible dips. On the 
other hand, for the AR, before day -40, it has an obvious negative-positive pattern and 
then it has several positive spikes before merger announcement. As a result, it is 







































Compared to Graph 5.1-5.4, the AR and CAAR in Figure 5.7 follow the assumption 
of a ‘normal return situation’ in the previous literature before day -5. The AR 
fluctuates randomly about zero though the event window and starts to increase from 
about  day -3 while the CAAR starts to build up on day -5 before which an increasing 
trend is observed but not obviously. This might be an indication that insider trading is 
less a problem in 2010 than in the previous years.  
 
Section 5.3.2The results of the first filter-the dummy variable 
approach for the targets 
 
Table 5.6 shows the result by applying the dummy variable approach. For the first 
filter, both positive and negative errors were picked out as ‘abnormal spikes’. The 
reason of taking the negative errors into account is because the insiders may 































Table 5.6: The descriptive statistics of the result in the U.K 
Descriptive statistic  
Numbers of target firms with significant 
abnormal returns before day 0 
Numbers of target firms with no 
significant abnormal returns 
before day 0 
2006 7 2006 12 
2007 12 2007 4 
2008 9 2008 9 
2009 7 2009 9 
2010 9 2010 9 
Numbers of target 
firms with significant 
positive abnormal 
returns before day 0 
(Target firms) 
Numbers of target firms 
with significant 
negative abnormal 
returns before day 0 
(Target firms) 
Numbers of target firms with both 
significant positive and significant 
negative abnormal returns before 
day 0 (Target firms) 
2006 6 2006 1 2006 0 
2007 9 2007 2 2007 1 
2008 6 2008 0 2008 3 
2009 3 2009 0 2009 4 
2010 5 2010 2 2010 2 
Total days with significant positive abnormal 
returns (Target firms) 
Total days with significant 
negative abnormal returns (Target 
firms) 
2006 12 2006 0 
2007 19 2007 2 
2008 15 2008 6 
2009 11 2009 4 
2010 13 2010 4 
Total days with significant abnormal returns 
(Target firms) 
Total days with significant 
abnormal returns (Acquiring 
firms) 
2006 12 2006 19 
2007 21                               2007 22 
2008 21 2008 18 
2009 15 2009 9 
2010 17 2010 6 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Tables 5.7-11 show the AR of the total, the suspected and the clean firms respectively 
and CAAR of the total firms for the U.K from 2006 to 2010. The percent of daily 
residual positive of the total firms is also calculated. The results are from the market 
model. The results from the market adjusted model and the modified market model 
are included in the appendix. Although there are slight differences in the results from 
the three models, when plotted in graphs, it is apparent that the graphs are identical. 
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Table 5.7: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.007328 0.019815 4.46E-05 47% 0.007328 
-59 0.005902 0.019135 -0.00182 53% 0.01323 
-58 -0.0003 0.00143 -0.00131 53% 0.012928 
-57 0.001938 0.000072 0.003026 53% 0.014866 
-56 -0.00455 0.003763 -0.00939 53% 0.01032 
-55 0.003391 0.002087 0.004152 37% 0.013711 
-54 -0.00228 0.001227 -0.00433 37% 0.011431 
-53 0.000123 0.004719 -0.00256 53% 0.011554 
-52 0.00442 0.004749 0.004229 63% 0.015974 
-51 0.000631 0.000792 0.000537 37% 0.016605 
-50 0.003411 0.00101 0.004811 47% 0.020016 
-49 -0.00584 0.00103 -0.00985 37% 0.014176 
-48 0.003254 0.001138 0.004489 47% 0.01743 
-47 -0.00165 -0.00824 0.002197 58% 0.015784 
-46 0.000305 -2.61E-04 0.000636 47% 0.016089 
-45 -0.00246 -0.00577 -0.00053 32% 0.013631 
-44 0.001096 0.000981 0.001163 47% 0.014727 
-43 -0.00338 4.18E-04 -0.00559 37% 0.011351 
-42 0.001238 0.004503 -0.00067 58% 0.012589 
-41 -0.00962 -0.00063 -0.01486 37% 0.002972 
-40 0.000106 0.009129 -0.00516 37% 0.003078 
-39 0.003391 -0.0007 0.001907 68% 0.004025 
-38 0.002474 -0.0019 0.005023 58% 0.006499 
-37 -0.0146 -0.00729 -0.01887 37% -0.0081 
-36 -0.00657 -0.00683 -0.00641 37% -0.01467 
-35 -0.00084 0.000787 -0.0018 53% -0.01551 
-34 0.002658 0.003112 0.002393 53% -0.01285 
-33 0.001245 0.003793 -0.00024 53% -0.01161 
-32 0.001049 0.003794 -5.52E-04 42% -0.01056 
-31 0.00594 0.027264 -0.0065 53% -0.00462 
-30 0.007509 0.002757 0.010282 53% 0.002889 
-29 0.003193 0.007993 0.000394 37% 0.006083 
-28 -0.00151 -0.00472 0.000371 32% 0.004578 
-27 0.001418 0.013452 -0.0056 58% 0.005996 
-26 -0.00475 -0.01655 0.002132 53% 0.001245 
-25 0.001853 -0.00376 0.005128 42% 0.003098 
-24 0.003829 0.010983 -0.00034 53% 0.006926 
-23 0.002438 0.01925 -0.00737 58% 0.009364 
-22 0.009126 0.027062 -0.00134 58% 0.01849 
-21 0.017995 0.047415 0.000834 58% 0.036485 
-20 -0.00483 -0.01 -0.00181 42% 0.031658 
-19 -0.00794 -0.00676 -0.00863 26% 0.023718 
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-18 -0.0026 -0.00703 -1.5E-05 32% 0.021117 
-17 -0.00151 0.004534 -0.00504 42% 0.019607 
-16 -0.00107 0.000515 -0.00199 53% 0.018541 
-15 0.003694 -0.00042 0.006092 58% 0.022235 
-14 0.00374 -0.0022 0.007206 53% 0.025975 
-13 -0.00229 -0.00592 -0.00017 42% 0.023684 
-12 -0.00146 -0.00555 9.21E-04 47% 0.022223 
-11 -0.00342 -0.00272 -0.00383 16% 0.018805 
-10 0.004018 0.007253 0.002131 53% 0.022823 
-9 0.006586 0.011974 0.003443 63% 0.029409 
-8 0.010961 0.025742 0.00234 53% 0.04037 
-7 -0.01245 -0.0233 -0.00612 37% 0.02792 
-6 0.001828 0.006659 -0.00099 42% 0.029748 
-5 -0.00194 -0.00425 -0.00059 37% 0.027811 
-4 0.003071 0.007062 7.43E-04 53% 0.030882 
-3 0.00367 0.000951 0.005256 68% 0.034552 
-2 0.006333 0.007591 0.0056 58% 0.040885 
-1 0.010058 0.032151 -0.00283 42% 0.050943 
0 0.093489 0.020038 0.136336 68% 0.144432 
1 0.004453 -0.00041 0.007292 58% 0.148885 
2 -0.00047 -0.00363 0.001368 42% 0.148412 
3 0.001127 0.001777 0.000748 47% 0.149539 
4 0.009296 9.73E-05 0.014661 53% 0.158834 
5 0.003372 0.009584 -0.00025 68% 0.162206 
6 0.006632 0.005081 0.007537 63% 0.168838 
7 0.003075 0.001846 0.003791 53% 0.171913 
8 0.004085 0.000398 0.006235 47% 0.175997 
9 -0.00158 0.000487 -0.00278 42% 0.174422 




































Table 5.8 Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.010119 0.013041 0.001354 75% 0.010119 
-59 0.006628 0.009338 -0.0015 69% 0.016747 
-58 -0.00081 0.005696 -0.02035 44% 0.015932 
-57 0.036119 0.043972 0.012559 44% 0.052051 
-56 0.013698 0.015993 0.006814 56% 0.065749 
-55 0.025196 0.028952 0.01393 75% 0.090946 
-54 0.003563 0.003317 0.004302 50% 0.094509 
-53 0.004355 0.002157 0.010949 56% 0.098864 
-52 -0.00346 -0.00532 0.00212 38% 0.095401 
-51 -0.00482 -0.01036 0.011806 31% 0.090584 
-50 0.001056 -0.00066 0.006197 56% 0.09164 
-49 0.00686 0.010149 -0.00301 44% 0.0985 
-48 -0.00346 -0.00584 0.003706 69% 0.095043 
-47 0.001741 0.003462 -0.00342 44% 0.096784 
-46 -0.00088 0.001892 -0.00918 31% 0.095909 
-45 0.012228 -4.5E-05 0.049045 56% 0.108137 
-44 -0.0005 0.002443 -0.00933 44% 0.107637 
-43 -0.00345 0.000536 -0.01541 56% 0.104187 
-42 0.004587 0.006826 -0.00213 63% 0.108775 
-41 -0.0001 -0.00405 0.011731 50% 0.10867 
-40 -0.00625 -0.00245 -0.01766 38% 0.10242 
-39 0.001345 0.000304 0.00447 44% 0.103765 
-38 0.000972 0.001456 -0.00048 25% 0.104737 
-37 0.006413 0.006406 0.006433 69% 0.11115 
-36 -0.00355 -0.00485 0.000353 31% 0.107603 
-35 -0.0047 -0.00706 0.002369 56% 0.102901 
-34 0.013094 0.016114 0.004035 63% 0.115995 
-33 0.008632 0.009774 0.005205 63% 0.124627 
-32 0.004392 0.000191 0.016992 44% 0.129019 
-31 -0.01028 -0.01275 -0.00285 63% 0.118742 
-30 0.000908 0.000378 0.002496 63% 0.119649 
-29 -0.00369 -0.0075 0.007733 44% 0.115956 
-28 -0.00343 -0.00389 -0.00205 44% 0.112529 
-27 0.003654 0.009682 -0.01443 50% 0.116183 
-26 -0.00166 0.00143 -0.01091 38% 0.114527 
-25 0.000445 -0.00181 0.007195 50% 0.114972 
-24 0.003078 0.001069 0.009104 56% 0.11805 
-23 0.01078 0.007505 0.020605 56% 0.128829 
-22 0.002621 0.007459 -0.01189 38% 0.131451 
-21 -0.00267 -0.00114 -0.00726 50% 0.128783 
-20 -0.00905 -0.01017 -0.00568 31% 0.119736 
-19 -0.00184 -0.0031 0.001962 44% 0.117901 
-18 0.011813 0.015025 0.002179 81% 0.129714 
-17 -0.00344 -0.00386 -0.0022 31% 0.126274 
-16 -0.00194 -0.00244 -0.00044 44% 0.124336 
-15 -0.0053 -0.00906 0.005981 44% 0.119037 
-14 -0.00028 0.001528 -0.0057 44% 0.118758 
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-13 0.007411 0.011283 -0.00421 25% 0.126169 
-12 0.001156 0.000228 0.003938 56% 0.127325 
-11 0.002198 0.000293 0.007912 50% 0.129522 
-10 0.003259 0.005536 -0.00357 56% 0.132781 
-9 -0.00025 -0.00064 0.000911 50% 0.132529 
-8 0.005833 0.007466 0.000933 44% 0.138362 
-7 0.000866 0.00637 -0.01565 44% 0.139227 
-6 0.006064 0.008135 -0.00015 50% 0.145291 
-5 -0.00956 -0.01435 0.004782 38% 0.135727 
-4 0.006939 0.010351 -0.0033 50% 0.142666 
-3 0.020078 0.021063 0.017123 69% 0.162744 
-2 0.001588 0.00479 -0.00802 31% 0.164332 
-1 0.088687 0.111777 0.019418 75% 0.25302 
0 0.111492 0.110985 0.113014 75% 0.364512 
1 -0.00035 -0.00114 0.002028 44% 0.364166 
2 0.014685 0.020988 -0.00423 63% 0.378851 
3 0.004288 0.001774 0.01183 75% 0.383139 
4 -0.00265 -0.00394 0.00121 25% 0.380487 
5 -0.00496 -0.00482 -0.0054 31% 0.375523 
6 -0.00242 -0.00126 -0.00589 31% 0.373102 
7 0.001511 0.002885 -0.00261 50% 0.374613 
8 -0.00097 0.000296 -0.00479 44% 0.373639 
9 0.00024 -0.0004 0.002163 62% 0.373879 

































Table 5.9 Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total 
target firms 
-60 -0.00414 0.001456 -0.01294 61% -0.00414 
-59 -0.01321 -0.00626 -0.02412 39% -0.01735 
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-58 -0.0009 -0.00288 0.002201 61% -0.01825 
-57 -0.00671 -0.01357 0.004059 61% -0.02496 
-56 -0.00154 0.011265 -0.02165 56% -0.0265 
-55 0.015909 0.012283 0.021608 72% -0.01059 
-54 0.006428 0.007453 0.004816 89% -0.00416 
-53 -0.01873 -0.03407 0.005389 39% -0.02289 
-52 -0.00136 -0.00617 0.006188 56% -0.02425 
-51 0.017334 0.0266 0.002771 89% -0.00692 
-50 0.005537 0.008458 0.000945 67% -0.00138 
-49 0.001123 0.001047 0.001241 67% -0.00026 
-48 0.004607 0.00855 -0.00159 61% 0.004349 
-47 0.002085 0.003838 -0.00067 61% 0.006434 
-46 -0.00393 -0.00205 -0.00689 78% 0.002504 
-45 -0.00462 -0.00494 -0.00412 50% -0.00212 
-44 -0.00068 -0.00091 -0.00033 78% -0.0028 
-43 0.0012 0.002208 -0.00038 78% -0.0016 
-42 -0.03097 -0.05159 0.001429 67% -0.03257 
-41 -0.00505 -0.00801 -0.00039 56% -0.03762 
-40 -0.01324 -0.02401 0.003679 56% -0.05086 
-39 -0.00172 -0.00016 -0.00418 72% -0.05258 
-38 -0.0108 -0.0248 0.011193 61% -0.06338 
-37 -0.01008 -0.01896 0.00387 67% -0.07346 
-36 -0.00586 -0.01429 0.007402 72% -0.07932 
-35 -0.02373 -0.03122 -0.01197 44% -0.10305 
-34 -0.01257 -0.02186 0.002012 78% -0.11563 
-33 0.038935 0.068082 -0.00687 61% -0.07669 
-32 0.032711 0.054242 -0.00112 89% -0.04398 
-31 -0.01461 -0.02834 0.006958 78% -0.05859 
-30 0.0121 0.018232 0.002463 67% -0.04649 
-29 0.023522 0.030943 0.011858 72% -0.02297 
-28 -0.00126 -0.00709 0.007886 67% -0.02423 
-27 0.011125 0.008245 0.015651 50% -0.01311 
-26 0.024116 0.010946 0.04481 72% 0.011008 
-25 0.02098 -0.01054 0.070513 61% 0.031987 
-24 0.003587 -0.00054 0.010075 72% 0.035574 
-23 0.014721 0.022618 0.002312 78% 0.050295 
-22 0.01966 0.029783 0.003753 72% 0.069955 
-21 0.016671 0.020839 0.010122 67% 0.086627 
-20 -0.00396 -0.00969 0.005039 50% 0.082667 
-19 -0.00433 -0.0173 0.016051 56% 0.078335 
-18 0.013652 0.019567 0.004356 78% 0.091986 
-17 -0.02258 -0.02166 -0.02402 50% 0.069407 
-16 0.000916 -0.01632 0.028002 50% 0.070323 
-15 0.019446 0.004105 0.043554 56% 0.089769 
-14 0.003598 0.00043 0.008576 72% 0.093367 
-13 0.010107 0.01722 -0.00107 67% 0.103474 
-12 0.007852 0.008117 0.007437 78% 0.111326 
-11 0.002777 -0.0048 0.01468 67% 0.114103 
-10 0.000343 -0.00292 0.005468 61% 0.114447 
-9 0.004824 0.006781 0.001749 61% 0.119271 
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-8 0.005611 0.002301 0.010812 67% 0.124881 
-7 0.00015 -0.00771 0.012495 50% 0.125031 
-6 0.003318 0.00705 -0.00255 67% 0.128349 
-5 0.0029 0.005046 -0.00047 72% 0.131249 
-4 0.005494 0.008284 0.00111 61% 0.136743 
-3 0.007959 0.009017 0.006297 61% 0.144702 
-2 0.011581 0.006834 0.019042 67% 0.156283 
-1 0.040505 0.064008 0.003572 67% 0.196788 
0 0.139482 0.067907 0.251959 67% 0.336271 
1 0.022384 0.038081 -0.00228 61% 0.358655 
2 -0.00342 -0.01589 0.016185 72% 0.355237 
3 -0.00575 -0.01322 0.00597 67% 0.349483 
4 -0.03075 -0.05066 0.000535 50% 0.318734 
5 5.14E-05 -0.00052 0.00095 61% 0.318785 
6 -0.00339 -0.00368 -0.00293 72% 0.315399 
7 -0.01126 -0.00855 -0.0155 50% 0.304143 
8 -0.00614 -0.00045 -0.01507 61% 0.298007 
9 -0.00864 -0.0238 0.015167 72% 0.289362 


































Table 5.10 Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.005834 0.004106 0.007179 63% 0.005835 
-59 -0.01783 -0.03032 -0.00812 38% -0.012 
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-58 -0.00808 -0.00365 -0.01152 31% -0.02007 
-57 -0.01315 -0.02382 -0.00485 44% -0.03322 
-56 -0.00518 -0.00137 -0.00815 44% -0.0384 
-55 -0.0068 -0.0218 0.004856 56% -0.0452 
-54 0.002261 -0.0077 0.010009 56% -0.04294 
-53 -0.06751 -0.02694 -0.09906 38% -0.11045 
-52 0.050065 -0.00728 0.094669 31% -0.06039 
-51 0.003574 0.002464 0.004438 81% -0.05681 
-50 0.008332 0.013086 0.004635 63% -0.04848 
-49 0.009148 0.024729 -0.00297 56% -0.03933 
-48 -0.00543 -0.00845 -0.00309 56% -0.04476 
-47 0.026393 0.032593 0.02157 75% -0.01837 
-46 0.016287 0.042374 -0.004 63% -0.00208 
-45 0.080323 0.009394 0.135491 75% 0.078239 
-44 0.015034 -0.00976 0.034323 56% 0.093273 
-43 -0.00914 -0.00744 -0.01046 44% 0.084137 
-42 0.002811 -0.01518 0.016802 50% 0.086948 
-41 -0.00583 -0.01467 0.001039 56% 0.081114 
-40 -0.00609 -0.00839 -0.00431 50% 0.075019 
-39 0.006269 -0.00756 0.017024 50% 0.081287 
-38 -0.0039 -0.02702 0.014094 38% 0.077392 
-37 0.005848 0.005224 0.006334 56% 0.083241 
-36 0.011572 0.051927 -0.01981 69% 0.094813 
-35 0.014508 0.038935 -0.00449 50% 0.109321 
-34 -0.01639 -0.01257 -0.01936 38% 0.092928 
-33 0.000118 0.008549 -0.00644 56% 0.093046 
-32 -0.00027 -0.00975 0.007105 50% 0.092778 
-31 0.041606 0.112942 -0.01388 69% 0.134384 
-30 -0.00606 -0.017 0.002438 44% 0.128319 
-29 -0.00846 -0.01123 -0.0063 44% 0.119859 
-28 0.004146 0.006382 0.002407 56% 0.124005 
-27 -0.00305 -0.00722 0.000195 38% 0.120957 
-26 0.015682 0.035536 0.00024 69% 0.136639 
-25 0.01912 0.042732 7.55E-04 56% 0.155759 
-24 -0.01118 -0.02656 7.90E-04 38% 0.144582 
-23 0.007022 6.24E-05 0.012436 63% 0.151604 
-22 -0.00637 -0.00308 -0.00893 38% 0.145233 
-21 -0.01008 -0.02206 -0.00076 50% 0.135154 
-20 6.89E-05 0.001951 -0.0014 50% 0.135223 
-19 0.004986 0.004015 0.005742 50% 0.140209 
-18 0.003551 0.004864 0.00253 56% 0.143761 
-17 -0.0036 0.010928 -0.0149 56% 0.140159 
-16 -0.00539 0.005512 -0.01387 38% 0.134767 
-15 -0.00319 0.008861 -0.01257 56% 0.131573 
-14 0.001986 0.004116 0.00033 63% 0.13356 
-13 0.009271 0.01564 0.004317 56% 0.142831 
-12 0.003876 0.027736 -0.01468 38% 0.146706 
-11 0.005403 0.01831 -0.00464 63% 0.152109 
-10 -0.00763 -0.00527 -0.00947 50% 0.144475 
-9 0.007284 0.035689 -0.01481 50% 0.151759 
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-8 0.008378 0.02711 -0.00619 69% 0.160136 
-7 0.009593 0.006353 0.012114 44% 0.16973 
-6 -0.0016 0.006327 -0.00776 50% 0.168131 
-5 0.008544 0.003698 0.012314 50% 0.176675 
-4 0.007995 0.007165 0.008641 69% 0.18467 
-3 0.005827 0.009819 0.002723 81% 0.190498 
-2 0.019394 0.023878 0.015906 56% 0.209892 
-1 0.013504 0.02335 0.005846 56% 0.223396 
0 0.085761 0.130404 0.051039 75% 0.309157 
1 -0.02485 -0.00675 -0.03893 38% 0.284305 
2 0.026172 0.040226 0.015242 81% 0.310477 
3 0.010132 0.022655 0.000392 69% 0.320609 
4 0.004886 0.005697 0.004256 50% 0.325495 
5 0.001825 -0.00039 0.003548 56% 0.327321 
6 -0.00114 0.005308 -0.00616 50% 0.326179 
7 0.004343 0.01191 -0.00154 69% 0.330522 
8 -0.00579 -0.00965 -0.00279 50% 0.324728 
9 0.002332 -0.00413 0.007359 56% 0.32706 

































Table 5.11 Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00146 0.000554 -0.00347 61% -0.00146 
-59 0.006597 0.011732 0.001461 39% 0.005139 
-58 0.00541 0.01065 0.00017 44% 0.010549 
71 
 
-57 -0.0262 -0.04548 -0.00692 50% -0.01565 
-56 0.00821 0.007277 0.009144 56% -0.00744 
-55 0.005294 -0.0003 0.010886 61% -0.00215 
-54 0.004197 0.003541 0.004853 67% 0.002048 
-53 0.004217 -0.00328 0.011715 78% 0.006265 
-52 -0.02236 -0.03515 -0.00957 39% -0.0161 
-51 0.011363 0.038687 -0.01596 39% -0.00473 
-50 -0.00129 0.000664 -0.00323 39% -0.00602 
-49 -0.00671 -0.00784 -0.00557 44% -0.01272 
-48 0.004608 0.007643 0.001574 56% -0.00812 
-47 -0.0032 -0.01072 0.004323 67% -0.01132 
-46 0.003618 0.011146 -0.00391 56% -0.0077 
-45 -0.00923 -0.01638 -0.00208 50% -0.01693 
-44 0.005153 0.007784 0.002521 56% -0.01177 
-43 0.010526 0.010633 0.010419 56% -0.00125 
-42 0.002942 -0.00355 0.009431 56% 0.001694 
-41 -0.0062 0.00347 -0.01587 39% -0.00451 
-40 0.022102 0.041209 0.002996 72% 0.017597 
-39 0.000369 -0.0044 0.005135 56% 0.017966 
-38 -0.00033 0.00368 -0.00435 67% 0.017632 
-37 -0.02009 -0.03797 -0.00221 44% -0.00246 
-36 0.009224 -0.00021 0.018654 61% 0.006766 
-35 -0.00612 -0.00816 -0.00408 44% 0.000646 
-34 0.010246 0.02112 -0.00063 33% 0.010892 
-33 -0.00904 -0.01381 -0.00427 39% 0.001855 
-32 0.004192 0.004263 0.004121 72% 0.006047 
-31 0.005261 0.004483 0.00604 56% 0.011308 
-30 0.01531 0.019409 0.011211 39% 0.026618 
-29 0.000716 -0.00179 0.003217 56% 0.027334 
-28 0.004603 0.000771 0.008435 61% 0.031937 
-27 0.000173 0.004198 -0.00385 44% 0.032111 
-26 0.009192 0.006887 0.011497 61% 0.041303 
-25 -0.0055 -0.00572 -0.00528 33% 0.035806 
-24 -0.00149 -0.00254 -0.00044 56% 0.034312 
-23 0.002022 -0.0148 0.01884 44% 0.036334 
-22 -0.0047 -0.00492 -0.00448 44% 0.031633 
-21 0.008203 0.008464 0.007942 67% 0.039836 
-20 0.005843 0.0093 0.002385 61% 0.045678 
-19 0.000225 0.006038 -0.00559 67% 0.045903 
-18 -0.0039 -0.00562 -0.00217 56% 0.042007 
-17 -0.006 -0.00862 -0.00338 44% 0.036006 
-16 0.013056 0.024637 0.001476 61% 0.049063 
-15 0.003347 -0.00029 0.006989 44% 0.05241 
-14 -0.00434 0.006104 -0.01479 28% 0.048066 
-13 0.001154 0.024786 -0.02248 44% 0.04922 
-12 -0.00745 -0.01162 -0.00327 44% 0.041772 
-11 -0.00273 -0.01583 0.010361 72% 0.039037 
-10 -0.00431 -0.00086 -0.00775 33% 0.034732 
-9 0.010783 0.005883 0.015683 61% 0.045515 
-8 -0.00341 -0.00365 -0.00317 39% 0.042107 
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-7 -0.00899 -0.02004 0.002056 44% 0.033117 
-6 -0.00637 0.010601 -0.02335 50% 0.026744 
-5 0.000232 0.00111 -0.00065 44% 0.026977 
-4 0.02578 0.047852 0.003708 50% 0.052757 
-3 -0.00151 -0.00763 0.004618 44% 0.051249 
-2 0.002446 0.007349 -0.00246 44% 0.053695 
-1 0.067601 0.14365 -0.00845 50% 0.121296 
0 0.178476 0.096961 0.259991 83% 0.299773 
1 0.020984 0.032743 0.009225 56% 0.320756 
2 0.087075 0.1644 0.009749 33% 0.407831 
3 0.046862 0.088399 0.005325 56% 0.454693 
4 -0.01891 -0.0327 -0.00513 44% 0.435779 
5 -0.0086 -0.01932 0.002117 50% 0.427178 
6 -0.00157 -0.01608 0.012946 44% 0.425609 
7 -0.01164 -0.02503 0.00176 44% 0.413971 
8 0.001672 0.005966 -0.00262 61% 0.415643 
9 -0.00828 -0.00622 -0.01034 33% 0.407364 




















































Graph 5.6 is the percentage of firms with positive AR in the U.K 2006.  The highest 
two percentages appear on day -39 and day -1 on which days there are about 70% of 
firms getting positive AR. Moreover, on 23 days out of 40, during a period from -40 
to 0 day, more than 50% of the total firms have positive AR. This is an indication that 
insider trading is potentially more of a problem one month before the announcement 


















































According to Graph 6, in 2007 there are much higher percentages of firms with 






















































It is noticeable that in 2008, a very large proportion of firms are getting positive AR. 
During the event window, only on three days there are less than 50% firms 
experiencing positive AR. Furthermore, from day -20 onwards, there is no case of less 




















































According to Graph 5.9, the highest two percentages of firms with positive AR appear 
on -51 day and -3 day. On both these two days there are more than 80% firms getting 
positive AR. When comparing to other years (2006, 2007 and 2010), in both years 
2008 and 2009, large numbers of positive returns were witnessed. This might be a 
sign of people responding to the crisis. People in financial trouble may seek to recover 
their losses elsewhere, for example by doing insider trading. This may explain why in 















































Table 5.12: The codes of the clean and suspected target firms after the dummy 
variable approach in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
T0603 T0613 T0618 T0601 T0610 
T0605 T0614 T0619 T0602 T0611 
T0606 T0615  T0604  
T0609 T0616  T0607  
T0612 T0617  T0608  
2007  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
T0704 T0701  T0710 T0715 
T0707 T0702  T0711 T0716 
T0708 T0703 T0712  
T0709 T0705 T0713  
 T0706 T0714  
2008  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
T0803 T0814 T0801 T0811 
T0804 T0815 T0802 T0812 
T0806 T0816 T0805 T0813 
T0808 T0818 T0807 T0817 
T0810  T0809  
2009  




























The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
T0903 T0910 T0901 T0914 
T0904 T0911 T0902 T0915 
T0905 T0912 T0906  
T0907 T0916 T0908  
T0909  T0913  
2010  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
T1001 T1012 T1002 T1011 
T1004 T1013 T1003 T1015 
T1006 T1014 T1005 T1017 
T1008 T1016 T1007 T1018 
T1009  T1010  
 




According to Figure 5.1, the AR for the clean firms appears more stable than both 
those for the suspected firms and for the total firms. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, 
during -40 day to -20 day, the spikes for the suspected firms suggest that they are 
experiencing high abnormal returns. Moreover, the reason why the AR for the clean 
firms are more stable than those for the total firms can be concluded to be the 
disturbance of the suspected firms. This seems obvious because when the suspicious 
firms have spikes from day -40 to day -20, the shape of the line for the total firms is 
very much like that for the suspected firms. The only difference is that the total firms 
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Figure 1  daily average return for U.k target firms 2006
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total, the suspected and the clean firms from day -40 to day -20, the evidence that the 
suspected firms have the highest variance substantiates the conclusion made earlier. 
That the variance of the clean firms is slightly greater than that of the total firms 
might be due to the very significant downward spike below zero for the clean firms.  
 





The total firms The suspected 
firms 










According to Figure 5.2, the suspicious firms are having spikes during mainly two 
periods-from day -60 to day -50 and from day -40 to day -20. However, it is notable 
that the clean firms are also having spikes and what is more, the spike during day -50 
to day -40 is very significant. In addition, in Figure 5.2, both the spikes of the 
suspicious firms and clean firms are surrounded by negative ARs. This makes the 
multiple day dummy variable difficult to pick up. In other words, the daily dummy 
variable picks up some but not all of the single spikes. But it does pick up when there 
is continuous trading over several days to make the visible evidence of insider trading. 
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Figure 2  daily average return for U.K target firms 2007
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In order to find out the reason, the following Graph 5.11 is presented on which the 








According to Graph 5.11, the err22 has three significant spikes, the highest of which 
is almost 20%, from day -50 to day -30. This is suspected to have influenced the curve 
of the total clean firms as can be seen in Figure 5.2. When referred back, the err22 is 
the Firm T0709. In Filter 2-the news search, public released rumours will be searched 








                                                          
16
 In Graph 5.11, the terminology ‘err ’refers to the error term of the specified firms. Here, err22 
represents the error term of firm T0709, err11 represents the error term of firm T0707, err18 
represents the error term of firm T0708 and err 25 represents the error term of firm T0704. The error 



































The daily average return of U.K clean target firms 2007
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According to Figure 5.3, the suspected firms are experiencing spikes from day -40 to 
day -30. Nonetheless, the clean firms also have spikes during period -30 to -20 day. 
The following Graph 5.12 is presented on which all the seven clean firms in the U.K 
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According to Graph 12, both err20 (represented by an orange curve) and err22 
(represented by a red curve) have significant spikes prior to the announcement day. 
Err20 has spikes from day -20 to day -10 while err22 has spikes from day -30 to day -
20. As a result, the first spike of the clean firms in Figure 5.3 might be driven by err22 
and the second spike of the clean firms might attribute to err20. When referred back, 
the err20 is the Firm T0814 and the err22 is the Firm T0806. In Filter 2-the news 
search, public released rumours will be searched to elucidate more information on 
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 In Graph 5.12, err20 is the error term of firm T0814, err11 is  the firm T0818, err13 is the firm T0803, 



















































The daily average return of U.K clean target firms 2008
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According to Figure 5.4, the curve of suspicious firms has very significant spikes 
during period from day -50 to day -20. The spike during -40 to -20 is like the ‘head 
and shoulder’ shape. On the other hand, there are also three very significant spikes for 
the clean firms among which two are significantly positive and one is significantly 
negative. The first positive spike might be a response to previous negative one- the 
‘bounce back’ in the stock market or it can also be suspicious because the insiders 
might leak negative information before they intend to buy shares. Moreover, there is a 
second positive spike in about a week’s time. Graph 5.13 and Graph 5.14 are 







this might be the 'bounce back' in the stock market
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The daily average return of Firm T0907 and T0910













































The daily average return of other U.K clean target firms 2009
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According to Graph 5.13, err16 and err19 have very high spikes prior to the 
announcement day. Err16 might be the reason for the second significantly positive 
spike in Figure 5.4. When referred back, the err16 is the Firm T0907. In Filter 2-the 
news search, public released rumours will be searched to elucidate more information 
on this firm. 
 
According to Graph 5.14, a very obvious negative-positive pattern is found for err22 
(Firm T0912) which is very similar to the pattern of the clean firm in Figure 4. 
Therefore, the negative-positive pattern of the clean firms in Figure 4 is very likely 
influenced by Firm T0912. Although sometimes the negative-positive pattern can be 
concluded as a ‘bounce-back’ of the stock market, however, it can also be a sign of 
insider trading due to the reason that the insiders might try to leak negative 
information to the market to lower the share prices before they intend to buy shares. 
In Filter 2-the news search, public released rumours will be searched to elucidate 


































According to Figure 5.5, only the curve of the suspicious firms has spikes from -60 
day to -40 day and the curve of the clean firms are very stable without any spikes 
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Figure 5  daily average return for U.K target firms 2010
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Figures 5.11-5.15 show the AR for the U.K target firms from 2006 to 2010 based on 
Tables 5.14-18 from the market adjusted model. 
Figures 5.11: The daily average return for the U.K target firms in 2006 from the 





Figure 5.11 is the ARs of the total, the clean and the suspected firms for U.K. 2006. 
The difference between Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.1 is that Figure 5.11 is based on the 
market-adjusted model while Figure 5.1 is based on the market model. The tables are 
in the appendix. When compared with the results from the market model, slight 
difference in numbers is found because the market-adjusted model has assumptions 
that α=0 and β=1 while the market model estimates α and β. However, there is no 
significant statistical difference between the results from the market-adjusted model 
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Figure 11  daily average return for U.K target firms 2006
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Figures 5.12: The daily average return for the U.K target firms in 2007 from the 




Figures 5.13: The daily average return for the U.K target firms in 2008 from the 
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Figure 13  daily average return for U.K target firms 2008
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Figures 5.14: The daily average return for the U.K target firms in 2009 from the 




Figures 5.15: The daily average return for the U.K target firms in 2010 from the 




Although Tables 5.14-18 in the appendix seem different from the Tables 5.7-12, 
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Figure 15  daily average return for U.K target firms 2010
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identical with those from the market model. As a result, the discussion is omitted for 
the results from the market-adjusted model.  
 
Table 5.19: The codes of the clean, suspected and suspected after the plotting firms 
after the dummy variable approach in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected after 
the plotting 
T0603 T0613 T0619 T0601 T0610 None 
T0605 T0614  T0602 T0611  
T0606 T0615  T0604   
T0609 T0616  T0607   
T0612 T0617  T0608   
2007  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected after 
the plotting 
T0704 T0701  T0710 T0715 T0709 
T0707 T0702  T0711 T0716  
T0708 T0703 T0712   
 T0705 T0713   
 T0706 T0714   
2008 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected after 
the plotting 
T0803 T0816 T0801 T0811 T0806 
T0804 T0818 T0802 T0812 T0814 
T0808  T0805 T0813  
T0810  T0807 T0817  
T0815  T0809   
2009 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected after 
the plotting 
T0903 T0911 T0901 T0914 T0907 
T0904 T0916 T0902 T0915 T0912 
T0905  T0906   
T0909  T0908   
T0910  T0913   
2010 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected after 
the plotting 
T1001 T1012 T1002 T1011 None 
T1004 T1013 T1003 T1015  
T1006 T1014 T1005 T1017  
T1008 T1016 T1007 T1018  




Section 5.3.3 The analysis of the CAARs after the dummy variable 
approach for the targets 
 
The previous literature assumes that if there are no unusual price movements prior to 
the announcement date, the CAAR would be expected to fluctuate randomly about 
zero. However, if there is possible existence of insider trading, one would expect a 
build up in the CAAR (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Figures 5.16-5.21 give the 
CAAR of both the suspected and clean firms in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 after the 
dummy variable approach. 
 
 
Figure 5.16: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.K. target firms in 2006 
 
 
According to Figure 5.16, in 2006, before the announcement day, the CAAR of the 
suspected firm are substantially above that of the clean firms. From day -60 to day 
+10, the CAAR of the suspected firms has a positive trend from 0% to about 25% 
indicating that suspected firms are getting increasingly positive cumulative abnormal 
returns all the way through the event window. On the other hand, the CAAR of the 
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day -60 to day 0. On day 0, the CAAR of the clean firms increases dramatically to 
10%.  There is no trend of a buildup in the CAAR of the clean firms.  
 
Figure 5.17: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.K. target firms in 2007 
 
In 2007, from -60 day to +10 day, both the CAAR of the suspected firms and that of 
the clean firms start to increase gradually from -60 day. The difference between them 
is that the CAAR of the suspected firms is above that of the clean firms indicating a 
larger return for the suspected firms than the clean firms. An obvious trend of CAAR 
buildup can be seen for both the suspected and clean. This is an indication that after 
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Figure 5.18: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.K. target firms in 2008 
 
Figure 5.18 is the CAAR for both the suspected and clean firms relative to the merger 
announcement. For the clean firms, the increasing trend in the CAAR is not 
perceivable before day -34. However, after day -34, the trend becomes pronounced. 
During a period from -34 day to -3 day, the CAAR of the clean firms has increased 
from 0% to 20%. For the CAAR of the suspected firms, it decreases sharply to almost 
-20% before -34 day. From -34 day onwards, an obvious increasing trend in the 
CAAR is observed. The CAAR of the suspected firms has increased from -20% on 
day -34 to 10% on day -3. This is a further indication that after the first filter, the 
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Figure 5.19: The CAAR for the suspected and clean U.K. target firms in 2009 
 
 
In 2009, the CAAR of the suspected firms has some fluctuations before the day -40. 
After -40 day, an increasing trend of buildup in the CAAR is observed. The CAAR of 
the suspected firms is increasing considerably from -10% on day -40 to 40% before 
the merger announcement, though with occasional dips. On the other hand, the CAAR 
of the clean firms increases dramatically before -40 day to about 20%. After this day, 
the CAAR of the clean firms decreases slowly. Before the announcement day, it keeps 
a gain of 20%. According to Figure 19, there is a further indication that after the first 
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Figure 5.20: The CAAR for the suspected and clean U.K. target firms in 2010 
 
 
In 2010, before the announcement day,  the CAAR of the suspected firms and of the 
clean firms go randomly about 0% and the CAAR of the clean firms is slightly above 
that of the suspected firms. However, the CAAR of the suspected firms is observed an 
increasing trend from day -7 onwards while the CAAR of the clean firms has a CAAR 
buildup on day -1. The result from the dummy variable approach in 2010 shows 
consistence with the previous assumption-there is less a problem of insider trading in 
2010 than in other years, at least in terms of the period prior to day -7. 
 
Section 5.3.4 Results of the first filter-the dummy variable approach 
for the bidders 
 
 
Section 5.3.4 is the analysis of the bidders in the U.K from 2006 to 2010. Tables 5.20-
24 shown in the appendix are the results of the AR and CAAR for the bidder firms in 
the U.K from 2006 to 2010.  Figures 5.21-5.25 give the AR for the U.K bidders from 
2006 to 2010 from the market model based on Tables 5.20-24. This thesis focuses 
mainly on the targets, in part because initial results suggest that there seems less of 
The CAAR of the suspected starts to increase on -7 day 
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interest to analyse in the bidders, and therefore, for the bidders, only the first filter is 
applied. 
 
Figure 5.21 The daily average return for the U.K bidder firms 2006 
 
Figure 5.22 The daily average return for the U.K bidder firms 2007 
 
 
no substantial return on day 0 for the 'clean' bidders
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Figure 21 daily average return for U.K bidder firms 2006





























Figure 22 daily average return for U.K bidder firms 2007
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Figure 5.23 The daily average return for the U.K bidder firms 2008 
 
 



























































Figure 24 daily average return for U.K bidder firms 2009
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Figure 5.25 The daily average return for the U.K bidder firms 2010 
 
According to Figures 5.21-5.25, it appears to be the case that the bidders are not 
experiencing the day 0 abnormal return run-up as the targets. Furthermore, the 
abnormal returns the bidders get are much lower than those the targets get. That 
suggests that the gains are asymmetric and largely accrue to the target firms. It is also 
consistent with, although not proof of, the hypothesis that the bidders are paying too 
much for the target firms. Apart from this, there is no obvious pattern for the clean, 
suspected and total bidder firms.  
 
Tables 5.30-34 in the appendix give the results of the average abnormal return (AR) 
and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of the U.K bidder firms from 2006 
to 2010 based on the market adjusted model. Although Tables 5.30-34 seem different 
from the Tables 5.20-24, but the graphs from the market-adjusted model are identical 
with those from the market model. As a result, the discussion is omitted for the results 
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Figure 25 daily average return for U.K bidder firms 2010
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Section 5.3.5 The CAAR analysis after the first filter for both the 
targets and bidders  
 
Section 5.3.5 is the analysis of the CAAR for both the targets and bidders after the 
first filter-the dummy variable approach. Here, the diagrams for both the targets and 
the bidders are plotted together to see if there are some pre-merger run-ups in the 












The CAAR of the targets builds up when day approaches 0
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The CAAR of U.K 2009
The CAAR of the targets starts to increase sharply on -5 day and peaks on 3 day
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According to Figure 5.26-5.30, generally, the CAARs for the targets from 2006 to 
2010 are upward sloping while for the CAARs of the bidders, there is a hint of them 
being downward sloping. For years 2006 and 2010, the CAARs of the targets have an 
upward trend from day -60 to day 0, and then increase very sharply on and after the 
announcement day. In 2006, the CAAR keeps on increasing to about 20% while in 
2010, the CAAR increases to about 40%. In 2007, the CAAR for the targets leaps to 
10% during the first ten days of the event window (from -60 day to -50 day), and then 
keeps on fluctuating around 10% until day 0. From day 0 onwards, the CAAR for the 
targets increases sharply to about 40%. In 2008, the CAAR for the targets remains 
stable from day -60 to day -40 and it decreases rapidly to -10% and from day -30 
onwards, the CAAR for the targets begins to increase. It starts a rapid increase on day 
-2 and from 0 day onwards, the CAAR for the targets leaps rapidly to approximately 
40%. In 2009, it is notable that the CAAR for the bidders are not like those in the 
other years which are generally stable but slightly downward sloped. Instead, the 
CAAR for the bidders in 2009 keeps on increasing during the event window and 
reaches 30% in the end. On the other hand, the CAAR for the targets decreases to -10% 
from day -60 to day -50 and then begins to increase. It is possible that the result may 
be attributed to the economic crisis which has a disturbance to the pattern of the 
CAAR from 2007 to 2009. But it may also be unique to this set of firms. 
 
Section 5.3.6The news search before the announcement date 
In reality, information can be gathered from a wide variety of resources, such as 
business newspaper, TV programs, Internet websites and so on. The possible link 
between insider trading and the publication of inside information has been recognized 
in Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971). Those who possess privileged 
information have an incentive to take market positions on the basis of their 
information and then announce their information publicly. This issue is challenging to 
investigate empirically because isolating trading based on private information is 
difficult.  In order to support the dummy variable approach, for each target firm, I 
used Nexis to search for the possible rumours as well as the directors’ trading on the 
shares before the announcement date. Nexis is one of the world’s largest online 
database services. It contains thousands of publications which provide extensive 





 I searched all English news world-wide. Tables 5.35-39 illustrate the 
public information leakage for each target firm in the U.K from 2006 to 2010. The 
results of the news search mainly suggest that 1) there is no evidence of director’s 
trading affecting the abnormal price movements of the targets. 2) For some targets, 
for example Firm T0601, the public news leakage of the potential takeover of the 
target is possibly influencing the abnormal price movements. According to the news 
search, Firm T0601 confirmed that it was in preliminary talks to sell the company 9 
days before the announcement. On day -8, the dummy variable approach suggests an 
abnormal return, and this might due to the rumour released one day before. 
 
Table 5.35: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 




Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





T0601 -8 day -7 day None 
-9 day 
T0602 -21 day -29 day None 
T0615 +4 day None -13 day 
T0604 -6 day None None 
T0605 +6 day None None 
T0606 None -43 day None 
T0607 -31 day None None 
T0608 -23 day None None 
-22 day 
+7 day 
T0609 None None -6 day 
-19 day 




T0611 -22 day None None 
-1 day 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: T0612, T0613, T0614, T0603, 
T0616, T0617, T0618, T0619 
 




  The firms with no entry are firms for which no rumours or director’s trading is found and no day on 




The dummy variable approach suggests that on day -8, Firm T0601 is experiencing 
abnormal return, but since public rumours are found released on day -7 and day -9, 
the day -8 abnormal return may be driven by the -9 day’s information leakage. 
Moreover, for Firm T0602, the news leakage is found on day -29 while the abnormal 
return is on day -21, and for Firm T0610, the public rumour is found on -41 and 
thereafter on day -32, day -30 and day-29, the abnormal returns are found.  The above 
findings might be the evidence of the long, and somewhat delayed, effect of the public 
information leakage. These findings do raise questions about market efficiency, where 
an efficient market should process and adapt to information immediately, but 
nonetheless this may help explain the abnormal trading without recourse to 
explanations of insider trading. On the other hand, for many firms such as Firm T0604, 
Firm T0607, Firm T0608 and so on, although no public rumour of potential takeover 
is detected, they are still experiencing abnormal returns and therefore, insider trading 
is suspected. 
 
Table 5.36: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2007: Firm T0701-T0716 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal return 





T0701 -34 day None -58 day 
-33 day 
T0702 -2 day None None 
-1 day 
0 day 




T0705 -1 day None None 
T0706 -31 day -1 day None 
-1 day 
0 day 
T0709 None -6 day None 




T0711 -1 day -1 day None 
0 day 
T0712 -13 day -18 day None 
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T0713 -1 day None None 
T0714 -57 day None None 
-56 day 
-55 day 
T0715 -34 day -4 day None 
T0716 -48 day -6 day None 
-7 day 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: T0704, T0707, T0708 
 
According to Table 5.36, there is only a rumour release on day -6 which would by no 
means affect the stock prices of the Firm T0709 from -50 to -30 day. As a result, Firm 
T0709 (mentioned as suspected in Graph 5.11) is also suspected to have been 
involved in insider trading. In addition, it is also noticeable that on -5 day, there is a 
negative spike in the AR of the Firm T0709 (see Graph 5.11). Of course it is not 
inconceivable that the negative spike is associated with insider trading in that the firm, 
or someone within the firm, leak negative news the day before they intend to buy 
shares. This pushes the price of shares down and increases their subsequent gains. 
 
Table 5.37: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2008: Firm T0801-T0818 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal return 





T0801 -38 day None None 
-19 day 
-12 day 




T0805 -18 day -10 day -5 day 
-11 day 
T0806 None -36 day None 
T0807 -23 day None None 
-22 day 
T0808 +1 day None -2 day 
+5 day 
T0809 -33 day None None 
-32 day 
-1 day 
T0811 -1 day -3 day -45 day 













Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: T0818, T0810, T0803, T0814, 
T0815, T0816 
 
According Table 5.37, no rumour for Firm T0814 (mentioned as suspected in Graph 
5.12) is found. The daily dummy variable fails to capture the spike in Firm T0814 but 
a spike on day -25 can be seen clearly in Graph 5.12 for this firm. From Table 5.37, a 
rumour of possible takeover is found for Firm T0806 on day -36. It is possible that 
this publicly released news causes the spike on day -25 for Firm T0806. 
 
Table 5.38: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2009: Firm T0901-T0916 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal return 





T0901 -9 day None None 
-6 day 
-5 day 
T0902 -36 day -50 day None 
+2 day 
+3 day 
T0906 -31 day -43 day None 
-30 day 
T0907 None -2 day None 
T0908 -1 day None -11 day 
-43 day 
-44 day 
T0911 None -17 day None 





T0914 -12 day None None 
-7 day 
T0915 +8 day None None 
T0916 +9 day None None 
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Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: T0903, T0904, T0905, T0909, 
T0910, T0912 
 
According to Table 5.38, there is only a rumour release on day -2 which would by no 
means affect the stock prices from -50 to -40 day. As a result, Firm T0907 (mentioned 
as suspected in Graph 5.13) is also suspected to have been involved in insider trading. 
Firm T0910 has several spikes during a period from -60 day to -40 day. No publicly 
released news is found for Firm T0910 and therefore, Firm T0910 is added to the list 
of suspected firms. Furthermore, according to news search, no publicly released news 
is found for Firm T0912, and as a result, it is also added to the list of suspected firms.  
 
Table 5.39: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2010: Firm T1001-T1018 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal return 
















T1005 -4 day None None 
T1007 -7 day None None 
T1009 None -1 day None 
-3 day 
-6 day 
T1010 -11 day None None 
T1011 -36 day -1 day None 
-4 day 
-1 day 
T1013 None None -21 day 
T1015 -13 day None None 
T1016 None -19 day -23 day 
-31 day 
T1017 -2 day None None 
-1 day 
0 day 
T1018 -57 day None None 
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Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: T1001, T1004, T1006, T1008, 
T1012, T1014 
 
Section 5.3.7The categorization after two filters-the dummy variable 
approach and the news search 
 
Table 5.40 shows the clean, the suspected, the clean after the news search and the 
suspected after the plotting firms in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 after dummy variable 
and news search. After the results are shown, the ‘clean after news search’ will be 
renamed as ‘obscure’ and the ‘suspected after the plotting’ will be categorized as 
‘suspected’ if no news support is found in Table 5.41 for the reason of simplification 
for further studies. 
 
 
Table 5.40: The codes of the clean, the suspected, the clean after the news search and 
the suspected after the plotting firms after two filters in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The clean after 




T0603 T0613 T0618 T0602 T0611 T0601 None 
T0605 T0614 T0619 T0604    
T0606 T0615  T0607    
T0609 T0616  T0608    
T0612 T0617  T0610    
2007   
The code of 
the clean 
firms 
The code of the suspected firms The clean after 




T0704 T0701 T0710 T0715  None T0709 
T0707 T0702 T0711 T0716    
T0708 T0703 T0712    
 T0705 T0713    
 T0706 T0714    
2008  
The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The clean after 




T0803 T0816 T0801 T0812 T0806 T0814 
T0804 T0818 T0802 T0813 T0811  
T0808  T0805 T0817   
T0810  T0807    




The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The clean after 




T0903 T0901 T0914 None T0907 
T0904 T0902 T0915  T0910 
T0905 T0906   T0912 
T0909 T0908    
T0916 T0913    
2010  
The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The clean after 




T1001 T1012 T1002 T1011 None None 
T1004 T1013 T1003 T1015   
T1006 T1014 T1005 T1017   
T1008 T1016 T1007 T1018   
T1009  T1010    
Source: Author’s summation 
Table 5.41: The codes of the clean, the suspected, and the obscure firm after two 
filters in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The obscure firm 
T0603 T0613 T0619 T0602 T0611 T0601 
T0605 T0614  T0604   
T0606 T0615  T0607   
T0609 T0616  T0608   
T0612 T0617  T0610   
2007  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The obscure firm 
T0704 T0701  T0709 T0714 None 
T0707 T0702  T0710 T0715  
T0708 T0703 T0711 T0716  
 T0705 T0712   
 T0706 T0713   
2008 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The obscure firm 
T0803 T0816 T0801 T0812 T0806 
T0804 T0818 T0802 T0813 T0811 
T0808  T0805 T0814  
T0810  T0807 T0817  
T0815  T0809   
2009 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The obscure firm 
T0903 T0916 T0901 T0910 None 
T0904  T0902 T0912  
T0905  T0906 T0913  
T0909  T0907 T0914  
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T0911  T0908 T0915  
2010 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The obscure firm 
T1001 T1012 T1002 T1011 None 
T1004 T1013 T1003 T1015  
T1006 T1014 T1005 T1017  
T1008 T1016 T1007 T1018  
T1009  T1010   
Source: Author’s summation 
Section 5.3.8The results of the detection of the outliers  
Tables 5.42-51 give the results from analysing and detecting outliers. With this filter, 
the firms are firstly grouped to be clean, suspected and obscure according to the 
previous filter, and then the firms in each group are examined respectively as to 
whether they have positive squared abnormal returns equal or greater than 3.5 or 4 




Table 5.42: The day(s) on which the clean firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0603 -55 day 1.14 None 
-28 day 0.87 
T0605 -26 day 1.94* None 
T0606 -48 day 2.86*** -43 day 
T0609 -57 day 2.97*** -19 day 
T0612 -13 day 1.04 None 
T0613 -21 day 2.69*** None 
T0614 None - None 
T0615 None - -13 day 
T0616 -2 day 3.54*** None 
T0617 None - None 
                                                          
20
 Only the positive error is squared and examined and the negative error is excluded. 
21
  The first column in the table is the firm’s name and the second column is the days on which the 
squared abnormal return is greater than 4*SD. For the squared abnormal return which is greater than 
3.5*SD, a bracket is given after the day to specify. The third column is the t-statistics for the daily 
dummy variable, the significance level is stated in the bracket (e.g. 2.86(1%) means the t-statistics is 
2.86 and it is significant with 1% level of significance.) The fourth column is the day on which public 
rumours or director’s trading is found.  
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T0618 None - None 
T0619 -14 day (3.5*SD) 0.73 None 
-4 day (3.5*SD) 0.83 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.43: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0601 -8 day 10.45 (1%) -7 day 
-9 day 
T0602 -21 day 6.16*** -29 day 
T0604 -6 day 3.98*** None 
T0607 -31 day 6.66*** None 
T0608 -22 day 2.98*** None 
-23 day (3.5*SD) 3.51*** 
T0610 -29 day 7.85*** -41 day 
-9 day 6.26*** 
T0611 -1 day 6.51*** None 
 
 
Table 5.44: The day(s) on which the clean firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 
4*SD in the U.K in 2007 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0704 -23 day 3.07*** None 
T0707 -3 day 2.71*** None 
T0708 -57 day (3.5*SD) 2.49** None 
 
Table 5.45: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0701 -33 day 3.18*** None 
T0702 -1 day 5.03*** None 
T0703 -3 day 5.15*** None 
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T0705 -1 day 17.24*** None 
T0706 -1 day -1.46 -1 day 
T0709 -45 day 5.26*** None 
T0710 -4 day 5.37*** -10 day 
T0711 -1 day 13.68*** -1 day 
T0713 -1 day 5.98*** None 
T0714 -57 day 20.65*** None 
T0715 -34 day 15.12*** -4 day 
T0716 None - -6 day 
-7 day 
 
Table 5.46: The day(s) on which the clean firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 
4*SD in the U.K in 2008 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0803 None - None 
T0804 None - None 
T0806 -25 day 11.63*** -36 day 
T0808 -2 day 2.68*** -2 day 
T0810 None - None 
T0815 -55 day 2.85*** None 
-16 day 2.56** 
T0816 -39 day 0.17 None 
T0818 None - None 
 
Table 5.47: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0801 None - None 
T0802 -33 day 6.69*** -1 day 
T0805 -18 day 7.62*** -11 day 
-10 day 
-5 day 
T0807 -23 day 8.64*** None 
T0809 -33 day 4.28*** None 
-1 day 3.64*** 
T0811 -1 day 8.89*** -45 day 
-3 day 
T0812 -21 day 10.10*** None 
T0813 -9 day 4.12*** None 
T0814 -15 day 5.54*** None 
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T0817 -1 day 7.52*** None 
 
Table 5.48: The day(s) on which the clean firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0903 -23 day 2.43** None 
-1 day (3.5*SD) 2.03** 
T0904 -53 day 3.25*** None 
T0905 -18 day 4.76*** None 
T0909 None - None 
T0910 -42 day 4.65*** None 
T0911 -38 day 2.01** -17 day 
-39 day (3.5*SD) 1.86* 
T0912 -52 day 13.71*** None 
T0916 -31 day 1.11 None 
 
 
Table 5.49: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T0901 -10 day 7.64*** None 
-9 day 7.67*** 
T0902 -36 day 4.71*** -50 day 
T0906 -31 day 21.95*** -43 day 
T0907 -44 day 4.54*** -2 day 
T0908 None - -44 day 
-43 day 
-11 day 
T0913 -46 day 4.37*** None 
-35 day (3.5*SD) 3.66*** 
T0914 -7 day 8.35*** None 
T0915 -8 day 4.47*** None 
 
 
Table 5.50: The day(s) on which the clean firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 
4*SD in the U.K in 2010 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 





greater than 4*SD 
T1001 -42 day 3.09*** None 
T1004 -36 day 3.72*** None 
T1006 -48 day 1.50 None 
T1008 -3 day 1.30 None 
T1009 -23 day 3.63*** -1 day 
-3 day 
-6 day 
T1012 None - None 
T1013 None - -21 day 
T1014 None - None 
T1016 -30 day 2.01** -19 day 
-58 day (3.5*SD) 1.75* -27 day 
-55 day (3.5*SD) 1.78* -31 day 
 
Table 5.51: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 
4*SD in the U.K in 2010 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
T1002 -16 day 8.82*** None 
T1003 -1 day 5.58*** None 
T1005 -4 day 3.02*** None 
T1007 None - None 
T1010 None - None 
T1011 -1 day 16.32*** -1 day 
-36 day (3.5*SD) 12.41*** 
T1015 -40 day 6.35*** None 
T1017 -41 day 5.35*** None 
T1018 -57 day 5.18*** None 
 
Section 5.3.9The categorization after three filters-the dummy 
variable approach, the news search, and the detection of the outliers 
 
After the previous three filters- the dummy variable approach, the news search and the 
detection of outliers, the U.K firms are categorized into five groups-the clean, the 
obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected and the ultra-suspected. 
 
Table 5.52: The codes of the clean, obscure, obscure with lagged news suspected and 
ultra-suspected firms after three filters in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the The code of The code of The code of The code of the 
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T0603 T0618 T0601 T0606 T0605 T0604 
T0612 T0619 T0602  T0609 T0607 
T0614    T0613 T0608 
T0615    T0616 T0610 
T0617     T0611 
2007  
The code of the 
clean firms 
The code of 
the obscure 
firms 




The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the 
ultra-suspected 
firms 
None T0710 None T0704 T0701 T0713 
 T0711  T0706 T0702 T0714 
 T0712  T0707 T0703 T0715 
   T0708 T0705  
  T0716 T0709  
2008  










The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the 
ultra-suspected 
firms 
T0803 T0806 T0805 T0801 T0802 T0814 
T0804 T0808  T0815 T0807 T0817 
T0810 T0811   T0809  
T0816    T0812  
T0818    T0813  
2009  










The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the 
ultra-suspected 
firms 
T0909 None None T0903 T0911 T0901 T0914 
T0916   T0904 T0912 T0902 T0915 
   T0905  T0906  
   T0908  T0907  
   T0910  T0913  
2010  










The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the 
ultra-suspected 
firms 
T1006 None None T1001 T1016 T1002 T1017 
T1008   T1004  T1003 T1018 
T1012   T1007  T1005  
T1013   T1009  T1011  
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T1014   T1010  T1015  
Source: Author’s summation22 
 
 
Section 5.3.10The Result of the Abnormal Turnover (AT) analysis 
Here, I examine whether the daily average turnover calculated for two months (-60 to 
-11 trading days) prior to merger announcement and two weeks (-10 to -1 trading days) 
prior to the merger announcement gives any signal of presence of any possible insider 
trading. I use the average turnover calculated for a period from -180 to -61 day as the 
benchmark for average turnover in normal days. Then the daily average turnover for 
each firm is compared with 1.25 multiplied by the benchmark, 1.50 multiplied by the 
benchmark and 2.0 multiplied by the benchmark because of gradual stringent standard. 
 
Table 5.53: The result of the AT analysis in the U.K. from 2006 to 2010 
2006  















The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
T0617 None T0605, T0604, 
T0615, T0613 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
T0617 None None 
2007 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61 day to -11 day 
None None T0713 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
None None None 
2008 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None T0803, T0814 
The average of the None None T0803 
                                                          
22
 The categorization of the firms after three filters can be found in Chapter 4, Table 4.4. 
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turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
2009 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61 day to -11 day 
None None T0916, T0914, 
T0901, T0908 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
None None None 
2010 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None T1018 T1015, T1004, 
T1005 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
None T1018 None 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
From Table 5.53, it is clear that the ATs mainly exist two months prior to the 
announcement day (-61 to -11 day). The fact suggests that there is a strong evidence 
of possible insider trading about one month prior to the merger announcement and 
this might indicate that the insider traders choose this period to make it less 
observable than the period from -10 to -1 day. 
 
Table 5.54: Distribution of firms with respect to percentage of AT increase 
(Benchmark: AT for a period from -180 to -61 day before announcement) 
 
% High of AT 
 
No. & % of firms with higher 
AT from -61 to -11 day 
No. & % of firms with higher 
AT from -10 to 0 day 
2006 
125-150% 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 4 (21%) 0 (0%) 
Total 5 (32%) 1 (5%) 
2007 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 
Total 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 
2008 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 2 (11%) 1 (6%) 
Total 2 (11%) 1 (6%) 
2009 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
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150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 4 (25%) 0 (0%) 
Total 4 (25%) 0 (0%) 
2010 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 
>200% 3 (17%) 0 (0%) 
Total 4 (22%) 1 (6%) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
Section 5.3.11The categorization after the dummy variable, the news 
search, the detection of the outliers and the analysis of the abnormal 
turnover (AT) 
 
After applying all four filters- the dummy variable approach, the news search, the 
detection of the outliers, and the analysis of the AT, the U.K firms are categorized 
into six groups-the clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected, 
the ultra-suspected and the ultra-ultra-suspected. 
 
Table 5.55: The codes of the absolute clean, obscure, obscure with lagged news 
suspected ultra-suspected and ultra-ultra-suspected firms after four filters in the U.K 
from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006   

























T0603 T0601 T0606 T0616 T0605 T0608 T0604 
T0612 T0602  T0609 T0613   
T0614   T0617 T0607   
T0618   T0615 T0610   
T0619    T0611   
2007   
















The code of 
the suspected 
firms 








None T0711 None T0704 T0715 T0703 T0713 
 T0710  T0707 T0705 T0709  
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 T0712  T0708 T0702   
   T0716 T0701   
  T0706 T0714   
2008   
















The code of 
the suspected 
firms 








T0818 T0806 T0805 T0815 T0813 T0817 T0814 
T0816 T0808  T0801 T0802   
T0810 T0811  T0803 T0809   
T0804    T0807   
    T0812   
2009   
















The code of the 
suspected firms 








T0909 None None T0903 T0912 T0913 T0906 T0914 
   T0904 T0916 T0908  T0901 
   T0905  T0915   
   T0910  T0902   
   T0911  T0907   
2010   















The code of the 
suspected firms 









T1006 None None T1001 T1002 T1018 
T1008   T1007 T1004 T1015 
T1012   T1009 T1003 T1005 
T1013   T1016 T1017  
T1014   T1010 T1011  
Source: Author’s summation23 
                                                          
23
 The categorization of the firms after four filters can be found in Chapter 4, Table 4.5. 
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Figures 5.36-5.40 present the AR of the six categories of firms in the U.K from 2006 
to 2010.  
Figure 5.36: The AR of the six categories of firms in the U.K 2006 
 
 
According to Figure 5.36, the AR of the absolute clean firm does not have spikes 
prior to day 0. Moreover, it is noticeable that the AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm 
has a spike on about day -7 and then nothing on day 0. On the other hand, the AR of 
the absolute clean firm reaches to 30% which is the highest among all the categories 
on day 0. The evidence above has supported the day 0 hypothesis that with the 
existence of insider trading, the abnormal return would be, at least partly, absorbed 
before merger announcement. Furthermore, the obscure firm with lagged news has 
both significant positive and negative spikes before the merger announcement. The 
only obscure firm with lagged news is Firm T0606. It has publicly news release on 
day -43. Graph 5.15 below presents the daily average turnover (AT) of the Firm 
T0606. 
 
The AR of the absolute clean firm reaches to 30% on day 0 which is the highest
The AR of the absolute clean firms does not have spikes prior to day 0






















-60 -40 -20 0 20
day
absolute clean firm obscure firm
obscure firm with lagged news suspected firm
ultra-suspected firm ultra-ultra-suspected firm
121 
 
Graph 5.15: The daily average turnover (AT) of the Firm T0606 
 
 
According to Graph 5.15, on day -57 and -48, there are two spikes of the AT and the 
news has released on day -43, after which the AR has two significantly negative 
spikes. Likewise, the AT has another run-up on day -57 after which there is a 
significantly negative spike on AR. Therefore, the argument that the insiders would 
buy share and then release the information to the public to cover up their insider 
trading activities does not apply in this case because the insiders will not buy shares 
and release negative information to make themselves suffer the loss As a result, the 
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Figure 5.37: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2007 
 
 
According to Figure 5.37, there is no absolute clean firm or obscure firm with lagged 
news in the U.K in 2007. All the other four categories of firms have significant spikes 
on AR before the merger announcement. There are significant day 0 spikes, for 
example for the ultra suspected firm, but this is substantially less than for the clean 
firm in 2006. There are three obscure firms in 2007, and they are Firm T0710 which 
has publicly news release on day -10, Firm T0711 which has publicly news release on 
day -1 and Firm T0712 which has publicly news release on day -18. Graphs 5.16-5.19 
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Graph 5.16: The AT of the Firm T0710 and Firm T0711 
 
 
Firm T0710 has publicly released news on day -10 and on day -7 and day -4, there are 
two significant spikes in the AT accompanied with significant positive AR which can 
be seen in Figure 5.37. Therefore, the significant positive AR from day -10 to day 0 
might be due to the increase of AT which is caused by the publicly released positive 
news. 
 
Firm T0711 has publicly released news on day -1 and according to Graph 5.16, the 
AT increases sharply on from day -3. This might be the case that the insiders buy 
shares to gain from the possession of inside information and then release the news to 
the public to cover up their illegal activities. From Figure 5.37, there is a significant 
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Graph 5.18: The AT and AR of the Firm T0711  
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Graph 5.19: The AT and AR of the Firm T0712 
 
 
Firm T0712 has publicly released news on day -18. According to Graph 5.19, on day -
50, day -33 and day -13, there are significant spikes on the AT. Finally, after the news 
released on day -18, the AT starts to increase. The spikes on AT which precedes a 
spike in the AR could indicate someone buying shares which then start to increase as 
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Figure 5.38: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2008 
 
 
According to Figure 5.38, the AR of the absolute clean firm does not have any spikes 
before merger announcement. Furthermore, on day 0, the AR of the absolute clean 
firm is the highest among all the categories which again supports the day 0 hypothesis. 
For the ultra-ultra-suspected and ultra-suspected firms, very significant ARs before 
merger announcement are found. Apart from this, the obscure firm and the obscure 
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Graph 5.20: The AT and AR of the Firm T0805 
 
 
There is only one obscure firm with lagged news-the Firm T0805. This firm has 
publicly released news on day -11, day -10 and day -5 respectively. It is noticeable 
according to the Graph 5.20 that the three news releases are all after significant ATs. 
This is highly suspicious because the insiders can buy shares in advance, making 
profit on inside information and then release the information to the public. However, 
according to Figure 5.38, no significant spikes on AR can be seen after day -10. The 
most significant spike appears on about day -18, accompanied by an increase in the 
AT. Therefore, the spike on AR might be due to insider trading around day -18 after 
which the insiders hold the information for a week and then release to the public or it 
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Figure 5.39: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2009 
 
 
According to Figure 5.39, the AR of the absolute clean firm is experiencing both 
significant positive spikes and significant negative spikes. On the merger 
announcement, the absolute clean does not seem to have substantial AR as suggested 
by the day 0 hypothesis. There is only one absolute clean firm- the Firm T0909. A 
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Figure 5.40: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2010 
 
 
According to Figure 5.40, the AR of the absolute clean firm does not have spikes 
before the merger announcement and on day 0, the AR of the clean firm reaches more 
than 40% which is the highest among all the categories in 2010. The AR of the ultra-
ultra-suspected firm has several significant spikes before merger announcement and 
moreover, on day 0, the difference of the ARs between the absolute clean firm and the 
ultra-ultra-suspected firm is quite substantial-about 20%. 
 
Figures 5.41-5.45 present the CAAR of the six categories-the absolute clean firm, the 
obscure firm, the obscure firm with lagged news, the suspected firm, the ultra-
suspected firm and the ultra-ultra-suspected firm. According to the previous literature, 
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Figure 5.41: The CAAR of the six categories of firms in the U.K 2006 
 
 
According to Figure 5.41, only the CAAR of the absolute clean firm rapidly builds up 
on day 0. Before the merger announcement, the CAAR of the absolute clean firm 
decreases slowly and reaches about -10%. On day 0, it increases sharply to 20%. It is 
also noticeable that the CAAR of the suspected firm ends up negative while the 
CAARs of the other categories of firms are all positive on day 0. The CAAR of the 
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Figure 5.42: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2007 
 
 
Similar to Figure 5.41, the CAARs of the obscure firm and the ultra-suspected firm 
increase steadily all the way through the event window and end up at comparatively 
higher level- the CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm ends up at about 60% on day 0 
while the CAAR of the obscure firm reaches at about 50%. On the other hand, the 
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Figure 5.43: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2008 
 
According to Figure 5.43, the CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm starts to 
increase on -30 day and ends up at more than 150% on day 0. For the CAAR of other 
categories of firms, they all end up positive on day 0. Before the merger 
announcement, the CAARs of all the categories apart from that of the ultra-ultra-









The CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm starts to increase on -30 day
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Figure 5.44: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2009 
 
According to Figure 5.44, the day -48 sharp increase of the CAAR of the suspected 
firm is highly suspicious of the involvement of insider trading. The CAAR of the 
ultra-ultra-suspected firm starts to leap up on day -12 and leaps up again on day -6 
while the CAAR of the absolute clean firm starts to increase on day -6.  On day 0, the 
CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm reaches highest at 40% while the CAAR of 
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Figure 5.45: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.K 2010 
 
According to Figure 5.45, the CAAR of the absolute clean firm remains below 0 and 
starts to build up on -1 day. On day 0, the buildup in the CAAR of the absolute clean 
firm is pronounced at about 40%. This is an indication that these absolute clean firms 
are indeed clean. On the other hand, the increasing trend in CAAR of the ultra-ultra-
suspected firm starts from day -60, though with occasional dips. It does not have an 
obvious leap up on day 0 and ends up at almost the same level which is 40% with that 
of the absolute clean firm. The CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm decreases before 
day -58 and then it increases steadily to about 20% before the merger announcement. 
On day -5, the increasing trend in CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm is more 
perceptible and moreover, it increases more rapidly than before. The CAAR of the 






The CAAR of the clean firm remains below 0 before day 0
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Figure 5.46: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.K 2006 
 
Figure 5.46 is the AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms relative to the 
merger announcement. It is pronounced that the AT of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms 
has several significant spikes before day 0. Furthermore, on day -6, a substantial AT 
up to more than 200,000,000 is observed. On the contrary, the AT of the clean firms 
remains stable before merger announcement. This is consistent with King (2009)’s 
finding that with the existence of insider trading, both massive AR and AT ahead of 
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Figure 5.47: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.K 2007 
 
In 2007, there is no absolute clean firm, as a result, only the AT of the ultra-ultra-
suspected firms is plotted in Figure 5.47. It is noticeable that from day -60 onwards, 
several spikes in the AT are observed. This is in accordance with the conclusion made 
by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Conrad and Niden (1993), Chae (2005) and Graham, 
Koski and Loewenstein (2006). They found that the higher than normal AT can be 
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Figure 5.48: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.K 2008 
 
Figure 5.49: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.K 2009 
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Figure 5.50: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.K 2010 
 
 
According to Figures 5.48-5.50, the ATs of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms have very 
high spikes before the merger announcement while those of the clean firms seem to be 
more stable. The run-ups of the AT of the ultra-ultra-suspected are observed several 
weeks or months before the merger announcement. The finding in this study is 
consistent with the studies by the previous scholars, for example, King (2009), Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989), Conrad and Niden (1993), Chae (2005) and Graham, Koski and 
Loewenstein (2006). 
 
Section 5.3.12The results of Granger causality test in the targets and 
the bidders 
 
Granger causality test tells us the linkages with inside traders. The insiders may first 
sell stocks in their own company to generate finance to buy shares in the target firm. 
On the other hand, the successful purchases of target firms’ shares may lead to sales 
of the insiders’ own shares if the shares were bought with borrowed money. Tables 
5.56-60 show the results of Granger causality test for the targets and bidders in pair in 
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the U.K from 2006 to 2010. Tables 5.62-66 in the appendix give the results of the 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test for the targets and bidders in the U.K from 2006 
to 2010. The results show that all the targets and bidders are stationary. 
 










T0601/obscure No 0.37 No 0.52 
T0602/obscure No 2.29 No 0.41 
T0603/clean No 0.60 No 0.67 
T0604/ultra-ultra-suspected No 1.47 No 0.72 
T0605/ultra-suspected No 0.60 No 0.64 
T0606/obscure with lagged news No 0.82 No 0.84 
T0607/ultra-suspected No 2.03 No 0.80 
T0608/ultra-suspected  No 0.26 No 0.12 
T0609/suspected Yes (5%) 4.44 No 0.40 
T0610/ultra-suspected No 0.08 No 0.47 
T0611/ultra-suspected No 0.46 No 0.82 
T0612/clean No 1.41 No 0.30 
T0613/ultra-suspected No 0.07 Yes (10%) 2.96 
T0614/clean No 0.43 Yes (1%) 6.63 
T0615/suspected No 0.88 No 1.52 
T0616/suspected Yes (10%) 2.35 No 0.51 
T0617/suspected No 0.74 No 2.12 
T0618/clean No 0.54 No 0.05 
T0619/clean No 0.34 No 1.50 
Source: Author’s calculation 










T0701/ultra-suspected No 2.18 No 1.07 
T0702/ultra-suspected No 2.09 No 0.36 
T0703/ultra-suspected No 0.17 Yes (5%) 3.94 
T0704/suspected No 0.86 No 0.12 
T0705/ultra-suspected No 0.29 No 0.36 
T0706/suspected No 0.39 No 2.26 
T0707/suspected No 0.24 No 0.35 
T0708/suspected Yes (5%) 4.47 Yes (1%) 6.03 
T0709/ultra-suspected No 0.45 No 0.19 
T0710/obscure No 0.15 Yes (10%) 3.01 
T0711/obscure No 1.11 No 0.18 
T0712/obscure No 0.87 No 0.49 
T0713/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.46 Yes (10%) 2.38 
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T0714/ultra-suspected No 1.96 No 0.14 
T0715/ultra-suspected No 0.40 Yes (1%) 8.66 
T0716/suspected No 0.66 No 0.87 
Source: Author’s calculation 










T0801/suspected No 0.96 No 0.30 
T0802/ultra-suspected No 0.67 No 1.65 
T0803/suspected No 0.95 No 2.02 
T0804/clean No 1.71 No 0.46 
T0805/obscure with lagged news No 0.81 No 0.03 
T0806/obscure No 2.10 No 0.55 
T0807/ultra-suspected No 0.18 No 0.91 
T0808/obscure No 0.11 No 0.59 
T0809/ultra-suspected No 1.21 No 0.58 
T0810/clean No 0.76 Yes (10%) 2.76 
T0811/obscure No 2.03 Yes (10%) 3.02 
T0812/ultra-suspected Yes (10%) 2.49 No 0.36 
T0813/ultra-suspected No 0.58 No 1.20 
T0814/ultra-ultra-suspected No 2.24 Yes (1%) 5.82 
T0815/suspected No 0.28 No 0.33 
T0816/clean Yes (10%) 2.38 No 0.52 
T0817/ultra-suspected No 0.60 Yes (10%) 3.04 
Source: Author’s calculation 










T0901/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.25 No 0.69 
T0902/ultra-suspected No 0.44 Yes (5%) 4.70 
T0903/suspected Yes (10%) 2.44 No 0.13 
T0904/suspected No 1.90 No 0.36 
T0905/suspected No 0.19 No 1.31 
T0906/ultra-suspected No 1.38 No 0.45 
T0907/ultra-suspected No 1.55 No 0.64 
T0908/ultra-suspected No 0.33 Yes (5%) 4.71 
T0909/clean No 0.12 No 1.87 
T0910/suspected No 0.24 No 0.57 
T0911/suspected Yes (5%) 4.57 No 1.20 
T0912/suspected No 0.02 No 0.25 
T0913/ultra-suspected No 0.92 No 0.69 
T0914/ultra-ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 7.13 Yes (10%) 2.81 
T0915/ultra-suspected No 0.39 No 2.32 
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T0916/suspected No 1.77 No 0.55 
Source: Author’s calculation 










T1001/suspected Yes (5%) 3.35 No 1.56 
T1002/ultra-suspected No 0.15 No 0.49 
T1003/ultra-suspected Yes (10%) 2.48 No 1.39 
T1004/ultra-suspected No 0.47 No 0.10 
T1005/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.08 No 1.41 
T1006/clean No 0.18 No 0.05 
T1007/suspected Yes (5%) 3.84 No 2.21 
T1008/clean No 0.35 No 0.14 
T1009/suspected No 0.42 No 0.84 
T1010/suspected No 0.25 No 0.97 
T1011/ultra-suspected No 0.63 No 1.97 
T1012/clean No 0.52 No 0.01 
T1013/clean No 0.94 No 0.43 
T1014/clean No 0.05 No 0.46 
T1015/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.48 No 0.12 
T1016/suspected No 0.03 No 1.50 
T1017/ultra-suspected No 1.58 Yes (1%) 6.32 
T1018/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.32 No 1.08 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Table 5.61: The descriptive statistics of the result of the Granger causality test in U.K 
Descriptive statistic  




Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 




2007 2/16 0/16 
2008 3/18 2/18 
2009 1/16 1/16 
2010 0/18 1/18 
Total 7/87 5/87 
Numbers of target firms Granger cause 
bidder firms (5%) 
Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 
target firms (5%) 
2006 0/19 1/19  
2007 1/16 1/16  
                                                          
24
 The percentage number in the parentheses is the significance level of the Granger causality test. 
25
 The denominator is the total number of firms in that specific year. 
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2008 0/18 0/18 
2009 2/16 1/16 
2010 0/18 2/18 
Total 3/87 5/87 
Numbers of target firms Granger cause 
bidder firms (1%) 
Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 
target firms (1%) 
2006 1/19 0/19 
2007 2/16 0/16 
2008 1/18 0/18 
2009 0/16 1/16 
2010 1/18 0/18 
Total 5/87 1/87 
Source: Author’s calculation 
According to the results of Granger causality test, there is some evidence that the 
targets Granger cause the bidders, and the bidders Granger cause the targets and 
mutual causality. I found the most prevalent cases happen on the suspected, the ultra-
suspected and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms. Among the total 9 cases on the bidders 
Granger cause the targets, 5 of which are suspected firms, 2 are ultra-suspected firms, 
1 is ultra-ultra-suspected and 1 is clean. On the other hand, among the total 15 cases 
of the target firms Granger cause the bidders, 7 are ultra-suspected firms, 3 are ultra-
ultra-suspected firms, 1 is suspected, 2 are obscure and 2 are clean. This is suggestive 
that there are mutual causalities between the targets and bidders especially within the 
firms which are suspected of doing insider trading.  
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Section 5.3.13The results of the application of the day 0 hypothesis 
The day 0 abnormal return hypothesis suggests that on day 0, there will be a 
substantial abnormal return for the targets due to the substantial trade volume in the 
stock market. But with the existence of insider dealing, the abnormal return may be 
partially absorbed prior to the announcement date and as a result, on day 0, the 
abnormal return will be expected to be lower than in the normal situation. Here, I 
compare the day 0 AR of the firms of the six categories. 
 






















2006 0.2965561 0.0661174 -0.0022799 0.0208337 0.0098004 0.018017 
2007 - 0.0918104 - 0.0967968 0.1450495 0.0091121 
2008 0.282932 0.0572395 -0.0248121 0.088181 0.1223371 0.2274815 
2009 -0.014199 - - 0.0787821 0.0992894 0.1253302 
2010 0.4365423 - - 0.0680473 0.0611894 0.1238359 
Average 0.250458 0.071722 -0.01355 0.070528 0.087533 0.100755 
Source: Author’s calculation 























2006 297.5% 28.9% -1.28% -20.2% 5.1% 33.4% 
2007 - 22.8% - 879.2% 34.1% 11.4% 
2008 306.5% 40.0% -13.9% 67.4% 46.6% 17.2% 
2009 -5.3% - - 34.8% 57.2% 43.0% 
2010 672.1% - - 205.9% 15.5% 45.8% 
Average 317.7% 30.57% -0.076% 233.42% 31.7% 30.16% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
                                                          
26
 The numbers in Table 5.68 are the average AR for all the six categories of firms on day 0 from 2006 
to 2010  
27
 The percentage numbers in Table 5.69 are calculated as the difference of the CAAR on  day 0 and 
the CAAR on day -1 over the CAAR on day 0. 
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According to Tables 5.68, the day 0 abnormal returns of the clean firms are much 
higher than those of the suspected firms except in the year 2009. There was just one 
clean firm in 2009 (T0909) and the main business of T0909 was natural resources. 
The reasons for it experiencing negative day 0 AR might be firstly, in 2009, the 
economic crisis worsen which affected the investors’ confidence in the stock market 
and therefore, the entire stock market was in a downturn. Secondly, the national 
natural resource workers went on strike which significantly affected the share prices 
of the firms in the natural resource industry.  Table 5.68 gives the ratio of the increase 
on day 0 to that from day -60 to day 0. This is the total gain from the merger and the 
day 0 gain that realised on the day of the merger announcement. According to Table 
5.69, the absolute clean firms have very high day 0 return except for the year 2009.  In 
2010, the absolute clean firms have up to 672.1% day 0 return. On the contrary, the 
ultra-ultra-suspected firms have much less day 0 return than the clean firms. 
 
Table 5.70: Test for Equality of Means between Series 
 
Method Degree of freedom Value Probability 
t-test 85 2.042547 0.0442 
Anova F-test (1, 85) 4.171999 0.0442 
Satterthwaite-
Welch-test 
52.49944 1.898216 0.0632 
Welch F-test (1, 52.4994) 3.603224 0.0632 
Source: Author’s calculation 
In applying test for equality of means between series, both t-test and Anova F-test 
prove that the result of the day 0 hypotheses is significant. (5% significance level) 
And Satterthwaite-Welch test and Welch F-test suggest significance under 10% level. 
 
Table 5.71: Test for Equality of Variance between Series 
 
Method Degree of freedom Value Probability 
F-test (48, 37) 3.665857 0.0001 
Bartlett 1 17.20390 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculation 
In applying both F-test and Bartlett test, it is proved that the result of the day 0 




Section 5.4 Conclusion  
In Chapter 5, the investigation is based on a database of firms for which the merger 
announcement date has been announced during 2006-2010. The analysis has been 
done for 180 trading days prior to the announcement and 11 days on and after the 
announcement date. For examining the pattern of the stock prices, AR and CAAR 
have been calculated for the sample. Firstly, the AR and the CAAR are plotted. The 
previous literature assumes that when there is no existence of insider trading, both the 
AR and CAAR would fluctuate randomly about zero. However, if there is suspected 
trading going underneath, AR would show up some positive spikes and the CAAR 
would be observed on an increasing trend ahead of the merger announcement. After 
plotting the ARs and CAARs of the U.K target firms from 2006 to 2010, one can 
observe from the graphs that there are signs of insider trading in all five years with 
positive spikes in the ARs and buildups in the CAAR. This chapter utilizes four filters 
to detect the possible existence of informed trading prior to merger announcement. 
The four filters are the market model with daily dummy variables approach
28
, the 
news search for the possible publicly released rumours prior to merger announcement, 
the investigation of outliers and the analysis of the trading volume pattern. With the 
first filter, the daily dummy variables show the separate single days on which there 
are positive abnormal returns. Nonetheless, after categorizing them as either 
‘suspected’ or ‘clean’ according to the dummy variable approach, the graphs of the 
‘clean’ firms show that they are not so ‘clean’ with spikes before the announcement 
day. This might be attributed to the fact that insider trading is more of a series of days’ 
activity than several separate single days’ because the insider trader may tend to do 
trading on adjacent days to avoid single suspicious spikes. But because of this way of 
doing insider trading, the insider trader may lose from news leaking out. Although 
noise in the system might mean that the daily dummy variable is not that suited to 
picking up a single spike, however, some people may still do insider trading in one 
day. As a result, the dummy variable approach is still needed as the first filter with 
more filters to support its results.  
                                                          
28
 The market adjusted and the modified market model give the same results as the market model 
does though some slight differences with the numbers.  
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Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971) argued that those who possess 
privileged information have an incentive to take market positions on the basis of their 
information and then announce their information publicly. Furthermore, there is a 
possibility that the insiders would leak negative information before they intend to buy 
the shares and positive news afterwards to get a larger profit. Either of these 
assumptions raises the importance of a news search. With this filter, all publicly 
released rumours for each target are searched with Nexis. Then the firms are re-
categorized as ‘clean’, ‘obscure’ ‘obscure with lagged news’ and ‘suspected’. The 
third filter is to detect the outliers. The idea is to find out the residuals which are 3.5 
or 4 times greater than the standard deviation. Daily dummy variables are also 
included for the significance of the outliers. The results from the news search are also 
used for the re-categorization. The suspected firms with news release less than or 
equal to five days ahead of the problematic days are classified as ‘obscure’ and the 
suspected firms with news release less than or equal five days after the problematic 
days as ‘obscure with lagged news’.  
 
The last filter is the analysis of the abnormal turnover (AT). Many previous works 
have found that accompanied by the run-ups in the AR, there are also run-ups in the 
AT. In this thesis, the average AT for a period from -180 to -61 day is taken as the 
benchmark because the AT during this period is free from being contaminated by the 
event. The daily average turnover for each firm is compared with 1.25 multiplied by 
the benchmark, 1.50 multiplied by the benchmark and 2.0 multiplied by the 
benchmark. After this filter, the firms are categorized ultimately as the ‘absolute 
clean’, the ‘obscure’, the ‘obscure with lagged news’, the ‘suspected’, the ‘ultra-
suspected’ and the ‘ultra-ultra-suspected’.  
 
In a sample of 87 firms being investigated, 17 are considered to be absolutely clean, 8 
are considered obscure, 2 are obscure with lagged news, 24 are suspected, 30 are 
ultra-suspected and 8 are considered to be ultra-ultra-suspected. This is a small 
number of clean firms and a large number of suspected firms. Given the filters we 
have applied we can be fairly confident that relatively few of the clean firms will be 
anything other than clean. Not all of the suspected firms will be suspected, but there is 
substantial reason to suppose that they should be examined in further detail to identify 




In the appendix, firstly, the ARs and CAARs for both the targets and bidders in the 
U.K from 2006 to 2010 from the market-adjusted model and from the modified 
market model are presented. Secondly, the results of the ADF test in the targets and 
bidders in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 are shown. Thirdly, the names, the 
announcement dates and the industries of both the targets and bidders in the U.K from 
2006 to 2010 are presented. Furthermore, the names and the days on which the firms 
have abnormal returns in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 are shown in tables.  
 
Table 5.14: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.010083 0.0262 0.000682 53% 0.010083 
-59 0.005207 0.01619 -0.0012 37% 0.01529 
-58 -0.00394 -0.00462 -0.00355 37% 0.011347 
-57 0.002289 -0.00035 0.003829 58% 0.013637 
-56 -0.00249 0.00241 -0.00535 47% 0.011144 
-55 0.002954 0.000597 0.004329 42% 0.014098 
-54 -0.00274 0.003023 -0.00609 42% 0.011362 
-53 -0.00113 0.001116 -0.00244 58% 0.010235 
-52 0.003214 0.000252 0.004943 53% 0.01345 
-51 -0.00028 0.002811 -0.00209 47% 0.013166 
-50 0.004534 0.003887 0.004912 58% 0.0177 
-49 -0.00556 -0.00479 -0.00601 42% 0.012137 
-48 -0.00015 -0.00157 0.000676 42% 0.011985 
-47 6.93E-05 -0.00776 0.004639 47% 0.012054 
-46 0.001283 -0.00188 0.003128 53% 0.013337 
-45 -0.00224 -0.00599 -5.1E-05 21% 0.011099 
-44 -0.00244 -0.00244 -0.00243 26% 0.008663 
-43 -0.00136 0.000928 -0.0027 42% 0.0073 
-42 -0.00067 0.000485 -0.00135 53% 0.006628 
-41 -0.00943 -0.00073 -0.0145 26% -0.0028 
-40 0.003076 0.009706 -0.00079 47% 0.000273 
-39 -0.00081 0.001087 -0.00192 47% -0.00054 
-38 0.005065 -0.00067 0.008411 68% 0.004523 
-37 -0.01653 -0.01218 -0.01907 42% -0.01201 
-36 -0.00649 -0.00357 -0.00819 42% -0.0185 
-35 -0.00018 0.001376 -0.00109 47% -0.01868 
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-34 0.002488 3.72E-06 0.003937 47% -0.01619 
-33 -0.00083 0.003733 -0.00349 47% -0.01702 
-32 -0.00081 0.000804 -0.00175 53% -0.01783 
-31 0.006313 0.027582 -0.00609 58% -0.01152 
-30 0.005904 0.001597 0.008416 42% -0.00561 
-29 0.003777 0.008177 0.00121 37% -0.00183 
-28 -0.00154 -0.00309 -0.00064 42% -0.00337 
-27 0.002801 0.014216 -0.00386 53% -0.00057 
-26 -0.00389 -0.01671 0.003593 53% -0.00446 
-25 0.002378 -0.00192 0.004888 42% -0.00208 
-24 0.005255 0.01072 0.002068 47% 0.003174 
-23 0.005107 0.019584 -0.00334 63% 0.008281 
-22 0.006676 0.02539 -0.00424 47% 0.014957 
-21 0.015337 0.042232 -0.00035 47% 0.030294 
-20 -0.00715 -0.01307 -0.0037 37% 0.023142 
-19 -0.00955 -0.00861 -0.0101 21% 0.013594 
-18 -0.00313 -0.00735 -0.00067 32% 0.010464 
-17 -0.00142 0.006497 -0.00603 58% 0.009046 
-16 -0.0007 -0.00108 -0.00047 53% 0.00835 
-15 0.003608 -0.00109 0.006351 53% 0.011958 
-14 0.004248 0.000872 0.006218 58% 0.016207 
-13 -0.00366 -0.00791 -0.00118 37% 0.012548 
-12 -0.00513 -0.01158 -0.00137 21% 0.007415 
-11 -0.00166 -0.00372 -0.00045 42% 0.005758 
-10 0.003128 0.006818 0.000975 37% 0.008886 
-9 0.005325 0.006368 0.004716 58% 0.01421 
-8 0.011805 0.026507 0.00323 53% 0.026016 
-7 -0.01204 -0.02275 -0.0058 32% 0.013972 
-6 0.002935 0.004999 0.001731 53% 0.016907 
-5 -0.00298 -0.00245 -0.00329 53% 0.01393 
-4 0.005085 0.007694 0.003563 79% 0.019015 
-3 0.001793 -0.00109 0.003474 63% 0.020807 
-2 0.004522 0.007426 0.002827 42% 0.025329 
-1 0.010001 0.030583 -0.002 47% 0.03533 
0 0.092431 0.016291 0.136846 68% 0.127761 
1 0.006513 0.00419 0.007868 79% 0.134274 
2 -0.00068 -0.00259 0.000426 53% 0.133589 
3 -3.1E-05 -0.00084 0.00044 37% 0.133558 
4 0.00883 -0.00298 0.01572 53% 0.142388 
5 0.002541 0.007558 -0.00039 68% 0.144928 
6 0.003657 0.000962 0.005229 47% 0.148585 
7 0.002185 -0.00122 0.004173 42% 0.15077 
8 0.004538 0.00401 0.004845 58% 0.155308 
9 -0.00208 -0.00176 -0.00227 37% 0.153229 




to -6 0.000307442 0.002377049 -0.00089944 - 0.006394182 
Average 
















to +10 0.002212342 0.002764813 0.001890169 - 0.028838761 
 
Table 5.15: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.010811 0.013486 0.002788 69% 0.010811 
-59 0.007725 0.010485 -0.00055 50% 0.018537 
-58 -0.00349 0.000458 -0.01534 38% 0.015045 
-57 0.035604 0.042571 0.014704 50% 0.050649 
-56 0.012444 0.013839 0.008259 50% 0.063093 
-55 0.023124 0.026752 0.012242 69% 0.086217 
-54 0.005689 0.004341 0.009734 63% 0.091906 
-53 0.00153 -0.00031 0.007062 44% 0.093436 
-52 -0.00408 -0.00701 0.004688 19% 0.089354 
-51 -0.00294 -0.00789 0.011929 44% 0.086415 
-50 0.000287 -0.00208 0.007394 44% 0.086702 
-49 0.006081 0.00891 -0.00241 56% 0.092783 
-48 -0.0026 -0.00662 0.00944 69% 0.090179 
-47 0.004177 0.004789 0.002342 69% 0.094356 
-46 -0.0039 -0.00082 -0.01315 25% 0.090455 
-45 0.010128 -0.00306 0.0497 31% 0.100582 
-44 0.00134 0.00472 -0.0088 50% 0.101922 
-43 -0.00225 -0.00068 -0.00694 50% 0.099675 
-42 0.001328 0.003452 -0.00504 63% 0.101003 
-41 -0.00094 -0.00542 0.012513 31% 0.100065 
-40 -0.00478 0.000387 -0.02028 56% 0.095285 
-39 0.003561 0.003529 0.003657 63% 0.098845 
-38 0.003347 0.004606 -0.00043 38% 0.102192 
-37 0.007532 0.006606 0.01031 50% 0.109724 
-36 -0.00279 -0.00293 -0.00235 31% 0.106936 
-35 -0.00214 -0.00455 0.00508 63% 0.104796 
-34 0.012598 0.015842 0.002868 50% 0.117394 
-33 0.006257 0.005122 0.009659 50% 0.123651 
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-32 0.004312 0.001247 0.013506 38% 0.127963 
-31 -0.00942 -0.01135 -0.00362 44% 0.118546 
-30 0.004563 0.005766 0.000951 63% 0.123109 
-29 0.00104 -0.00155 0.008817 50% 0.124149 
-28 -0.00943 -0.01252 -0.00016 31% 0.114718 
-27 0.002004 0.007087 -0.01324 63% 0.116723 
-26 -0.00502 -0.00325 -0.01031 19% 0.111706 
-25 0.006814 0.006714 0.007116 75% 0.11852 
-24 0.002861 0.000744 0.009214 56% 0.121381 
-23 0.010251 0.007577 0.018273 63% 0.131633 
-22 -0.00088 0.002824 -0.01201 31% 0.130749 
-21 0.002052 0.004537 -0.0054 44% 0.1328 
-20 -0.01188 -0.01461 -0.0037 25% 0.120918 
-19 5.87E-05 -0.00094 0.003058 50% 0.120977 
-18 0.01304 0.016107 0.003839 69% 0.134016 
-17 -0.0071 -0.00912 -0.00104 31% 0.126919 
-16 -0.00387 -0.00577 0.001833 50% 0.123051 
-15 -0.00572 -0.00878 0.003438 38% 0.117326 
-14 0.000453 0.002583 -0.00593 31% 0.117779 
-13 0.005966 0.010776 -0.00846 44% 0.123745 
-12 0.000384 -0.00165 0.006485 44% 0.124128 
-11 0.000581 -0.00254 0.009929 31% 0.124709 
-10 0.0004 0.001682 -0.00345 44% 0.125108 
-9 0.000719 -4.51E-06 0.00289 44% 0.125828 
-8 0.003478 0.005367 -0.00219 38% 0.129306 
-7 -0.00037 0.004685 -0.01554 38% 0.128935 
-6 0.003338 0.004267 0.000549 50% 0.132273 
-5 -0.00538 -0.00814 0.002887 63% 0.126893 
-4 0.009334 0.014387 -0.00583 63% 0.136226 
-3 0.018699 0.020825 0.012322 56% 0.154926 
-2 -0.00076 0.001981 -0.00897 25% 0.154167 
-1 0.086329 0.107608 0.022492 63% 0.240496 
0 0.115026 0.115068 0.114898 81% 0.355522 
1 -0.00179 -0.00267 0.000858 38% 0.353737 
2 0.01268 0.018469 -0.00469 50% 0.366417 
3 0.003479 -0.00029 0.014781 63% 0.369896 
4 -0.00377 -0.00599 0.002862 25% 0.366121 
5 -0.00567 -0.00492 -0.0079 38% 0.360456 
6 -0.00359 -0.00303 -0.00525 38% 0.356869 
7 0.002043 0.00512 -0.00719 44% 0.358911 
8 -0.00085 0.00138 -0.00752 38% 0.358065 
9 -0.00229 -0.00401 0.002877 44% 0.355775 






















to +10 0.0049487 0.005475796 0.003368085 - 0.148398366 
 
Table 5.16: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total 
target firms 
-60 -0.00167 0.001748 -0.0051 50% -0.00167 
-59 -0.01644 -0.01471 -0.01816 11% -0.01811 
-58 -7.4E-05 0.004497 -0.00465 50% -0.01819 
-57 -0.00394 -0.00282 -0.00507 44% -0.02213 
-56 -0.00565 0.008051 -0.01935 33% -0.02778 
-55 0.016868 0.017902 0.015833 56% -0.01091 
-54 0.007654 0.012558 0.002751 56% -0.00326 
-53 -0.02343 -0.0265 -0.02037 11% -0.02669 
-52 -0.00683 -0.00162 -0.01204 39% -0.03352 
-51 0.011064 0.018919 0.00321 56% -0.02245 
-50 0.00386 0.025929 -0.01821 44% -0.01859 
-49 0.001919 -0.00088 0.004715 61% -0.01667 
-48 0.005539 0.029598 -0.01852 61% -0.01113 
-47 0.001115 0.005947 -0.00372 67% -0.01002 
-46 -0.00348 -0.01303 0.006064 56% -0.0135 
-45 -0.00346 0.000578 -0.0075 61% -0.01696 
-44 -0.00232 -0.00517 0.000524 44% -0.01929 
-43 -0.00088 -0.00306 0.0013 61% -0.02017 
-42 -0.03775 -0.07509 -0.00041 44% -0.05792 
-41 -0.00663 -0.02018 0.006918 33% -0.06455 
-40 -0.00913 -0.03052 0.012261 44% -0.07368 
-39 -0.00308 -0.00621 5.07E-05 61% -0.07676 
-38 -0.01526 -0.03478 0.004261 44% -0.09202 
-37 -0.01513 -0.03054 0.000275 33% -0.10716 
-36 0.00208 -0.01441 0.018575 56% -0.10508 
-35 -0.0287 -0.03739 -0.02 44% -0.13377 
-34 -0.00936 -3.14E-02 0.012658 50% -0.14313 
-33 0.029148 0.071269 -0.01297 44% -0.11398 
-32 0.034446 0.066718 0.002174 78% -0.07954 
-31 -0.01791 -0.0375 0.001676 61% -0.09745 
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-30 0.00549 0.019666 -0.00869 44% -0.09196 
-29 0.020592 0.037616 0.003569 56% -0.07137 
-28 -0.00335 -0.00111 -0.0056 44% -0.07473 
-27 0.001148 0.004251 -0.00195 33% -0.07358 
-26 0.02247 0.004202 0.040739 44% -0.05111 
-25 0.028937 -0.00973 0.067609 61% -0.02217 
-24 0.003528 0.006074 0.000981 56% -0.01864 
-23 0.015796 0.021012 0.010581 56% -0.00285 
-22 0.010532 0.012161 0.008904 44% 0.007687 
-21 0.019354 -0.01542 0.054126 61% 0.027041 
-20 -0.0061 -0.0025 -0.00971 56% 0.020936 
-19 -0.00475 -0.01841 0.008906 44% 0.016186 
-18 0.012067 0.029538 -0.0054 56% 0.028253 
-17 -0.02531 -0.0198 -0.03081 33% 0.002946 
-16 -0.00696 -0.01856 0.004643 28% -0.00401 
-15 0.018026 0.020059 0.015993 56% 0.014015 
-14 0.004937 0.001425 0.00845 50% 0.018952 
-13 0.007984 0.00438 0.011588 39% 0.026936 
-12 -0.00088 0.017192 -0.01895 61% 0.026055 
-11 0.005805 0.010456 0.001155 50% 0.03186 
-10 -0.00059 -0.00301 0.001824 50% 0.031267 
-9 0.009827 0.020824 -0.00117 44% 0.041094 
-8 0.005644 0.005598 0.00569 56% 0.046738 
-7 -0.0029 -0.0154 0.009596 50% 0.043835 
-6 -0.00282 0.004817 -0.01046 50% 0.041012 
-5 0.002211 0.006771 -0.00235 67% 0.043223 
-4 0.007533 0.012951 0.002115 44% 0.050756 
-3 0.01281 -0.00107 0.026691 61% 0.063566 
-2 0.011454 -0.00118 0.024088 61% 0.07502 
-1 0.03994 0.089482 -0.0096 61% 0.11496 
0 0.136969 0.202053 0.071886 61% 0.251929 
1 0.020847 0.005697 0.035997 50% 0.272776 
2 -0.00045 0.00791 -0.00882 72% 0.272321 
3 -0.00941 -0.0095 -0.00932 50% 0.262908 
4 -0.02272 -0.00682 -0.03862 56% 0.240185 
5 -0.00741 -0.03679 0.021975 50% 0.232777 
6 -0.00261 -0.00344 -0.00177 78% 0.230172 
7 -0.00898 -0.01473 -0.00324 44% 0.22119 
8 -0.00435 0.002941 -0.01163 33% 0.216844 
9 -0.01387 -0.0144 -0.01334 44% 0.202974 








to -5 0.000772446 1.07143E-07 0.001543566 - -0.024972571 
Average 












to +10 0.002661268 0.003034507 0.002287207 - 0.021110239 
 
 
Table 5.17: Daily average returns (A91R) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2009(from the market-adjusted model)  






















(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.00456 0.000368 0.00782 69% 0.00456 
-59 -0.02049 -0.03657 -0.00798 38% -0.01593 
-58 -0.00841 0.002428 -0.01684 44% -0.02434 
-57 -0.00624 -0.01932 0.003926 50% -0.03058 
-56 -0.00216 -0.00297 -0.00152 44% -0.03274 
-55 -0.00188 -0.00991 0.00436 56% -0.03462 
-54 0.001115 -0.0116 0.011004 50% -0.03351 
-53 -0.07042 -0.03574 -0.0974 31% -0.10393 
-52 0.044757 -0.02018 0.095259 38% -0.05917 
-51 0.004127 -0.00747 0.013142 56% -0.05504 
-50 0.003715 0.009366 -0.00068 56% -0.05133 
-49 0.007737 0.029941 -0.00953 38% -0.04359 
-48 -0.00911 -0.01217 -0.00674 50% -0.0527 
-47 0.02387 0.021162 0.025976 69% -0.02883 
-46 0.023229 0.054927 -0.00142 63% -0.00561 
-45 0.085283 0.004635 0.14801 63% 0.079678 
-44 0.014825 -0.01024 0.03432 38% 0.094503 
-43 -0.01244 -0.01243 -0.01246 31% 0.082059 
-42 0.00169 -0.00921 0.010166 44% 0.083748 
-41 -0.00606 -0.01679 0.002289 38% 0.077692 
-40 -0.00989 -0.01804 -0.00355 44% 0.067803 
-39 0.013173 -0.00498 0.027293 63% 0.080977 
-38 -0.00613 -0.03365 0.01527 25% 0.074844 
-37 0.009596 0.010949 0.008544 38% 0.08444 
-36 0.014658 0.052841 -0.01504 63% 0.099098 
-35 0.01528 0.037629 -0.0021 38% 0.114378 
-34 -0.02655 -3.78E-02 -0.01778 25% 0.087827 
-33 0.000971 0.009051 -0.00531 44% 0.088799 
-32 -0.00538 -0.01459 0.001783 44% 0.083418 
-31 0.041017 0.108235 -0.01126 50% 0.124435 
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-30 -0.00199 -0.02177 0.013387 50% 0.122443 
-29 -0.0031 0.000879 -0.0062 31% 0.119338 
-28 0.000064 -0.00242 0.001996 50% 0.119402 
-27 -0.00556 -0.01185 -0.00066 25% 0.113843 
-26 0.010674 0.026254 -0.00144 44% 0.124517 
-25 0.02118 0.046783 0.001267 56% 0.145697 
-24 -0.01558 -0.04148 0.004556 31% 0.130113 
-23 0.008919 -0.00233 0.017668 63% 0.139032 
-22 -0.00966 -0.01198 -0.00786 44% 0.129372 
-21 -0.00872 -0.02668 0.005246 44% 0.120651 
-20 0.003158 0.003053 0.003239 56% 0.123809 
-19 0.006718 0.000782 0.011334 50% 0.130526 
-18 -0.00251 0.000568 -0.0049 38% 0.12802 
-17 -0.00079 0.013355 -0.01179 63% 0.127233 
-16 -0.0081 -0.00144 -0.01327 44% 0.119136 
-15 -0.00414 0.005148 -0.01137 38% 0.114993 
-14 0.00334 0.006318 0.001025 44% 0.118333 
-13 0.011126 0.010897 0.011304 50% 0.129459 
-12 0.003038 0.024255 -0.01347 38% 0.132496 
-11 0.004561 0.01382 -0.00264 38% 0.137058 
-10 -0.0127 -0.01243 -0.01291 31% 0.124361 
-9 0.004783 0.026478 -0.01209 56% 0.129144 
-8 0.009539 0.027045 -0.00408 63% 0.138683 
-7 0.006264 -0.00082 0.011777 38% 0.144947 
-6 -0.00629 -0.00327 -0.00863 25% 0.138659 
-5 0.005155 -0.00715 0.014729 50% 0.143813 
-4 0.012632 0.00525 0.018374 63% 0.156446 
-3 0.004897 0.006347 0.003769 56% 0.161342 
-2 0.014434 0.020435 0.009766 38% 0.175776 
-1 0.012332 0.023566 0.003595 44% 0.188108 
0 0.087288 0.131138 0.053182 69% 0.275396 
1 -0.02327 -0.00628 -0.03648 38% 0.252131 
2 0.027256 0.035543 0.020811 63% 0.279387 
3 0.014902 0.032267 0.001397 69% 0.294289 
4 0.004693 0.003913 0.0053 44% 0.298982 
5 0.003579 -0.00247 0.008287 56% 0.302561 
6 -0.00446 0.002007 -0.00949 31% 0.298101 
7 0.003823 0.007618 0.000872 44% 0.301925 
8 -0.00662 -0.0115 -0.00283 38% 0.295305 
9 0.006161 -0.00051 0.011353 63% 0.301466 








to -5 0.00256825 0.001605125 0.003317321 - 0.073239589 
Average 












to +10 0.004265662 0.004797676 0.003851915 - 0.112471704 
 
 
Table 5.18: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2010(from the market-adjusted model)  






















(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.000709 0.00015 0.001268 56% 0.000709 
-59 0.001377 0.008094 -0.00534 28% 0.002086 
-58 0.006142 0.008444 0.00384 44% 0.008228 
-57 -0.02998 -0.05027 -0.00969 28% -0.02175 
-56 0.010474 0.011562 0.009386 56% -0.01128 
-55 0.005176 -0.00394 0.014295 50% -0.0061 
-54 0.005714 0.004612 0.006817 67% -0.00039 
-53 0.002002 -0.00716 0.011161 61% 0.001615 
-52 -0.02449 -0.04467 -0.00431 33% -0.02288 
-51 0.010634 0.035124 -0.01386 44% -0.01224 
-50 -0.00236 -0.00232 -0.0024 39% -0.0146 
-49 -0.00806 -0.01334 -0.00278 33% -0.02267 
-48 0.001967 -0.00017 0.004101 44% -0.0207 
-47 -0.00341 -0.01332 0.006493 56% -0.02411 
-46 0.001759 0.009686 -0.00617 39% -0.02235 
-45 -0.00798 -0.0153 -0.00066 50% -0.03033 
-44 0.005724 0.00634 0.005109 44% -0.02461 
-43 0.011006 0.009276 0.012736 61% -0.0136 
-42 0.000149 -0.00789 0.008186 39% -0.01345 
-41 -0.00914 0.000923 -0.0192 11% -0.02259 
-40 0.020165 0.035896 0.004435 50% -0.00243 
-39 -0.00058 -0.00721 0.006058 50% -0.003 
-38 -0.00121 -0.00083 -0.00159 44% -0.00421 
-37 -0.01992 -0.04074 0.000909 28% -0.02413 
-36 0.010883 0.001119 0.020648 67% -0.01324 
-35 -0.00795 -0.00914 -0.00675 33% -0.02119 
-34 0.007632 0.01614 -0.00087 50% -0.01356 
-33 -0.0094 -0.01517 -0.00364 39% -0.02296 
-32 0.002839 0.002322 0.003356 56% -0.02012 
-31 0.005256 0.005683 0.00483 39% -0.01487 
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-30 0.016496 0.019145 0.013846 50% 0.001628 
-29 1.06E-05 -0.00335 0.003372 50% 0.001639 
-28 0.003436 -0.00196 0.008833 44% 0.005075 
-27 0.002171 0.00542 -0.00108 50% 0.007247 
-26 0.010444 0.006373 0.014515 61% 0.017691 
-25 -0.00088 -0.00176 7.85E-07 39% 0.016812 
-24 -0.00113 -0.00337 0.001113 56% 0.015682 
-23 0.003918 -0.01832 0.026157 39% 0.019601 
-22 -0.00239 -0.00534 0.000554 44% 0.017206 
-21 0.005099 0.005152 0.005046 44% 0.022305 
-20 0.008994 0.013739 0.004249 78% 0.031299 
-19 0.001599 0.009522 -0.00633 56% 0.032898 
-18 -0.00213 -0.00116 -0.0031 50% 0.030764 
-17 -0.00428 -0.00861 6.26E-05 50% 0.026489 
-16 0.01006 0.018524 0.001595 56% 0.036549 
-15 0.002018 -0.00417 0.008204 28% 0.038567 
-14 -0.00522 0.00365 -0.0141 22% 0.033344 
-13 -0.00138 0.021364 -0.02412 39% 0.031966 
-12 -0.00586 -0.0112 -0.00051 56% 0.026111 
-11 -0.00261 -0.01804 0.012815 67% 0.023498 
-10 -0.00336 -0.00652 -0.00021 44% 0.020133 
-9 0.010838 0.005483 0.016192 50% 0.030971 
-8 -0.00394 -0.001 -0.00689 39% 0.027028 
-7 -0.0136 -0.02978 0.00258 39% 0.013427 
-6 -0.00847 0.006705 -0.02364 28% 0.004961 
-5 0.00218 0.002303 0.002057 56% 0.00714 
-4 0.023102 0.042248 0.003955 56% 0.030242 
-3 -0.00334 -0.00893 0.00224 28% 0.026899 
-2 0.003961 0.008194 -0.00027 56% 0.030859 
-1 0.065469 0.140304 -0.00937 56% 0.096328 
0 0.180718 0.097878 0.263557 72% 0.277046 
1 0.018405 0.030328 0.006482 44% 0.295451 
2 0.088672 0.168459 0.008886 44% 0.384123 
3 0.047193 0.088575 0.005812 56% 0.431316 
4 -0.0189 -0.03197 -0.00584 39% 0.412412 
5 -0.00812 -0.01961 0.003366 56% 0.404291 
6 -0.00429 -0.01987 0.011287 44% 0.399997 
7 -0.00849 -0.02037 0.003395 67% 0.391512 
8 0.000517 0.002775 -0.00174 39% 0.392029 
9 -0.00845 -0.00456 -0.01234 39% 0.383578 








to -5 0.000127529 0.001308911 0.001563918 - 0.002309089 
Average 
















Table 5.20: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.001307 0.00443 -0.00013 47% 0.001307 
-59 0.005325 0.007827 0.004171 42% 0.006633 
-58 0.001586 -0.00801 0.006013 47% 0.008218 
-57 -0.00197 -0.00126 -0.0023 53% 0.006245 
-56 -0.00705 -0.01581 -0.00301 32% -0.00081 
-55 0.000884 0.001927 0.000402 37% 7.86E-05 
-54 -0.00069 -0.00444 0.001034 32% -0.00061 
-53 -0.00453 0.001572 -0.00735 21% -0.00515 
-52 0.011377 0.013543 0.010378 53% 0.00623 
-51 0.010395 0.030596 0.001071 47% 0.016625 
-50 -0.00493 -0.01096 -0.00215 42% 0.011694 
-49 0.012221 0.054354 -0.00722 37% 0.023915 
-48 -0.00551 -0.01742 -1.1E-05 32% 0.018407 
-47 -0.00518 -0.01178 -0.00213 32% 0.013226 
-46 0.003628 0.005313 0.00285 53% 0.016853 
-45 -0.00253 -0.00232 -0.00263 47% 0.014325 
-44 -0.00734 -0.01166 -0.00535 26% 0.006985 
-43 -0.00984 -0.02382 -0.00339 32% -0.00286 
-42 -0.00641 -0.00643 -0.00639 37% -0.00926 
-41 -0.0078 -0.02627 0.000725 32% -0.01706 
-40 0.001827 -0.00563 0.005268 37% -0.01524 
-39 0.003443 -0.00374 0.00676 26% -0.01179 
-38 6.83E-05 0.011943 -0.00541 37% -0.01172 
-37 -0.00532 -0.00736 -0.00438 42% -0.01704 
-36 0.00083 0.003918 -0.00059 47% -0.01621 
-35 0.005913 0.018321 0.000186 37% -0.0103 
-34 -0.00031 -0.00585 0.002251 47% -0.01061 
-33 -0.00403 -0.01115 -0.00075 47% -0.01464 
-32 0.005194 -0.0063 0.0105 53% -0.00945 
159 
 
-31 -0.00305 -0.00659 -0.00142 21% -0.0125 
-30 0.003624 0.011409 0.000031 42% -0.00888 
-29 -0.00152 0.004324 -0.00422 37% -0.0104 
-28 -0.00023 0.003878 -0.00212 47% -0.01062 
-27 -0.00239 -0.00882 0.000572 32% -0.01302 
-26 0.001954 0.00461 0.000728 47% -0.01106 
-25 0.002234 0.010994 -0.00181 37% -0.00883 
-24 -0.00955 -0.02906 -0.00054 42% -0.01838 
-23 0.000338 0.000113 0.000442 58% -0.01804 
-22 0.004721 0.012392 0.001181 63% -0.01332 
-21 -0.00049 -0.00976 0.003797 63% -0.0138 
-20 -0.00497 0.005503 -0.0098 37% -0.01877 
-19 -0.00381 -0.01461 0.001166 37% -0.02258 
-18 -0.00167 -0.00604 0.00034 58% -0.02426 
-17 0.006923 0.033338 -0.00527 47% -0.01734 
-16 0.015467 0.049493 -0.00024 47% -0.00187 
-15 -0.01471 -0.02953 -0.00788 32% -0.01658 
-14 -0.01286 -0.03653 -0.00194 32% -0.02945 
-13 -0.0026 -0.00759 -0.0003 37% -0.03205 
-12 -0.00834 -0.02221 -0.00195 32% -0.04039 
-11 -0.00257 -0.0085 1.63E-04 47% -0.04296 
-10 0.010291 0.025537 0.003254 42% -0.03267 
-9 -0.00241 -0.00038 -0.00335 42% -0.03508 
-8 -4.70E-06 0.00388 -0.0018 37% -0.03509 
-7 -0.00654 -0.01853 -0.00101 32% -0.04163 
-6 -0.0018 -0.00494 -0.00035 32% -0.04342 
-5 -0.00241 -0.00274 -0.00226 37% -0.04584 
-4 0.00129 -1.93E-03 0.002777 63% -0.04455 
-3 -0.00201 -0.00141 -0.00229 47% -0.04656 
-2 -0.00054 -0.00572 0.001851 32% -0.0471 
-1 -0.00414 -0.0068 -0.00292 37% -0.05124 
0 -0.00903 -0.01402 -0.00672 32% -0.06027 
1 0.000796 0.002775 -0.00012 53% -0.05947 
2 -0.00295 -0.00888 -0.00021 26% -0.06243 
3 -9.3E-05 -0.01043 0.00468 32% -0.06252 
4 0.001526 -0.00555 0.004792 58% -0.06099 
5 0.002221 -0.00972 0.007732 47% -0.05877 
6 -0.00062 -0.00982 0.003629 37% -0.05939 
7 0.002945 -0.00344 0.00589 53% -0.05644 
8 -0.00169 -0.00968 0.002 37% -0.05813 
9 0.002252 0.006578 0.000256 63% -0.05588 




















0.000645857 - -0.0110864 


























0.000145423 - -0.020559273 
 
 
Table 5.21: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00383 0.00615 0.002293 50% -0.00383 
-59 0.000212 -0.00198 0.004916 44% -0.00362 
-58 0.006255 0.008309 -0.00587 63% 0.002632 
-57 -0.00368 -0.00484 -0.00083 56% -0.00105 
-56 0.002893 -0.00292 -0.01201 56% 0.001847 
-55 -5.37E-06 0.001508 -0.0002 38% 0.001841 
-54 0.000504 0.000544 -0.00329 56% 0.002346 
-53 -0.00612 -0.00251 -0.00218 38% -0.00378 
-52 -0.00144 -0.00377 0.016656 38% -0.00522 
-51 -0.00307 -0.00361 0.023846 25% -0.00829 
-50 0.006064 0.003732 -0.00783 63% -0.00223 
-49 0.003786 0.010305 0.041607 50% 0.001561 
-48 -0.00369 0.007052 -0.01431 50% -0.00213 
-47 0.00149 0.00471 -0.00996 56% -0.00064 
-46 -0.00988 -0.01564 0.004703 25% -0.01053 
-45 -0.00059 -0.00529 -0.00044 44% -0.01112 
-44 -0.00016 0.001399 -0.00883 50% -0.01128 
-43 -0.00278 0.003821 -0.01745 31% -0.01406 
-42 0.001624 0.010957 -0.00493 44% -0.01244 
-41 -0.00037 0.001101 -0.02174 44% -0.0128 
-40 -0.00085 0.002936 -0.0016 50% -0.01365 
-39 -0.00547 -0.0075 -0.00347 38% -0.01912 
-38 -0.00415 -0.00237 0.007968 38% -0.02327 
-37 -0.0012 0.004229 -0.00896 38% -0.02447 
-36 0.001597 0.002918 0.003292 44% -0.02287 
161 
 
-35 -0.00041 -0.00248 0.018409 50% -0.02329 
-34 0.000722 0.000345 -0.00306 50% -0.02256 
-33 -0.00041 0.001793 -0.00823 44% -0.02298 
-32 -0.00134 -0.00304 -0.00128 56% -0.02432 
-31 0.001746 0.001643 -0.00508 44% -0.02257 
-30 -0.00092 0.001157 0.009762 50% -0.02349 
-29 -0.00301 0.001321 0.004987 44% -0.02651 
-28 -0.01927 -0.03012 0.004159 38% -0.04577 
-27 -0.00189 -0.00604 -0.0077 25% -0.04767 
-26 -0.00157 -0.00932 0.005194 38% -0.04924 
-25 0.001558 0.00399 0.008966 38% -0.04768 
-24 -0.00596 -0.00745 -0.02249 44% -0.05363 
-23 0.006993 0.001416 0.002231 69% -0.04664 
-22 -0.00546 -0.00367 0.008879 31% -0.0521 
-21 0.010348 0.022902 -0.00553 44% -0.04176 
-20 -0.00432 -0.0066 0.004585 31% -0.04607 
-19 0.003216 0.007833 -0.01418 56% -0.04286 
-18 0.01196 0.02465 -0.00374 50% -0.0309 
-17 -0.00492 -0.00233 0.025667 25% -0.03582 
-16 2.85E-05 -0.00074 0.039545 44% -0.03579 
-15 0.003725 0.005514 -0.02432 50% -0.03207 
-14 0.004534 0.010744 -0.0329 31% -0.02753 
-13 0.000589 0.002392 -0.00395 69% -0.02694 
-12 0.004666 0.007208 -0.01867 56% -0.02228 
-11 -0.00411 -0.00725 -0.00624 25% -0.02639 
-10 0.001098 0.000945 0.017415 50% -0.02529 
-9 -0.00343 -0.00156 -0.00376 38% -0.02872 
-8 -0.00596 -0.00641 0.003075 25% -0.03468 
-7 0.002237 0.006424 -0.01413 50% -0.03244 
-6 -0.00259 -0.0012 -0.00486 44% -0.03503 
-5 -0.00431 -0.00695 -0.00261 38% -0.03934 
-4 0.003335 -0.00085 -4.9E-05 44% -0.03601 
-3 -0.00478 -0.00026 -0.00193 31% -0.04079 
-2 0.002345 0.004979 -0.00596 50% -0.03844 
-1 -0.00301 -0.00943 -0.00381 44% -0.04146 
0 0.000286 -0.00584 -0.01237 56% -0.04117 
1 -0.00559 0.000914 -0.0025 31% -0.04676 
2 -0.00215 -0.00326 -0.00567 38% -0.04891 
3 -0.00328 -0.00579 -0.0015 31% -0.05219 
4 -0.00178 -0.00058 -0.00424 38% -0.05398 
5 -0.00515 -0.00959 -0.00796 31% -0.05913 
6 -0.00594 -0.00187 0.000105 44% -0.06507 
7 0.001151 6.82E-05 -0.00026 69% -0.06392 
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8 -0.00355 -0.00403 -0.0037 25% -0.06746 
9 0.003638 0.008092 0.003981 63% -0.06383 








































0.001386169 - -0.028905676 
 
Table 5.22: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.005781 0.008557 0.002312 78% 0.005781 
-59 0.00281 0.000445 0.005766 56% 0.008592 
-58 0.005656 0.013112 -0.00366 56% 0.014248 
-57 -0.00464 -0.00634 -0.00252 50% 0.009604 
-56 -0.00702 -0.00621 -0.00803 33% 0.002587 
-55 -0.00088 0.000743 -0.0029 39% 0.001712 
-54 -0.00252 -0.00236 -0.00271 44% -0.0008 
-53 -0.00511 -0.01337 5.22E-03 61% -0.00591 
-52 -0.00255 -0.00165 -0.00367 61% -0.00846 
-51 0.00732 0.01144 0.002169 67% -0.00114 
-50 0.004381 0.005285 0.003251 50% 0.003239 
-49 0.005532 0.006812 0.003933 44% 0.008771 
-48 -0.00799 -0.01409 -0.00037 50% 0.00078 
-47 0.003848 0.005444 1.85E-03 61% 0.004628 
-46 -0.00375 -0.00469 -0.00257 50% 0.000879 
-45 0.004933 0.007546 0.001667 56% 0.005812 
-44 -0.00362 -0.00864 0.002671 67% 0.002197 
-43 -0.00796 -0.01527 0.001166 39% -0.00577 
-42 0.009578 0.012567 0.005841 56% 0.003811 
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-41 0.007741 0.013417 0.000646 72% 0.011552 
-40 0.002005 0.009 -0.00674 67% 0.013557 
-39 -0.00095 -0.00829 0.008223 61% 0.012604 
-38 0.006652 0.009511 0.003079 44% 0.019256 
-37 -0.00466 -0.00633 -0.00257 61% 0.014598 
-36 0.004592 0.010905 -0.0033 61% 0.019189 
-35 -0.00774 -0.01476 0.001034 61% 0.011451 
-34 -0.00919 -0.01409 -0.00308 50% 0.002256 
-33 0.010907 0.022072 -0.00305 56% 0.013164 
-32 -0.00586 -0.01049 -6.1E-05 39% 0.007307 
-31 0.002239 0.002943 0.001358 67% 0.009546 
-30 0.003131 6.19E-05 0.006967 44% 0.012677 
-29 0.004565 0.009268 -0.00131 56% 0.017242 
-28 0.015925 0.027435 0.001539 72% 0.033167 
-27 0.000407 -0.00053 0.001581 61% 0.033574 
-26 0.010709 0.020285 -0.00126 44% 0.044283 
-25 -0.00971 -0.01733 -0.0002 56% 0.03457 
-24 -0.00327 -0.00545 -0.00055 56% 0.031297 
-23 -0.01011 -0.01998 0.002227 50% 0.021186 
-22 0.000262 -0.00069 0.001448 50% 0.021448 
-21 -0.00095 -0.00341 0.002115 39% 0.020496 
-20 -0.01194 -0.02409 0.003235 50% 0.008553 
-19 -0.00384 -0.01014 0.004038 39% 0.004713 
-18 0.002092 0.000427 0.004174 61% 0.006805 
-17 0.005773 0.004763 0.007036 61% 0.012578 
-16 -0.00048 0.002068 -0.00367 33% 0.012097 
-15 -0.01038 -0.01222 -0.00807 44% 0.001718 
-14 0.013562 0.016747 0.009581 72% 0.01528 
-13 -0.0103 -0.00857 -0.01246 44% 0.004984 
-12 -0.00911 -0.0111 -0.00662 28% -0.00412 
-11 -0.00115 0.0008 -0.00359 56% -0.00528 
-10 -0.01127 -0.00855 -0.01466 39% -0.01654 
-9 -0.00795 -0.01324 -0.00133 56% -0.02449 
-8 0.006562 0.003278 0.010668 78% -0.01793 
-7 0.004423 0.00589 0.002589 56% -0.0135 
-6 0.007253 0.007061 0.007493 61% -0.00625 
-5 0.004185 0.012604 -0.00634 50% -0.00207 
-4 0.006584 0.007731 0.005151 50% 0.004518 
-3 0.001539 -0.00128 0.005063 56% 0.006057 
-2 -0.00619 -0.00563 -0.0069 39% -0.00014 
-1 0.001794 0.00097 0.002825 44% 0.001658 
0 -0.0081 -0.0099 -0.00585 39% -0.00644 
1 0.006852 0.002848 0.011858 50% 0.000408 
2 -0.01777 -0.02337 -0.01077 33% -0.01736 
3 0.000816 0.003188 -0.00215 56% -0.01655 
4 -0.00537 -0.00532 -0.00544 61% -0.02192 
5 -0.00259 -0.00292 -0.00218 44% -0.02451 
6 0.000844 0.002961 -0.0018 56% -0.02366 
7 -0.00821 -0.01786 0.003866 61% -0.03187 
8 -0.0038 -0.0025 -0.00543 28% -0.03567 
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9 0.006444 0.007287 0.00539 61% -0.02923 




















to -1 2.75167E-05 
-




to +1 6.5E-06 
-




to +10 -0.00055131 
-
0.001107861 0.000144465 - 0.002784225 
 
Table 5.23: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.016903 0.015097 0.01703 63% 0.016903 
-59 -0.01525 -0.02984 -0.00365 38% 0.001654 
-58 0.013959 0.034073 -0.00143 50% 0.015613 
-57 0.03154 0.065131 0.005793 63% 0.047153 
-56 0.018514 0.057188 -0.01204 56% 0.065667 
-55 0.007438 0.008983 0.006525 56% 0.073106 
-54 0.008781 0.019267 0.001966 63% 0.081886 
-53 -0.0012 -0.00672 0.004013 44% 0.08069 
-52 0.011185 0.016283 0.008995 50% 0.091875 
-51 0.001169 -0.00363 0.004088 56% 0.093043 
-50 -0.00549 -0.00357 -0.00541 31% 0.08755 
-49 0.00852 0.013596 0.003213 44% 0.09607 
-48 0.01703 -0.00329 0.036836 69% 0.1131 
-47 -0.00327 -0.00547 -0.00106 31% 0.109825 
-46 0.00787 0.023105 -0.008 69% 0.117696 
-45 -0.00356 0.000971 -0.0096 50% 0.114134 
-44 -0.00599 -0.01151 -0.00284 44% 0.108141 
-43 0.012513 0.019118 0.006302 69% 0.120654 
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-42 -0.00637 0.005648 -0.01699 31% 0.114284 
-41 0.011268 0.020055 0.00569 56% 0.125551 
-40 -0.00477 0.002211 -0.01237 25% 0.120785 
-39 0.014138 0.023119 0.007722 63% 0.134923 
-38 -0.00345 -0.01764 0.009945 31% 0.131478 
-37 -0.01779 -0.04037 0.000475 38% 0.113691 
-36 0.004334 -0.00033 0.009121 44% 0.118025 
-35 0.000797 0.015602 -0.01141 56% 0.118822 
-34 0.00447 0.01104 0.000196 44% 0.123293 
-33 -0.00518 -0.00942 -0.00209 38% 0.118115 
-32 0.009698 0.022957 0.000319 56% 0.127813 
-31 0.007607 0.011371 0.004297 56% 0.13542 
-30 -0.00403 -0.00925 -0.00284 44% 0.131394 
-29 -0.00474 -0.00622 -0.00145 63% 0.126658 
-28 -0.00461 -0.00387 -0.00713 38% 0.122049 
-27 0.022741 0.03241 0.015589 75% 0.14479 
-26 -0.00887 -0.01665 0.002519 44% 0.135919 
-25 0.005176 0.010552 0.001661 63% 0.141095 
-24 0.012256 0.02956 0.000137 44% 0.153351 
-23 -0.00621 0.004811 -0.01624 38% 0.147143 
-22 0.008232 0.014467 0.003262 56% 0.155375 
-21 0.037511 0.085714 -0.00444 38% 0.192886 
-20 0.008759 0.023875 -0.00303 38% 0.201645 
-19 -0.00499 -0.02256 0.010293 50% 0.196651 
-18 0.002492 0.004974 0.000683 25% 0.199143 
-17 0.008128 0.013481 0.003367 63% 0.207271 
-16 -0.00452 -0.0065 -0.00289 31% 0.202755 
-15 0.000202 -0.00457 0.005654 50% 0.202957 
-14 -0.00043 0.003465 -0.00286 38% 0.202528 
-13 -0.00927 0.001963 -0.02164 38% 0.193263 
-12 0.018639 0.033393 0.005395 69% 0.211902 
-11 -0.01167 -0.0107 -0.01289 31% 0.200228 
-10 0.001249 0.004014 -0.00155 38% 0.201478 
-9 -0.00279 0.003538 -0.008 38% 0.198685 
-8 0.008625 0.020222 0.000543 44% 0.207309 
-7 0.01666 0.026158 0.011101 63% 0.223969 
-6 0.027125 0.030049 0.026081 75% 0.251094 
-5 -0.0032 0.000146 -0.00505 25% 0.247891 
-4 0.036335 0.074095 0.006493 63% 0.284226 
-3 0.001536 0.006492 -0.00216 31% 0.285762 
-2 0.005025 0.009626 0.001302 63% 0.290787 
-1 -0.00494 -0.01339 0.003156 38% 0.285849 
0 0.018285 0.025445 0.010353 50% 0.304134 
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1 0.007497 -0.01185 0.021912 75% 0.311631 
2 0.00182 -0.00205 0.004017 56% 0.31345 
3 -0.01528 -0.03481 0.000726 25% 0.298174 
4 0.008349 0.0179 0.000515 56% 0.306523 
5 0.001304 0.002061 -0.00046 50% 0.307826 
6 -0.00545 -0.0124 0.001347 50% 0.302376 
7 -0.00031 -0.00113 0.000959 50% 0.302065 
8 0.00414 0.009614 0.000269 50% 0.306205 
9 -0.00455 0.00992 -0.01641 31% 0.301656 




















to +10 0.004393592 0.008896972 0.000881408 - 0.172239634 
 
Table 5.24: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.002837 0.023917 0.007219 50% 0.002837 
-59 0.014324 0.024061 -0.00135 67% 0.017161 
-58 -0.00107 0.008276 -0.00332 44% 0.016096 
-57 0.00535 0.016294 -0.00034 61% 0.021446 
-56 -0.0094 -0.01719 -0.01117 28% 0.012044 
-55 -0.00265 -0.00405 0.001601 33% 0.009396 
-54 0.003063 -0.00246 0.005887 44% 0.012459 
-53 0.009056 0.005664 0.013024 44% 0.021515 
-52 -0.01579 -0.0062 -0.02219 28% 0.005729 
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-51 0.001395 0.001159 0.000349 39% 0.007124 
-50 0.011325 0.011031 0.012305 33% 0.018449 
-49 -0.00308 -0.00428 -0.00591 39% 0.015365 
-48 -0.00748 0.006725 -0.00939 50% 0.00788 
-47 0.000851 -0.00256 0.004518 39% 0.008731 
-46 0.007319 -0.00147 0.009963 28% 0.01605 
-45 -0.00474 -0.00227 -0.0101 39% 0.011312 
-44 -0.00363 -0.00344 -0.00413 39% 0.007683 
-43 -0.00475 -0.002 0.00389 22% 0.002936 
-42 -0.00029 0.004203 -0.01057 44% 0.002649 
-41 -0.00261 0.00891 -0.0065 44% 4.31E-05 
-40 0.010399 0.004752 0.013634 39% 0.010442 
-39 -0.00044 -0.00905 0.002855 44% 0.010004 
-38 -0.00219 0.000648 -0.00252 39% 0.007813 
-37 -0.00168 -0.00698 -0.00033 33% 0.006137 
-36 -0.0009 0.002963 -0.00197 50% 0.005237 
-35 -0.00291 0.002837 -0.00354 50% 0.00233 
-34 0.0082 0.016039 0.003739 56% 0.01053 
-33 0.003117 -0.00124 0.000168 39% 0.013647 
-32 -0.00611 -8.7E-05 -0.00746 22% 0.007542 
-31 -0.00819 0.001285 -0.01061 33% -0.00065 
-30 -0.00468 -0.00485 -0.00489 56% -0.00533 
-29 -0.00832 0.001567 -0.01447 28% -0.01365 
-28 -0.00331 0.001542 -0.00707 39% -0.01696 
-27 0.000746 0.002603 -0.00254 33% -0.01621 
-26 -0.00377 0.000432 -0.00221 39% -0.01999 
-25 0.007948 0.007305 0.009546 67% -0.01204 
-24 0.002388 0.004138 -0.00044 61% -0.00965 
-23 -0.00449 -0.00706 -0.00139 22% -0.01414 
-22 -0.00833 -0.00189 -0.01278 17% -0.02247 
-21 -0.00055 0.003701 0.000435 44% -0.02302 
-20 0.001229 0.002224 -0.00148 50% -0.02179 
-19 0.00626 0.01279 0.003349 67% -0.01553 
-18 -0.00225 0.017347 -0.01609 61% -0.01778 
-17 -0.00952 0.000174 -0.0098 33% -0.0273 
-16 -0.00464 0.001026 -0.00608 33% -0.03194 
-15 -0.00197 -0.00733 -0.00183 28% -0.03391 
-14 0.001792 0.005902 0.004283 33% -0.03212 
-13 7.01E-05 -0.00644 -0.00241 28% -0.03205 
-12 -0.00082 -0.00342 0.000826 33% -0.03287 
-11 -0.00828 -0.00546 -0.00929 33% -0.04114 
-10 -0.00579 -0.00873 -0.00258 28% -0.04694 
-9 -0.00829 -0.0063 -0.00316 11% -0.05522 
168 
 
-8 0.002983 -0.00383 -0.0007 33% -0.05224 
-7 -0.00285 0.003239 -0.00748 39% -0.05509 
-6 0.004931 0.007957 0.006046 33% -0.05016 
-5 0.017036 0.009374 0.019492 50% -0.03312 
-4 -0.00554 -0.00238 -0.00698 22% -0.03867 
-3 0.010236 -0.00397 0.012514 33% -0.02843 
-2 -0.00889 -0.00674 -0.00332 22% -0.03732 
-1 0.001943 0.007196 -0.01339 56% -0.03537 
0 -0.01416 0.012622 -0.01589 33% -0.04954 
1 -0.01139 -0.02774 -0.00748 39% -0.06093 
2 -0.01039 -0.00843 -0.00769 11% -0.07132 
3 0.002712 -0.00085 0.004389 50% -0.06861 
4 -0.0073 -0.01108 -0.00558 17% -0.07591 
5 0.003599 0.002449 0.005721 44% -0.07231 
6 -0.0006 0.001043 -0.00472 33% -0.07291 
7 -0.0036 0.005202 -0.00619 56% -0.07651 
8 -0.00991 -0.00251 -0.01484 17% -0.08642 
9 -0.006 -0.00445 -0.00659 28% -0.09242 












to -5 -0.00059198 0.001812464 
-


















to +10 -0.00133283 0.000934535 -0.00238038 - -0.019774689 
 
 
Table 5.25: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2006(from the market model with 





















































-60 0.007 0.0196 8E-05 47% 0.007 0.0196 8E-05 
-59 0.006 0.0200 -2E-03 58% 0.014 0.0395 -2E-03 
-58 0.000 0.0015 -1E-03 53% 0.013 0.0410 -3E-03 
-57 0.002 -0.0008 3E-03 53% 0.015 0.0402 5E-05 
-56 -0.005 0.0029 -9E-03 53% 0.010 0.0431 -9E-03 
-55 0.003 0.0016 4E-03 37% 0.013 0.0447 -5E-03 
-54 -0.002 0.0012 -4E-03 37% 0.011 0.0459 -9E-03 
-53 0.000 0.0049 -3E-03 53% 0.011 0.0507 -1E-02 
-52 0.004 0.0049 4E-03 58% 0.015 0.0556 -8E-03 
-51 0.000 0.0002 6E-04 37% 0.016 0.0558 -7E-03 
-50 0.003 0.0006 5E-03 47% 0.019 0.0564 -3E-03 
-49 -0.006 0.0010 -1E-02 37% 0.013 0.0573 -1E-02 
-48 0.003 0.0009 5E-03 42% 0.016 0.0583 -8E-03 
-47 -0.002 -0.0087 2E-03 53% 0.015 0.0495 -6E-03 
-46 0.000 -0.0003 6E-04 42% 0.015 0.0492 -5E-03 
-45 -0.003 -0.0063 -5E-04 26% 0.012 0.0429 -6E-03 
-44 0.001 0.0005 1E-03 47% 0.013 0.0434 -4E-03 
-43 -0.003 0.0004 -5E-03 37% 0.010 0.0437 -1E-02 
-42 0.001 0.0051 -6E-04 53% 0.011 0.0489 -1E-02 
-41 -0.010 -0.0009 -1E-02 42% 0.002 0.0480 -3E-02 
-40 0.000 0.0093 -5E-03 32% 0.002 0.0573 -3E-02 
-39 0.001 -0.0007 2E-03 63% 0.003 0.0567 -3E-02 
-38 0.003 -0.0021 5E-03 58% 0.005 0.0546 -2E-02 
-37 -0.015 -0.0076 -2E-02 32% -0.010 0.0470 -4E-02 
-36 -0.007 -0.0071 -6E-03 32% -0.016 0.0399 -5E-02 
-35 -0.001 0.0007 -2E-03 42% -0.017 0.0406 -5E-02 
-34 0.003 0.0032 2E-03 53% -0.015 0.0438 -5E-02 
-33 0.001 0.0041 -1E-04 53% -0.013 0.0479 -5E-02 
-32 0.001 0.0037 -5E-04 42% -0.012 0.0517 -5E-02 
-31 0.006 0.0271 -6E-03 53% -0.006 0.0788 -6E-02 
-30 0.007 0.0028 1E-02 47% 0.001 0.0816 -5E-02 
-29 0.003 0.0078 4E-04 42% 0.005 0.0894 -4E-02 
-28 -0.002 -0.0055 3E-04 26% 0.003 0.0839 -4E-02 
-27 0.001 0.0133 -6E-03 58% 0.004 0.0972 -5E-02 
-26 -0.005 -0.0166 2E-03 53% -0.001 0.0806 -5E-02 
-25 0.002 -0.0038 5E-03 37% 0.001 0.0768 -4E-02 
-24 0.004 0.0111 -5E-04 53% 0.005 0.0879 -4E-02 
-23 0.003 0.0194 -7E-03 58% 0.008 0.1073 -5E-02 
-22 0.009 0.0271 -1E-03 53% 0.017 0.1344 -5E-02 
-21 0.018 0.0468 8E-04 58% 0.034 0.1812 -5E-02 
-20 -0.005 -0.0101 -2E-03 42% 0.029 0.1710 -5E-02 
-19 -0.008 -0.0062 -9E-03 26% 0.022 0.1648 -6E-02 
-18 -0.003 -0.0070 1E-04 32% 0.019 0.1578 -6E-02 
-17 -0.001 0.0046 -5E-03 42% 0.018 0.1624 -7E-02 
-16 -0.001 0.0011 -2E-03 53% 0.017 0.1635 -7E-02 
-15 0.004 -0.0002 6E-03 53% 0.021 0.1633 -6E-02 
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-14 0.004 -0.0019 7E-03 47% 0.024 0.1614 -6E-02 
-13 -0.002 -0.0052 3E-05 37% 0.023 0.1562 -6E-02 
-12 -0.001 -0.0053 8E-04 47% 0.021 0.1509 -5E-02 
-11 -0.004 -0.0031 -4E-03 16% 0.018 0.1478 -6E-02 
-10 0.004 0.0077 2E-03 42% 0.022 0.1555 -6E-02 
-9 0.007 0.0123 3E-03 68% 0.028 0.1678 -5E-02 
-8 0.011 0.0253 2E-03 53% 0.039 0.1931 -5E-02 
-7 -0.012 -0.0238 -6E-03 37% 0.027 0.1693 -6E-02 
-6 0.002 0.0065 -1E-03 47% 0.028 0.1758 -6E-02 
-5 -0.002 -0.0047 -8E-04 37% 0.026 0.1711 -6E-02 
-4 0.003 0.0067 4E-04 47% 0.029 0.1778 -6E-02 
-3 0.004 0.0009 5E-03 68% 0.033 0.1787 -5E-02 
-2 0.006 0.0076 6E-03 58% 0.039 0.1863 -5E-02 
-1 0.010 0.0317 -3E-03 42% 0.049 0.2179 -5E-02 
0 0.093 0.0196 1E-01 68% 0.142 0.2376 9E-02 
1 0.004 -0.0008 7E-03 53% 0.147 0.2368 9E-02 
2 0.000 -0.0034 1E-03 42% 0.146 0.2334 1E-01 
3 0.001 0.0021 7E-04 47% 0.148 0.2355 1E-01 
4 0.009 0.0001 1E-02 47% 0.157 0.2356 1E-01 
5 0.003 0.0098 -4E-04 68% 0.160 0.2454 1E-01 
6 0.007 0.0050 8E-03 58% 0.167 0.2504 1E-01 
7 0.003 0.0018 4E-03 53% 0.170 0.2523 1E-01 
8 0.004 0.0003 6E-03 53% 0.174 0.2526 1E-01 
9 -0.002 0.0000 -3E-03 32% 0.172 0.2526 1E-01 


























































































Table 5.26: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2007(from the market model with 





















































-60 0.010 0.011 0.004 75% 0.010 0.011 0.004 
-59 0.007 0.008 0.000 69% 0.017 0.020 0.004 
-58 -0.001 0.003 -0.019 44% 0.016 0.023 -0.015 
-57 0.036 0.040 0.020 44% 0.052 0.063 0.005 
-56 0.014 0.014 0.011 56% 0.066 0.077 0.016 
-55 0.025 0.027 0.016 75% 0.091 0.105 0.032 
-54 0.004 0.003 0.004 50% 0.095 0.108 0.036 
-53 0.004 0.001 0.019 56% 0.099 0.109 0.055 
-52 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 38% 0.095 0.106 0.049 
-51 -0.005 -0.009 0.015 31% 0.091 0.097 0.065 
-50 0.001 -0.001 0.008 56% 0.092 0.096 0.072 
-49 0.007 0.006 0.012 44% 0.099 0.102 0.084 
-48 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 69% 0.095 0.096 0.092 
-47 0.002 0.004 -0.007 44% 0.097 0.099 0.086 
-46 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 31% 0.096 0.101 0.076 
-45 0.012 0.015 0.002 56% 0.108 0.115 0.077 
-44 0.000 0.001 -0.005 44% 0.108 0.116 0.072 
-43 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 56% 0.104 0.114 0.061 
-42 0.005 0.002 0.014 63% 0.109 0.116 0.076 
-41 0.000 0.001 -0.003 50% 0.109 0.117 0.072 
-40 -0.006 -0.004 -0.017 38% 0.102 0.113 0.055 
-39 0.001 0.001 0.003 44% 0.104 0.114 0.058 
-38 0.001 0.001 0.002 25% 0.105 0.115 0.060 
-37 0.006 0.007 0.006 69% 0.111 0.122 0.066 
-36 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 31% 0.108 0.117 0.065 
-35 -0.005 -0.008 0.009 56% 0.103 0.110 0.074 
-34 0.013 0.014 0.009 63% 0.116 0.124 0.083 
-33 0.009 0.012 -0.007 63% 0.125 0.136 0.076 
-32 0.004 0.008 -0.013 44% 0.129 0.144 0.063 
-31 -0.010 -0.014 0.005 63% 0.119 0.130 0.068 
-30 0.001 0.001 0.001 63% 0.120 0.131 0.069 
-29 -0.004 -0.007 0.010 44% 0.116 0.124 0.079 
-28 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 44% 0.113 0.119 0.083 
-27 0.004 0.004 0.000 50% 0.116 0.124 0.083 
-26 -0.002 0.001 -0.014 38% 0.115 0.125 0.069 
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-25 0.000 -0.002 0.011 50% 0.115 0.123 0.080 
-24 0.003 0.000 0.016 56% 0.118 0.123 0.096 
-23 0.011 0.007 0.028 56% 0.129 0.130 0.124 
-22 0.003 0.007 -0.014 38% 0.131 0.137 0.109 
-21 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 50% 0.129 0.135 0.100 
-20 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 31% 0.120 0.127 0.088 
-19 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 44% 0.118 0.124 0.092 
-18 0.012 0.013 0.007 81% 0.130 0.137 0.099 
-17 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 31% 0.126 0.132 0.100 
-16 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 44% 0.124 0.130 0.101 
-15 -0.005 -0.009 0.011 44% 0.119 0.121 0.112 
-14 0.000 0.002 -0.011 44% 0.119 0.123 0.101 
-13 0.007 0.010 -0.004 25% 0.126 0.133 0.097 
-12 0.001 0.001 0.001 56% 0.127 0.134 0.097 
-11 0.002 0.001 0.009 50% 0.130 0.135 0.107 
-10 0.003 0.004 0.001 56% 0.133 0.138 0.108 
-9 0.000 -0.001 0.003 50% 0.133 0.137 0.111 
-8 0.006 0.006 0.004 44% 0.138 0.144 0.116 
-7 0.001 0.000 0.003 44% 0.139 0.144 0.119 
-6 0.006 0.009 -0.005 50% 0.145 0.152 0.114 
-5 -0.010 -0.014 0.011 38% 0.136 0.138 0.125 
-4 0.007 0.008 0.004 50% 0.143 0.146 0.129 
-3 0.020 0.022 0.012 69% 0.163 0.168 0.141 
-2 0.002 0.004 -0.009 31% 0.164 0.172 0.132 
-1 0.089 0.103 0.026 75% 0.253 0.275 0.158 
0 0.111 0.109 0.120 75% 0.365 0.384 0.278 
1 0.000 -0.002 0.005 44% 0.364 0.383 0.283 
2 0.015 0.019 -0.003 63% 0.379 0.402 0.280 
3 0.004 0.002 0.015 75% 0.383 0.403 0.295 
4 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 25% 0.380 0.399 0.299 
5 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 31% 0.376 0.395 0.292 
6 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 31% 0.373 0.393 0.286 
7 0.002 0.002 -0.002 50% 0.375 0.396 0.283 
8 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 44% 0.374 0.395 0.280 
9 0.000 0.000 0.002 63% 0.374 0.395 0.281 
















































































Table 5.27: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2008(from the market model with 





















































-60 -0.004 0.002 -0.010 61% -0.004 0.002 -0.010 
-59 -0.013 -0.011 -0.016 39% -0.017 -0.009 -0.026 
-58 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 61% -0.018 -0.012 -0.025 
-57 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 61% -0.025 -0.016 -0.034 
-56 -0.002 0.014 -0.017 56% -0.026 -0.002 -0.051 
-55 0.016 0.010 0.022 72% -0.011 0.008 -0.029 
-54 0.006 0.008 0.005 89% -0.004 0.016 -0.024 
-53 -0.019 -0.016 -0.021 39% -0.023 0.000 -0.046 
-52 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 56% -0.024 0.000 -0.048 
-51 0.017 0.030 0.005 89% -0.007 0.030 -0.043 
-50 0.006 0.022 -0.011 67% -0.001 0.052 -0.055 
-49 0.001 0.003 -0.001 67% 0.000 0.055 -0.055 
-48 0.005 0.026 -0.017 61% 0.004 0.080 -0.072 
-47 0.002 0.006 -0.002 61% 0.006 0.087 -0.074 
-46 -0.004 -0.013 0.005 78% 0.003 0.074 -0.069 
-45 -0.005 -0.001 -0.008 50% -0.002 0.073 -0.077 
-44 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 78% -0.003 0.071 -0.076 
-43 0.001 0.000 0.003 78% -0.002 0.070 -0.073 
-42 -0.031 -0.066 0.004 67% -0.033 0.004 -0.069 
-41 -0.005 -0.019 0.009 56% -0.038 -0.015 -0.060 
-40 -0.013 -0.028 0.001 56% -0.051 -0.043 -0.059 
-39 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 72% -0.053 -0.047 -0.058 
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-38 -0.011 -0.031 0.009 61% -0.063 -0.078 -0.049 
-37 -0.010 -0.026 0.006 67% -0.073 -0.104 -0.043 
-36 -0.006 -0.018 0.006 72% -0.079 -0.122 -0.036 
-35 -0.024 -0.034 -0.013 44% -0.103 -0.157 -0.049 
-34 -0.013 -0.030 0.005 78% -0.116 -0.187 -0.045 
-33 0.039 0.080 -0.002 61% -0.077 -0.107 -0.047 
-32 0.033 0.065 0.001 89% -0.044 -0.042 -0.046 
-31 -0.015 -0.036 0.007 78% -0.059 -0.078 -0.039 
-30 0.012 0.024 0.000 67% -0.046 -0.054 -0.039 
-29 0.024 0.038 0.009 72% -0.023 -0.016 -0.030 
-28 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 67% -0.024 -0.015 -0.034 
-27 0.011 0.012 0.010 50% -0.013 -0.002 -0.024 
-26 0.024 0.010 0.038 72% 0.011 0.007 0.015 
-25 0.021 -0.013 0.055 61% 0.032 -0.006 0.070 
-24 0.004 0.006 0.001 72% 0.036 0.000 0.071 
-23 0.015 0.022 0.008 78% 0.050 0.021 0.079 
-22 0.020 0.015 0.024 72% 0.070 0.036 0.103 
-21 0.017 -0.017 0.051 67% 0.087 0.019 0.154 
-20 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 50% 0.083 0.017 0.148 
-19 -0.004 -0.017 0.008 56% 0.078 0.001 0.156 
-18 0.014 0.029 -0.001 78% 0.092 0.029 0.155 
-17 -0.023 -0.015 -0.030 50% 0.069 0.014 0.125 
-16 0.001 -0.011 0.013 50% 0.070 0.002 0.138 
-15 0.019 0.020 0.019 56% 0.090 0.023 0.157 
-14 0.004 0.000 0.007 72% 0.093 0.022 0.164 
-13 0.010 0.010 0.011 67% 0.103 0.032 0.175 
-12 0.008 0.020 -0.004 78% 0.111 0.052 0.171 
-11 0.003 0.010 -0.005 67% 0.114 0.062 0.166 
-10 0.000 -0.003 0.004 61% 0.114 0.059 0.170 
-9 0.005 0.017 -0.007 61% 0.119 0.075 0.163 
-8 0.006 0.004 0.007 67% 0.125 0.079 0.171 
-7 0.000 -0.008 0.008 50% 0.125 0.071 0.179 
-6 0.003 0.009 -0.002 67% 0.128 0.080 0.177 
-5 0.003 0.006 0.000 72% 0.131 0.086 0.177 
-4 0.005 0.014 -0.003 61% 0.137 0.100 0.174 
-3 0.008 0.004 0.012 61% 0.145 0.103 0.186 
-2 0.012 -0.004 0.027 67% 0.156 0.099 0.213 
-1 0.041 0.080 0.001 67% 0.197 0.179 0.215 
0 0.139 0.203 0.076 67% 0.336 0.382 0.290 
1 0.022 0.007 0.038 61% 0.359 0.389 0.328 
2 -0.003 0.004 -0.010 72% 0.355 0.392 0.318 
3 -0.006 0.007 -0.019 67% 0.349 0.400 0.299 
4 -0.031 -0.020 -0.042 50% 0.319 0.380 0.258 
5 0.000 -0.036 0.036 61% 0.319 0.344 0.293 
6 -0.003 -0.011 0.004 72% 0.315 0.334 0.297 
7 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 50% 0.304 0.323 0.285 
8 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 61% 0.298 0.317 0.279 
9 -0.009 -0.015 -0.002 72% 0.289 0.302 0.276 
10 0.000 -0.004 0.004 56% 0.290 0.299 0.281 








































































Table 5.28: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2009(from the market model with 





















































-60 0.005 0.003 0.007 63% 0.005 0.003 0.007 
-59 -0.017 -0.028 -0.008 38% -0.012 -0.026 -0.001 
-58 -0.006 0.000 -0.012 38% -0.018 -0.025 -0.012 
-57 -0.012 -0.021 -0.005 50% -0.030 -0.047 -0.017 
-56 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 44% -0.037 -0.051 -0.025 
-55 -0.006 -0.020 0.005 50% -0.043 -0.071 -0.021 
-54 0.002 -0.008 0.010 63% -0.040 -0.078 -0.011 
-53 -0.068 -0.027 -0.099 38% -0.108 -0.106 -0.110 
-52 0.049 -0.011 0.095 31% -0.059 -0.116 -0.015 
-51 0.004 0.002 0.004 81% -0.056 -0.114 -0.011 
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-50 0.008 0.013 0.005 69% -0.047 -0.101 -0.006 
-49 0.009 0.023 -0.003 50% -0.039 -0.078 -0.009 
-48 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 56% -0.045 -0.088 -0.012 
-47 0.026 0.033 0.022 81% -0.019 -0.055 0.010 
-46 0.016 0.042 -0.004 56% -0.002 -0.013 0.006 
-45 0.080 0.009 0.135 81% 0.078 -0.004 0.141 
-44 0.015 -0.010 0.034 56% 0.093 -0.014 0.175 
-43 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 50% 0.083 -0.023 0.165 
-42 0.003 -0.014 0.017 50% 0.086 -0.038 0.182 
-41 -0.006 -0.014 0.001 63% 0.080 -0.052 0.183 
-40 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 50% 0.074 -0.061 0.178 
-39 0.007 -0.007 0.017 56% 0.080 -0.068 0.196 
-38 -0.003 -0.025 0.014 38% 0.077 -0.093 0.210 
-37 0.005 0.003 0.006 63% 0.082 -0.089 0.216 
-36 0.011 0.051 -0.020 69% 0.094 -0.038 0.196 
-35 0.013 0.036 -0.004 56% 0.107 -0.002 0.192 
-34 -0.016 -0.012 -0.019 31% 0.091 -0.014 0.172 
-33 0.000 0.009 -0.006 63% 0.091 -0.005 0.166 
-32 0.000 -0.008 0.007 50% 0.091 -0.013 0.173 
-31 0.041 0.112 -0.014 63% 0.133 0.099 0.159 
-30 -0.007 -0.018 0.002 44% 0.126 0.081 0.162 
-29 -0.009 -0.011 -0.006 44% 0.118 0.069 0.155 
-28 0.004 0.006 0.002 56% 0.122 0.075 0.158 
-27 -0.003 -0.008 0.000 38% 0.118 0.067 0.158 
-26 0.016 0.036 0.000 63% 0.134 0.103 0.158 
-25 0.019 0.041 0.001 56% 0.153 0.145 0.159 
-24 -0.012 -0.027 0.001 38% 0.141 0.117 0.160 
-23 0.008 0.002 0.012 69% 0.149 0.119 0.172 
-22 -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 38% 0.143 0.117 0.163 
-21 -0.011 -0.024 -0.001 44% 0.132 0.093 0.162 
-20 0.000 0.002 -0.001 56% 0.132 0.095 0.161 
-19 0.004 0.001 0.006 50% 0.136 0.096 0.167 
-18 0.004 0.006 0.003 63% 0.140 0.102 0.169 
-17 -0.003 0.012 -0.015 56% 0.137 0.114 0.154 
-16 -0.006 0.004 -0.014 38% 0.131 0.118 0.140 
-15 -0.004 0.007 -0.013 50% 0.127 0.125 0.128 
-14 0.002 0.004 0.000 63% 0.129 0.129 0.128 
-13 0.009 0.016 0.004 63% 0.138 0.145 0.133 
-12 0.003 0.026 -0.015 38% 0.141 0.170 0.118 
-11 0.005 0.018 -0.005 63% 0.146 0.188 0.113 
-10 -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 50% 0.139 0.184 0.104 
-9 0.007 0.035 -0.015 50% 0.146 0.219 0.089 
-8 0.009 0.027 -0.006 63% 0.154 0.246 0.083 
-7 0.010 0.007 0.012 44% 0.164 0.253 0.095 
-6 -0.001 0.008 -0.008 50% 0.163 0.260 0.087 
-5 0.009 0.004 0.012 50% 0.171 0.264 0.099 
-4 0.008 0.007 0.009 69% 0.179 0.271 0.108 
-3 0.005 0.009 0.003 75% 0.185 0.280 0.111 
-2 0.019 0.023 0.016 56% 0.204 0.303 0.127 
-1 0.013 0.023 0.006 56% 0.217 0.326 0.132 
177 
 
0 0.086 0.132 0.051 75% 0.304 0.459 0.184 
1 -0.025 -0.007 -0.039 38% 0.279 0.451 0.145 
2 0.026 0.040 0.015 81% 0.305 0.491 0.160 
3 0.010 0.022 0.000 69% 0.315 0.513 0.160 
4 0.005 0.005 0.004 56% 0.319 0.519 0.164 
5 0.002 0.000 0.004 56% 0.321 0.518 0.168 
6 -0.001 0.005 -0.006 50% 0.320 0.523 0.162 
7 0.004 0.010 -0.002 69% 0.324 0.533 0.160 
8 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 50% 0.318 0.524 0.158 
9 0.003 -0.003 0.007 56% 0.321 0.521 0.165 











































































Table 5.29: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.K. in 2010(from the market model with 























































-60 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 56% -0.001 0.003 -0.005 
-59 0.006 0.012 -0.001 39% 0.004 0.015 -0.006 
-58 0.007 0.010 0.005 50% 0.012 0.025 -0.002 
-57 -0.026 -0.045 -0.008 50% -0.015 -0.020 -0.009 
-56 0.008 0.007 0.010 56% -0.007 -0.014 0.001 
-55 0.006 0.001 0.011 61% 0.000 -0.013 0.012 
-54 0.003 0.003 0.002 67% 0.002 -0.010 0.014 
-53 0.006 0.000 0.012 78% 0.008 -0.010 0.026 
-52 -0.022 -0.034 -0.009 44% -0.014 -0.044 0.017 
-51 0.009 0.036 -0.018 33% -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 
-50 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 33% -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 
-49 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 39% -0.014 -0.016 -0.012 
-48 0.004 0.007 0.001 56% -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
-47 -0.004 -0.010 0.002 61% -0.014 -0.019 -0.008 
-46 0.004 0.011 -0.003 61% -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 
-45 -0.008 -0.017 0.001 56% -0.017 -0.024 -0.010 
-44 0.005 0.009 0.002 56% -0.012 -0.016 -0.008 
-43 0.010 0.011 0.010 56% -0.001 -0.005 0.003 
-42 0.002 -0.004 0.008 56% 0.001 -0.009 0.011 
-41 -0.007 0.002 -0.016 33% -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
-40 0.022 0.040 0.004 72% 0.016 0.034 -0.001 
-39 0.000 -0.004 0.004 56% 0.016 0.029 0.003 
-38 0.000 0.004 -0.005 61% 0.016 0.034 -0.002 
-37 -0.021 -0.038 -0.003 44% -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
-36 0.010 0.000 0.019 61% 0.005 -0.004 0.013 
-35 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 50% -0.001 -0.012 0.010 
-34 0.011 0.022 0.000 39% 0.010 0.010 0.010 
-33 -0.009 -0.014 -0.004 39% 0.001 -0.003 0.006 
-32 0.005 0.005 0.004 72% 0.006 0.002 0.010 
-31 0.005 0.004 0.006 50% 0.011 0.006 0.016 
-30 0.016 0.020 0.012 44% 0.027 0.026 0.028 
-29 0.002 0.000 0.003 56% 0.029 0.026 0.031 
-28 0.006 0.003 0.009 61% 0.035 0.029 0.040 
-27 0.000 0.005 -0.005 44% 0.035 0.035 0.035 
-26 0.009 0.008 0.010 61% 0.044 0.042 0.046 
-25 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 33% 0.038 0.037 0.039 
-24 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 50% 0.037 0.036 0.038 
-23 0.003 -0.013 0.019 44% 0.040 0.023 0.057 
-22 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 39% 0.033 0.017 0.050 
-21 0.008 0.007 0.008 67% 0.041 0.024 0.058 
-20 0.005 0.010 0.001 61% 0.046 0.033 0.059 
-19 0.001 0.007 -0.005 72% 0.047 0.040 0.054 
-18 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 56% 0.044 0.038 0.051 
-17 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 50% 0.041 0.031 0.050 
-16 0.014 0.025 0.003 67% 0.054 0.056 0.053 
-15 0.004 0.000 0.009 50% 0.059 0.055 0.062 
-14 -0.005 0.005 -0.014 28% 0.054 0.061 0.047 
-13 0.002 0.025 -0.021 50% 0.056 0.086 0.026 
-12 -0.006 -0.011 -0.001 50% 0.050 0.075 0.025 
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-11 -0.003 -0.016 0.010 72% 0.047 0.059 0.035 
-10 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 28% 0.041 0.056 0.026 
-9 0.010 0.005 0.015 61% 0.051 0.061 0.041 
-8 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 33% 0.047 0.057 0.038 
-7 -0.010 -0.021 0.002 44% 0.038 0.036 0.039 
-6 -0.006 0.011 -0.022 56% 0.032 0.047 0.017 
-5 0.001 0.002 0.001 50% 0.033 0.049 0.018 
-4 0.025 0.047 0.004 50% 0.059 0.096 0.022 
-3 -0.001 -0.007 0.006 50% 0.058 0.089 0.027 
-2 0.002 0.006 -0.002 39% 0.060 0.096 0.025 
-1 0.067 0.144 -0.009 50% 0.128 0.239 0.016 
0 0.178 0.095 0.260 78% 0.305 0.335 0.276 
1 0.020 0.032 0.008 56% 0.326 0.367 0.284 
2 0.088 0.165 0.012 39% 0.414 0.532 0.297 
3 0.046 0.087 0.005 50% 0.460 0.619 0.302 
4 -0.019 -0.033 -0.005 44% 0.441 0.586 0.297 
5 -0.009 -0.019 0.002 50% 0.433 0.567 0.299 
6 -0.002 -0.017 0.013 39% 0.431 0.550 0.311 
7 -0.011 -0.025 0.003 50% 0.420 0.526 0.315 
8 0.001 0.006 -0.003 56% 0.422 0.532 0.311 
9 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012 33% 0.413 0.526 0.299 




















































































Table5.30: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.004344 0.006177 0.003498 53% 0.004344 
-59 0.005658 0.011813 0.002818 47% 0.010002 
-58 0.000708 -0.00673 0.004142 58% 0.01071 
-57 -0.0005 0.003649 -0.00241 58% 0.010212 
-56 -0.0052 -0.01394 -0.00117 32% 0.005011 
-55 0.001587 0.006179 -0.00053 47% 0.006598 
-54 8.06E-05 -0.00182 0.000958 37% 0.006679 
-53 -0.00464 0.003374 -0.00834 37% 0.002036 
-52 0.012851 0.016596 0.011122 63% 0.014887 
-51 0.013173 0.032239 0.004374 58% 0.02806 
-50 -0.00273 -0.00628 -0.0011 42% 0.025325 
-49 0.014086 0.056435 -0.00546 42% 0.039411 
-48 -0.00571 -0.01421 -0.00178 37% 0.033704 
-47 -0.00382 -0.01048 -0.00074 42% 0.029889 
-46 0.005463 0.005323 0.005528 58% 0.035352 
-45 -0.00169 -0.00082 -0.00209 53% 0.033664 
-44 -0.00802 -0.00898 -0.00758 32% 0.02564 
-43 -0.008 -0.02026 -0.00234 26% 0.017641 
-42 -0.00555 -0.00121 -0.00755 32% 0.012092 
-41 -0.0077 -0.02562 0.000572 26% 0.004392 
-40 0.004827 -0.00149 0.007744 53% 0.009219 
-39 0.003651 -0.00296 0.0067 26% 0.01287 
-38 0.002052 0.017564 -0.00511 37% 0.014922 
-37 -0.006 -0.00874 -0.00473 47% 0.008926 
-36 0.000858 0.00248 0.00011 47% 0.009784 
-35 0.007724 0.02332 0.000526 53% 0.017509 
-34 0.000653 -0.00133 0.001567 53% 0.018162 
-33 -0.00281 -0.00838 -0.00024 53% 0.015349 
-32 0.004928 -0.00458 0.009318 47% 0.020277 
-31 -0.00224 -0.00395 -0.00145 32% 0.01804 
-30 0.003989 0.011096 0.000709 42% 0.022029 
-29 -0.00084 0.006414 -0.00419 42% 0.021188 
-28 -0.00023 0.002654 -0.00156 53% 0.02096 
-27 -0.0007 -0.0053 0.001417 42% 0.020257 
-26 0.003107 0.006871 0.00137 53% 0.023363 
-25 0.00233 0.010799 -0.00158 42% 0.025694 
-24 -0.00616 -0.02236 0.001316 42% 0.019532 
-23 0.003089 0.002128 0.003532 68% 0.022621 
-22 0.004733 0.014437 0.000254 58% 0.027353 
-21 -0.00039 -0.007 0.002666 53% 0.026966 
-20 -0.00503 0.009628 -0.0118 32% 0.021936 
181 
 
-19 -0.00354 -0.01477 0.001645 37% 0.018396 
-18 -8.1E-05 -0.00349 0.001495 58% 0.018315 
-17 0.007386 0.034664 -0.0052 53% 0.025701 
-16 0.015618 0.051478 -0.00093 47% 0.041319 
-15 -0.0136 -0.02506 -0.00831 26% 0.027721 
-14 -0.0122 -0.03581 -0.0013 47% 0.015526 
-13 -0.00199 -0.00471 -0.00074 37% 0.013533 
-12 -0.00918 -0.02219 -0.00318 21% 0.00435 
-11 -0.00136 -0.00734 1.40E-03 42% 0.002991 
-10 0.011302 0.029118 0.003079 53% 0.014293 
-9 -0.00203 0.002189 -0.00398 42% 0.01226 
-8 0.000932 0.005358 -0.00111 37% 0.013192 
-7 -0.00403 -0.01551 0.001265 42% 0.009159 
-6 -0.0005 -0.00182 0.00011 42% 0.00866 
-5 -0.00294 -0.00389 -0.0025 32% 0.00572 
-4 0.004597 3.43E-03 0.005135 84% 0.010317 
-3 -0.00098 0.001735 -0.00224 53% 0.009335 
-2 0.000145 -0.00321 0.001695 32% 0.00948 
-1 -0.00293 -0.00344 -0.0027 42% 0.006549 
0 -0.00702 -0.00987 -0.00571 32% -0.00047 
1 0.00286 0.006681 0.001096 53% 0.002386 
2 -0.00172 -0.0067 0.00058 47% 0.000666 
3 0.000771 -0.0096 0.005558 37% 0.001437 
4 0.002708 -0.00193 0.004849 53% 0.004145 
5 0.003589 -0.00865 0.009237 63% 0.007734 
6 -0.0008 -0.00986 0.003377 32% 0.006931 
7 0.004683 0.001493 0.006156 53% 0.011614 
8 -0.00135 -0.00984 0.002576 42% 0.010268 
9 0.002447 0.005712 0.00094 63% 0.012715 




to -6 0.000157429 0.000183014 
-




to -5 0.000102118 0.001088446 
-




to -1 0.000109177 0.000991133 
-




to +1 3.85581E-05 0.000907726 
-










Table5.31: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00319 0.006205 -0.01258 44% -0.00319 
-59 0.002372 -4.1E-05 0.004786 56% -0.00082 
-58 0.01066 0.013761 0.007558 81% 0.009844 
-57 -0.00399 -0.00727 -0.00072 44% 0.005849 
-56 0.00224 -0.00673 0.011213 50% 0.008089 
-55 0.000956 0.000757 0.001155 38% 0.009045 
-54 0.002373 0.00084 0.003906 56% 0.011418 
-53 -0.00636 -0.00202 -0.0107 63% 0.005058 
-52 -0.00084 -0.00279 0.001117 38% 0.004221 
-51 -0.00242 -0.00459 -0.00024 44% 0.001803 
-50 0.006564 -2.4E-05 0.013151 63% 0.008367 
-49 0.007322 0.011877 0.002766 50% 0.015688 
-48 -0.00414 0.007013 -0.0153 44% 0.011543 
-47 0.003716 0.005938 0.001494 69% 0.015259 
-46 -0.01179 -0.01914 -0.00443 31% 0.003471 
-45 0.001605 -0.00335 0.006557 44% 0.005077 
-44 0.000129 0.000897 -0.00064 56% 0.005205 
-43 0.001121 0.006387 -0.00414 44% 0.006326 
-42 0.002465 0.008907 -0.00398 56% 0.008791 
-41 0.001302 0.0008 0.001805 56% 0.010093 
-40 -0.00074 0.002736 -0.00422 50% 0.00935 
-39 -0.002 -0.00616 0.002155 38% 0.007347 
-38 -0.00458 -0.00111 -0.00804 38% 0.002769 
-37 0.000906 0.003969 -0.00216 44% 0.003675 
-36 0.003795 0.005196 0.002394 50% 0.007469 
-35 0.000881 0.001152 0.00061 56% 0.00835 
-34 0.001825 0.001928 0.001723 63% 0.010176 
-33 0.00044 -0.00083 0.001713 56% 0.010616 
-32 0.000892 -0.00336 0.005144 44% 0.011507 
-31 0.002181 0.002489 0.001873 56% 0.013689 
-30 -0.00012 -7.6E-05 -0.00016 44% 0.013568 
-29 -0.00169 0.0003 -0.00367 50% 0.011883 
-28 -0.01596 -0.03032 -0.0016 31% -0.00408 
-27 -0.00224 -0.00401 -0.00046 50% -0.00631 
-26 -0.00177 -0.00865 0.005115 31% -0.00808 
-25 0.00505 0.008447 0.001653 50% -0.00303 
-24 -0.0052 -0.00784 -0.00256 44% -0.00823 
-23 0.008123 0.003203 0.013042 69% -0.00011 
-22 -0.00427 -0.00153 -0.00702 38% -0.00438 
-21 0.013129 0.0279 -0.00164 56% 0.008746 
-20 -0.00101 -0.00719 0.00517 44% 0.007735 
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-19 0.005405 0.008983 0.001826 56% 0.013139 
-18 0.013319 0.024267 0.00237 56% 0.026458 
-17 -0.0062 -0.00564 -0.00677 31% 0.020253 
-16 0.000827 -0.00194 0.003594 44% 0.02108 
-15 0.004941 0.009394 0.000488 63% 0.026021 
-14 0.007895 0.013912 0.001878 38% 0.033916 
-13 0.000703 0.00604 -0.00463 44% 0.034619 
-12 0.005128 0.004565 0.005691 56% 0.039747 
-11 -0.00189 -0.00493 0.001156 25% 0.037858 
-10 0.001897 0.00054 0.003254 56% 0.039755 
-9 1.41E-05 -0.00091 0.000938 44% 0.039769 
-8 -0.00633 -0.00557 -0.00709 25% 0.03344 
-7 0.004976 0.009506 0.000447 56% 0.038417 
-6 -0.00296 -0.00417 -0.00175 31% 0.035456 
-5 -0.00215 -0.00407 -0.00024 31% 0.033304 
-4 0.002741 -0.00144 0.006918 44% 0.036045 
-3 -0.00291 0.00265 -0.00847 50% 0.033135 
-2 0.003215 0.0075 -0.00107 50% 0.03635 
-1 -0.00356 -0.01367 0.006553 38% 0.03279 
0 0.000861 -0.00776 0.009477 63% 0.033651 
1 -0.00469 0.002337 -0.01172 31% 0.02896 
2 -0.00223 -0.00359 -0.00087 44% 0.026731 
3 -0.00055 -0.00461 0.003508 56% 0.02618 
4 -0.00108 0.000659 -0.00281 38% 0.025103 
5 -0.00296 -0.00646 0.000548 44% 0.022145 
6 -0.00478 -0.00327 -0.00629 44% 0.017363 
7 0.003178 0.00597 0.000385 69% 0.020541 
8 -0.00145 -1.55E-06 -0.0029 25% 0.019088 
9 0.001725 0.002772 0.000678 50% 0.020813 

























Table5.32: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.009077 0.010419 0.0074 67% 0.009077 
-59 0.003804 0.00194 0.006134 56% 0.012881 
-58 0.008029 0.015504 -0.00131 44% 0.02091 
-57 0.003292 0.004891 0.001292 56% 0.024202 
-56 -0.00755 -0.00579 -0.00976 33% 0.016647 
-55 0.002591 0.002083 0.003227 50% 0.019238 
-54 0.00288 0.006245 -0.00133 44% 0.022119 
-53 -0.00589 -0.01095 4.31E-04 44% 0.016228 
-52 -0.00718 -0.00526 -0.00958 33% 0.00905 
-51 0.006569 0.011032 0.000989 56% 0.015619 
-50 0.007341 0.007449 0.007207 44% 0.02296 
-49 0.010614 0.015546 0.004448 61% 0.033574 
-48 -0.00712 -0.0151 0.002848 33% 0.026453 
-47 -0.00112 -0.00346 1.81E-03 61% 0.025338 
-46 -0.0002 -0.00108 0.000912 44% 0.02514 
-45 0.006749 0.010405 0.002179 67% 0.031889 
-44 -0.00403 -0.00927 0.002529 50% 0.027863 
-43 -0.00768 -0.01746 0.004553 44% 0.020187 
-42 0.010332 0.015496 0.003878 67% 0.030519 
-41 0.011304 0.019515 0.00104 78% 0.041822 
-40 0.003203 0.011787 -0.00753 67% 0.045025 
-39 0.00098 -0.00806 0.012283 50% 0.046006 
-38 0.003628 0.004431 0.002624 44% 0.049634 
-37 -0.00819 -0.01187 -0.00359 50% 0.041447 
-36 0.011254 0.019658 0.00075 61% 0.052701 
-35 -0.00665 -0.00859 -0.00422 56% 0.046052 
-34 -0.00301 -0.0103 0.006111 67% 0.043047 
-33 0.004957 0.019202 -0.01285 50% 0.048004 
-32 0.002664 0.003259 0.001921 56% 0.050668 
-31 -0.00316 -0.00887 0.003971 67% 0.047504 
-30 0.005047 6.18E-05 0.011278 44% 0.052551 
-29 0.005451 0.008527 0.001605 56% 0.058001 
-28 0.01769 0.029057 0.003482 78% 0.075691 
-27 -0.00551 -0.00528 -0.0058 50% 0.070176 
-26 0.010723 0.02138 -0.0026 44% 0.080899 
-25 -0.00213 -0.0081 0.005328 56% 0.078765 
-24 0.00057 0.004812 -0.00473 56% 0.079335 
-23 -0.00908 -0.01992 0.00447 56% 0.070256 
-22 -0.00356 -0.00579 -0.00077 44% 0.066698 
-21 0.003942 0.003093 0.005003 50% 0.070639 
-20 -0.01446 -0.02286 -0.00395 44% 0.056182 
185 
 
-19 -0.00477 -0.01396 0.00672 50% 0.051416 
-18 0.002375 -0.00358 0.009825 61% 0.053791 
-17 0.008999 0.005522 0.013345 67% 0.06279 
-16 -0.00521 0.00244 -0.01478 28% 0.057578 
-15 -0.01161 -0.01483 -0.00757 39% 0.045972 
-14 0.018251 0.023061 0.012239 78% 0.064223 
-13 -0.0045 -0.00061 -0.00936 39% 0.059728 
-12 -0.01438 -0.0194 -0.00811 28% 0.045348 
-11 0.004642 0.009497 -0.00143 56% 0.04999 
-10 -0.00477 8.07E-05 -0.01083 39% 0.04522 
-9 -0.00375 -0.00881 0.002578 39% 0.041472 
-8 0.007071 0.000395 0.015416 67% 0.048543 
-7 -0.00289 0.003604 -0.011 44% 0.045654 
-6 0.008497 0.003147 0.015183 67% 0.054151 
-5 0.005214 0.010086 -0.00088 56% 0.059365 
-4 0.010572 0.017308 0.00215 44% 0.069937 
-3 0.004581 0.006691 0.001944 67% 0.074518 
-2 -0.00319 -0.00731 0.001964 50% 0.071328 
-1 -0.00175 -0.01124 0.010113 50% 0.069576 
0 -0.01199 -0.01244 -0.01142 39% 0.057588 
1 0.005417 0.00233 0.009277 44% 0.063005 
2 -0.01632 -0.02387 -0.00688 28% 0.046684 
3 0.006686 0.01136 0.000844 67% 0.05337 
4 0.005577 -0.00056 0.013246 72% 0.058948 
5 -0.00697 -0.00637 -0.00772 50% 0.051979 
6 0.002345 -0.00114 0.0067 67% 0.054324 
7 -0.00344 -0.01372 0.009405 67% 0.050883 
8 0.003202 0.0003 0.006831 28% 0.054085 
9 -0.00357 -0.00385 -0.00322 50% 0.050516 




















to +10 0.000437324 
-





Table5.33: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.016451 0.018651 0.01474 69% 0.016451 
-59 -0.01939 -0.02621 -0.0141 25% -0.00294 
-58 0.013627 0.038619 -0.00581 44% 0.010683 
-57 0.036373 0.069852 0.010335 75% 0.047056 
-56 0.020587 0.058921 -0.00923 63% 0.067644 
-55 0.013003 0.014462 0.011869 56% 0.080647 
-54 0.007273 0.020191 -0.00278 38% 0.087919 
-53 -0.00617 -0.00787 -0.00485 31% 0.081748 
-52 0.005547 0.011348 0.001035 38% 0.087296 
-51 0.000703 -0.0054 0.005454 44% 0.087999 
-50 -0.01117 -0.00466 -0.01623 19% 0.076829 
-49 0.006348 0.01555 -0.00081 44% 0.083178 
-48 0.012844 0.001013 0.022046 38% 0.096022 
-47 -0.00346 -0.01306 0.004012 50% 0.092563 
-46 0.013517 0.027894 0.002335 69% 0.10608 
-45 -0.00019 0.004922 -0.00416 69% 0.105893 
-44 -0.00693 -0.0139 -0.0015 31% 0.098966 
-43 0.009394 0.011134 0.008041 69% 0.108361 
-42 -0.00607 0.005431 -0.01502 38% 0.102286 
-41 0.010725 0.019243 0.0041 50% 0.11301 
-40 -0.0087 -0.0011 -0.01462 31% 0.104307 
-39 0.021893 0.022981 0.021047 75% 0.1262 
-38 -0.00804 -0.01726 -0.00087 31% 0.118156 
-37 -0.01379 -0.03923 0.005997 44% 0.104368 
-36 0.005518 -0.00753 0.015667 56% 0.109885 
-35 0.00151 0.015623 -0.00947 50% 0.111395 
-34 -0.00413 0.006183 -0.01214 50% 0.107269 
-33 -0.00414 -0.00669 -0.00215 44% 0.103132 
-32 0.005002 0.024368 -0.01006 44% 0.108134 
-31 0.006415 0.008415 0.004859 50% 0.114549 
-30 -0.00252 -0.00822 0.001917 44% 0.112031 
-29 -0.00118 0.001322 -0.00312 44% 0.110856 
-28 -0.00823 -0.00999 -0.00685 38% 0.102629 
-27 0.020234 0.029129 0.013315 69% 0.122863 
-26 -0.01271 -0.02787 -0.00093 38% 0.110149 
-25 0.005235 0.014888 -0.00227 56% 0.115383 
-24 0.007325 0.034666 -0.01394 44% 0.122709 
-23 -0.00565 0.007742 -0.01606 38% 0.117063 
-22 0.005709 0.008711 0.003374 69% 0.122772 
-21 0.038318 0.084912 0.002079 44% 0.16109 
-20 0.011088 0.020196 0.004003 50% 0.172178 
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-19 -0.00489 -0.02034 0.007133 56% 0.167291 
-18 -0.00057 0.000784 -0.00162 25% 0.166724 
-17 0.008451 0.0139 0.004214 50% 0.175175 
-16 -0.00692 -0.01163 -0.00326 31% 0.168254 
-15 -0.00168 -0.00765 0.002962 44% 0.166575 
-14 0.000862 0.003976 -0.00156 31% 0.167437 
-13 -0.00865 0.000733 -0.01594 31% 0.15879 
-12 0.01721 0.032165 0.005578 69% 0.176 
-11 -0.01529 -0.01305 -0.01703 19% 0.160708 
-10 -0.00346 -0.00468 -0.00251 31% 0.157246 
-9 -0.00522 0.000913 -0.01 56% 0.152022 
-8 0.011099 0.023463 0.001483 44% 0.163121 
-7 0.01431 0.02322 0.007381 56% 0.177431 
-6 0.02069 0.026135 0.016455 63% 0.198121 
-5 -0.0055 2.03E-05 -0.0098 38% 0.192617 
-4 0.036871 0.074967 0.007241 75% 0.229488 
-3 8.12E-06 -0.00051 0.000414 38% 0.229496 
-2 0.002067 0.005358 -0.00049 44% 0.231563 
-1 -0.0044 -0.01418 0.003202 44% 0.22716 
0 0.019327 0.026406 0.013821 50% 0.246487 
1 0.007974 -0.00929 0.021402 69% 0.254461 
2 0.001803 2.48E-05 0.003187 31% 0.256264 
3 -0.01139 -0.0332 0.005567 19% 0.24487 
4 0.00877 0.01365 0.004975 56% 0.25364 
5 0.002156 0.001327 0.0028 50% 0.255795 
6 -0.00648 -0.02126 0.005007 44% 0.249312 
7 -0.00154 -0.00347 -3E-05 44% 0.247777 
8 0.004052 0.012137 -0.00224 50% 0.251829 
9 -0.00144 0.010233 -0.01052 38% 0.250386 




to -6 0.003602018 0.008642109 
-




to -5 0.003439482 0.008488148 
-




to -1 0.003785952 0.009016188 
-













Table5.34: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.010277 0.025514 0.002659 67% 0.010277 
-59 0.010022 0.02371 0.003178 61% 0.020299 
-58 0.001631 0.012697 -0.0039 67% 0.02193 
-57 0.004773 0.016625 -0.00115 61% 0.026703 
-56 -0.00686 -0.01086 -0.00486 28% 0.019846 
-55 0.001284 -0.00277 0.003313 39% 0.02113 
-54 0.006067 0.001658 0.008271 39% 0.027196 
-53 0.011842 0.008965 0.01328 61% 0.039038 
-52 -0.01362 -0.01508 -0.01288 39% 0.025423 
-51 0.004824 0.003506 0.005482 61% 0.030246 
-50 0.014139 0.010625 0.015896 44% 0.044385 
-49 -0.00277 -0.0051 -0.0016 39% 0.041619 
-48 -0.00166 0.008904 -0.00694 44% 0.039964 
-47 0.000629 -0.00055 0.001218 44% 0.040593 
-46 0.006094 -0.00187 0.010076 39% 0.046687 
-45 0.000147 0.00424 -0.0019 50% 0.046834 
-44 0.000354 0.000395 0.000333 50% 0.047188 
-43 -0.0028 -9.3E-05 -0.00415 44% 0.044389 
-42 0.002996 0.00413 0.00243 56% 0.047386 
-41 -0.00097 0.013398 -0.00815 44% 0.046416 
-40 0.010777 0.003199 0.014566 33% 0.057192 
-39 0.000604 -0.01586 0.008838 50% 0.057796 
-38 0.000788 0.001108 0.000628 44% 0.058584 
-37 -0.00073 -0.00526 0.001534 39% 0.057855 
-36 0.002787 0.007041 0.000661 61% 0.060642 
-35 -0.00079 0.00419 -0.00328 56% 0.05985 
-34 0.009045 0.013537 0.006799 44% 0.068895 
-33 0.004978 0.002935 0.006 56% 0.073873 
-32 -0.00344 0.002369 -0.00635 39% 0.070431 
-31 -0.00544 0.005076 -0.0107 44% 0.06499 
-30 -0.00351 -0.00144 -0.00455 56% 0.061477 
-29 -0.00585 0.003294 -0.01041 33% 0.055632 
-28 -0.00079 0.001483 -0.00193 56% 0.054842 
-27 0.004995 0.00536 0.004813 56% 0.059838 
-26 -0.0001 0.001235 -0.00077 44% 0.059738 
-25 0.016458 0.014047 0.017664 78% 0.076196 
-24 0.003161 0.00555 0.001967 56% 0.079357 
-23 -9.3E-05 -0.00341 0.001567 33% 0.079264 
-22 -0.00255 0.005254 -0.00646 39% 0.07671 
-21 0.002008 -0.00073 0.003376 56% 0.078718 
-20 0.006051 0.011289 0.003432 78% 0.084769 
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-19 0.012008 0.016958 0.009534 83% 0.096777 
-18 -0.00245 0.021493 -0.01442 56% 0.094327 
-17 -0.00558 0.008564 -0.01265 39% 0.08875 
-16 -0.00304 0.003998 -0.00656 44% 0.085708 
-15 0.000557 -0.00695 0.00431 39% 0.086265 
-14 0.008861 0.013822 0.00638 61% 0.095126 
-13 -0.00693 -0.00422 -0.00829 39% 0.088195 
-12 0.004979 0.000921 0.007009 50% 0.093174 
-11 -0.00786 -0.0067 -0.00844 33% 0.085316 
-10 -0.0033 -0.00638 -0.00175 39% 0.082019 
-9 -0.0032 -0.00622 -0.00169 28% 0.078819 
-8 0.005205 -0.00406 0.009837 56% 0.084024 
-7 -0.00625 -0.00087 -0.00893 44% 0.077777 
-6 0.005695 0.005798 0.005644 44% 0.083472 
-5 0.022255 0.014882 0.025942 72% 0.105727 
-4 -0.00451 -0.00181 -0.00586 50% 0.101216 
-3 0.011699 -0.00341 0.019255 56% 0.112916 
-2 -0.00231 -0.002 -0.00247 56% 0.110602 
-1 0.002585 0.010246 -0.00125 56% 0.113187 
0 -0.01407 0.017056 -0.02963 33% 0.099119 
1 -0.01328 -0.02995 -0.00495 22% 0.085837 
2 -0.008 -0.00776 -0.00812 17% 0.077839 
3 0.005177 -0.00075 0.008141 61% 0.083017 
4 -0.00393 -0.0076 -0.00209 50% 0.079091 
5 0.005399 0.005241 0.005477 61% 0.08449 
6 -0.00018 -0.00204 0.000757 39% 0.084313 
7 0.001001 0.007259 -0.00213 72% 0.085314 
8 -0.00669 -0.00665 -0.00671 33% 0.078626 
9 -0.00474 -0.00267 -0.00577 44% 0.073887 
























Table 5.62: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.K 2006 
 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
T0601/stationary 0.00 B0601/stationary 0.00 
T0602/stationary 0.00 B0602/stationary 0.00 
T0603/stationary 0.00 B0603/stationary 0.00 
T0604/stationary 0.00 B0604/stationary 0.00 
T0605/stationary 0.00 B0605/stationary 0.00 
T0606/stationary 0.00 B0606/stationary 0.00 
T0607/stationary 0.00 B0607/stationary 0.00 
T0608/stationary 0.00 B0608/stationary 0.00 
T0609/stationary 0.00 B0609/stationary 0.00 
T0610/stationary 0.00 B0610/stationary 0.00 
T0611/stationary 0.00 B0611/stationary 0.00 
T0612/stationary 0.00 B0612/stationary 0.00 
T0613/stationary 0.00 B0613/stationary 0.00 
T0614/stationary 0.00 B0614/stationary 0.00 
T0615/stationary 0.00 B0615/stationary 0.00 
T0616/stationary 0.00 B0616/stationary 0.00 
T0617/stationary 0.00 B0617/stationary 0.00 
T0618/stationary 0.00 B0618/stationary 0.00 
T0619/stationary 0.00 B0619/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 5.63: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.K 2007 
 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
T0701/stationary 0.00 B0701/stationary 0.00 
T0702/stationary 0.00 B0702/stationary 0.00 
T0703/stationary 0.00 B0703/stationary 0.00 
T0704/stationary 0.00 B0704/stationary 0.00 
T0705/stationary 0.00 B0705/stationary 0.00 
T0706/stationary 0.00 B0706/stationary 0.00 
T0707/stationary 0.00 B0707/stationary 0.00 
T0708/stationary 0.00 B0708/stationary 0.00 
T0709/stationary 0.00 B0709/stationary 0.00 
T0710/stationary 0.00 B0710/stationary 0.00 
T0711/stationary 0.00 B0711/stationary 0.00 
T0712/stationary 0.00 B0712/stationary 0.00 
T0713/stationary 0.00 B0713/stationary 0.00 
T0714/stationary 0.00 B0714/stationary 0.00 
T0715/stationary 0.00 B0715/stationary 0.00 




Table 5.64: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.K 2008 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
T0801/stationary 0.00 B0801/stationary 0.00 
T0802/stationary 0.00 B0802/stationary 0.00 
T0803/stationary 0.00 B0803/stationary 0.00 
T0804/stationary 0.00 B0804/stationary 0.00 
T0805/stationary 0.00 B0805/stationary 0.00 
T0806/stationary 0.00 B0806/stationary 0.00 
T0807/stationary 0.00 B0807/stationary 0.00 
T0808/stationary 0.00 B0808/stationary 0.00 
T0809/stationary 0.00 B0809/stationary 0.00 
T0810/stationary 0.00 B0810/stationary 0.00 
T0811/stationary 0.00 B0811/stationary 0.00 
T0812/stationary 0.00 B0812/stationary 0.00 
T0813/stationary 0.00 B0813/stationary 0.00 
T0814/stationary 0.00 B0814/stationary 0.00 
T0815/stationary 0.00 B0815/stationary 0.00 
T0816/stationary 0.00 B0816/stationary 0.00 
T0817/stationary 0.00 B0817/stationary 0.00 
T0818/stationary 0.00 B0818/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 5.65: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.K 2009 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
T0901/stationary 0.00 B0901/stationary 0.00 
T0902/stationary 0.00 B0902/stationary 0.00 
T0903/stationary 0.00 B0903/stationary 0.00 
T0904/stationary 0.00 B0904/stationary 0.00 
T0905/stationary 0.00 B0905/stationary 0.00 
T0906/stationary 0.00 B0906/stationary 0.00 
T0907/stationary 0.00 B0907/stationary 0.00 
T0908/stationary 0.00 B0908/stationary 0.00 
T0909/stationary 0.00 B0909/stationary 0.00 
T0910/stationary 0.00 B0910/stationary 0.00 
T0911/stationary 0.00 B0911/stationary 0.00 
T0912/stationary 0.00 B0912/stationary 0.00 
T0913/stationary 0.00 B0913/stationary 0.00 
T0914/stationary 0.00 B0914/stationary 0.00 
T0915/stationary 0.00 B0915/stationary 0.00 
T0916/stationary 0.00 B0916/stationary 0.00 
Table 5.66: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.K 2010 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
T1001/stationary 0.00 B1001/stationary 0.00 
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T1002/stationary 0.00 B1002/stationary 0.00 
T1003/stationary 0.00 B1003/stationary 0.00 
T1004/stationary 0.00 B1004/stationary 0.00 
T1005/stationary 0.00 B1005/stationary 0.00 
T1006/stationary 0.00 B1006/stationary 0.00 
T1007/stationary 0.00 B1007/stationary 0.00 
T1008/stationary 0.00 B1008/stationary 0.00 
T1009/stationary 0.00 B1009/stationary 0.00 
T1010/stationary 0.00 B1010/stationary 0.00 
T1011/stationary 0.00 B1011/stationary 0.00 
T1012/stationary 0.00 B1012/stationary 0.00 
T1013/stationary 0.00 B1013/stationary 0.00 
T1014/stationary 0.00 B1014/stationary 0.00 
T1015/stationary 0.00 B1015/stationary 0.00 
T1016/stationary 0.00 B1016/stationary 0.00 
T1017/stationary 0.00 B1017/stationary 0.00 
T1018/stationary 0.00 B1018/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 5.71: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.K in 2006 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
T0601 B0601 2006 Retail 
T0602 B0602 2006 High Technology 
T0603 B0603 2006 Healthcare 
T0604 B0604 2006 Media and Entertainment 
T0605 B0605 2006 Healthcare 
T0606 B0606 2006 Financials 
T0607 B0607 2006 Real Estate 
T0608 B0608 2006 Financials 
T0609 B0609 2006 Financials 
T0610 B0610 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
T0611 B0611 2006 Financials 
T0612 B0612 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
T0613 B0613 2006 Healthcare 
T0614 B0614 2006 Consumer Staples 
T0615 B0615 2006 High Technology 
T0616 B0616 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
T0617 B0617 2006 Retail 
T0618 B0618 2006 Healthcare 
T0619 B0619 2006 Telecommunications 
 
Table 5.72: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.K in 2007 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
T0701 B0701 2007 Industrials 
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T0702 B0702 2007 High Technology 
T0703 B0703 2007 Energy and Power 
T0704 B0704 2007 Healthcare 
T0705 B0705 2007 Healthcare 
T0706 B0706 2007 Consumer Staples 
T0707 B0707 2007 Industrials 
T0708 B0708 2007 Materials 
T0709 B0709 2007 High Technology 
T0710 B0710 2007 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T0711 B0711 2007 Healthcare 
T0712 B0712 2007 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T0713 B0713 2007 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T0714 B0714 2007 Media and 
Entertainment 
T0715 B0715 2007 Materials 
T0716 B0716 2007 Financials 
 
Table 5.73: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.K in 2008 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
T0801 B0801 2008 High Technology 
T0802 B0802 2008 Retail 
T0803 B0803 2008 High Technology 
T0804 B0804 2008 Telecommunications 
T0805 B0805 2008 Industrials 
T0806 B0806 2008 Healthcare 
T0807 B0807 2008 Telecommunications 
T0808 B0808 2008 High Technology 
T0809 B0809 2008 High Technology 
T0810 B0810 2008 Financials 
T0811 B0811 2008 Industrials 
T0812 B0812 2008 Materials 
T0813 B0813 2008 Retail 
T0814 B0814 2008 High Technology 
T0815 B0815 2008 Consumer Products and 
Services 
T0816 B0816 2008 High Technology 
T0817 B0817 2008 Energy and Power 
T0818 B0818 2008 Materials 
 
Table 5.74: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.K in 2009 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
T0901 B0901 2009 Media and 
Entertainment 





T0903 B0903 2009 Retail 
T0904 B0904 2009 Financials 
T0905 B0905 2009 High 
Technology 
T0906 B0906 2009 Healthcare 
T0907 B0907 2009 Materials 
T0908 B0908 2009 Financials 
T0909 B0909 2009 Materials 
T0910 B0910 2009 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T0911 B0911 2009 Materials 
T0912 B0912 2009 Industrials 
T0913 B0913 2009 Real Estate 
T0914 B0914 2009 High 
Technology 
T0915 B0915 2009 Healthcare 
T0916 B0916 2009 Energy and 
Power 
 
Table 5.75: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.K in 2010 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
T1001 B1001 2010 Energy and 
Power 
T1002 B1002 2010 Healthcare 
T1003 B1003 2010 Financials 
T1004 B1004 2010 Healthcare 
T1005 B1005 2010 Matrials 
T1006 B1006 2010 Real Estate 
T1007 B1007 2010 High 
Technology 
T1008 B1008 2010 Industrials 
T1009 B1009 2010 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T1010 B1010 2010 Financials 
T1011 B1011 2010 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
T1012 B1012 2010 Retail 
T1013 B1013 2010 Financials 
T1014 B1014 2010 Financials 
T1015 B1015 2010 Financials 
T1016 B1016 2010 Retail 
T1017 B1017 2010 High 
Technology 





Table 5.76: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 












T0601 -8 day 0.17752 10.40 B0601 Nothing - - 
T0602 -21 day 0.25573 6.25 B0602 Nothing - - 
T0603 Nothing - - B0603 -48 day 0.0333 3.34 
-47 day 0.0402 4.04 
T0604 -6 day 0.06139 3.97 B0604 Nothing - - 
T0605 Nothing - - B0605 Nothing - - 
T0606 Nothing - - B0606 -52 day 0.12031 2.39 
-51 day 0.18106 3.59 
-49 day 0.33892 7.40 
T0607 -31 day 0.12597 -1.68 B0607 Nothing - - 
T0608 -23 day 0.02729 2.87 B0608 Nothing - - 
-22 day 0.03318 3.48 
T0609 Nothing - - B0609 Nothing - - 
T0610 -32 day 0.02412 2.03 B0610 Nothing - - 
-30 day 0.04865 4.10 
-29 day 0.07943 7.08 
-9 day 0.06312 5.34 
T0611 -22 day 0.13727 3.89 B0611 Nothing - - 
-1 day 0.22224 6.69 
T0612 Nothing - - B0612 -38 day 0.158729 9.57 
-32 day -0.07922 -4.79 
T0613 Nothing - - B0613 Nothing - - 
T0614 Nothing - - B0614 Nothing - - 
T0615 Nothing - - B0615 -43 day -0.05706 -2.56 
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-41 day -0.07576 3.53 
-22 day 0.047652 2.12 
T0616 Nothing - - B0616 -56 day -0.07305 -2.44 
-24 day -0.17536 -6.65 
-21 day -0.07159 -2.73 
-20 day 0.095301 3.64 
-12 day -0.06757 -2.36 
-10 day 0.123427 4.32 
T0617 Nothing - - B0617 Nothing - - 
T0618 Nothing - - B0618 -17 day 0.170675 3.16 
-16 day 0.257746 4.78 
-15 day -0.12027 -2.23 




Table 5.77: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2007 
 












T0701 -34 day 0.052112 2.03 B0701 Nothing - - 
-33 day 0.082267 3.21 
T0702 -2 day 0.132315 2.52 B0702 Nothing - - 
-1 day 0.351679 6.72 
T0703 -37 day 0.077910 3.11 B0703 -23 day 0.056932 4.23 
-35 day -0.07012 -2.80 -21 day 0.156868 11.62 
-23 day 0.084282 3.33 
-22 day 0.060703 2.40 
T0704 Nothing - - B0704 Nothing - - 
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T0705 -1 day 0.33214 17.24 B0705 Nothing - - 
T0706 -31 day -0.1343 1.43 B0706 -28 day -0.16286 -8.76 
-1 day 0.27832 10.79 -26 day -0.05270 -2.86 
T0707 Nothing - - B0707 -31 day 0.03723 2.71 
-30 day 0.02972 2.16 
-27 day -0.0332 -2.39 
-26 day -0.0312 -2.41 
T0708 Nothing - - B0708 -43 day 0.04828 2.97 
-42 day 0.05026 3.09 
-40 day 0.04202 2.56 
-2 day 0.05887 3.52 
T0709 Nothing - - B0709 Nothing - - 
T0710 -8 day 0.07397 2.78 B0710 -20 day -0.21559 -5.62 
-4 day 0.13393 6.70 -18 day 0.18690 13.20 
-3 day 0.07777 3.85 -15 day -0.04420 -3.12 
T0711 -1 day 0.26061 14.36 B0711 Nothing - - 
T0712 -13 day 0.15832 8.45 B0712 -14 day 0.07238 4.71 
-12 day 0.03773 2.46 
-6 day 0.04344 2.72 
-2 day -0.04953 -3.15 
-1 day -0.04622 -2.94 
T0713 -1 day 0.09254 6.07 B0713 -58 day 0.05448 4.21 
T0714 -57 day 0.50494 24.85 B0714 Nothing - - 
-56 day 0.10572 5.19 
-55 day 0.13932 6.87 
T0715 -34 day 0.10661 15.08 B0715 Nothing - - 






Table 5.78: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2008 
 












T0801 -38 day -0.2494 -20.63 B0801 Nothing - - 
-19 day -0.0928 -4.44 
-12 day 0.07864 3.72 
T0802 -42 day -0.4840 -5.60 B0802 -34 day -0.0674 -3.36 
-36 day -0.2240 -2.45 -32 day -0.0846 -4.11 
-35 day -0.2881 -3.23 
-29 day 0.28604 3.12 
T0803 Nothing - - B0803 Nothing - - 
T0804 Nothing - - B0804 -23 day -0.1196 -3.12 
-20 day -0.2156 -5.62 
T0805 -18 day 0.1124 7.25 B0805 Nothing - - 
T0806 Nothing - - B0806 -42 day 0.1306 3.95 
T0807 -23 day 0.2581 9.19 B0807 Nothing - - 
-22 day 0.1332 4.74 
T0808 Nothing - - B0808 -29 day 0.0454 2.17 
-28 day 0.0553 2.62 
T0809 -33 day 0.16597 4.27 B0809 Nothing - - 
-32 day 0.1098 2.82 
-1 day 0.13652 3.39 
T0810 Nothing - - B0810 Nothing - - 
T0811 -1 day 0.3150 8.95 B0811 -17 day -0.0634 -2.81 
-7 day 0.06165 -2.62 
T0812 -22 day 0.17167 4.43 B0812 -17 day 0.09722 2.73 
-21 day 0.40383 10.41 
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-20 day -0.0823 -2.12 
T0813 -9 day 0.18454 4.11 B0813 Nothing - - 
T0814 Nothing - - B0814 -47 day 0.05247 2.63 
-29 day 0.07191 3.73 
-26 day 0.04189 2.18 
T0815 Nothing - - B0815 -28 day 0.09207 2.95 
T0816 Nothing - - B0816 Nothing - - 
T0817 -48 day 0.1556 3.94 B0817 -36 day 0.10623 3.85 
-47 day 0.0982 2.49 
-1 day 0.27600 8.46 
T0818 Nothing - - B0818 -56 day -0.0716 -4.22 
-44 day 0.07387 4.38 




Table 5.79: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.K 2009 
 














T0901 -9 day 0.12148 6.77 B0901 -58 day 0.04159 2.07 
-6 day 0.04597 2.56 
-5 day -0.0442 -2.46 
T0902 -36 day 0.16846 4.72 B0902 Nothing - - 
T0903 Nothing - - B0903 Nothing - - 
T0904 Nothing - - B0904 Nothing - - 
T0905 Nothing - - B0905 Nothing - - 
T0906 -31 day 0.75396 22.31 B0906 Nothing - - 
-30 day -0.0904 -2.68 
T0907 Nothing - - B0907 Nothing - - 
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T0908 -1 day 0.2008 2.92 B0908 Nothing - - 
T0909 Nothing - - B0909 Nothing - - 
T0910 Nothing - - B0910 Nothing - - 
T0911 Nothing - - B0911 -58 day 0.17626 2.20 
-21 day 0.57921 8.41 
-4 day 0.48451 6.64 
T0912 Nothing - - B0912 Nothing - - 
T0913 -53 day -0.2191 -3.05 B0913 -59 day -0.1872 -4.08 
-49 day 0.14280 2.07 -57 day 0.15030 3.30 
-46 day 0.28329 4.12 -46 day 0.09965 2.07 
-12 day 0.19252 2.77 
-10 day 0.20942 3.01 
T0914 -12 day -0.0829 -3.15 B0914 -8 day 0.22526 5.29 
-7 day 0.19121 8.29 
T0915 -8 day 0.12892 4.57 B0915 Nothing - - 




Table 5.80: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 




















T1001 Nothing - - B1001 Nothing - - 
T1002 -46 day 0.11320 4.17 B1002 Nothing - - 
-44 day 0.05855 2.11 
-43 day 0.07673 2.79 
-23 day -0.1110 -4.09 
-16 day 0.20929 8.75 
T1003 -57 day -0.7214 -4.14 B1003 -1 day 0.04557 2.62 
201 
 
-1 day 0.92259 5.48 
T1004 Nothing - - B1004 Nothing - - 
T1005 -4 day 0.12301 3.06 B1005 -18 day 0.03551 3.25 
T1006 Nothing - - B1006 -18 day 0.03502 3.22 
T1007 -7 day -0.0945 -4.90 B1007 -34 day 0.10173 4.30 
T1008 Nothing - - B1008 Nothing - - 
T1009 Nothing - - B1009 Nothing - - 
T1010 -11 day -0.1703 -7.40 B1010 Nothing - - 
T1011 -36 day 0.18719 7.82 B1011 Nothing - - 
-4 day 0.08182 4.14 
-1 day 0.24631 12.46 
T1012 Nothing - - B1012 Nothing - - 
T1013 Nothing - - B1013 -19 day 0.02943 2.04 
-18 day 0.02874 1.99 
T1014 Nothing - - B1014 Nothing - - 
T1015 -13 day 0.21803 3.95 B1015 Nothing - - 
T1016 Nothing - - B1016 Nothing - - 
T1017 -2 day 0.06268 3.28 B1017 Nothing - - 
-1 day 0.04677 2.45 











Chapter 6   Insider trading in domestic U.S M&As 
from 2006 to 2010 
 
Section 6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 is the analysis of insider trading in U.S M&As.  The source of the data is 
given—all the data ranging from 2006 to 2010 in the U.S are collected with 
Datastream. Tables 6.60-6.64 included in the appendix give the names, the M&A 
announcement dates and the industries of the U.S targets and bidders from 2006 to 
2010. The models, as well as the method used in this chapter are the same with those 
in the previous chapter. Similar with the Chapter 5, four filters are applied in this 
chapter with the U.S data for the investigation of possible insider trading. 
Additionally, the day 0 hypotheses is tested again and with U.S data.  Apart from this, 
a Granger causality is applied with the U.S targets and bidders to identify possible 
linkage with the insider traders. 
 
Section 6.2 Data and Model 
Section 6.2.1The sample and data collection 
In this chapter, a sample of 100 stocks listed on the S&P is gathered in total for a five 
year period from 2006 to 2010. The sample contains 100 targets and 100 bidders. For 
each year, 20 targets and 20 bidders are included. The sample is chosen randomly 
from a large variety of industries. Tables 6.60-6.64 in the appendix show the names, 
announcement dates and industries of the 100 target firms and the 100 acquiring firms. 
The process of data collecting is the same with it is done in the precious chapter. The 
daily turnover is collected with Datastream. However, there are still some firms 
whose daily turnovers cannot be found. This might due to the imperfection of the 
database. 
 
Table 6.1 Summary statistics for the sample of the turnovers of 85 target firms in U.S. 
acquisitions for the period 2006-2010  
 









Source: Author’s summary  
Section 6.3 Empirical Results 
Section 6.3.1The analysis of AR and CAAR before the four-filter 
approach 
 
Graph 6.1: the AR and CAAR relative to the announcement day in the U.S 2006 
 
 
Graph 6.1 presents the AR and CAAR of the U.S firms in 2006 relative to the merger 
announcement. An increasing trend in the CAAR can be observed from day -32 
onwards, though with some occasional dips. From -10 to -1 day, the CAAR is 
relatively stable. However, it increases dramatically on day -1. For the AR, a 
pronounced spike can be seen on day -10. As a result, there is possible existence of 




a significant spike before merger announcement


























Graph 6.2: the AR and CAAR relative to the announcement day in the U.S 2007 
 
 
According to Graph 6.2, the increasing trend in CAAR is observed from day -13 
onwards. From day -8 to day -1, the CAAR is relatively stable, and on day -1, it 
increases considerably. For the AR, it has spikes from day-13 onwards and the most 










pre-merger spike of the AR can be observed




























Graph 6.3: the AR and CAAR relative to the announcement day in the U.S 2008 
 
In 2008, the AR has several spikes from day -14 onwards and for the CAAR, it 
decreases sharply to almost -40% and starts to increase from day -14 onwards. As a 
result, although the CAAR starts with a very negative figure, from onwards -14, an 
increasing trend of buildup is observed. Therefore, in the year 2008, it is also 











pre-merger spikes in the AR are observed





























Graph 6.4: the AR and CAAR relative to the announcement day in the U.S 2009 
 
In 2009, the AR has several spikes before merger announcement while the CAAR has 
a similar pattern as it is in 2008. The CAAR decreases sharply to -40% and starts to 
increase on day -1. The reason why in both 2008 and 2009, the CAARs decrease so 
dramatically might be the influence of the financial crisis which starts in the U.S and 
has a significant effect on the economy. One possibility is that more so than in other 
years, it affects the rationale for mergers, with potential buyers on the lookout for 
firms in trouble. When the stock market was on a downward trend, the CAAR of all 







a dramatic decreasing trend of the CAAR is observed




























Graph 6.5: the AR and CAAR relative to the announcement day in the U.S 2010 
 
Graph 6.5 is the AR and CAAR of the U.S in 2010 relative to the merger 
announcement. The AR does not have any significant spikes before merger 
announcement. However, for the CAAR, the increasing trend is observed on day -1. 
Consequently, it is suspected that there is possible insider trading in 2010. However, 
insider trading is also less of a problem than in other years. 
 
Section 6.3.2The results of the first filter-the dummy variable 
approach for the targets 
 
Tables 6.2-6.6 show results of the AR of the total, the suspected and the clean firms 
respectively and the CAAR of the total firms for the U.S from 2006 to 2010. The 
percent of daily residual positive of the total firms is also calculated. For the first filter, 
both positive and negative errors are taken into account because the insiders may 
deliberately leak negative information to drive the share price down before they 
































Table 6.2: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 -0.00137 0.006392 -0.00396 50% -0.00137 
-59 -0.00869 -0.00984 -0.00831 45% -0.01007 
-58 -0.00459 0.002039 -0.00681 30% -0.01466 
-57 0.004367 0.002421 0.005016 45% -0.01029 
-56 0.023221 0.012996 0.026629 60% 0.012926 
-55 -0.01271 -0.00281 -0.01602 35% 0.000213 
-54 0.003377 -0.00733 0.006945 50% 0.00359 
-53 -0.00547 -0.00357 -0.0061 45% -0.00188 
-52 0.018319 0.00099 0.024096 55% 0.016444 
-51 -0.00499 -0.00827 -0.0039 30% 0.011449 
-50 0.01005 0.01013 0.010023 50% 0.021499 
-49 0.006108 0.001204 0.007743 50% 0.027607 
-48 -0.01567 0.01225 -0.02497 25% 0.011941 
-47 -0.0019 0.010164 -0.00592 35% 0.010043 
-46 0.014979 0.007871 0.017349 50% 0.025022 
-45 -0.01275 -0.00342 -0.01586 40% 0.012275 
-44 -0.00264 -0.01069 4.92E-05 30% 0.00964 
-43 0.004152 0.007437 0.003057 35% 0.013792 
-42 0.002448 -0.00926 0.006351 35% 0.01624 
-41 -0.01878 -0.00678 -0.02279 35% -0.00254 
-40 0.012341 0.001986 0.015793 45% 0.009796 
-39 0.010913 0.020489 0.007721 40% 0.020709 
-38 -0.0022 0.004079 -0.00429 45% 0.018511 
-37 -0.00334 0.00936 -0.00757 40% 0.015172 
-36 -0.00595 0.024128 -0.01598 35% 0.009219 
-35 0.00096 0.005826 -0.00066 50% 0.010179 
-34 -0.00462 -0.00514 -0.00445 45% 0.005557 
-33 0.000802 -0.00335 0.002185 40% 0.006358 
-32 -0.0071 0.00089 -0.00976 25% -0.00074 
-31 0.00719 0.015718 0.004348 65% 0.006449 
-30 0.007749 0.008526 0.00749 35% 0.014198 
-29 0.010461 0.005041 0.012268 65% 0.024659 
-28 -0.00828 -0.00041 -0.0109 40% 0.016384 
-27 0.012176 0.012188 0.012172 35% 0.02856 
-26 0.014178 0.000706 0.018668 45% 0.042737 
-25 0.002843 0.011584 -7.1E-05 55% 0.04558 
-24 0.005105 -0.01732 0.01258 40% 0.050685 
-23 -0.01313 -0.00028 -0.01741 40% 0.037554 
-22 -0.00639 0.009066 -0.01154 60% 0.031163 
-21 -0.00298 -0.01755 0.001884 20% 0.028188 
-20 -0.00067 0.005675 -0.00278 25% 0.02752 
209 
 
-19 -0.00343 0.016618 -0.01012 40% 0.024087 
-18 0.010791 0.008432 0.011578 55% 0.034878 
-17 0.00209 -0.00223 0.003531 40% 0.036968 
-16 -0.00652 -0.0166 -0.00316 40% 0.030452 
-15 0.004094 -0.00445 0.006941 50% 0.034547 
-14 0.012106 0.010073 0.012784 55% 0.046653 
-13 -0.00249 -0.0052 -0.00158 40% 0.044164 
-12 -0.00873 0.004479 -0.01313 35% 0.035437 
-11 0.001835 0.01181 -0.00149 35% 0.037272 
-10 0.004574 0.002102 0.005398 55% 0.041845 
-9 0.068341 0.004064 0.089767 60% 0.110187 
-8 -0.01989 0.01386 -0.03113 40% 0.090301 
-7 -0.00196 0.007243 -0.00503 45% 0.08834 
-6 0.000602 0.001787 0.000207 55% 0.088942 
-5 0.002609 0.007155 0.001094 40% 0.091551 
-4 -0.0008 0.000424 -0.00121 40% 0.090751 
-3 -0.00758 0.01145 -0.01392 30% 0.083175 
-2 0.016747 -0.00269 0.023225 35% 0.099922 
-1 -0.01735 0.011137 -0.02685 50% 0.082568 
0 0.117206 0.020365 0.149487 70% 0.199775 
1 0.098762 0.118091 0.092319 60% 0.298537 
2 -0.01131 0.002351 -0.01586 45% 0.287227 
3 -0.00658 0.001256 -0.0092 35% 0.280645 
4 0.002075 0.006383 0.00064 45% 0.282721 
5 0.003329 -0.00144 0.004918 55% 0.286049 
6 -0.019 -0.00172 -0.02476 50% 0.267052 
7 -0.00104 -0.00114 -0.00101 30% 0.266009 
8 -0.00408 -0.00191 -0.0048 40% 0.261932 
9 0.005453 0.002134 0.006559 55% 0.267384 
























Table 6.3: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.003421 0.007651 0.000601 55% 0.003421 
-59 0.00613 0.003242 0.008056 60% 0.009551 
-58 -0.00043 -0.00833 0.004844 35% 0.009125 
-57 0.006469 0.013526 0.001764 70% 0.015594 
-56 0.006034 0.006491 0.00573 55% 0.021628 
-55 0.001966 0.002738 0.001451 50% 0.023594 
-54 -0.00321 -0.01558 0.005032 45% 0.020383 
-53 0.020442 0.038523 0.008388 65% 0.040825 
-52 0.001168 0.002495 0.000283 45% 0.041993 
-51 -0.00236 -0.01079 0.003253 40% 0.03963 
-50 -0.00104 -0.00483 0.001479 40% 0.038585 
-49 0.004676 0.019917 -0.00548 35% 0.043261 
-48 -0.00502 0.002687 -0.01016 50% 0.038239 
-47 0.004171 -0.01223 0.015103 55% 0.04241 
-46 0.001797 0.006696 -0.00147 55% 0.044207 
-45 -0.00912 -0.02234 -0.00031 45% 0.035088 
-44 -0.00359 -0.01535 0.00425 50% 0.031497 
-43 0.001154 0.011384 -0.00567 40% 0.032651 
-42 0.00329 -0.00207 0.006861 55% 0.035941 
-41 -0.00997 -0.00535 -0.01305 55% 0.025969 
-40 0.004662 0.019123 -0.00498 55% 0.030631 
-39 -0.00456 -0.01176 0.000235 45% 0.026067 
-38 0.016262 0.011003 0.019768 70% 0.042329 
-37 -0.00399 0.000148 -0.00674 40% 0.038341 
-36 -0.00766 0.012676 -0.02121 45% 0.030686 
-35 -0.00441 -0.00228 -0.00584 65% 0.026272 
-34 0.001283 0.00066 0.001698 55% 0.027554 
-33 0.003718 0.004204 0.003394 55% 0.031272 
-32 0.005855 0.010395 0.002828 70% 0.037126 
-31 0.000661 -0.00494 0.004397 50% 0.037787 
-30 0.006527 0.00114 0.010118 65% 0.044314 
-29 0.005184 0.002664 0.006864 55% 0.049498 
-28 -0.0036 -0.01108 0.001383 40% 0.045896 
-27 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.00347 45% 0.042495 
-26 0.001134 -0.0029 0.003823 45% 0.043629 
-25 0.00071 -0.01251 0.009523 55% 0.044339 
-24 0.012683 0.014853 0.011235 50% 0.057022 
-23 -0.01017 -0.00272 -0.01513 30% 0.046852 
-22 -0.00622 -0.01347 -0.00138 40% 0.040633 
-21 -0.00584 -0.00583 -0.00585 50% 0.034788 
-20 -0.00394 0.004869 -0.00981 40% 0.030851 
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-19 -0.00373 -0.00216 -0.00477 50% 0.027124 
-18 -0.00773 -0.00631 -0.00868 50% 0.019393 
-17 -0.01023 -0.01548 -0.00673 55% 0.009164 
-16 -0.00698 -0.02129 0.002562 65% 0.002186 
-15 0.00542 0.021218 -0.00511 65% 0.007606 
-14 -0.00172 -0.01733 0.008691 55% 0.005887 
-13 -0.01256 -0.03005 -0.0009 30% -0.00668 
-12 0.00446 0.018 -0.00457 50% -0.00222 
-11 0.027293 0.053518 0.009809 65% 0.025077 
-10 -0.00366 -0.01541 0.004178 65% 0.021421 
-9 -0.00251 0.005755 -0.00803 50% 0.018907 
-8 -0.00258 0.015535 -0.01466 35% 0.016326 
-7 0.072584 0.189185 -0.00515 45% 0.08891 
-6 0.001972 -2.17E-03 0.004735 50% 0.090882 
-5 -0.00366 -0.00968 0.000345 50% 0.087218 
-4 0.00732 0.009465 0.005889 60% 0.094537 
-3 0.001764 0.010368 -0.00397 45% 0.096301 
-2 -0.00733 0.005548 -0.01592 40% 0.088967 
-1 -0.00067 -0.00485 0.002119 50% 0.088298 
0 0.298159 0.059519 0.457252 80% 0.386457 
1 0.083376 0.059471 0.099312 60% 0.469833 
2 -0.00075 -0.00285 0.00065 65% 0.469084 
3 0.000693 0.002729 -0.00066 45% 0.469777 
4 0.001427 0.002697 0.00058 55% 0.471204 
5 0.002972 0.0118 -0.00291 50% 0.474176 
6 0.002592 0.003773 0.001805 60% 0.476768 
7 -0.00629 -0.01528 -0.0003 40% 0.470476 
8 -0.00436 -0.00552 -0.00358 50% 0.466119 
9 -0.00253 -0.0092 0.001911 55% 0.463586 
























Table 6.4: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.004391 0.012071 -0.00713 55% 0.004391 
-59 0.000415 -0.00925 0.014918 25% 0.004806 
-58 -0.0067 0.004503 -0.02349 40% -0.00189 
-57 -0.003 -0.00394 -1.60E-03 50% -0.00489 
-56 -0.00551 -0.00547 -0.00556 55% -0.0104 
-55 -0.01392 -0.01536 -0.01175 35% -0.02432 
-54 -0.01365 0.018201 -0.06143 30% -0.03797 
-53 -0.0342 -0.02943 -0.04136 40% -0.07217 
-52 0.008437 -0.0164 0.0457 55% -0.06373 
-51 -0.01188 -0.01815 -0.00248 55% -0.07561 
-50 -0.0188 -0.02547 -0.00881 40% -0.09442 
-49 0.014554 0.034265 -0.01501 45% -0.07986 
-48 -0.00766 -0.03386 0.031645 50% -0.08752 
-47 0.01168 0.03705 -0.02638 70% -0.07584 
-46 -0.03 -0.02043 -0.04435 25% -0.10584 
-45 -0.06887 -0.02411 -0.136 40% -0.17471 
-44 -0.00853 -0.01671 0.003749 30% -0.18323 
-43 -0.02981 -0.03738 -0.01846 30% -0.21304 
-42 -0.01338 -0.02017 -0.0032 45% -0.22643 
-41 0.02484 0.020804 0.030893 35% -0.20159 
-40 0.005548 0.003714 0.008297 55% -0.19604 
-39 0.009504 0.02059 -0.00712 40% -0.18654 
-38 -0.00022 -0.00938 0.013523 55% -0.18676 
-37 0.010429 0.008422 0.013439 45% -0.17633 
-36 0.008094 -0.00156 0.022576 60% -0.16823 
-35 -0.01201 -0.01486 -0.00774 50% -0.18025 
-34 -0.00081 0.006627 -0.01198 50% -0.18106 
-33 -0.01823 -0.033 0.003923 40% -0.19929 
-32 -0.01835 -0.01925 -0.017 50% -0.21764 
-31 -0.01559 -0.02054 -0.00816 40% -0.23323 
-30 -0.01435 -0.02339 -0.00078 40% -0.24758 
-29 -0.01802 -0.02896 -0.00161 50% -0.2656 
-28 -0.00141 0.022233 -0.03686 45% -0.26701 
-27 0.01694 0.021403 0.010246 50% -0.25007 
-26 -0.01565 -0.02108 -0.0075 35% -0.26571 
-25 0.017416 -0.0113 0.060498 40% -0.2483 
-24 0.007513 0.027555 -0.02255 65% -0.24078 
-23 0.030359 0.01891 0.047533 45% -0.21042 
-22 -0.0024 0.047892 -0.07784 45% -0.21282 
-21 -0.0317 -0.0654 0.018856 50% -0.24452 
-20 0.00949 0.027098 -0.01692 55% -0.23503 
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-19 -0.01387 -0.04544 0.033494 65% -0.2489 
-18 0.009728 0.017436 -0.00183 50% -0.23917 
-17 -0.02829 -0.05886 0.017574 55% -0.26746 
-16 -0.05315 -0.02054 -0.10208 30% -0.32062 
-15 -0.00236 -0.01729 0.020026 45% -0.32298 
-14 -0.00925 0.013658 -0.04362 40% -0.33223 
-13 0.080442 0.062199 0.107805 40% -0.25179 
-12 -0.02165 -0.03346 -0.00394 40% -0.27344 
-11 -0.03648 -0.02502 -0.05366 55% -0.30992 
-10 0.062035 0.002689 0.151054 55% -0.24789 
-9 -0.01286 -0.01429 -0.01071 60% -0.26074 
-8 0.035136 0.07473 -0.02426 50% -0.22561 
-7 0.008779 0.017627 -0.00449 50% -0.21683 
-6 -0.03143 -0.05196 -0.00063 35% -0.24826 
-5 -0.02829 0.015061 -0.09331 55% -0.27654 
-4 0.121516 0.123008 0.119278 50% -0.15503 
-3 0.02378 0.026654 0.019469 60% -0.13125 
-2 -0.03476 -0.02375 -0.05127 50% -0.16601 
-1 0.056055 0.093039 0.000579 65% -0.10995 
0 0.365763 0.122998 0.729912 90% 0.255811 
1 0.053978 0.070121 0.029764 55% 0.30979 
2 -0.04056 -0.00818 -0.08914 45% 0.269226 
3 0.00964 -0.00545 0.032281 35% 0.278866 
4 -0.00561 0.009418 -0.02816 20% 0.273254 
5 -0.00158 0.005447 -0.01212 40% 0.271673 
6 0.022878 0.020268 0.026792 50% 0.294551 
7 -0.0536 -0.04624 -0.06465 45% 0.240949 
8 0.001219 -0.00825 0.015425 50% 0.242167 
9 -0.01597 -0.01692 -0.01456 35% 0.226195 
























Table 6.5: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 -0.007 -0.01584 -0.0048 45% -0.007 
-59 0.007184 0.012037 0.005971 60% 0.000179 
-58 -0.0098 -0.0411 -0.00197 30% -0.00962 
-57 0.001918 -0.02458 0.008543 55% -0.0077 
-56 -0.01093 -0.01898 -0.00892 45% -0.01863 
-55 0.028237 0.163154 -0.00549 40% 0.009605 
-54 -6.9E-05 -0.01109 0.002686 45% 0.009535 
-53 0.002306 -0.0032 0.003683 45% 0.011841 
-52 -0.03875 -0.22246 0.007179 30% -0.02691 
-51 -0.0255 -0.03227 -0.02381 25% -0.05241 
-50 -0.01957 -0.06716 -0.00767 40% -0.07198 
-49 0.009581 0.052542 -0.00116 55% -0.0624 
-48 0.002863 -0.01455 0.007216 45% -0.05954 
-47 0.006354 0.005442 0.006582 50% -0.05319 
-46 -0.03613 -0.13141 -0.01231 15% -0.08931 
-45 -0.02177 -0.08666 -0.00555 45% -0.11109 
-44 -0.01417 -0.00977 -0.01527 40% -0.12526 
-43 -0.01433 -0.04137 -0.00757 35% -0.13958 
-42 -0.01547 -0.03452 -0.01071 35% -0.15505 
-41 -0.0099 -0.01638 -0.00827 25% -0.16495 
-40 -0.00435 -0.0013 -0.00512 60% -0.1693 
-39 0.009921 0.010086 0.00988 55% -0.15938 
-38 -0.01108 -0.06917 0.003446 50% -0.17046 
-37 -0.01261 -0.01137 -0.01291 40% -0.18306 
-36 0.000366 0.026938 -0.00628 35% -0.1827 
-35 0.002467 -0.03971 0.013011 50% -0.18023 
-34 -0.00222 -0.00581 -0.00132 35% -0.18245 
-33 -0.00711 -0.00743 -0.00703 30% -0.18956 
-32 0.014239 0.055889 0.003826 40% -0.17532 
-31 -0.02035 -0.07139 -0.0076 35% -0.19567 
-30 -0.00096 -0.02627 0.005372 45% -0.19663 
-29 0.070955 0.408872 -0.01352 30% -0.12567 
-28 -0.0066 -0.03289 -2.5E-05 30% -0.13227 
-27 -0.0105 -0.03398 -0.00462 35% -0.14277 
-26 -0.01309 -0.02441 -0.01026 25% -0.15586 
-25 -0.00554 -0.04696 0.004811 50% -0.1614 
-24 -0.02279 -0.09918 -0.0037 30% -0.18419 
-23 -0.01064 0.000986 -0.01355 35% -0.19484 
-22 -0.00772 -0.02176 -0.00421 30% -0.20256 
-21 -0.00811 -0.02706 -0.00337 45% -0.21066 
-20 -0.02938 -0.09798 -0.01223 40% -0.24004 
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-19 -0.00178 -0.02467 0.003938 40% -0.24183 
-18 -0.01238 -0.00479 -0.01427 40% -0.2542 
-17 0.013366 0.059138 0.001922 65% -0.24084 
-16 -0.0229 -0.03173 -0.02069 30% -0.26374 
-15 -0.02902 -0.06497 -0.02003 20% -0.29275 
-14 -0.01643 -0.13565 0.013382 40% -0.30918 
-13 -0.00879 -0.00957 -0.00859 25% -0.31797 
-12 -0.00966 -0.01471 -0.0084 25% -0.32763 
-11 0.022154 0.12538 -0.00365 35% -0.30548 
-10 -0.03144 -0.10679 -0.01261 30% -0.33692 
-9 -0.01638 -0.05385 -0.00702 40% -0.3533 
-8 -0.01315 -0.08027 0.003636 45% -0.36645 
-7 -0.01135 -0.0103 -0.01161 30% -0.3778 
-6 0.005113 0.031912 -0.00159 40% -0.37269 
-5 -0.01402 -0.05121 -0.00473 45% -0.38671 
-4 0.006515 0.015234 0.004335 45% -0.38019 
-3 -0.00341 -0.01411 -0.00074 40% -0.38361 
-2 0.003138 -0.0007 0.004098 45% -0.38047 
-1 0.013181 0.069067 -0.00079 45% -0.36729 
0 0.211081 0.222696 0.208177 80% -0.15621 
1 0.068667 -0.01647 0.089951 50% -0.08754 
2 -0.00581 -0.00161 -0.00686 40% -0.09335 
3 -0.00772 -0.01882 -0.00495 40% -0.10107 
4 -0.00872 -0.01216 -0.00785 25% -0.10979 
5 -0.03541 -0.13903 -0.00951 25% -0.1452 
6 0.058968 0.238955 0.013972 45% -0.08623 
7 -0.00408 -0.01627 -0.00104 35% -0.09031 
8 -0.00367 -0.00704 -0.00283 35% -0.09398 
9 0.010993 0.092959 -0.0095 30% -0.08299 
























Table 6.6: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 -0.00566 -0.02475 0.002528 40% -0.00566 
-59 0.007942 0.025035 0.000617 65% 0.002287 
-58 0.008704 -0.00688 0.015383 35% 0.01099 
-57 -0.01837 0.001447 -0.02687 55% -0.00738 
-56 -0.03084 -0.00133 -0.04349 55% -0.03822 
-55 0.038627 -0.0084 0.05878 35% 0.000404 
-54 0.006797 -0.01829 0.017548 50% 0.007201 
-53 0.005985 -0.0026 0.009663 55% 0.013186 
-52 -4.1E-05 -0.004 0.001657 65% 0.013144 
-51 -0.01302 -0.02066 -0.00975 25% 0.000124 
-50 -0.01245 0.000653 -0.01807 40% -0.01233 
-49 0.01463 0.005377 0.018595 65% 0.002301 
-48 -0.0016 -0.01876 0.005749 45% 0.000698 
-47 -0.0072 -0.00217 -0.00935 40% -0.0065 
-46 -0.0031 -0.01548 0.002207 60% -0.0096 
-45 -0.00653 -0.01304 -0.00374 45% -0.01613 
-44 0.007709 0.011462 0.0061 50% -0.00842 
-43 0.000361 5.16E-03 -0.0017 50% -0.00806 
-42 -0.00071 0.01383 -0.00694 40% -0.00876 
-41 0.005975 0.019035 0.000377 60% -0.00279 
-40 -0.00173 -0.00636 0.000259 50% -0.00452 
-39 -0.03085 -0.02205 -0.03462 30% -0.03537 
-38 -0.01475 0.004247 -0.0229 55% -0.05012 
-37 0.024484 0.032229 0.021165 60% -0.02564 
-36 0.009733 0.023319 0.003911 70% -0.0159 
-35 0.01516 0.038247 0.005266 50% -0.00074 
-34 0.005425 0.010853 0.003099 45% 0.004682 
-33 -0.0348 -0.07693 -0.01674 20% -0.03011 
-32 0.002415 -0.0027 0.004608 40% -0.0277 
-31 -0.00845 -0.00643 -0.00932 25% -0.03615 
-30 -0.00821 -0.01373 -0.00584 45% -0.04436 
-29 0.006827 0.026262 -0.0015 45% -0.03753 
-28 -0.01493 -0.01681 -0.01412 60% -0.05246 
-27 -0.00068 -0.01192 0.004138 40% -0.05314 
-26 -0.01815 0.029419 -0.03854 55% -0.07129 
-25 -0.00988 -0.01937 -0.00582 40% -0.08117 
-24 -0.00287 0.005782 -0.00657 50% -0.08404 
-23 0.012905 0.032789 0.004383 60% -0.07114 
-22 -0.00133 -0.01512 0.004576 50% -0.07247 
-21 -0.00243 0.021025 -0.01248 35% -0.0749 
-20 -0.01488 -0.01214 -0.01605 40% -0.08977 
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-19 0.006434 0.05562 -0.01465 65% -0.08334 
-18 0.006607 0.017477 0.001948 45% -0.07673 
-17 0.003388 -0.00947 0.008898 70% -0.07334 
-16 -0.00788 -0.02559 -0.00029 45% -0.08123 
-15 -0.00637 -0.02697 0.002455 50% -0.0876 
-14 0.012994 0.010447 0.014086 55% -0.07461 
-13 0.012409 0.008504 0.014082 65% -0.0622 
-12 0.011205 0.053232 -0.00681 35% -0.05099 
-11 0.005626 0.025038 -0.00269 55% -0.04537 
-10 0.008737 -0.00231 0.01347 60% -0.03663 
-9 0.011613 0.046662 -0.00341 45% -0.02502 
-8 -0.01996 -0.03784 -0.01229 20% -0.04497 
-7 -0.00612 0.003547 -0.01026 45% -0.05109 
-6 -0.00519 -0.02392 0.00284 50% -0.05628 
-5 0.049049 0.004233 0.068255 60% -0.00723 
-4 0.006462 0.013594 0.003406 65% -0.00076 
-3 -0.00516 7.62E-05 -0.00741 45% -0.00593 
-2 0.006334 0.027384 -0.00269 55% 0.000408 
-1 0.046271 0.122036 0.013801 80% 0.04668 
0 0.306246 0.180102 0.360308 95% 0.352926 
1 0.103927 0.031537 0.134951 55% 0.456852 
2 0.000507 0.005471 -0.00162 50% 0.45736 
3 -0.04977 -0.00854 -0.06743 30% 0.407594 
4 0.295708 -0.00656 0.425252 40% 0.703302 
5 -0.02559 0.002904 -0.03781 45% 0.677709 
6 0.053086 0.002101 0.074937 50% 0.730795 
7 -0.00467 0.001202 -0.00719 50% 0.726125 
8 -0.01061 -0.002 -0.0143 30% 0.715518 
9 -0.03013 -0.00706 -0.04002 50% 0.685384 

























Graph 6.6: The % of firms with positive AR in the U.S 2006 
 
 
According to Graph 6.6, there are more firms getting negative AR than the firms 
getting positive AR all through the event window because the firms below 50% are 
much more than those above 50%. The highest percentages appear during a period 




















































In 2007, the highest percentage appears on day 0 on which day 80% of the firms are 
experiencing positive AR. Apart from this, during a period from day -60 to -30, the 

















































Graph 6.8: The % of firms with positive AR in the U.S 2008 
 
 
Graph 6.8 is the percentage of firms with positive AR relative to the announcement 
day in the U.S 2008. Similar with the previous years, the highest percentage rises on 
day 0 on which about 90% of the total firms are getting positive AR. Apart from the 
high percentage on day 0, it is also noticeable that before the merger announcement, 







































Graph 6.9: The % of firms with positive AR in the U.S 2009 
 
 
According to Graph 6.9, there are much more firms getting negative AR than those 
getting positive AR. The highest percentage appears on day 0 which indicates that 80% 
of the total firms get positive AR on this day. When comparing with the U.K in 2008 















































Graph 6.10: The % of firms with positive AR in the U.S 2010 
 
 
According to Graph 6.6-6.9, the highest percentages of firms with positive AR appear 
on day 0 for all the five years. The lowest is 2006 in which year 70% firms get 
positive AR on day 0 and the highest two are in 2008 and 2010 in which years 90% 
firms can get positive AR on the merger announcement day.  
 
Table 6.7 gives the categorization after the dummy variable approach. All the firms 
are grouped as ‘clean’ or ‘suspected’ depending on whether they have significant 
daily dummy variables or not. 
 
Table 6.7: The codes of the clean and suspected target firms after the dummy variable 
approach in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
UST0601 UST0608 UST0615 UST0602 
UST0603 UST0609 UST0616 UST0607 
UST0604 UST0610 UST0618 UST0611 
UST0605 UST0612 UST0619 UST0614 
UST0606 UST0613 UST0620 UST0617 
2007  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 




























UST0701 UST0708 UST0720 UST0706  UST0717 
UST0702 UST0709  UST0711  UST0718 
UST0703 UST0710  UST0713 UST0719 
UST0704 UST0712  UST0714  
UST0705 UST0716  UST0715  
2008  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
UST0801 UST0814 UST0802 UST0809 UST0818 
UST0804 UST0817 UST0803 UST0811 UST0819 
UST0808 UST0820 UST0805 UST0813  
UST0810  UST0806 UST0815  
UST0812  UST0807 UST0816  
2009  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
UST0901 UST0909 UST0915 UST0920 UST0903 
UST0902 UST0910 UST0916  UST0905 
UST0904 UST0912 UST0917  UST0906 
UST0907 UST0913 UST0918  UST0911 
UST0908 UST0914 UST0919   
2010  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
UST1002 UST1009 UST1015 UST1001 UST1019 
UST1003 UST1010 UST1017 UST1004  
UST1005 UST1011 UST1018 UST1007  
UST1006 UST1012 UST1020 UST1014  















Figure 6.1 The daily average return of the U.S target firms 2006 
 
According to Figure 6.1, the AR of the suspected firms is more stable than that of the 
clean firms which is odd. The AR of the clean firms keeps fluctuating before -10 day. 
From day -10 onwards, there is a sharp increase in the AR of the clean firms. 
However, on day 0, the AR of the clean firms is higher than that of the suspected 
firms. The following Graph 6.11 is presented on which ten ‘clean’ firms suggested by 
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 In 2006, there are 15 clean firms according to the first filter and therefore, three Graphs, Graph 
6.11(a) Graph 6.11(b) and Graph 6.11(c) are presented to show the difference between error21 and 
other errors clearly. 















































































































































The daily average return of U.S clean target firms 2006
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According to Graph 6.11(a) Graph 6.11(b) and Graph 6.11(c), the err21 has a 
comparatively similar pattern with that of the clean firms in Figure 6.1 and this can 
explain the spikes of the clean firms.  From day -60 to day -40, the AR of err21 is 
fluctuating and on day -9, it has a high spike which is of the same pattern with the AR 
of the clean firms in Figure 6.1. The only difference is that the spike of the clean firms 
in Figure 6.1 is lower and the reason could be that the high spike is driven down by 
the other clean firms. When referred back, the err21 is Firm UST0605. In Filter 2-the 
news search, public released rumours will be searched to elucidate more information 
on these firms.  
 
Figure 6.2 The daily average return of the U.S target firms 2007 
 
According to Figure 6.2, the AR of the clean firms is stable all through the event 
window and the AR of the suspected firms is stable before day -20. A significant 
spike in the AR of the suspected firms is observed on day -10. Moreover, on day 0, 
the suspected firms are getting a much lower AR than the clean firms. This can be an 
evidence of the suspected firms absorbing the abnormal returns before the 
announcement day and therefore, on the announcement day, the ARs for them are 
much lower and this will be explained in details in the latter part concerning the day 0 
hypothesis.   
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Figure 2  daily average return for U.S target firms 2007
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According Figure 6.3, Graph 6.12(a) and Graph 6.12(b), the pattern of the AR of the 
clean firms from day -15 to day 0 is similar with that of the err21. Apart from the 
three significant spikes which appear from day -20 onwards, the err21 also has spikes 
observed from a period from day -50 to day -20. The err21 is Firm UST0820. In Filter 
2-the news search, public released rumours will be searched to elucidate more 












































The daily average return of U.S clean target firms 2008
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Figure 6.4 The daily average return of the U.S target firms 2009 
 
In the U.S in 2009, the AR of the clean firms is stable all through the event window. 
On the other hand, the AR of the suspected firm has several significant spikes from 
day -60 to day 0. It is worth noting that these spikes include both significant positive 
and significant negative. On day 0, the clean and suspected firms have almost the 
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Figure 4 daily average return for U.S target firms 2009
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Figure 6.5 The daily average return of the U.S target firms 2010 
 
According to Figure 6.5, the AR of the clean firms is comparatively stable and the AR 
of the suspected firms has several spikes before merger announcement. However, on 
day -55 and day -5, two significant spikes of AR of the clean firms are observed. On 
day 0, the AR of the clean firms is higher than that of the suspected firms. All the ARs 
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According to Graph 6.13(a), Graph 6.13(b) and Graph 6.13(c), the AR of err16 has 
the same pattern as the AR of the clean firms in Figure 6.5. Similarly, the AR of err16 
has two significant spikes on both day -55 and day -5. This is suspected to have 
influenced the AR of clean firms in Figure 6.5. When refer back, err16 is the Firm 
T1011. In Filter 2-the news search, public released rumours will be searched to 








































The daily average return of U.S clean target firms 2010
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Figures 6.6-6.10 show the AR for the U.S target firms from 2006 to 2010 based on 
Tables 6.8-6.12 from the market adjusted model. 
 































-60 -40 -20 0 20-10
day
total firm suspected firm
clean firm




















-60 -40 -20 0 20-15
day
total firm suspected firm
clean firm
Figure 7 daily average return for U.S target firms 2007
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Although Tables 6.8-6.12 seem different from the Tables 6.2-6.6, according to 
Figures 6.6-6.10, the results from the market-adjusted model are visually identical 
with those from the market model. As a result, the discussion is omitted for the results 
from the market-adjusted model.  
 
Table 6.13: The codes of the clean, suspected and suspected after the plotting firms 
after the dummy variable approach in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 





UST0601 UST0609 UST0616 UST0602 UST0605 
UST0603 UST0610 UST0618 UST0607  
UST0604 UST0612 UST0619 UST0611  
UST0606 UST0613 UST0620 UST0614  
UST0608 UST0615  UST0617  
2007  





UST0701 UST0708 UST0720 UST0706  UST0717 None 
UST0702 UST0709  UST0711  UST0718  
UST0703 UST0710  UST0713 UST0719  
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UST0705 UST0716  UST0715   
2008 
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms The suspected 
after the 
plotting 
UST0801 UST0814 UST0802 UST0809 UST0818 UST0820 
UST0804 UST0817 UST0803 UST0811 UST0819  
UST0808  UST0805 UST0813   
UST0810  UST0806 UST0815   
UST0812  UST0807 UST0816   
2009 





UST0901 UST0909 UST0915 UST0920 UST0903 None 
UST0902 UST0910 UST0916  UST0905  
UST0904 UST0912 UST0917  UST0906  
UST0907 UST0913 UST0918  UST0911  
UST0908 UST0914 UST0919    
2010 





UST1002 UST1009 UST1017 UST1001 UST1019 UST1011 
UST1003 UST1010 UST1018 UST1004   
UST1005 UST1012 UST1020 UST1007   
UST1006 UST1013  UST1014   
UST1008 UST1015  UST1016   
Source: Author’s summation 
 
Section 6.3.3The analysis of the CAARs after the dummy variable 
approach for the targets 
 
The previous literature assumes that if there are no unusual price movements prior to 
the announcement date, the CAAR would be expected to fluctuate randomly about 
zero. However, if there is possible existence of insider trading, one would expect a 
build up in the CAAR (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Figures 6.11-6.15 give the 
CAAR of both the suspected and clean firms in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 after the 







Figure 6.11: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S. target firms in 2006 
 
 
Figure 6.11 is the CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S target firms in 2006. After 
the first filter-the dummy variable approach, an increasing trend in both the suspected 
and the clean is observed. The difference is that the CAAR of the suspected firms 
starts to buildup from day -51 onwards while that of the clean firms begins from day -
32 onwards. This is an indication that after the first filter, the ‘clean’ firms are not yet 









The increasing trend in the suspected is observed from -51 onwards




































-60 -40 -20 0 2010-32-51
day
CAAR of the clean CAAR of the suspected
239 
 
Figure 6.12: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S. target firms in 2007 
 
 
According to Figure 6.12, an increasing trend of the CAAR buildup for the suspected 
firms is observed from day -13 onwards. For the clean firms, there is no sign of 
CAAR buildup throughout the event window. The CAAR of the clean firms increases 











The increasing trend in the suspected is observed from -13 day onwards
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Figure 6.13: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S. target firms in 2008 
 
According to Figure 6.13, both the CAAR of the clean and the CAAR of the 
suspected decrease to about -40% from day -60 to day -20. However, from day -14 
onwards, the CAAR of the clean firms starts to increase and on the other hand, for the 
CAAR of the suspected firms, the increasing trend is observed later on day -9. As a 
result, although both the CAAR of the clean and the CAAR of the suspected start to 
buildup from negative, the increasing trend is pronounced for both, but more for the 









An increasing trend is observed in the CAAR of the suspected from -9 day onwards







































-60 -40 -20 0 2010-14 -9
day
CAAR of the clean CAAR of the suspected
241 
 
Figure 6.14: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S. target firms in 2009 
 
Figure 6.14 is the CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S target firms in 2009. It is 
very noticeable that the CAAR of the suspected decreases sharply to -100% from day 
-60 to day -2. From day -2 onwards, it starts to increase and ends up at -70% on day 0. 
The downward trend in the suspected firms may be linked to the industry of firms 
being taken over in the crisis. But still, the spikes on -30 day and -12 day may indicate 
possible insider trading. By day 0, the insider traders have lost money, or at least the 
day -30sh one would. But they would then have regained that in the days following 
day 0 and the gains may well have gone on increasing after day +10. The CAAR of 
the clean firms decreases gradually to -20% before -1 day on which day it begins to 
increase. The CAAR of the clean firms ends up at about 0% on the merger 
announcement day, but from a negative starting point the day before and hence a big 
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Figure 6.15: The CAAR of the suspected and clean U.S. target firms in 2010 
 
According to Figure 6.15, an increasing trend in the CAAR of the suspected is 
observed from day -27 onwards, though with occasional dips. On day -3, the CAAR 
of the suspected increases sharply and ends up at 40% on day 0. For the clean firms, 
the increasing trend is observed from day -20 onwards. On day -1, the CAAR of the 
clean firms increases sharply and ends up almost the same as the suspected firms at 40% 
on day 0. Since for both categories, an increasing trend before the merger 
announcement is observed, the clean firms may not yet absolutely ‘clean’. 
 
Section 6.3.4Results of the first filter-the dummy variable approach 
for the bidders 
 
Section 6.3.4 is the analysis of the bidders in the U.S from 2006 to 2010. Tables 6.14-
6.18 in the appendix are the results of the AR and the CAAR for the bidder firms in 
the U.S from 2006 to 2010.  Figures 6.16-6.20 give the AR for the U.S bidders from 
2006 to 2010 from the market model based on Tables 6.14-6.18. This thesis focuses 
mainly on the targets, in part because there seems less of interest to not in terms of 
what is happening to the bidders, and therefore, only the first filter is applied to the 
bidders. 
An increasing trend in the CAAR of the suspected is observed from -27 day onwards
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Figure 6.16 The daily average return for the U.S bidder firms in 2006 
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Figure 17 daily average return for U.S bidder firm 2007
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Figure 6.18 The daily average return for the U.S bidder firms in 2008 
 























-60 -40 -20 0 2010
day
total firm suspected firm
clean firm



























-60 -40 -20 0 2010
day
total firm suspected firm
clean firm
Figure 19 daily average return for U.S bidder firms 2009
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Figure 6.20 The daily average return for the U.S bidder firms in 2010 
 
According to Figures 6.16-6.20, it appears to be the case that the bidders are not 
experiencing the day 0 abnormal return run-up as the targets. Furthermore, the 
abnormal returns the bidders get are much lower than those the targets get. Apart from 
this, there is no obvious pattern for the clean, suspected and total bidder firms.  
 
Tables 6.24-6.28 in the appendix give the results of the AR and the CAAR of the U.S 
bidder firms from 2006 to 2010 based on the market adjusted model. Although Tables 
6.24-6.28 seem different from the Tables 6.14-6.18, the graphs from the market-
adjusted model are identical with those from the market model. As a result, the 
discussion is omitted for the results from the market-adjusted model. 
 
 
Section 6.3.5The CAAR analysis after the first filter for both the 
targets and bidders  
 
Section 6.3.5 is the CAAR analysis of both the targets and bidders after the dummy 
variable approach. Figures 6.21-6.25 give the CAAR of the U.S targets and bidders 
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The CAAR of the bidders is all the way below zero
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According to Figure 6.21-6.25, generally, the CAARs for the targets from 2006 to 
2010 are upward sloping while the CAARs for the bidders are more stable. For years 
2006, 2007 and 2010, the CAARs for the targets keep fluctuating around 0% from day 
-60 to day 0, and then increase rapidly on and after the announcement day. In 2006, 
the CAAR keeps on increasing to 30%, in 2007, the CAAR increases to about 50% 
and in 2010, it is very notable that the CAAR increase to approximately 74%. But for 
years 2008 and 2009, the CAARs for the targets decrease sharply to about -40% from 
day -60 to day 0 and from day 0 onwards, the CAARs start to increase. However, in 
2009, even the CAAR begins to increase from day 0, it is still below 0% which is to 
say, the cumulative abnormal returns for the targets in 2009 are negative. The result of 
2009 supports the hypothesis that in the heat of the crisis the nature of takeovers 
changes with poorly performing firms being targeted. But in 2010, the stock market 
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Section 6.3.6The news search before the announcement date 
Tables 6.29-6.33 illustrate the public information leakage for each target firm in the 
U.S from 2006 to 2010. The news search is done with Nexis (mentioned in chapter 4). 
Comparing the news search results of the U.S to that of the U.K., less cases of director 
trading prior to the announcement dates are found. Only two cases are found during 
the five years period. They are Firm UST0710 (director trading on day -28) and Firm 
UST0713 (director trading on day -9). However, there is no clear evidence of 
directors’ dealing of the shares affecting the share prices. Moreover, there is also no 
evidence of public rumours influencing the share price movements.  
 
Table 6.29: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2006 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





UST0601 +1 day None None 
UST0602 -36 day None None 




UST0608 +1 day None None 
+2 day 
UST0610 +1 day None None 
UST0611 -48 day None None 
-11 day 
+1 day 
UST0614 -41 day None None 
+1 day 
UST0616 None -1 day None 





UST0618 None -3 day None 
UST0619 +1 day None None 
UST0620 +1 day None None 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: UST0603, UST0604, 





The dummy variable approach suggests that the AR of Firm UST0605 has several 
spikes before merger announcement, among which the most significant one appears 
on day -9. However, since no public rumours or directors’ trading on shares are found, 
Firm UST0605 is suspected of getting involved in insider trading. 
 
Table 6.30: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2007 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





UST0710 None None -28 day 
UST0704 +1 day None None 
UST0714 -4 day None None 
-1 day 
0 day 
UST0706 -37 day None None 





UST0703 None -1 day None 
UST0719 -9 day None None 
-8 day 
-7 day 
UST0715 -49 day None None 
UST0720 None None None 
UST0705 None None None 
UST0717 -24 day None None 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: UST0701, UST0702, 
UST0707, UST0708, UST0709, UST0712, UST0716 
 
Table 6.31: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2008 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





UST0815 -18 day -3 day None 
-6 day 
-4 day 
UST0816 -21 day None None 
+1 day 
UST0819 -24 day None None 




















UST0802 -47 day -4 day None 
-5 day 
UST0818 -21 day None None 
-20 day 
-19 day 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: UST0801, UST0810, 
UST0817, UST0820 
 
In 2008, the dummy variable approach suggests that the AR of Firm UST0820 has 
several spikes before merger announcement. Three significant spikes are observed in 
a period from day -20 to 0.  However, since no public rumours or directors’ trading on 
shares are found, Firm UST0820 is suspected of getting involved in insider trading. 
 
Table 6.32: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2009 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





UST0919 +1 day None None 
UST0914 None -14 day None 




UST0903 -14 day -11 day None 
UST0906 -48 day None None 
-1 day 
UST0910 +1 day None None 
UST0911 -29 day None None 
UST0920 +6 day None None 
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UST0916 +1 day None None 
UST0915 None -27 day None 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: UST0901, UST0902, 
UST0904, UST0907, UST0908, UST0909, UST0912, UST0913, UST0917, UST0918 
 
 
Table 6.33: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2010 
 
Target The day(s) on which abnormal 





UST1001 -43 day None None 
-41 day 
-40 day 
UST1014 -12 day -1 day None 
UST1004 -1 day None None 
0 day 
UST1009 +1 day None None 
UST1011 +3 day None None 
+4 day 
+5 day 
UST1005 None -15 day None 
UST1006 None -1 day None 
UST1002 +1 day None None 
UST1003 None -3 day None 
-5 day 
-41 day 





UST1016 -44 day None None 
-3 day 
0 day 
UST1013 +9 day None None 
+10 day 
UST1019 -33 day None None 
-32 day 
Firms with neither abnormal return nor public rumours: UST1008, UST1010, 
UST1012, UST1015, UST1017, UST1018, UST1020 
 
In 2010, the dummy variable approach suggests that the AR of Firm UST1011 has a 
spike on day -5 which substantially influences the pattern of the clean firms in this 
year.  Nevertheless, since no public rumours or directors’ trading on shares are found, 
Firm UST1011 is suspected of getting involved in insider trading. 
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Section 6.3.7The categorization after two filters-the dummy variable 
approach and the news search 
 
Table 6.34 shows the clean, the suspected, the clean after the news search and the 
suspected after the plotting firms in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 after dummy variable 
and news search. After the results are shown, the ‘clean after news search’ will be 
renamed as ‘obscure’ and the ‘suspected after the plotting’ will be categorized as 
‘suspected’ if no news support is found in Table 5.35 for the reason of simplification 
for further studies. 
 
Table 6.34: The codes of the clean, the suspected, the clean after the news search and 
the suspected after the plotting firms after two filters in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  









UST0601 UST0609 UST0616 UST0602 None UST0605 
UST0603 UST0610 UST0618 UST0607   
UST0604 UST0612 UST0619 UST0611   
UST0606 UST0613 UST0620 UST0614   
UST0608 UST0615  UST0617   
2007   









UST0701 UST0708 UST0720 UST0706 UST0717 None None 
UST0702 UST0709  UST0711 UST0718   
UST0703 UST0710  UST0713 UST0719   
UST0704 UST0712  UST0714    
UST0705 UST0716  UST0715    
2008  
The code of the clean 
firms 







UST0801 UST0814 UST0802 UST0809 UST0818 None UST0820 
UST0804 UST0817 UST0803 UST0811 UST0819   
UST0808  UST0805 UST0813    
UST0810  UST0806 UST0815    
UST0812  UST0807 UST0816    
2009  








news search after the 
plotting 
UST0901 UST0909 UST0915 UST0920 UST0905 UST0903 None 
UST0902 UST0910 UST0916  UST0906   
UST0904 UST0912 UST0917  UST0911   
UST0907 UST0913 UST0918     
UST0908 UST0914 UST0919     
2010  









UST1002 UST1009 UST1017 UST1001 UST1019 None UST1011 
UST1003 UST1010 UST1018 UST1004    
UST1005 UST1012 UST1020 UST1007    
UST1006 UST1013  UST1014    
UST1008 UST1015  UST1016    
Source: Author’s summation 
Table 6.35: The codes of the clean, the suspected, and the obscure firm after two 
filters in the U.K from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 




UST0601 UST0609 UST0616 UST0602 UST0605 None 
UST0603 UST0610 UST0618 UST0607   
UST0604 UST0612 UST0619 UST0611   
UST0606 UST0613 UST0620 UST0614   
UST0608 UST0615  UST0617   
2007  




UST0701 UST0708 UST0720 UST0706 UST0717 None 
UST0702 UST0709  UST0711 UST0718  
UST0703 UST0710  UST0713 UST0719  
UST0704 UST0712  UST0714   
UST0705 UST0716  UST0715   
2008 
The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the suspected firms The obscure 
firm 
UST0801 UST0814 UST0802 UST0809 UST0818 None 
UST0804 UST0817 UST0803 UST0811 UST0819  
UST0808  UST0805 UST0813 UST0820  
UST0810  UST0806 UST0815   
UST0812  UST0807 UST0816   
2009 






UST0901 UST0909 UST0915 UST0920 UST0905 UST0903 
UST0902 UST0910 UST0916  UST0906  
UST0904 UST0912 UST0917  UST0911  
UST0907 UST0913 UST0918    
UST0908 UST0914 UST0919    
2010 




UST1002 UST1009 UST1017 UST1001 UST1019 None 
UST1003 UST1010 UST1018 UST1004 UST1011  
UST1005 UST1012 UST1020 UST1007   
UST1006 UST1013  UST1014   
UST1008 UST1015  UST1016   
Source: Author’s summation 
 
Section 6.3.8The results of the detection of the outliers  
Tables 6.36-6.45 give the results from the detection of the outliers filter. With this 
filter, the firms are firstly grouped to be clean and suspected according to the previous 
filters, and then the firms in each group are examined respectively whether they have 
positive squared abnormal returns equal or greater than 3.5 or 4 multiplied by the 
standard error. 
 
Table 6.36: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 
U.S in 2006 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0601 -21 day 2.84*** None 
-8 day 2.69*** 
-3 day (3.5*SD) 2.49** 
UST0603 None - None 
UST0604 -59 day 3.16*** None 
UST0606 None - None 
UST0608 None - None 
UST0609 -34 day 4.48*** None 
UST0610 -59 day 2.45** None 
UST0612 -13 day 1.84* None 
UST0613 None - None 
UST0615 -52 day 3.24*** None 
UST0616 None - -1 day 
UST0618 -28 day - -3 day 
UST0619 -24 day 3.83*** None 




Table 6.37: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 





The day(s) on which 
the squared abnormal 
return is greater than 
4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys share 
UST0602 -36 day 2.85*** None 
-25 day (3.5*SD) 2.43** 
UST0605 -9 day 6.60*** None 
UST0607 -9 day 4.09*** None 
UST0611 -48 day 2.72*** None 
-11 day 3.09*** 
UST0614 None - None 
UST0617 -38 day 2.74*** None 
-29 day 2.43** 
 
Table 6.38: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 
U.S in 2007 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0701 None - None 
UST0702 -38 day 2.03** None 
UST0703 -12 day 1.11 -1 day 
UST0704 None - None 
UST0705 -41 day 1.76* None 
-1 day 2.24** 
UST0707 -29 day 0.72 None 
UST0708 None - None 
UST0709 -24 day 5.31*** None 
UST0710 None - -28 day 
UST0712 -54 day 1.54 None 
UST0716 -47 day 2.33** None 
UST0720 None - None 
 
Table 6.39: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0706 -15 day 2.34** None 
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UST0711 -53 day 7.42*** None 
-11 day (3.5*SD) 5.51*** 
UST0713 None - -9 day 
UST0714 -15 day 2.51** None 
UST0715 -49 day 5.13*** None 
UST0717 -24 day 5.79*** None 
-12 day (3.5*SD) 4.27*** 
UST0718 -20 day 3.93*** None 
UST0719 -7 day 45.93*** None 
 
 
Table 6.40: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 
U.S in 2008 
 
The clean target 
firms 
The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0801 None - None 
UST0804 -34 day 1.59 None 
UST0808 -10 day 1.14 None 
UST0810 -52 day 3.65*** None 
UST0812 -41 day 3.72*** -17 day 
UST0814 None - None 
UST0817 -23 day 1.50 None 
 
Table 6.41: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0815 -22 day 5.13*** -3 day 
UST0816 -7 day 1.70* None 
UST0819 -27 day 3.57*** None 
-24 day (3.5*SD) 2.94*** 
UST0807 -23 day 9.98*** None 
UST0803 None - None 
UST0806 -8 day 9.53*** None 
UST0802 -47 day 17.43*** -4 day 
-5 day 
UST0818 None - None 
UST0811 -1 day 5.64*** None 
UST0813 -4 day 5.81*** None 
UST0809 None - None 
UST0805 -3 day 2.11** None 
-43 day (3.5*SD) 2.43** 
UST0820 -13 day 7.17*** None 
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-10 day 7.21*** 
-4 day (3.5*SD) 6.10*** 
 
 
Table 6.42: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 





The day(s) on which 
the squared abnormal 
return is greater than 
4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys share 
UST0901 None - None 
UST0902 -19 day 2.50** None 
UST0904 -32 day 1.43 None 
-4 day (3.5*SD) 1.13 
UST0907 -47 day 1.33 None 
-2 day 1.24 
UST0908 None - None 
UST0909 None - None 
UST0910 -19 day 1.90* None 
UST0912 -43 day 1.74* None 
UST0913 None - None 
UST0914 -14 day (3.5*SD) 1.23 -14 day 
UST0915 -21 day 0.43 -27 day 
UST0916 -59 day 1.66* None 
-4 day 1.64 
UST0917 -52 day 2.78*** None 
UST0918 None - None 
UST0919 -45 day 3.22*** None 
UST0920 -37 day 1.82* None 
 
 
Table 6.43: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 




The day(s) on 
which the squared 
abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys 
share 
UST0903 None - -11 day 
UST0905 -48 day 4.82*** None 
UST0906 -1 day 7.30*** None 






Table 6.44: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 





The day(s) on which 
the squared abnormal 
return is greater than 
4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys share 
UST1002 None - None 
UST1003 -60 day 2.83*** -41 day 
-5 day 
-3 day 
UST1005 None - -15 day 
UST1006 -49 day 3.49*** -1 day 
-44 day (3.5*SD) 2.78*** 
UST1008 -23 day 1.92* None 
UST1009 None - None 
UST1010 -13 day 1.22 None 
-48 day (3.5*SD) 1.45 
UST1011 -55 day 2.03** None 
-5 day 1.99** 
UST1012 -35 day 1.94* None 
UST1013 -58 day 2.53** None 
UST1015 -14 day 1.71* None 
-8 day 1.68* 
UST1017 None - None 
UST1018 None - None 
UST1020 -1 day 2.48** None 
 
Table 6.45: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 





The day(s) on which 
the squared abnormal 
return is greater than 
4*SD 
t-statistics Public rumours or 
Director buys share 
UST1001 -41 day 7.28*** None 
UST1004 -1 day 7.18*** None 
UST1007 -1 day 4.49*** None 
UST1014 -12 day 9.61*** -1 day 
UST1016  -44 day 8.08*** None 
UST1019 None - None 
 
Section 6.3.9The categorization after three filters-the dummy 




After the first three filters- the dummy variable approach, the news search and the 
detection of the outliers, the U.S firms are categorized into five groups-the clean, the 
obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected and the ultra-suspected. 
Table 6.46: The codes of the absolute clean, obscure, obscure with lagged news 
suspected and ultra-suspected firms after three filters in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the 













The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
UST0603 UST0620 None None UST0601 UST0614 UST0602 
UST0606    UST0604 UST0615 UST0605 
UST0608    UST0609 UST0618 UST0607 
UST0613    UST0610 UST0619 UST0611 
UST0616    UST0612  UST0617 
2007  
The code of the 













The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
UST0701 UST0710 None None UST0702 UST0706 UST0718 
UST0703 UST0712   UST0705 UST0711 UST0719 
UST0704 UST0720   UST0709 UST0714  
UST0707    UST0716 UST0715  
UST0708    UST0713 UST0717  
2008  
The code of the 
absolute clean 
firms 










The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
UST0801 None None UST0803 UST0802 UST0813 
UST0804   UST0809 UST0805 UST0815 
UST0808   UST0810 UST0806 UST0816 
UST0814   UST0812 UST0807 UST0819 
UST0817   UST0818 UST0811 UST0820 
2009  
The code of the 





The code of the 
suspected firms 












UST0901 UST0913 None UST0903 UST0902 UST0919 UST0905 
UST0904 UST0914   UST0910 UST0920 UST0906 
UST0907 UST0915   UST0912  UST0911 
UST0908 UST0918   UST0916   
UST0909    UST0917   
2010  














The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
UST1002 UST1018 None None UST1003 UST1013 UST1001 
UST1005    UST1006 UST1015 UST1004 
UST1009    UST1008 UST1019 UST1007 
UST1010    UST1011 UST1020 UST1014 
UST1017    UST1012  UST1016 
Source: Author’s summation 
 
Section 6.3.10The Result of the Abnormal Turnover (AT) analysis 
 
Here, I examine whether the daily average turnover calculated for two months (-60 to 
-11 trading days) prior to merger announcement and two weeks (-10 to -1 trading days) 
prior to the merger announcement gives any signal of presence of any possible insider 
trading. I use the average turnover calculated for a period from -180 to -61 day as the 
benchmark for average turnover in normal days. Then the daily average turnover for 
each firm is compared with 1.25 multiplied by the benchmark, 1.50 multiplied by the 
benchmark and 2.0 multiplied by the benchmark because of a gradual increasingly 
stringent standard. 
 
Table 6.47: The result of the AT analysis in the U.S. from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  

















The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11day 
None None UST0605, 
UST0607, UST0617 
The average of the 
turnover from           
-10 day to 0 day 
None None UST0602 
2007 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11day 
None None UST0715 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10 day to 0 day 
None None None 
2008 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11day 
None None UST0819, UST0812 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
2009 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None UST0902, UST0904 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None UST0901 
2010 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None None 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Similar to the results of the U.K, Table 6.47 shows that in a period from day -61 to -
10, abnormal high turnovers which are at least 200% higher than the benchmark AT 
of some firms are seen. This is a sign that most possible cases of insider trading take 
place one or two months prior to the merger announcement. 
 
Table 6.48: Distribution of firms with respect to percentage of AT increase 
(Benchmark: AT for a period from -180 to -61 day before announcement) 
 
% High of AT No. & % of firms with higher No. & % of firms with higher 
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 AT from -61 to -11 day AT from -10 to 0 day 
2006 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 3 (15%) 1 (5%) 
Total 3 (15%) 1 (5%) 
2007 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 
Total 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 
2008 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 2 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Total 2 (10%) 0 (0%) 
2009 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 
Total 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 
2010 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Section 6.3.11The categorization after the dummy variable, the news 
search, the detection of the outliers and the analysis of the Abnormal 
Turnover (AT) 
 
After the four filters- the dummy variable approach, the news search, the detect of the 
outliers, and the analysis of the AT, the U.S firms are categorized into six groups-the 
clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected, the ultra-suspected 
and the ultra-ultra-suspected. 
 
Table 6.49: The codes of the absolute clean, obscure, obscure with lagged news 
suspected ultra-suspected and ultra-ultra-suspected firms after four filters in the U.S 
from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 
The code of the 







The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of 
the ultra-
suspected 












UST0603 UST0620 None None UST0601 UST0615 UST0611 UST0605 
UST0606    UST0604 UST0618  UST0607 
UST0608    UST0609 UST0619  UST0617 
UST0613    UST0610 UST0614  UST0602 
UST0616    UST0612    
2007 
The code of the 

















The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 





UST0701 UST0710 None None UST0702 UST0706 UST0719 UST0715 
UST0703 UST0712   UST0705 UST0711   
UST0704 UST0720   UST0709 UST0714   
UST0707    UST0716 UST0717   
UST0708    UST0713 UST0718   
2008 

















The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 





UST0801 None None UST0810 UST0815 UST0802 UST0819 
UST0804   UST0803 UST0816 UST0811  
UST0808   UST0818 UST0807 UST0813  
UST0814   UST0809 UST0806 UST0805  
UST0817    UST0820 UST0812  
2009 
The code of the 
























UST0907 UST0915 None UST0903 UST0901 UST0917 UST0905 None 
UST0908 UST0918   UST0904 UST0919 UST0906  
UST0909    UST0910 UST0920 UST0902  
UST0913    UST0912  UST0911  
UST0914    UST0916    
2010 





























UST1002 UST1018 None None UST1003 UST1013 UST1001 None 
UST1005    UST1006 UST1015 UST1004  
UST1009    UST1008 UST1020 UST1007  
UST1010    UST1011 UST1019 UST1014  
UST1017    UST1012  UST1016  
Source: Author’s summation 
Figures 6.26-6.30 present the AR of the six categories of firms in the U.S from 2006 
to 2010. 
Figure 6.26: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2006 
 
 
Figure 6.26 is the AR of the six categories of firms in the U.S 2006. Since in 2006, 
there is no obscure firm or obscure firm with lagged news, only four categories of 
firms are presented. According to Figure 6.31, the AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected 
firms has several significant spikes prior to the merger announcement. These spikes 
include both significant positive and significant negative ones.  Likewise, the AR of 
the ultra-suspected firms also has significant positive spikes before merger 
several significant spikes prior to day 0 for the ultra-ultra-suspected firm





















-60 -40 -20 0 20
day
absolute clean firm suspected firm
ultra-suspected firm ultra-ultra-suspected firm
266 
 
announcement. On the other hand, the AR of the suspected firm and the AR for the 
absolute clean firms are both stable all through the event window. However, on day 0, 
the AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected is the highest-about 25%. The CAARs of all the 
four categories are presented later for a further discussion of the effectiveness of the 
four-filter approach. 
 
Figure 6.27: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2007 
 
 
In 2007, the AR of the absolute clean firms is stable before merger announcement and 
moreover, on day 0, the absolute clean firms have the highest AR which is about 50%. 
The AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm has several significant positive spikes during 
a period from -60 to 0 day. The AR of the ultra-suspected has a significant positive 
spike on -10 day. On day 0, the ultra-suspected firms are getting the smallest AR-
about 2%. There are also substantial differences between the ARs of the clean and the 
ultra-ultra-suspected, the ARs of the clean and the suspected and the ARs of the clean 
and the ultra-suspected. 
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Figure 6.28: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2008 
 
 
In 2008, there is no obscure firm or obscure firm with lagged news hence only four 
categories of firms are plotted. The AR of the absolute clean firm is stable before the 
merger announcement except one significant negative spike on day -45. The most 
significant spikes are observed on the AR of ultra-suspected firm from a period from 
day -20 to 0. It is noticeable that on day 0, the AR of the clean firms is the highest, 
reaching about 80% while the ARs of the other categories are comparatively lower. 
The difference between the AR of the clean and that of the ultra-ultra-suspected is 
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Figure 6.29: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2009 
 
 
In 2009, there is no ultra-ultra-suspected firm, however, there is obscure firm with 
lagged news. As a result, in 2009, four categories are plotted. The AR of the ultra-
suspected firms has several significant spikes before merger announcement and the 
AR of the clean firms is stable. On day 0, the obscure firm with lagged news has the 
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Figure 6.30: The AR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2010 
 
 
In 2010, there are only three categories-the absolute clean firm, the suspected firm 
and the ultra-suspected firm. The AR of the suspected firm has two noticeable spikes 
before merger announcement one of which appears on day -55 and the other one 
appears on day -5. The AR of the absolute clean firm and that of the ultra-suspected 
firm are both stable before day 0. On day 0, the clean firms have slightly lower AR 
than the suspected firms while the ultra-suspected firms have the lowest-about 10%. 
 
Figures 6.31-6.35 present the CAAR of the six categories-the absolute clean firm, the 
obscure firm, the suspected firm, the ultra-suspected firm and the ultra-ultra-suspected 
firm. According to the previous literature, if there is trading on inside information, the 
CAAR is expected to build up before the merger announcement. 
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Figure 6.31: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2006 
 
 
In Figure 6.31, only the CAAR of the absolute clean firm remain below zero before 
the merger announcement. The CAAR of the suspected firms starts to increase slowly 
from day -40 onwards. The CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm increases to 20% on 
day -45 and keeps on increasing slowly afterwards, and on day -15, it increases 
sharply to more than 40% and keeps at 40% before day 0. The increasing trend in the 
CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms is observed on day -15 on which it goes up 
dramatically to 30% and then nothing before merger announcement. The evidences of 
both the AR and the CAAR support the effectiveness of the four-filter approach 










The CAARs of the other three categories are above 0 before day 0
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Figure 6.32: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2007 
 
 
According to Figure 6.32, the CAAR of the suspected firm remains stable before  day 
-5. However, an increasing trend of CAAR buildup can be observed from day -5 
onwards. The CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm starts to build up on day -9. The 
CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firm increases considerably to 30% on day -50 and 
again to 40% on day -30 after which it remains increasing steadily to more than 60% 
before merger announcement. On the other hand, the CAAR of the clean firms remain 









The CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm starts to build up on -9 day
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Figure 6.33: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2008 
 
 
According to Figure 6.33, in the year 2008 in which the economic crisis happens, only 
the CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms remains increasing steadily from day -60 
onwards. It is noticeable that the CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms is above 0 
all through the event window. The CAAR of the ultra-suspected firms remains below 
0 before day -20 after which an increasing trend is observed. The CAAR of the 
absolute clean firm decreases gradually to about -50% before merger announcement. 
Only the CAAR of the suspected firm ends up negative on day 0. However, an 
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Figure 6.34: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2009 
 
 
According to Figure 6.34, in the year 2009, only the CAAR of the suspected firm ends 
up positive on day 0. Before day -10, the CAAR of the suspected firm remains very 
close to 0 and from day -10 onwards, an increasing trend can be observed. For the 
CAARs of other categories, they all decrease sharply. However, the CAAR of the 
obscure firm with lagged news starts to increase on day -7 and an increasing trend is 
seen for the CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm from day -3 onwards. For the ultra-
suspected firms, a spike can be seen on day -30, it is arguably that if there is evidence 
of insider trading on day -30, then the insiders got it wrong as the price on day 0 was 
virtually the same as prior to the insider trading. This is evidence that other things 
affect stock prices and the insider trading does not always profit. Among all the 
categories, only the CAAR of the absolute clean firm starts to increase sharply on day 
0. Before the merger announcement, there is no sign of CAAR buidup for the clean 
firms. 
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Figure 6.35: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in the U.S 2010 
 
 
According to Figure 6.35, an increasing trend of CAAR buildup is observed from day 
-20 onwards for the ultra-suspected firms, though with occasional dips. From day -6, 
the CAAR buildup for the ultra-suspected firms is more rapid than before. The CAAR 
of the suspected firms begins to increase on day -6 before which it is relatively stable. 
The CAAR of the absolute clean firms decreases gradually to -25% before merger 
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Figures 6.36-6.40 give the AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the 
U.S from 2006 to 2010.  
Figure 6.36: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.S 2006 
 
 
According to Figure 6.36, the AT of the clean firms is above that of the ultra-ultra-
suspected firms. On day -40, the AT of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms has a spike and 
within a period from day -60 to -40 and on day -33, the AT of the clean firms has 
several spikes. In other words, both the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms have 
pre-merger abnormal run-up of the AT. As a result, the analysis of the AT must be 
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Figure 6.37: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.S 2007 
 
 
According to Figure 6.37, the average daily AT of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms is 
much smaller than that of the clean firms due to the thin trading volume of Firm 
UST0715 which is the only ultra-ultra-suspected firm in 2007. However, the AT of 
the Firm UST0715 still has several noticeable spikes despite of its low trading volume. 
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Figure 6.38: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.S 2008 
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According to Figure 6.39, in 2009, there is no ultra-ultra-suspected firm and therefore 
only the AT of the clean firms is plotted. The AT of the clean firms does not have 
spikes before the merger announcement. 
 
Figure 6.40: The AT of the clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms in the U.S 2010 
 
 
According to Figure 6.40, there is no ultra-ultra-suspected firm in 2010 and for the 
absolute clean firms, the AT has a significant spike on day -40 and several other 
spikes before merger announcement. 
 
Section 6.3.12The results of Granger causality test in the targets and 
the bidders 
 
Tables 6.50-6.54 show the results of Granger causality test for the targets and bidders 
in pairs in the U.S from 2006 to 2010. Tables 6.76-6.80 in the appendix give the 
results of the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test for the targets and bidders in the 
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UST0601/suspected No 2.27 No 0.30 
UST0602/ultra-ultra-suspected Yes (5%) 3.37 No 0.07 
UST0603/clean No 0.23 No 0.42 
UST0604/suspected No 1.03 No 0.30 
UST0605/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.75 No 1.48 
UST0606/clean No 0.27 No 0.02 
UST0607/ultra-ultra-suspected No 1.08 No 0.33 
UST0608/clean No 1.19 No 1.57 
UST0609/suspected No 0.08 Yes (1%) 6.65 
UST0610/suspected No 0.72 No 0.32 
UST0611/ultra-suspected No 0.40 No 0.66 
UST0612/suspected Yes (10%) 2.54 Yes (5%) 3.95 
UST0613/clean No 0.04 No 0.44 
UST0614/suspected No 0.14 No 0.14 
UST0615/suspected No 0.38 No 0.57 
UST0616/clean No 1.02 Yes (10%) 2.44 
UST0617/ultra-ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 5.33 No 0.32 
UST0618/suspected No 0.00 No 0.10 
UST0619/suspected No 2.03 No 0.08 
UST0620/clean No 1.33 No 0.59 
Source: Author’s calculation 










UST0701/clean Yes (10%) 2.84 No 1.69 
UST0702/suspected No 0.61 No 1.27 
UST0703/clean No 0.10 No 0.87 
UST0704/clean No 1.59 No 2.10 
UST0705/suspected No 1.47 No 1.41 
UST0706/ultra-suspected No 0.75 No 0.36 
UST0707/clean No 1.66 Yes (10%) 3.02 
UST0708/clean No 1.02 No 0.03 
UST0709/suspected No 0.85 No 0.85 
UST0710/clean No 1.66 No 0.71 
UST0711/ultra-suspected No 0.51 No 0.02 
UST0712/clean No 0.38 Yes (1%) 5.51 
UST0713/suspected Yes (5%) 3.35 Yes (5%) 3.50 
UST0714/ultra-suspected No 0.41 Yes (5%) 3.90 
UST0715/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.88 No 1.76 
UST0716/suspected No 0.16 No 0.75 
UST0717/ultra-suspected No 1.57 No 1.91 
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UST0718/ultra-suspected No 0.24 No 1.18 
UST0719/ultra-suspected No 0.01 No 1.50 
UST0720/clean No 0.02 No 0.70 
Source: Author’s calculation 










UST0801/clean No 1.93 Yes (1%) 4.81 
UST0802/ultra-suspected No 0.44 No 0.03 
UST0803/suspected No 1.39 No 1.61 
UST0804/clean No 0.23 No 0.10 
UST0805/ultra-suspected No 0.11 No 1.51 
UST0806/ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 11.04 No 1.20 
UST0807/ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 15.68 No 1.30 
UST0808/clean No 0.30 No 0.06 
UST0809/suspected No 1.92 Yes (1%) 11.78 
UST0810/suspected No 0.92 No 0.12 
UST0811/ultra-suspected No 0.42 Yes (5%) 4.42 
UST0812/ultra-suspected Yes (10%) 2.74 Yes (1%) 6.33 
UST0813/ultra-suspected No 0.38 No 0.41 
UST0814/clean Yes (1%) 4.83 No 0.81 
UST0815/ultra-suspected No 2.11 Yes (10%) 2.35 
UST0816/ultra-suspected No 0.08 No 1.42 
UST0817/clean No 1.93 Yes (1%) 4.81 
UST0818/suspected No 1.75 No 2.21 
UST0819/ultra-ultra-suspected No 2.00 No 0.96 
UST0820/ultra-suspected Yes (10%) 2.40 Yes (10%) 2.73 
Source: Author’s calculation 










UST0901/suspected No 2.11 Yes (5%) 3.23 
UST0902/ultra-suspected No 0.05 No 0.19 
UST0903/obscure with lagged news No 0.73 No 0.55 
UST0904/suspected No 1.25 No 0.45 
UST0905/ultra-suspected No 0.76 No 0.58 
UST0906/ultra-suspected No 0.59 No 0.51 
UST0907/clean Yes (10%) 2.38 No 0.85 
UST0908/clean No 0.09 No 0.06 
UST0909/clean No 0.45 No 1.35 
UST0910/suspected No 0.45 No 2.01 
UST0911/ultra-suspected No 0.06 No 0.59 
UST0912/suspected No 0.05 No 0.23 
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UST0913/clean Yes (10%) 2.88 Yes (5%) 4.30 
UST0914/clean No 0.78 No 1.35 
UST0915/clean No 0.07 No 0.78 
UST0916/suspected No 1.49 No 1.56 
UST0917/suspected No 0.13 Yes (5%) 4.04 
UST0918/clean No 1.22 No 0.70 
UST0919/suspected No 0.05 No 0.53 
UST0820/suspected No 0.44 No 1.19 
Source: Author’s calculation 










UST1001/ultra-suspected No 1.21 No 0.11 
UST1002/clean No 0.42 No 1.52 
UST1003/suspected No 0.30 No 0.59 
UST1004/ultra-suspected No 0.05 No 0.42 
UST1005/clean No 0.63 No 1.67 
UST1006/suspected No 1.34 No 1.46 
UST1007/ultra-suspected No 2.01 Yes (5%) 3.32 
UST1008/suspected No 0.79 No 1.65 
UST1009/clean No 1.27 No 0.83 
UST1010/clean No 0.07 No 0.56 
UST1011/suspected No 0.35 No 0.13 
UST1012/suspected No 0.25 No 1.66 
UST1013/suspected Yes (1%) 5.43 No 2.17 
UST1014/ultra-suspected No 1.06 No 1.61 
UST1015/suspected No 0.28 Yes (5%) 3.57 
UST1016/ultra-suspected No 0.12 No 1.30 
UST1017/clean No 0.99 No 0.70 
UST1018/clean No 1.01 No 0.18 
UST1019/suspected No 0.75 No 0.74 
UST1020/suspected No 0.83 No 1.70 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Table 6.55: The descriptive statistics of the result of the Granger causality test in U.S 
 
Descriptive statistic  




Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 




                                                          
30
 The percentage number in the parentheses is the significance level of the Granger causality test. 
31
 The denominator is the total number of firms in that specific year.  
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2007 1/20 1/20 
2008 3/20 2/20 
2009 0/20 2/20 
2010 0/20 0/20 
Total 5/100 6/100 
Numbers of target firms Granger cause 
bidder firms (5%) 
Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 
target firms (5%) 
2006 1/20 1/20  
2007 2/20 1/20  
2008 1/20 0/20 
2009 3/20 0/20 
2010 2/20 0/20 
Total 9/100 2/100 
Numbers of target firms Granger cause 
bidder firms (1%) 
Numbers of bidder firms Granger cause 
target firms (1%) 
2006 1/20 1/20 
2007 1/20 0/20 
2008 3/20 3/20 
2009 0/20 0/20 
2010 0/20 1/20 
Total 5/100 5/100 
Source: Author’s summation 
According to the results of Granger causality test, there is evidence that the targets 
Granger cause the bidders, and the bidders Granger cause the targets and mutual 
causality. I found the most prevalent cases happen on the suspected, the ultra-
suspected and the clean firms. Among the total 13 cases on the bidders Granger cause 
the targets, 4 of which are clean firms, 3 are suspected firms, 4 are ultra-suspected 
firms and 2 are ultra-ultra-suspected firms. On the other hand, there are 18 cases of 
the targets Granger cause the bidders, 6 of which are clean firms, 7 are suspected 
firms and 5 are ultra-suspected firms. 
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Section 6.3.13The results of the application of the day 0 hypothesis 
In this chapter, the day 0 hypotheses is tested to provide evidence that the insider 
dealing activity has absorbed part of the abnormal return on day 0 and as a result, the 
firms which are suspected to have traded with inside information will have a 
comparatively lower excess return on day 0 than the clean firms. In addition to the 
day 0 return, the ratio of the increase on day 0 to that from day -60 to day 0 is also 
included. 
 























2006 0.083715 - - 0.0957496 -0.0106942 0.2446426 
2007 0.4978723 - - 0.2940957 0.0558327 0.1870548 
2008 0.7592605 - - 0.2373422 0.2499221 0.0850869 
2009 0.3495395 - 0.6776646 0.0838218 0.1007806 - 
2010 0.3457057 - - 0.3762397 0.1383411 - 
Average 0.407219 - 0.6776646 0.21745 0.106836 0.172261 
Source: Author’s calculation 























2006 234.3% - - 145.6% -2.2% 160.6% 
2007 306.0% - - 559.5% 20.6% 35.2% 
2008 141.4% - - 31.9% 79.8% 24.0% 
2009 65.1% - 91.1% 178.8% 16.3% - 
2010 111.1% - - 258.0% 37.2% - 
Average 172% - 91.1% 235% 30% 73% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
                                                          
32
 The numbers in Table 6.57 are the average AR for all the six categories of firms on day 0 from 2006 
to 2010. For example, in 2006, there are 6 absolute clean firms, and the number 0.083713 is the 
average AR of these 6 firms on day 0. The last column ‘Average’ is the average value from 2006 to 
2010 for each of the six categories. 
33
 The percentage numbers in Table 6.58 are calculated as the difference of the CAAR on day 0 and 
the CAAR on day -1 over the CAAR on day 0.       
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According to Table 6.57, the only exception which is not in line with the day 0 
hypothesis is the year 2006. However, if comparing the day 0 AR of the clean firms 
with that of the ultra-suspected firms, the empirical result of the day 0 hypothesis is 
supported by all five years. Furthermore, it is also noticeable that the most substantial 
difference is between the day 0 AR of the clean and that of the ultra-suspected instead 
of the ultra-ultra-suspected. The difference between the ultra-suspected and the ultra-
ultra-suspected firms is that the latter have AT before the merger announcement. 
Presumably it is because of the sizes of the firms as for the smaller firms with a lower 
trading volume on a normal day, ATs are easier to be observed. However, because the 
targets are the firms which have been taken over, it is difficult to find out information 
about their sizes to verify.  Table 6.58 provides a support for the day 0 hypothesis in 
which the ratio of the day 0 increase of the share prices to that from day -60 to day 0. 
According to Table 6.58, the ratio of day 0 share increase for the absolute clean firms 
is the highest among all categories. The evidence of day 0 hypothesis has supported 
the assumption that on day 0, with the existence of insider trading, the AR would be, 
at least partly, absorbed prior to merger announcement. It is also worth emphasising 
that the results of the day 0 hypothesis are very similar to the U.K results. The key 
differences lie between absolute clean and the ultra-ultra-suspected firms. This is 
suggestive that the four filter approach works.  
 
Table 6.59: Test for Equality of Means between Series 
 
Method Degree of freedom Value Probability 
t-test 98 3.887555 0.0002 
Anova F-test (1, 98) 15.11309 0.0002 
Satterthwaite-
Welch-test 
75.27871 -3.887555 0.0002 
Welch F-test (1, 75.2787) 15.11309 0.0002 
Source: Author’s calculation 
In applying test for equality of means between series, t-test, Anova, F-test 
Satterthwaite-Welch test and Welch F-test all suggest highly significance (under 5% 
significance level). 
 
Table 6.60: Test for Equality of variance between Series 
 
Method Degree of freedom Value Probability 
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F-test (49, 49) 3.438424 0.0000 
Bartlett 1 17.42744 0.0000 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The above table shows in applying both F-test and Bartlett test, it is proved that the 
result of the day 0 hypotheses is significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
Section 6.4 A comparison of the U.K and U.S results 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2 the regulation of insider trading, the U.K 
definition is argued to be superior in form to that defined by the U.S law (Tridimas, 
1991; Watson, 1995). Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2005) conclude that the 
observed abnormal returns in the U.K are found to be larger than those in the U.S and 
they attribute this to the differences in regulation between the two countries. Figures 
6.41-6.45 are presented to show the AR of the U.K and U.S target firms from 2006 to 
2010. 
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According to Figure 6.41, the AR of the U.S target firms has a significant spike on 
day -9 while that of the U.K firms is comparatively more stable. However, on day 0, 
the AR of the U.S firms is higher than that of the U.K and according to the day 0 
hypothesis, this is an indication that insider trading is more of a problem in the U.K 
than in the U.S because the AR is absorbed partly before the merger announcement. 
 
 
Figure 6.42: The AR of the U.K and U.S target firm 2007 
 
 
In 2007, the AR of the U.S has several spikes before day 0 among which the most 
significant one appears on day -7. Nevertheless, on day 0, the difference between the 
AR of the U.K and that of the U.S is quite substantial. The AR of the U.S has reaches 
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Figure 6.43: The AR of the U.K and U.S target firm 2008 
 
 





























-60 -40 -20 0 20-16
days
AR of the U.K AR of the U.S
Day 0 difference























-60 -40 -20 0 20
days
AR of the U.K AR of the U.S
288 
 
Figure 6.45: The AR of the U.K and U.S target firm 2010 
 
 
According to Figures 6.41 to 6.45, it is notable that the day 0 ARs of the U.S targets 
are much higher than those of the U.K targets in all five years which is suggestive that 
insider trading is more severe a problem in the U.K than in the U.S. Alternatively it 
may be that the merger terms are such that in the U.S the target firms receive a much 
greater boost than in the U.K. In 2006, the day 0 average abnormal return for U.S 
targets is more than 10% while that for the U.K targets is less than 10%. From 2007 
onwards, the difference becomes much larger. In 2007, on day 0, the average 
abnormal return for U.K is 10% while that for the U.S is up to 30%. Besides, in 2008, 
the average abnormal return on day 0 for the U.K is 10% while that for the U.S is 
about 40%. In 2009 and 2010, the differences are both about 10%. Furthermore, it is 
obvious to see spikes during a 10-day period before the announcement day (from -10 
day to 0 day) for the U.S targets. As a result, the conclusion made by Fidrmuc, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2005) that the observed abnormal returns in the U.K are 
larger than those in the U.S is supported by the data used in this thesis. In addition, the 
differences in news leakages are worth noting. As mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 
2.3.2, the U.K Code requires much faster reporting of director’s dealings. The 
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later than the fifth business day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf 
of their spouses and children (Hillier and Marshall, 2002). In the U.S., insiders only 
have to report their holdings within the first ten days of the month following the 
month of the trade (Persons, 1997). Evidences also support that for the U.S, relatively 
rarer news leakages were found in comparison with the U.K. 
 
Figures 6.46-6.50 are the CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms from 2006 to 2010. 
Figure 6.46: The CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms 2006 
 
 
According to Figure 6.46, the buildup in the CAAR begins on day -38 for the U.K 
target firms relative to the date of announcement. From this day onwards, an 
increasing trend in the CAAR is observed, though with occasional dips. However, 
from day -5 onwards the buildup in CAAR is more perceptible as after this day the 
dips in the curve is less pronounced than that observed before day -5. For the U.S 
target firms, the increasing trend can be seen from the beginning of the event window. 
From day -60 to day -35, the trend is less obvious than it is after day -35. Moreover, 
all through the event window, the curve of the CAAR of the U.S is right above that of 
the U.K. 
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Figure 6.47: The CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms 2007 
 
According to Figure 6.41, the CAAR of the U.K increases on day -58 to 10% and then 
nothing before day -18. From day -18 onwards, an increasing trend in the CAAR of 
the U.K is observed. The buildup in the CAAR of the U.S begins on day -18 before 
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Figure 6.48: The CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms 2008 
 
 
Figure 6.49: The CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms 2009 
 
According to Figure 6.48 and Figure 6.49, it is noticeable that in both 2008 and 2009, 
the CAARs of the U.S decrease sharply to about -40% and then starts to increase days 
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or weeks before merger announcement. However, for the U.K, in both years, the 
CAARs have an increasing trend and end up positive. The reason might be that the 
financial crisis happens in 2008 in the U.S and then spreads out to the Europe. When 
the stock market was in a down trend, barely any stocks can experience very high 
ARs and especially for U.S which has suffered the most severely, and therefore, a 
sharp dip in the CAAR is seen in Figure 6.49.  
 
 
Figure 6.50: The CAAR of the U.K and U.S target firms 2010 
 
 
In 2010, both the CAARs of the U.K and of the U.S remain stable about 0 before  day 
-5. From day -5 onwards, an increasing trend of CAAR buildup can be observed for 
both curves. 
 
Section 6.5 Conclusion  
Similar to Chapter 5, this chapter also utilizes the four filters to detect the possible 
existence of insider trading prior to the merger announcement. The investigation is 
based on a database of U.S domestic takeovers whose announcement dates have been 
during 2006-2010. The methodology used is the same with that in Chapter 5. The AR 
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and CAAR have been calculated to examine the pattern of the stock prices. In a 
sample of 100 firms being investigated, 32 are considered to be absolute clean, 35 are 
suspected, 26 are ultra-suspected, 6 are ultra-ultra-suspected and 1 is considered 
obscure with lagged news. There is no obscure firm in the U.S. according to the 
analysis. In addition, when compared with the U.K, the U.S target firms have higher 
AR on day 0 for all five years, however, more absolute clean firms are found in the 
U.S than in the U.K. In the U.K, only 19.5% of the sample passed all four filters and 
are therefore considered as ‘absolute clean’ while in the U.S, 32% of the sample are 
considered as ‘absolute clean.’ The result of the Granger causality test shows that 
shows that 31% of the total U.S firms have evidence of Granger causality which is 
slightly higher than that of the U.K (27.6%) and the difference is supportive to Hillier 
and Marshall (2002) and Persons (1997) that the directors in the U.K are required to 













In the appendix, firstly, the ARs and CAARs for both the targets and bidders in the 
U.S from 2006 to 2010 from the market-adjusted model and from the modified market 
model are presented. Secondly, the names, the announcement dates and the industries 
of both the targets and bidders in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 are presented. Thirdly, 
the names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns in the U.S from 
2006 to 2010 are shown in tables. Further, the results of the ADF test in the targets 
and bidders in the U.S from 2006 to 2010 are shown.  
 
Table 6.8: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 -0.00166 0.004198 -0.00361 30% -0.00166 
-59 -0.01036 -0.0112 -0.01008 50% -0.01202 
-58 -0.00608 0.001089 -0.00848 25% -0.01811 
-57 0.003994 0.001621 0.004784 45% -0.01411 
-56 0.022095 0.010458 0.025974 60% 0.007982 
-55 -0.01283 -0.00542 -0.0153 40% -0.00485 
-54 0.003207 -0.01035 0.007727 60% -0.00164 
-53 -0.00661 -0.00484 -0.0072 40% -0.00825 
-52 0.017072 -0.00072 0.023004 50% 0.008826 
-51 -0.00583 -0.00988 -0.00447 35% 0.003 
-50 0.009142 0.008209 0.009453 50% 0.012142 
-49 0.005768 -0.00128 0.008116 45% 0.01791 
-48 -0.01674 0.00839 -0.02511 20% 0.001173 
-47 -0.00207 0.008096 -0.00546 40% -0.00089 
-46 0.013853 0.007648 0.015922 55% 0.012958 
-45 -0.01357 -0.00626 -0.01601 40% -0.00061 
-44 -0.0033 -0.01177 -4.72E-04 30% -0.00391 
-43 0.003151 0.006236 0.002123 35% -0.00076 
-42 0.002636 -0.01282 0.007788 35% 0.001878 
-41 -0.019 -0.00798 -0.02267 40% -0.01712 
-40 0.012781 9.76E-05 0.017008 40% -0.00434 
-39 0.010454 0.017021 0.008265 35% 0.006111 
-38 -0.00319 0.002834 -0.0052 45% 0.002921 
-37 -0.00471 0.006468 -0.00843 40% -0.00178 
-36 -0.00668 0.022955 -0.01656 35% -0.00846 
-35 8.74E-05 0.00612 -0.00192 45% -0.00838 
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-34 -0.00409 -0.00607 -0.00343 45% -0.01247 
-33 0.001002 -0.00503 0.003012 40% -0.01147 
-32 -0.00685 -0.00294 -0.00816 35% -0.01832 
-31 0.006378 0.013359 0.004052 70% -0.01194 
-30 0.00707 0.006156 0.007375 50% -0.00487 
-29 0.009428 0.004614 0.011033 55% 0.004555 
-28 -0.00965 -0.00092 -0.01257 40% -0.0051 
-27 0.011881 0.010319 0.012402 45% 0.006782 
-26 0.014987 -0.00247 0.020808 50% 0.02177 
-25 0.002867 0.009133 0.000779 55% 0.024637 
-24 0.004935 -0.01905 0.012929 40% 0.029572 
-23 -0.01425 -0.00292 -0.01803 25% 0.01532 
-22 -0.00729 0.007744 -0.0123 55% 0.008029 
-21 -0.00298 -0.01938 0.002482 25% 0.005047 
-20 -0.00127 0.004045 -0.00304 35% 0.003778 
-19 -0.00467 0.014896 -0.01119 30% -0.00089 
-18 0.010739 0.008064 0.011631 60% 0.009845 
-17 0.002197 -0.00243 0.003741 45% 0.012042 
-16 -0.00771 -0.0179 -0.00431 45% 0.004337 
-15 0.003637 -0.00746 0.007337 65% 0.007974 
-14 0.012034 0.007752 0.013462 60% 0.020008 
-13 -0.00272 -0.00671 -0.00139 30% 0.017288 
-12 -0.00972 0.002803 -0.01389 25% 0.00757 
-11 0.000446 0.008239 -0.00215 30% 0.008016 
-10 0.005264 0.000142 0.006971 75% 0.013279 
-9 0.067055 0.002128 0.088698 50% 0.080335 
-8 -0.02162 0.011271 -0.03259 50% 0.058713 
-7 -0.00282 0.00493 -0.0054 55% 0.055892 
-6 0.000555 -0.00051 0.000912 65% 0.056447 
-5 0.003448 0.006759 0.002344 50% 0.059895 
-4 -0.00127 -0.00247 -0.00087 40% 0.058624 
-3 -0.00798 0.009283 -0.01373 45% 0.050646 
-2 0.01545 -0.00511 0.022302 35% 0.066096 
-1 -0.01762 0.009642 -0.0267 50% 0.04848 
0 0.116522 0.020671 0.148473 75% 0.165003 
1 0.098442 0.117641 0.092042 65% 0.263445 
2 -0.01173 0.00046 -0.01579 50% 0.251719 
3 -0.00602 -0.00066 -0.0078 35% 0.245704 
4 0.001777 0.004419 0.000897 50% 0.247481 
5 0.002711 -0.00512 0.00532 50% 0.250192 
6 -0.01912 -0.00369 -0.02426 50% 0.231076 
7 -0.00126 -0.00206 -0.00099 30% 0.229818 
8 -0.00514 -0.00373 -0.00561 25% 0.224676 
9 0.004135 -0.00013 0.005557 45% 0.228811 




to -6 0.001026 0.000922 0.001061 - 0.006803 
Average 
















to +10 0.003237 0.002901 0.00335 - 0.045433 
 
Table 6.9: Daily average returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.001544 0.004666 -0.00054 50% 0.001544 
-59 0.006305 0.005039 0.007149 70% 0.007848 
-58 -0.00263 -0.01069 0.002743 25% 0.005218 
-57 0.004864 0.012865 -0.00047 60% 0.010082 
-56 0.00498 0.004293 0.005438 55% 0.015062 
-55 0.001329 0.001261 0.001374 50% 0.016391 
-54 -0.00669 -0.01687 9.72E-05 35% 0.009699 
-53 0.020006 0.036425 0.00906 65% 0.029706 
-52 -0.00089 -0.00283 0.000399 45% 0.028813 
-51 -0.00294 -0.01005 0.001795 35% 0.025871 
-50 -0.002 -0.00645 0.000974 45% 0.023874 
-49 0.005322 0.018556 -0.0035 40% 0.029196 
-48 -0.00755 -0.00016 -0.01247 40% 0.02165 
-47 0.00333 -0.0136 0.014619 50% 0.02498 
-46 0.000358 0.002978 -0.00139 60% 0.025338 
-45 -0.01055 -0.02407 -0.00154 35% 0.014785 
-44 -0.00565 -0.018 0.002586 45% 0.009138 
-43 0.000862 0.008588 -0.00429 40% 0.010001 
-42 0.004087 -0.00076 0.007317 50% 0.014088 
-41 -0.01248 -0.00847 -0.01515 50% 0.00161 
-40 0.007235 0.018286 -0.00013 65% 0.008845 
-39 -0.00659 -0.01298 -0.00232 25% 0.002258 
-38 0.016865 0.012706 0.019638 65% 0.019123 
-37 -0.00496 -0.0004 -0.00799 40% 0.014168 
-36 -0.00713 0.011462 -0.01952 40% 0.007039 
-35 -0.00636 -0.00373 -0.00811 55% 0.000683 
-34 0.003188 -0.0006 0.005713 55% 0.00387 
-33 0.002522 0.001561 0.003163 50% 0.006392 
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-32 0.00194 0.005921 -0.00071 60% 0.008332 
-31 0.002881 -0.00536 0.008372 50% 0.011213 
-30 0.005996 -0.00265 0.011761 60% 0.017208 
-29 0.006098 0.006509 0.005824 55% 0.023306 
-28 -0.00307 -0.01439 0.004474 50% 0.020233 
-27 -0.00245 -0.00531 -0.00054 40% 0.017787 
-26 -0.00215 -0.0077 0.001556 45% 0.015642 
-25 0.003629 -0.01023 0.012871 55% 0.019271 
-24 0.011942 0.016198 0.009104 60% 0.031213 
-23 -0.01077 -0.0028 -0.01608 40% 0.020444 
-22 -0.00407 -0.0136 0.002279 30% 0.016371 
-21 -0.01078 -0.01263 -0.00955 35% 0.005591 
-20 -0.00387 0.004012 -0.00912 25% 0.001724 
-19 -0.00367 -0.00096 -0.00548 45% -0.00195 
-18 -0.00825 -0.01036 -0.00684 45% -0.0102 
-17 -0.00757 -0.01479 -0.00276 45% -0.01777 
-16 -0.0099 -0.02229 -0.00164 65% -0.02767 
-15 0.003893 0.020511 -0.00719 55% -0.02377 
-14 -0.00279 -0.01911 0.00809 45% -0.02656 
-13 -0.01707 -0.03183 -0.00723 20% -0.04363 
-12 0.007773 0.020204 -0.00051 60% -0.03586 
-11 0.024672 0.049996 0.00779 65% -0.01119 
-10 -0.00705 -0.02093 0.002209 55% -0.01823 
-9 -0.00268 0.004256 -0.00731 55% -0.02092 
-8 -0.00136 0.013975 -0.01158 45% -0.02228 
-7 0.070433 0.189846 -0.00918 40% 0.048155 
-6 0.001792 -2.23E-03 0.004476 50% 0.049947 
-5 -0.00592 -0.01589 0.000727 45% 0.044026 
-4 0.002166 0.003981 0.000957 35% 0.046192 
-3 0.001596 0.00936 -0.00358 45% 0.047788 
-2 -0.00874 0.003091 -0.01662 20% 0.039052 
-1 -0.00116 -0.00561 0.001806 50% 0.037893 
0 0.299065 0.055354 0.461539 80% 0.336958 
1 0.081967 0.056235 0.099122 60% 0.418925 
2 -0.00167 -0.00314 -0.0007 65% 0.41725 
3 0.001255 0.006119 -0.00199 30% 0.418505 
4 0.000153 0.000895 -0.00034 50% 0.418657 
5 0.001613 0.010278 -0.00416 40% 0.42027 
6 0.003859 0.001822 0.005217 45% 0.424129 
7 -0.01024 -0.02052 -0.00338 30% 0.41389 
8 -0.00367 -0.00838 -0.00053 40% 0.410225 
9 -0.0036 -0.01126 0.001505 35% 0.406624 






















to +10 0.005804 0.003339 0.007447 - 0.072481 
 
Table 6.10: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.005979 0.017217 -0.01088 65% 0.005979 
-59 0.002565 -0.00773 0.018001 35% 0.008544 
-58 -0.01092 -0.00555 -0.01898 45% -0.00238 
-57 0.001246 -0.00349 8.35E-03 50% -0.00113 
-56 -0.00649 -0.00862 -0.00329 40% -0.00762 
-55 -0.00946 -0.00998 -0.00869 30% -0.01708 
-54 -0.00796 0.022055 -0.05299 35% -0.02504 
-53 -0.03399 -0.03489 -0.03263 40% -0.05902 
-52 0.007387 -0.01718 0.044236 55% -0.05164 
-51 -0.01342 -0.01545 -0.01038 50% -0.06506 
-50 -0.01243 -0.0244 0.005516 40% -0.07749 
-49 0.014303 0.031615 -0.01166 45% -0.06319 
-48 -0.0105 -0.04459 0.040621 50% -0.07369 
-47 0.012405 0.044702 -0.03604 70% -0.06129 
-46 -0.03275 -0.01884 -0.05361 25% -0.09404 
-45 -0.06718 -0.03095 -0.12152 40% -0.16122 
-44 -0.00293 -0.01519 0.015452 50% -0.16415 
-43 -0.03452 -0.04191 -0.02343 25% -0.19867 
-42 -0.01013 -0.01821 0.00199 45% -0.2088 
-41 0.019927 0.012961 0.030375 30% -0.18887 
-40 0.002927 -0.00626 0.016714 50% -0.18594 
-39 0.008843 0.024372 -0.01445 45% -0.1771 
-38 0.010622 0.008911 0.013188 60% -0.16648 
-37 0.015416 0.008151 0.026313 50% -0.15106 
-36 -0.00041 -0.0169 0.024308 60% -0.15148 
-35 -0.00832 -0.0131 -0.00114 50% -0.15979 
-34 0.015529 0.019511 0.009556 60% -0.14426 
-33 -0.01811 -0.03547 0.007947 40% -0.16237 
-32 -0.01918 -0.02893 -0.00455 60% -0.18155 
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-31 -0.01718 -0.02822 -0.00061 45% -0.19873 
-30 -0.01722 -0.01337 -0.02299 40% -0.21594 
-29 -0.01602 -0.03161 0.007356 55% -0.23197 
-28 0.004631 0.021983 -0.0214 45% -0.22734 
-27 0.02421 0.036605 0.005616 50% -0.20313 
-26 -0.00911 -0.01745 0.003396 50% -0.21224 
-25 0.012848 -0.01322 0.051951 35% -0.19939 
-24 0.005385 0.019598 -0.01593 65% -0.194 
-23 0.035979 0.016727 0.064857 55% -0.15803 
-22 0.003367 0.061284 -0.08351 45% -0.15466 
-21 -0.04244 -0.08564 0.022361 50% -0.1971 
-20 0.007266 0.019367 -0.01089 55% -0.18983 
-19 -0.02094 -0.03905 0.006227 50% -0.21077 
-18 0.011295 0.016996 0.002743 65% -0.19948 
-17 -0.03002 -0.06081 0.016169 45% -0.2295 
-16 -0.05531 -0.0281 -0.09612 30% -0.28481 
-15 0.005161 -0.00522 0.020733 45% -0.27964 
-14 -0.01066 0.016971 -0.0521 40% -0.2903 
-13 0.074234 0.043499 0.120337 50% -0.21607 
-12 -0.01932 -0.03456 0.00353 50% -0.23539 
-11 -0.04304 -0.02669 -0.06757 55% -0.27843 
-10 0.059445 -0.00473 0.155713 60% -0.21899 
-9 -0.00827 -0.01271 -0.0016 60% -0.22726 
-8 0.046312 0.085288 -0.01215 45% -0.18094 
-7 0.008901 0.023363 -0.01279 50% -0.17204 
-6 -0.02549 -0.04881 0.009493 45% -0.19753 
-5 -0.02819 0.016575 -0.09534 40% -0.22572 
-4 0.121128 0.118746 0.124702 50% -0.10459 
-3 0.022133 0.013878 0.034516 55% -0.08246 
-2 -0.02444 -0.01798 -0.03413 55% -0.1069 
-1 0.051459 0.096066 -0.01545 60% -0.05544 
0 0.363359 0.124357 0.721862 90% 0.307917 
1 0.056962 0.07588 0.028584 55% 0.364878 
2 -0.04011 -0.00396 -0.09435 45% 0.324766 
3 0.015565 0.003176 0.034149 45% 0.340331 
4 -0.0023 0.01342 -0.02587 30% 0.338033 
5 -0.0059 -0.01125 0.002124 45% 0.332135 
6 0.016681 0.017527 0.015412 50% 0.348816 
7 -0.05373 -0.04586 -0.06554 30% 0.295084 
8 0.00219 -0.00646 0.01516 45% 0.297274 
9 -0.01958 -0.01761 -0.02253 35% 0.277694 








to -5 -0.00403 -0.005 -0.00257 - -0.15741 













to +10 0.004036 0.001328 0.008098 - -0.07959 
 
 
Table 6.11: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























of the total target 
firms 
-60 0.003613 0.010996 0.001768 60% 0.003613 
-59 0.014915 0.023176 0.01285 60% 0.018529 
-58 -0.00366 -0.03559 0.004324 40% 0.014869 
-57 0.006606 -0.02284 0.013968 60% 0.021475 
-56 -0.00449 -0.00365 -0.0047 35% 0.016982 
-55 0.03275 0.169253 -0.00138 40% 0.049731 
-54 0.005952 -0.00274 0.008125 55% 0.055683 
-53 0.006399 -0.00519 0.009297 45% 0.062082 
-52 -0.03146 -0.20952 0.013051 45% 0.030619 
-51 -0.01944 -0.01865 -0.01963 20% 0.011183 
-50 -0.01368 -0.05559 -0.0032 50% -0.0025 
-49 0.01535 0.057405 0.004837 60% 0.012855 
-48 0.012013 0.00462 0.013861 55% 0.024868 
-47 0.013574 0.015732 0.013035 60% 0.038442 
-46 -0.02821 -0.11173 -0.00733 30% 0.010231 
-45 -0.0157 -0.07527 -0.00081 45% -0.00547 
-44 -0.00464 0.014683 -0.00947 50% -0.01011 
-43 -0.00505 -0.01571 -0.00239 40% -0.01516 
-42 -0.00793 -0.02316 -0.00412 50% -0.02309 
-41 -0.00363 -0.00703 -0.00278 35% -0.02672 
-40 0.00281 0.011422 0.000657 65% -0.02391 
-39 0.015636 0.024097 0.01352 60% -0.00827 
-38 0.000268 -0.03587 0.009302 60% -0.008 
-37 -0.00457 -0.00103 -0.00546 50% -0.01258 
-36 0.006037 0.027678 0.000627 45% -0.00654 
-35 0.006066 -0.04139 0.017931 55% -0.00047 
-34 0.003006 0.002782 0.003062 40% 0.002533 
-33 -0.00335 0.003579 -0.00508 40% -0.00082 
-32 0.02076 0.063405 0.010098 50% 0.019943 
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-31 -0.01324 -0.06104 -0.00129 30% 0.006702 
-30 0.006522 -0.0136 0.011552 65% 0.013223 
-29 0.076788 0.410219 -0.00657 40% 0.090012 
-28 -0.00209 -0.01881 0.002093 30% 0.087924 
-27 -0.00045 -0.01103 0.002191 50% 0.087472 
-26 -0.00607 -0.01287 -0.00436 25% 0.081406 
-25 0.000784 -0.03208 0.008999 55% 0.08219 
-24 -0.01166 -0.0783 0.004998 40% 0.070529 
-23 -0.00731 0.004468 -0.01025 35% 0.063222 
-22 4.17E-05 0.001447 -0.00031 35% 0.063264 
-21 0.001687 0.001317 0.001779 55% 0.064951 
-20 -0.02129 -0.08268 -0.00595 55% 0.043658 
-19 0.007712 -0.00016 0.009679 50% 0.05137 
-18 -0.00658 -0.0092 -0.00592 45% 0.044794 
-17 0.02385 0.093989 0.006315 80% 0.068644 
-16 -0.01688 -0.02159 -0.0157 20% 0.051764 
-15 -0.02251 -0.05248 -0.01502 30% 0.029253 
-14 -0.01035 -0.11953 0.016942 45% 0.018901 
-13 -0.00247 -0.01023 -0.00053 30% 0.016434 
-12 -0.00619 -0.00698 -0.00599 30% 0.010243 
-11 0.025293 0.123238 0.000806 45% 0.035536 
-10 -0.02588 -0.09268 -0.00918 40% 0.00966 
-9 -0.01035 -0.04232 -0.00236 45% -0.00069 
-8 -0.00421 -0.06102 0.009991 65% -0.0049 
-7 -0.00222 0.003064 -0.00354 40% -0.00712 
-6 0.010757 0.033686 0.005025 50% 0.003632 
-5 -0.00885 -0.04231 -0.00049 55% -0.00522 
-4 0.014659 0.029041 0.011063 45% 0.009442 
-3 0.004536 0.009445 0.003309 45% 0.013978 
-2 0.011793 0.014639 0.011082 60% 0.025771 
-1 0.020098 0.074366 0.006531 50% 0.045869 
0 0.217753 0.23559 0.213294 90% 0.263622 
1 0.074274 -0.00541 0.094194 60% 0.337896 
2 -0.00016 0.010101 -0.00273 45% 0.337733 
3 0.002589 0.010308 0.000659 50% 0.340322 
4 -0.00071 0.000618 -0.00104 30% 0.339615 
5 -0.03071 -0.13697 -0.00414 35% 0.308908 
6 0.065694 0.252071 0.019099 55% 0.374601 
7 0.005475 0.004082 0.005823 60% 0.380076 
8 0.002312 0.00186 0.002425 50% 0.382388 
9 0.017498 0.107913 -0.00511 25% 0.399886 










05 -0.00596 0.001373 - 0.023694 













to +10 0.006167052 0.006481 0.006088 - 0.074998 
 
Table 6.12: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00653 -0.0294 0.003273 35% -0.00653 
-59 0.008422 0.025617 0.001053 60% 0.001892 
-58 0.006044 -0.00381 0.010267 35% 0.007935 
-57 -0.01825 0.001699 -0.02679 50% -0.01031 
-56 -0.02984 0.000111 -0.04267 50% -0.04015 
-55 0.041667 -0.00554 0.0619 35% 0.00152 
-54 0.006005 -0.0191 0.016765 45% 0.007525 
-53 0.007378 -0.0017 0.011271 65% 0.014903 
-52 0.000524 -0.00876 0.004504 50% 0.015427 
-51 -0.00682 -0.01883 -0.00167 35% 0.008611 
-50 -0.01276 0.000379 -0.01839 20% -0.00415 
-49 0.013686 0.002213 0.018604 60% 0.009537 
-48 0.000554 -0.02103 0.009806 40% 0.010091 
-47 -0.00814 -0.00406 -0.00989 35% 0.001948 
-46 -0.00045 -0.01462 0.00562 50% 0.001495 
-45 -0.00529 -0.01155 -0.0026 40% -0.00379 
-44 0.007672 0.010504 0.006458 50% 0.003879 
-43 0.002492 3.55E-03 0.002036 60% 0.006371 
-42 -1E-04 0.009618 -0.00426 40% 0.006271 
-41 0.005528 0.015822 0.001116 55% 0.011799 
-40 -0.00315 -0.00682 -0.00158 55% 0.008648 
-39 -0.02994 -0.02341 -0.03274 30% -0.02129 
-38 -0.0142 0.004676 -0.02229 50% -0.03549 
-37 0.026589 0.032708 0.023967 60% -0.00891 
-36 0.011072 0.019585 0.007424 75% 0.002166 
-35 0.01483 0.038179 0.004823 50% 0.016996 
-34 0.007868 0.011051 0.006503 50% 0.024863 
-33 -0.0306 -0.07708 -0.01068 40% -0.00574 
-32 0.003641 -0.00595 0.007752 50% -0.0021 
-31 -0.00542 -0.00709 -0.0047 35% -0.00752 
-30 -0.00684 -0.01327 -0.00409 35% -0.01436 
303 
 
-29 0.007523 0.025743 -0.00029 55% -0.00683 
-28 -0.01317 -0.01634 -0.01182 50% -0.02001 
-27 0.003224 -0.01029 0.009015 60% -0.01678 
-26 -0.01449 0.031156 -0.03406 60% -0.03128 
-25 -0.00894 -0.02196 -0.00336 45% -0.04022 
-24 0.001198 0.004882 -0.00038 65% -0.03902 
-23 0.012438 0.030636 0.004638 50% -0.02658 
-22 0.000726 -0.01663 0.008163 55% -0.02585 
-21 -0.00394 0.020315 -0.01434 30% -0.0298 
-20 -0.01219 -0.01286 -0.0119 45% -0.04198 
-19 0.007883 0.054543 -0.01211 70% -0.0341 
-18 0.005934 0.01807 0.000733 55% -0.02816 
-17 0.002924 -0.0099 0.00842 55% -0.02524 
-16 -0.00834 -0.02604 -0.00076 45% -0.03358 
-15 -0.00409 -0.02527 0.00498 40% -0.03768 
-14 0.015445 0.008935 0.018235 70% -0.02223 
-13 0.011892 0.007982 0.013568 60% -0.01034 
-12 0.011773 0.051122 -0.00509 30% 0.001435 
-11 0.006172 0.023827 -0.0014 50% 0.007606 
-10 0.009687 -0.00187 0.014639 45% 0.017294 
-9 0.012777 0.046282 -0.00158 55% 0.03007 
-8 -0.01797 -0.03755 -0.00958 20% 0.012102 
-7 -0.00436 0.003437 -0.0077 45% 0.007745 
-6 -0.00372 -0.02454 0.0052 40% 0.004022 
-5 0.046005 0.002235 0.064764 45% 0.050027 
-4 0.007075 0.012164 0.004894 60% 0.057102 
-3 -0.00386 -0.00172 -0.00478 45% 0.053243 
-2 0.008241 0.026304 0.0005 55% 0.061484 
-1 0.045386 0.121998 0.012552 70% 0.10687 
0 0.307757 0.181303 0.361952 95% 0.414627 
1 0.103866 0.030593 0.135269 55% 0.518493 
2 0.001963 0.00699 -0.00019 55% 0.520456 
3 -0.04626 -0.00654 -0.06328 35% 0.474197 
4 0.296463 -0.00694 0.426492 45% 0.77066 
5 -0.02255 0.005663 -0.03465 60% 0.748105 
6 0.051295 0.001618 0.072585 45% 0.7994 
7 -0.00303 -0.0027 -0.00318 30% 0.796367 
8 -0.00955 -0.00167 -0.01292 30% 0.786819 
9 -0.0298 -0.00669 -0.0397 60% 0.757021 






















to +10 0.010673746 0.005541465 0.012873 - 0.102603 
 
Table 6.14: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00214 0.011314 -0.00451 40% -0.00214 
-59 -0.00795 -0.01189 -0.00726 30% -0.01009 
-58 -0.01425 0.004179 -0.01751 35% -0.02435 
-57 -0.00589 -0.00678 -0.00574 30% -0.03024 
-56 -0.00217 0.008571 -0.00407 45% -0.03241 
-55 -0.00356 -0.00408 -0.00347 40% -0.03597 
-54 -0.02013 0.002675 -0.02415 40% -0.0561 
-53 -0.01226 0.001164 -0.01463 50% -0.06836 
-52 -0.00682 -0.00022 -0.00799 45% -0.07518 
-51 -0.03217 0.005181 -0.03876 45% -0.10735 
-50 -0.00734 -0.00208 -0.00827 40% -0.11469 
-49 -0.00656 -0.00589 -0.00668 40% -0.12125 
-48 -0.0034 0.000874 -0.00415 55% -0.12465 
-47 -0.00636 -0.00311 -0.00694 35% -0.13101 
-46 0.024808 -0.00661 0.030351 55% -0.1062 
-45 -0.02988 0.004263 -0.0359 50% -0.13608 
-44 0.01436 -0.00073 0.017024 60% -0.12172 
-43 -0.00622 -0.0211 -0.0036 35% -0.12794 
-42 -0.00552 -0.00429 -0.00574 35% -0.13346 
-41 -0.00428 0.004392 -0.00581 30% -0.13774 
-40 -0.00433 0.012789 -0.00735 60% -0.14207 
-39 0.004057 -0.00024 0.004815 50% -0.13801 
-38 0.001414 0.001702 0.001363 50% -0.1366 
-37 -0.01106 0.002241 -0.0134 55% -0.14765 
-36 -0.00318 -0.00612 -0.00266 60% -0.15083 
-35 -0.00374 0.002149 -0.00479 45% -0.15457 
-34 -0.00581 0.00518 -0.00775 50% -0.16039 
-33 -0.01068 6.97E-05 -0.01257 35% -0.17107 
-32 -0.00875 0.002629 -0.01076 40% -0.17982 
-31 0.001859 0.016987 -0.00081 60% -0.17796 
-30 -0.00126 -0.00585 -0.00045 60% -0.17921 
-29 -0.00061 -1.41E-03 -0.00047 50% -0.17982 
-28 -0.00249 0.001592 -0.00321 50% -0.18231 
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-27 -0.00654 -0.00655 -0.00653 40% -0.18885 
-26 -0.00926 -0.01145 -0.00887 50% -0.1981 
-25 0.001526 0.001156 0.001592 60% -0.19658 
-24 -0.00448 -0.00169 -0.00497 40% -0.20105 
-23 -0.00131 0.010478 -0.00339 45% -0.20236 
-22 -0.00149 0.008589 -0.00327 50% -0.20385 
-21 -0.00028 0.006973 -0.00157 45% -0.20414 
-20 -0.0077 -0.01136 -0.00706 25% -0.21184 
-19 0.001272 -0.00129 0.001723 40% -0.21057 
-18 -0.00278 0.002998 -0.0038 35% -0.21335 
-17 -0.00589 0.004931 -0.0078 35% -0.21924 
-16 -0.00713 -0.00601 -0.00732 35% -0.22637 
-15 -0.02552 -0.00548 -0.02905 35% -0.25189 
-14 0.004382 -0.00984 0.006891 50% -0.24751 
-13 0.023671 -7.26E-04 0.027976 50% -0.22383 
-12 -0.01973 -0.00293 -0.02269 50% -0.24356 
-11 0.01916 0.000847 0.022392 60% -0.2244 
-10 0.004304 0.001877 0.004732 65% -0.2201 
-9 -0.0102 0.004447 -0.01279 50% -0.2303 
-8 -0.02348 -0.02426 -0.02334 25% -0.25378 
-7 -0.00492 -0.00686 -0.00457 40% -0.2587 
-6 -0.01797 -0.0085 -0.01964 40% -0.27667 
-5 -0.00767 -0.01543 -0.0063 30% -0.28434 
-4 -0.00621 -0.00105 -0.00713 35% -0.29055 
-3 0.05628 -0.00115 0.066416 75% -0.23427 
-2 -0.0004 0.010281 -2.28E-03 55% -0.23467 
-1 -0.00107 0.000656 -0.00137 45% -0.23574 
0 0.002881 -0.00872 0.004929 45% -0.23286 
1 0.008184 -0.00083 0.009776 50% -0.22468 
2 -0.00862 -0.01343 -0.00778 25% -0.2333 
3 -0.02355 -0.00152 -0.02744 45% -0.25685 
4 -0.00052 -0.00521 0.000311 50% -0.25737 
5 0.003876 0.002667 0.004089 70% -0.25349 
6 0.00112 -0.00408 0.002037 35% -0.25237 
7 0.010497 -0.00554 0.013327 40% -0.24188 
8 -0.00324 -0.00157 -0.00353 35% -0.24512 
9 -0.0039 -0.00143 -0.00486 50% -0.24902 




to -6 -0.00503 
-




to -5 -0.00508 
-




to -1 -0.00393 
-












to +10 -0.00359 
-
0.001284539 -0.00404 - -0.17868 
 
Table 6.15: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.002047 0.000609 0.003006 40% 0.002047 
-59 -0.0014 -0.00402 0.000342 45% 0.000646 
-58 0.004918 -0.00051 0.008535 50% 0.005564 
-57 0.002172 -0.00075 0.004123 35% 0.007736 
-56 -0.00666 0.002562 -0.0128 45% 0.00108 
-55 -0.00235 -0.00119 -0.00311 40% -0.00127 
-54 0.002581 -0.00161 0.005376 45% 0.001315 
-53 -0.00348 -0.00854 -0.00011 30% -0.00217 
-52 -0.00214 -0.00104 -0.00288 35% -0.00431 
-51 0.00085 -0.00422 0.00423 60% -0.00346 
-50 -0.00423 -0.00384 -0.00448 40% -0.00769 
-49 -0.00201 -0.00348 -0.00104 45% -0.0097 
-48 0.004825 -0.00145 0.009007 55% -0.00487 
-47 -0.00525 -0.00147 -0.00778 35% -0.01013 
-46 0.006127 0.012484 0.001888 50% -0.004 
-45 -0.00649 -0.00993 -0.00419 45% -0.01049 
-44 0.001621 0.000332 0.002481 60% -0.00887 
-43 -0.00746 -0.00264 -0.01066 25% -0.01632 
-42 -0.0033 0.000592 -0.0059 50% -0.01963 
-41 -0.00744 -0.00011 -0.01232 25% -0.02706 
-40 0.007416 0.011094 0.004964 55% -0.01965 
-39 -0.00119 -0.01363 0.007106 40% -0.02084 
-38 -0.00319 -0.00517 -0.00187 30% -0.02402 
-37 0.005477 0.005073 0.005746 50% -0.01855 
-36 -0.00559 0.000849 -0.00989 45% -0.02414 
-35 0.006221 0.002942 0.008407 70% -0.01792 
-34 -0.00336 0.003962 -0.00825 35% -0.02128 
-33 6.07E-06 -0.00292 0.001958 50% -0.02127 
-32 -0.0078 -0.02463 0.003414 40% -0.02908 
-31 0.005929 0.002254 0.008379 50% -0.02315 
-30 0.000832 -0.00279 0.003244 35% -0.02231 
-29 0.003468 -0.00681 0.010318 60% -0.01885 
-28 -0.00055 -0.0047 0.002217 35% -0.0194 
-27 -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.00279 40% -0.02179 
-26 0.003955 -0.00236 0.008169 45% -0.01784 
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-25 -0.0118 -0.00291 -0.01772 35% -0.02963 
-24 -0.00029 0.008674 -0.00626 45% -0.02992 
-23 0.01253 0.01955 0.007851 60% -0.01739 
-22 -0.00305 -0.00172 -0.00393 35% -0.02044 
-21 0.006344 0.005712 0.006766 55% -0.0141 
-20 0.002357 -0.00568 0.007715 45% -0.01174 
-19 0.000438 0.0021 -0.00067 55% -0.0113 
-18 -0.00518 -0.00776 -0.00346 25% -0.01648 
-17 -0.00638 -0.00952 -0.00429 25% -0.02286 
-16 0.001902 -0.00939 0.009428 50% -0.02096 
-15 -0.00633 -0.01211 -0.00248 35% -0.02729 
-14 -0.00262 -0.00897 0.001617 40% -0.02991 
-13 -0.01397 -0.0189 -0.01068 35% -0.04388 
-12 -0.00431 -0.00575 -0.00335 40% -0.04819 
-11 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.00457 40% -0.05229 
-10 -0.00087 0.000674 -0.0019 45% -0.05316 
-9 -0.00287 -0.00816 0.000655 40% -0.05603 
-8 -0.00312 -0.00676 -0.00069 45% -0.05914 
-7 -0.00152 0.0055 -0.0062 40% -0.06066 
-6 0.001352 -0.00495 0.005555 65% -0.05931 
-5 -0.00327 -0.0049 -0.00217 45% -0.06258 
-4 0.000474 -0.01196 0.008763 40% -0.0621 
-3 0.000733 -0.00698 0.005876 40% -0.06137 
-2 -0.00493 0.000354 -0.00845 55% -0.0663 
-1 0.001419 -0.01112 0.009782 50% -0.06488 
0 -0.00564 0.000153 -0.00951 50% -0.07052 
1 0.012219 0.008658 0.014592 55% -0.05831 
2 0.00507 0.001202 0.007648 65% -0.05324 
3 -0.00141 -0.00174 -0.00119 45% -0.05465 
4 0.001327 0.003621 -0.0002 65% -0.05332 
5 0.00469 0.001091 0.007089 70% -0.04863 
6 0.01061 0.012092 0.009622 60% -0.03802 
7 0.000384 -0.00123 0.001458 55% -0.03764 
8 -0.01064 -0.0217 -0.00327 35% -0.04828 
9 -0.00537 0.000389 -0.00921 50% -0.05365 




to -6 -0.00107876 
-




to -5 -0.00111789 
-




to -1 -0.00108177 
-




to +1 -0.00094076 
-






to +10 -0.0007496 
-
0.002235915 0.000242 - -0.02821 
 
Table 6.16: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.01789 -0.01295 -0.02392 30% -0.01789 
-59 0.003897 0.015179 -0.00989 50% -0.01399 
-58 0.004618 0.001873 0.007973 40% -0.00937 
-57 -0.01007 -0.01397 -0.0053 35% -0.01944 
-56 -0.00091 -0.00044 -0.00148 50% -0.02035 
-55 0.008504 0.010103 0.00655 65% -0.01185 
-54 -0.00272 0.005042 -0.01221 20% -0.01457 
-53 -0.00405 -0.0091 0.002119 55% -0.01862 
-52 0.008975 0.013413 0.003551 70% -0.00964 
-51 -0.00589 -0.01839 0.009399 35% -0.01553 
-50 -0.01656 -0.01914 -0.01342 55% -0.03209 
-49 -0.00506 -0.00652 -0.00327 50% -0.03715 
-48 0.005009 0.010653 -0.00189 55% -0.03214 
-47 0.009268 0.016649 0.000248 80% -0.02288 
-46 0.001509 0.007929 -0.00634 40% -0.02137 
-45 0.006538 0.004399 0.009153 45% -0.01483 
-44 -0.00758 -0.0129 -0.00107 65% -0.02241 
-43 0.006353 0.003112 0.010313 55% -0.01605 
-42 -0.00516 -0.01291 0.004314 45% -0.02121 
-41 0.009835 0.002022 0.019385 55% -0.01138 
-40 -0.00279 0.004041 -0.01113 45% -0.01416 
-39 0.000177 0.000326 -5.88E-06 55% -0.01399 
-38 -0.00966 -0.02272 0.00631 40% -0.02364 
-37 0.00632 0.015468 -0.00486 50% -0.01732 
-36 0.004591 0.029108 -0.02537 30% -0.01273 
-35 -0.00256 -0.00176 -0.00353 55% -0.01529 
-34 0.001785 -0.01466 0.021885 45% -0.0135 
-33 0.004676 -0.01118 0.024059 45% -0.00883 
-32 -0.00135 -0.00104 -0.00174 40% -0.01018 
-31 -0.00961 -0.00505 -0.01518 45% -0.01979 
-30 0.014427 -0.00021 0.03231 45% -0.00536 
-29 -0.0135 -0.00984 -0.01798 35% -0.01887 
-28 -0.00079 -0.00017 -0.00154 50% -0.01965 
-27 -0.01172 -0.00577 -0.01899 45% -0.03137 
-26 0.004376 -0.00296 0.013346 50% -0.027 
-25 -0.00638 -0.00666 -0.00602 45% -0.03337 
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-24 -0.00631 0.021111 -0.03983 50% -0.03968 
-23 0.00225 -0.02007 0.02953 55% -0.03743 
-22 -0.00444 -0.01689 0.010787 40% -0.04187 
-21 -0.00287 0.002022 -0.00886 45% -0.04475 
-20 0.008391 0.009266 0.007321 50% -0.03636 
-19 -0.01426 0.005313 -0.03818 30% -0.05062 
-18 0.021043 0.001553 0.044863 60% -0.02957 
-17 -0.00059 -0.00534 0.005215 30% -0.03016 
-16 0.009475 0.020843 -0.00442 65% -0.02069 
-15 -0.01417 -0.03441 0.010579 35% -0.03485 
-14 -0.0102 -0.00332 -0.01861 35% -0.04506 
-13 -0.02268 -0.01089 -0.03708 20% -0.06773 
-12 0.001031 0.004592 -0.00332 45% -0.0667 
-11 0.014396 -0.00638 0.039788 45% -0.05231 
-10 -0.03204 -0.01635 -0.05122 40% -0.08434 
-9 -0.00394 -0.01834 0.013657 70% -0.08828 
-8 0.01838 0.034535 -0.00137 50% -0.0699 
-7 0.008557 0.013581 0.002418 35% -0.06135 
-6 0.002087 -0.00436 0.009963 40% -0.05926 
-5 0.000179 0.004488 -0.00509 40% -0.05908 
-4 0.006817 0.007622 0.005833 45% -0.05226 
-3 -0.00865 -0.01181 -0.00478 40% -0.06091 
-2 0.01597 -0.00062 0.036247 30% -0.04494 
-1 0.010073 0.022041 -0.00456 65% -0.03487 
0 -0.00716 0.010484 -0.02873 40% -0.04203 
1 0.002773 0.005484 -0.00054 60% -0.03926 
2 -0.00427 -0.0062 -0.00192 50% -0.04353 
3 0.007124 0.008795 0.005081 50% -0.03641 
4 0.003314 -0.01151 0.021431 50% -0.03309 
5 -0.0009 -0.01147 0.012003 35% -0.034 
6 -0.00435 -0.01135 0.00421 45% -0.03835 
7 -0.00501 -0.02263 0.016525 40% -0.04336 
8 0.013752 0.016427 0.010484 45% -0.0296 
9 0.002387 0.008824 -0.0072 55% -0.02721 




to -6 -0.00107785 
-




to -5 -0.00105541 
-




to -1 -0.00058155 
-




to +1 -0.00063355 
-
0.000562387 -0.00072 - -0.03165 
Average 






Table 6.17: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00591 -0.02949 -0.00175 35% -0.00591 
-59 -0.00472 -0.03066 -0.00014 45% -0.01063 
-58 0.001601 0.024426 -0.00243 45% -0.00903 
-57 -5.7E-05 -0.0004 2.70E-06 45% -0.00908 
-56 -0.0003 0.023826 -0.00456 55% -0.00938 
-55 -0.00267 -0.00956 -0.00146 40% -0.01205 
-54 -0.00398 -0.00758 -0.00334 55% -0.01603 
-53 0.00187 -0.02149 0.005993 60% -0.01416 
-52 0.008073 0.03513 0.003298 60% -0.00609 
-51 0.002393 0.019305 -0.00059 40% -0.0037 
-50 -0.00037 -0.02114 0.0033 55% -0.00406 
-49 -0.00772 -0.03911 -0.00218 60% -0.01178 
-48 0.007106 0.019538 0.004912 70% -0.00468 
-47 -0.0046 0.004341 -0.00618 45% -0.00928 
-46 -0.00177 -0.00117 -0.00188 35% -0.01105 
-45 0.002989 -0.01273 0.005763 60% -0.00806 
-44 0.00587 0.019768 0.003418 55% -0.00219 
-43 -0.00047 -0.00682 0.000652 50% -0.00266 
-42 -0.00421 0.005674 -0.00595 45% -0.00687 
-41 0.007136 0.062947 -0.00271 35% 0.000263 
-40 0.004807 -0.00696 0.006883 60% 0.00507 
-39 -8.1E-05 -0.01107 0.001858 50% 0.004989 
-38 -0.00651 -0.01707 -0.00465 30% -0.00152 
-37 -0.00636 0.000987 -0.00766 40% -0.00788 
-36 -0.00275 0.006363 -0.00436 50% -0.01063 
-35 0.002407 0.002933 0.002314 60% -0.00823 
-34 -0.00173 -0.00305 -0.0015 40% -0.00996 
-33 -0.00442 -0.01587 -0.0024 50% -0.01438 
-32 -0.00076 0.010113 -0.00268 40% -0.01514 
-31 -0.00532 0.00641 -0.00739 30% -0.02047 
-30 0.004528 -0.00616 0.006414 55% -0.01594 
-29 -0.00963 -0.00026 -0.01128 20% -0.02556 
-28 -0.00145 0.001268 -0.00193 35% -0.02701 
-27 0.010547 0.009476 0.010736 80% -0.01647 
-26 -0.00741 -0.01155 -0.00668 45% -0.02388 
-25 0.002641 -0.00018 0.003138 45% -0.02124 
-24 -0.00587 -0.02358 -0.00274 30% -0.02711 
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-23 -0.00377 -0.00037 -0.00437 45% -0.03087 
-22 -0.00604 0.001195 -0.00732 25% -0.03691 
-21 -0.00662 -0.00833 -0.00632 40% -0.04353 
-20 -0.00227 -0.00604 -0.0016 55% -0.0458 
-19 -0.00313 0.004574 -0.00448 50% -0.04893 
-18 -0.00658 -1.06E-03 -0.00755 45% -0.0555 
-17 -0.00683 -0.0377 -0.00138 35% -0.06233 
-16 0.005197 0.000903 0.005955 55% -0.05713 
-15 -0.00961 -0.03275 -0.00553 35% -0.06674 
-14 -0.00102 -0.00753 0.000133 45% -0.06776 
-13 -0.00305 0.022506 -0.00756 55% -0.07081 
-12 -0.00848 -0.00751 -0.00864 30% -0.07928 
-11 0.001051 0.027304 -0.00358 50% -0.07823 
-10 -0.00369 -0.0073 -0.00305 45% -0.08192 
-9 0.009306 -0.00268 0.011421 75% -0.07262 
-8 -0.00077 0.01467 -0.0035 50% -0.07339 
-7 -0.00269 0.008142 -0.0046 50% -0.07608 
-6 -0.00241 -0.00533 -0.00189 40% -0.07849 
-5 0.000734 -0.00037 0.000929 55% -0.07775 
-4 -0.00067 0.01156 -0.00282 55% -0.07842 
-3 -0.00293 -0.00472 -0.00261 45% -0.08135 
-2 -0.00468 -0.02229 -0.00157 25% -0.08603 
-1 -0.00345 0.008894 -0.00563 35% -0.08948 
0 0.007581 0.005406 0.007965 40% -0.0819 
1 -0.00918 -0.00067 -0.01068 40% -0.09108 
2 -0.0062 -0.01426 -0.00477 35% -0.09728 
3 -0.00953 -0.03717 -0.00465 30% -0.1068 
4 -0.00425 -0.00681 -0.0038 30% -0.11106 
5 0.001023 -0.00644 0.002341 50% -0.11003 
6 -0.00108 -0.00829 0.000196 35% -0.11111 
7 -0.00083 -0.02169 0.002856 50% -0.11193 
8 0.005198 0.033096 0.000275 65% -0.10674 
9 -0.00305 -0.01132 -0.00159 40% -0.10978 




to -6 -0.00142738 
-




to -5 -0.00138879 
-




to -1 -0.0014917 
-




to +1 -0.00146937 
-
0.001014371 -0.00155 - -0.03394 
Average 
from 





Table 6.18: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.003484 0.004007 0.003203 55% 0.003484 
-59 -0.00261 -0.00717 -0.00015 40% 0.000876 
-58 -0.00685 -0.0178 -0.00096 45% -0.00598 
-57 0.003782 0.004597 0.003343 50% -0.0022 
-56 -0.00079 0.001939 -0.00225 50% -0.00298 
-55 0.004798 0.012351 0.000732 65% 0.001816 
-54 0.004311 0.01012 0.001183 55% 0.006127 
-53 -0.001 -0.00585 0.00162 40% 0.005132 
-52 -0.00118 -0.0027 -0.00037 35% 0.00395 
-51 -0.00226 -0.00525 -0.00066 45% 0.001686 
-50 -0.00059 -0.00315 0.000788 60% 0.001097 
-49 0.004501 0.00635 0.003506 65% 0.005598 
-48 -0.00122 -0.0114 0.004268 45% 0.004382 
-47 -0.00451 -0.00749 -0.00291 35% -0.00013 
-46 -0.00132 -0.00372 -2.1E-05 35% -0.00145 
-45 0.004508 0.012976 -5.1E-05 65% 0.003063 
-44 0.001213 0.000967 0.001346 50% 0.004277 
-43 -0.0003 -0.00275 0.00102 55% 0.003977 
-42 0.004514 -0.00255 0.00832 75% 0.008491 
-41 -0.00262 0.000524 -0.00432 45% 0.00587 
-40 -0.00814 -0.00875 -0.00781 25% -0.00227 
-39 -0.00191 -0.00417 -0.0007 50% -0.00418 
-38 0.000925 -0.00235 0.002689 45% -0.00326 
-37 -0.00434 -0.00415 -0.00444 50% -0.00759 
-36 -0.00909 -0.0313 0.002871 45% -0.01668 
-35 -0.00299 -0.01142 0.001555 45% -0.01967 
-34 -0.00211 -0.00545 -0.00031 50% -0.02178 
-33 0.000304 -0.00787 0.004705 50% -0.02147 
-32 -0.00093 -0.00051 -0.00116 50% -0.02241 
-31 -0.00272 -0.00679 -0.00052 35% -0.02512 
-30 0.002841 0.00585 0.001222 60% -0.02228 
-29 0.00257 -0.00286 0.005493 60% -0.01971 
-28 -0.00436 -0.01283 0.000206 30% -0.02407 
-27 0.006106 0.02182 -0.00236 40% -0.01796 
-26 -0.00297 -0.00567 -0.00152 45% -0.02094 
-25 -0.00253 -0.00771 0.000256 55% -0.02347 
-24 0.002377 -0.00376 0.005679 65% -0.02109 
-23 0.000515 0.008122 -0.00358 30% -0.02058 
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-22 0.000946 0.00192 0.000421 40% -0.01963 
-21 -0.00469 -0.00251 -0.00587 30% -0.02433 
-20 0.002627 -0.00137 0.004779 55% -0.0217 
-19 -0.00041 0.010111 -0.00607 45% -0.02211 
-18 0.001263 0.001344 0.00122 50% -0.02084 
-17 0.007159 0.004064 0.008826 75% -0.01369 
-16 -0.00694 -0.01201 -0.00421 35% -0.02062 
-15 0.000131 -0.00638 0.003636 35% -0.02049 
-14 -0.00195 -0.00046 -0.00276 40% -0.02244 
-13 -0.00134 -0.00577 0.001046 65% -0.02378 
-12 0.006841 0.013854 0.003064 60% -0.01694 
-11 0.001097 0.006127 -0.00161 60% -0.01584 
-10 -0.00165 5.73E-05 -0.00256 40% -0.01749 
-9 0.001211 -0.00168 0.002769 45% -0.01628 
-8 -0.00242 0.001656 -0.00462 30% -0.0187 
-7 0.000647 0.003579 -0.00093 50% -0.01806 
-6 0.000488 0.000327 0.000574 55% -0.01757 
-5 0.001353 0.003241 0.000337 60% -0.01622 
-4 0.002989 0.000177 0.004502 55% -0.01323 
-3 -0.00604 -0.00855 -0.00469 30% -0.01927 
-2 0.000236 0.012096 -0.00615 40% -0.01903 
-1 -0.00209 -0.00461 -0.00073 55% -0.02112 
0 -0.00461 8.27E-05 -0.00714 35% -0.02573 
1 0.009364 0.008059 0.010067 45% -0.01637 
2 -0.00177 0.001824 -0.00371 50% -0.01814 
3 0.001823 0.005931 -0.00039 60% -0.01632 
4 -0.00368 -0.00979 -0.00039 55% -0.01999 
5 -0.00312 -0.00128 -0.00411 50% -0.02311 
6 0.007549 -0.00032 0.011787 75% -0.01556 
7 0.000828 -0.00232 0.002522 40% -0.01474 
8 0.006581 0.001922 0.009089 60% -0.00816 
9 0.001679 0.003492 7.03E-04 55% -0.00648 




to -6 -0.00031965 
-




to -5 -0.00028979 
-




to -1 -0.00035222 
-




to +1 -0.00026418 
-




to +10 -0.00014182 
-




Table 6.19: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.S. in 2006(from the market model with 





















































-60 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 45% -0.001 0.007 -0.004 
-59 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 40% -0.010 -0.004 -0.012 
-58 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 30% -0.015 -0.001 -0.019 
-57 0.005 0.003 0.005 50% -0.010 0.001 -0.014 
-56 0.023 0.013 0.027 65% 0.013 0.014 0.013 
-55 -0.013 -0.003 -0.016 30% 0.000 0.011 -0.003 
-54 0.003 -0.007 0.007 50% 0.004 0.004 0.004 
-53 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 35% -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
-52 0.018 0.001 0.024 55% 0.016 -0.001 0.022 
-51 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 30% 0.011 -0.010 0.018 
-50 0.011 0.012 0.010 55% 0.022 0.002 0.028 
-49 0.006 0.002 0.008 50% 0.028 0.004 0.036 
-48 -0.016 0.012 -0.025 25% 0.012 0.016 0.011 
-47 -0.002 0.010 -0.006 35% 0.010 0.026 0.005 
-46 0.015 0.007 0.017 45% 0.025 0.032 0.022 
-45 -0.013 -0.004 -0.016 40% 0.012 0.029 0.006 
-44 -0.003 -0.011 0.000 35% 0.009 0.017 0.006 
-43 0.004 0.006 0.003 35% 0.013 0.023 0.010 
-42 0.002 -0.009 0.006 35% 0.015 0.014 0.016 
-41 -0.019 -0.006 -0.023 35% -0.003 0.008 -0.007 
-40 0.012 0.001 0.016 50% 0.009 0.009 0.009 
-39 0.011 0.022 0.008 45% 0.020 0.031 0.017 
-38 -0.002 0.005 -0.004 45% 0.018 0.035 0.012 
-37 -0.004 0.006 -0.007 40% 0.014 0.042 0.005 
-36 -0.006 0.022 -0.016 35% 0.008 0.064 -0.011 
-35 0.001 0.006 -0.001 50% 0.009 0.070 -0.012 
-34 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 45% 0.004 0.065 -0.016 
-33 0.001 -0.003 0.002 40% 0.005 0.062 -0.014 
-32 -0.007 0.002 -0.010 25% -0.002 0.064 -0.024 
-31 0.007 0.014 0.004 60% 0.005 0.078 -0.019 
-30 0.007 0.006 0.007 35% 0.012 0.084 -0.012 
-29 0.010 0.004 0.012 65% 0.022 0.088 0.000 
-28 -0.008 0.001 -0.011 40% 0.014 0.089 -0.011 
-27 0.012 0.012 0.012 40% 0.026 0.101 0.002 
-26 0.014 0.000 0.019 50% 0.041 0.101 0.020 
-25 0.003 0.012 0.000 55% 0.044 0.113 0.020 
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-24 0.004 -0.020 0.012 40% 0.048 0.094 0.033 
-23 -0.013 -0.001 -0.017 40% 0.035 0.093 0.015 
-22 -0.007 0.008 -0.012 60% 0.028 0.101 0.004 
-21 -0.003 -0.017 0.002 25% 0.025 0.084 0.006 
-20 0.000 0.006 -0.003 35% 0.025 0.090 0.003 
-19 -0.003 0.016 -0.010 45% 0.021 0.107 -0.007 
-18 0.011 0.008 0.012 60% 0.032 0.115 0.005 
-17 0.002 -0.003 0.004 40% 0.034 0.112 0.008 
-16 -0.006 -0.017 -0.003 40% 0.028 0.096 0.005 
-15 0.004 -0.005 0.007 55% 0.032 0.091 0.012 
-14 0.012 0.008 0.013 50% 0.043 0.099 0.025 
-13 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 40% 0.041 0.095 0.023 
-12 -0.009 0.004 -0.013 35% 0.032 0.100 0.010 
-11 0.002 0.012 -0.001 35% 0.034 0.112 0.008 
-10 0.005 0.003 0.006 60% 0.039 0.115 0.014 
-9 0.068 0.004 0.090 60% 0.108 0.119 0.104 
-8 -0.020 0.014 -0.031 40% 0.088 0.133 0.073 
-7 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 50% 0.085 0.138 0.068 
-6 0.001 0.001 0.000 60% 0.086 0.139 0.068 
-5 0.002 0.007 0.001 40% 0.088 0.146 0.069 
-4 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 40% 0.088 0.147 0.068 
-3 -0.008 0.011 -0.014 30% 0.080 0.158 0.054 
-2 0.017 -0.003 0.023 40% 0.097 0.155 0.077 
-1 -0.018 0.010 -0.027 50% 0.079 0.165 0.050 
0 0.117 0.020 0.149 70% 0.196 0.185 0.200 
1 0.099 0.119 0.092 60% 0.295 0.304 0.292 
2 -0.011 0.002 -0.016 50% 0.284 0.306 0.276 
3 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 35% 0.277 0.307 0.267 
4 0.002 0.006 0.001 45% 0.279 0.313 0.268 
5 0.003 -0.001 0.005 50% 0.282 0.311 0.273 
6 -0.019 -0.003 -0.025 45% 0.263 0.309 0.248 
7 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 30% 0.262 0.308 0.247 
8 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 45% 0.259 0.309 0.242 
9 0.005 0.002 0.007 55% 0.264 0.311 0.249 






























































1 0.442254 0.06507 0.103873 0.052183 
 
 
Table 6.20: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.S. in 2007(from the market model with 





















































-60 0.003 0.007 0.000 55% 0.003 0.007 0.000 
-59 0.006 0.003 0.008 60% 0.009 0.011 0.008 
-58 -0.001 -0.010 0.005 35% 0.008 0.000 0.013 
-57 0.005 0.011 0.001 65% 0.013 0.011 0.014 
-56 0.006 0.006 0.006 65% 0.019 0.017 0.020 
-55 0.002 0.001 0.003 45% 0.021 0.017 0.023 
-54 -0.004 -0.015 0.004 45% 0.017 0.003 0.027 
-53 0.020 0.036 0.009 65% 0.037 0.039 0.035 
-52 0.002 0.005 0.000 40% 0.039 0.044 0.035 
-51 -0.001 -0.007 0.003 40% 0.038 0.037 0.038 
-50 -0.002 -0.006 0.001 35% 0.036 0.031 0.039 
-49 0.005 0.021 -0.005 35% 0.041 0.051 0.034 
-48 -0.006 -0.001 -0.010 45% 0.035 0.051 0.024 
-47 0.004 -0.013 0.016 55% 0.039 0.037 0.040 
-46 0.001 0.006 -0.001 60% 0.040 0.043 0.039 
-45 -0.009 -0.021 -0.001 45% 0.031 0.022 0.038 
-44 -0.003 -0.015 0.004 55% 0.028 0.007 0.042 
-43 0.001 0.012 -0.006 40% 0.029 0.019 0.036 
-42 0.003 -0.002 0.007 55% 0.033 0.017 0.043 
-41 -0.011 -0.007 -0.013 50% 0.022 0.009 0.030 
-40 0.004 0.019 -0.006 55% 0.026 0.028 0.025 
-39 -0.005 -0.013 0.000 45% 0.021 0.015 0.024 
-38 0.016 0.011 0.020 70% 0.037 0.026 0.044 
-37 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 40% 0.033 0.026 0.038 
-36 -0.009 0.008 -0.021 45% 0.024 0.034 0.017 
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-35 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 65% 0.019 0.032 0.010 
-34 0.001 0.000 0.001 55% 0.020 0.032 0.012 
-33 0.004 0.004 0.003 55% 0.024 0.036 0.015 
-32 0.007 0.013 0.003 70% 0.030 0.049 0.018 
-31 0.001 -0.005 0.004 50% 0.031 0.044 0.022 
-30 0.006 -0.001 0.010 65% 0.037 0.043 0.033 
-29 0.005 0.003 0.007 55% 0.042 0.046 0.040 
-28 -0.004 -0.012 0.001 40% 0.038 0.034 0.041 
-27 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 45% 0.034 0.029 0.038 
-26 0.002 -0.002 0.004 50% 0.036 0.027 0.042 
-25 0.001 -0.012 0.010 55% 0.037 0.015 0.052 
-24 0.013 0.015 0.012 55% 0.050 0.030 0.063 
-23 -0.011 -0.003 -0.016 40% 0.039 0.027 0.048 
-22 -0.006 -0.013 -0.001 40% 0.033 0.014 0.046 
-21 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 45% 0.028 0.007 0.041 
-20 -0.003 0.008 -0.009 40% 0.025 0.015 0.032 
-19 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 50% 0.022 0.013 0.027 
-18 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 50% 0.014 0.006 0.019 
-17 -0.008 -0.014 -0.005 60% 0.005 -0.008 0.014 
-16 -0.007 -0.021 0.002 65% -0.001 -0.028 0.016 
-15 0.004 0.020 -0.006 65% 0.003 -0.009 0.011 
-14 -0.001 -0.017 0.009 55% 0.002 -0.025 0.020 
-13 -0.011 -0.026 -0.001 30% -0.010 -0.052 0.018 
-12 0.003 0.016 -0.006 45% -0.007 -0.035 0.012 
-11 0.028 0.055 0.010 65% 0.021 0.019 0.022 
-10 -0.004 -0.015 0.004 65% 0.017 0.004 0.026 
-9 -0.003 0.005 -0.008 45% 0.014 0.009 0.018 
-8 -0.003 0.013 -0.013 35% 0.012 0.022 0.005 
-7 0.073 0.192 -0.006 45% 0.085 0.213 0.000 
-6 0.002 -0.001 0.005 55% 0.087 0.212 0.004 
-5 -0.004 -0.009 0.000 50% 0.083 0.203 0.004 
-4 0.010 0.015 0.007 60% 0.094 0.217 0.011 
-3 0.001 0.008 -0.003 45% 0.095 0.225 0.008 
-2 -0.007 0.007 -0.015 40% 0.089 0.232 -0.007 
-1 0.000 -0.005 0.002 50% 0.088 0.227 -0.004 
0 0.299 0.062 0.456 75% 0.387 0.290 0.452 
1 0.085 0.061 0.100 65% 0.472 0.351 0.552 
2 0.000 -0.001 0.001 65% 0.472 0.350 0.553 
3 0.002 0.005 -0.001 45% 0.474 0.355 0.553 
4 0.000 -0.003 0.001 50% 0.473 0.352 0.554 
5 0.003 0.012 -0.003 45% 0.476 0.364 0.550 
6 0.004 0.007 0.002 55% 0.480 0.371 0.553 
7 -0.007 -0.017 0.000 40% 0.473 0.354 0.552 
8 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 50% 0.469 0.349 0.548 
9 -0.002 -0.010 0.003 60% 0.467 0.339 0.552 


























































1 - 0.099028 0.089521 0.105268 
 
 
Table 6.21: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.S. in 2008(from the market model with 





















































-60 0.007 0.012 -0.001 55% 0.007 0.012 -0.001 
-59 0.000 -0.008 0.011 25% 0.006 0.004 0.009 
-58 -0.006 0.004 -0.023 40% 0.000 0.009 -0.013 
-57 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 55% -0.002 0.005 -0.012 
-56 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 55% -0.006 0.000 -0.016 
-55 -0.013 -0.016 -0.008 35% -0.019 -0.016 -0.024 
-54 -0.012 0.019 -0.057 30% -0.031 0.003 -0.081 
-53 -0.034 -0.030 -0.040 40% -0.064 -0.027 -0.121 
-52 0.011 -0.016 0.051 55% -0.053 -0.042 -0.069 
-51 -0.012 -0.018 -0.003 55% -0.065 -0.060 -0.072 
-50 -0.022 -0.026 -0.017 40% -0.087 -0.086 -0.090 
-49 0.014 0.033 -0.013 40% -0.073 -0.053 -0.103 
-48 -0.005 -0.034 0.038 55% -0.078 -0.087 -0.065 
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-47 0.011 0.037 -0.029 70% -0.068 -0.050 -0.095 
-46 -0.030 -0.020 -0.045 25% -0.098 -0.070 -0.139 
-45 -0.071 -0.025 -0.139 40% -0.169 -0.095 -0.279 
-44 -0.007 -0.017 0.007 30% -0.176 -0.112 -0.272 
-43 -0.027 -0.036 -0.014 30% -0.203 -0.148 -0.286 
-42 -0.013 -0.020 -0.004 45% -0.216 -0.168 -0.290 
-41 0.026 0.021 0.034 35% -0.190 -0.147 -0.256 
-40 0.005 0.003 0.009 55% -0.185 -0.144 -0.247 
-39 0.006 0.020 -0.015 40% -0.179 -0.124 -0.262 
-38 0.000 -0.009 0.014 50% -0.179 -0.133 -0.248 
-37 0.009 0.008 0.011 45% -0.170 -0.125 -0.237 
-36 0.008 -0.001 0.021 60% -0.162 -0.127 -0.215 
-35 -0.013 -0.016 -0.008 50% -0.175 -0.142 -0.223 
-34 -0.002 0.006 -0.014 45% -0.177 -0.136 -0.238 
-33 -0.016 -0.032 0.008 45% -0.193 -0.169 -0.229 
-32 -0.017 -0.020 -0.014 50% -0.210 -0.188 -0.243 
-31 -0.017 -0.021 -0.010 40% -0.227 -0.209 -0.253 
-30 -0.014 -0.024 0.000 40% -0.241 -0.234 -0.253 
-29 -0.017 -0.029 0.001 50% -0.258 -0.262 -0.252 
-28 -0.001 0.021 -0.034 45% -0.259 -0.242 -0.286 
-27 0.016 0.023 0.006 45% -0.243 -0.218 -0.280 
-26 -0.013 -0.019 -0.004 35% -0.256 -0.238 -0.285 
-25 0.017 -0.012 0.062 40% -0.239 -0.250 -0.222 
-24 0.007 0.027 -0.022 65% -0.232 -0.223 -0.245 
-23 0.032 0.019 0.053 50% -0.199 -0.205 -0.192 
-22 -0.001 0.048 -0.074 45% -0.200 -0.156 -0.266 
-21 -0.034 -0.065 0.013 50% -0.234 -0.221 -0.252 
-20 0.006 0.024 -0.022 55% -0.228 -0.197 -0.274 
-19 -0.013 -0.044 0.032 65% -0.241 -0.241 -0.242 
-18 0.008 0.017 -0.004 50% -0.233 -0.225 -0.246 
-17 -0.029 -0.060 0.017 55% -0.262 -0.284 -0.229 
-16 -0.053 -0.021 -0.102 30% -0.316 -0.305 -0.331 
-15 -0.001 -0.019 0.026 40% -0.316 -0.324 -0.305 
-14 -0.012 0.012 -0.047 40% -0.328 -0.312 -0.352 
-13 0.080 0.062 0.106 40% -0.248 -0.250 -0.245 
-12 -0.023 -0.036 -0.002 40% -0.271 -0.286 -0.248 
-11 -0.038 -0.025 -0.057 55% -0.309 -0.311 -0.305 
-10 0.064 0.008 0.148 55% -0.245 -0.304 -0.156 
-9 -0.013 -0.015 -0.009 60% -0.257 -0.319 -0.165 
-8 0.033 0.071 -0.025 45% -0.225 -0.247 -0.190 
-7 0.011 0.019 -0.003 50% -0.214 -0.228 -0.193 
-6 -0.030 -0.050 -0.001 35% -0.245 -0.278 -0.194 
-5 -0.028 0.016 -0.093 55% -0.272 -0.262 -0.287 
-4 0.120 0.123 0.116 50% -0.152 -0.139 -0.171 
-3 0.022 0.023 0.020 60% -0.130 -0.116 -0.151 
-2 -0.035 -0.025 -0.050 50% -0.165 -0.141 -0.201 
-1 0.056 0.093 0.001 65% -0.109 -0.048 -0.200 
0 0.366 0.123 0.731 90% 0.258 0.075 0.531 
1 0.056 0.074 0.030 55% 0.314 0.149 0.562 
2 -0.041 -0.009 -0.090 45% 0.273 0.140 0.472 
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3 0.010 -0.004 0.032 40% 0.283 0.136 0.504 
4 -0.004 0.013 -0.029 20% 0.279 0.149 0.476 
5 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 40% 0.277 0.152 0.463 
6 0.023 0.022 0.025 50% 0.300 0.174 0.488 
7 -0.054 -0.047 -0.066 40% 0.245 0.127 0.422 
8 0.001 -0.009 0.015 50% 0.246 0.118 0.437 
9 -0.015 -0.014 -0.017 35% 0.231 0.104 0.420 































































4 - -0.10731 -0.11608 -0.09421 
 
 
Table 6.22: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.S. in 2009(from the market model with 





















































-60 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005 55% -0.007 -0.013 -0.005 
-59 0.006 0.011 0.004 60% -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
321 
 
-58 -0.009 -0.034 -0.003 35% -0.011 -0.036 -0.005 
-57 0.003 -0.018 0.008 55% -0.008 -0.054 0.003 
-56 -0.011 -0.016 -0.009 45% -0.019 -0.070 -0.006 
-55 0.027 0.156 -0.005 40% 0.008 0.086 -0.011 
-54 0.000 -0.008 0.002 45% 0.008 0.078 -0.009 
-53 0.004 0.002 0.004 45% 0.012 0.080 -0.005 
-52 -0.035 -0.207 0.008 30% -0.023 -0.128 0.003 
-51 -0.024 -0.030 -0.023 25% -0.047 -0.158 -0.020 
-50 -0.021 -0.075 -0.008 40% -0.068 -0.232 -0.028 
-49 0.007 0.047 -0.002 55% -0.061 -0.185 -0.030 
-48 0.003 -0.015 0.008 45% -0.058 -0.201 -0.022 
-47 0.008 0.003 0.010 50% -0.050 -0.198 -0.013 
-46 -0.038 -0.133 -0.014 15% -0.088 -0.331 -0.027 
-45 -0.021 -0.087 -0.005 45% -0.109 -0.419 -0.031 
-44 -0.014 -0.008 -0.015 45% -0.123 -0.427 -0.047 
-43 -0.016 -0.049 -0.008 30% -0.139 -0.476 -0.055 
-42 -0.016 -0.035 -0.012 40% -0.155 -0.511 -0.066 
-41 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 30% -0.165 -0.522 -0.076 
-40 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 50% -0.170 -0.527 -0.081 
-39 0.015 0.015 0.015 60% -0.155 -0.511 -0.066 
-38 -0.013 -0.064 0.000 50% -0.168 -0.575 -0.066 
-37 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 45% -0.180 -0.590 -0.077 
-36 -0.003 0.036 -0.013 35% -0.183 -0.554 -0.090 
-35 0.003 -0.032 0.012 50% -0.179 -0.586 -0.078 
-34 0.001 -0.001 0.001 35% -0.179 -0.587 -0.077 
-33 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 30% -0.184 -0.585 -0.084 
-32 0.012 0.048 0.004 40% -0.172 -0.537 -0.080 
-31 -0.018 -0.056 -0.009 35% -0.190 -0.593 -0.089 
-30 -0.001 -0.028 0.006 45% -0.191 -0.621 -0.083 
-29 0.071 0.409 -0.014 30% -0.120 -0.212 -0.097 
-28 -0.006 -0.034 0.001 35% -0.126 -0.246 -0.096 
-27 -0.011 -0.043 -0.002 35% -0.137 -0.289 -0.098 
-26 -0.015 -0.026 -0.012 25% -0.151 -0.315 -0.110 
-25 -0.009 -0.057 0.003 50% -0.160 -0.372 -0.107 
-24 -0.021 -0.098 -0.002 35% -0.182 -0.470 -0.109 
-23 -0.011 0.001 -0.014 40% -0.192 -0.469 -0.123 
-22 -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 30% -0.200 -0.485 -0.129 
-21 -0.009 -0.030 -0.004 45% -0.209 -0.515 -0.133 
-20 -0.033 -0.104 -0.015 45% -0.242 -0.619 -0.148 
-19 -0.004 -0.024 0.001 40% -0.246 -0.642 -0.147 
-18 -0.013 -0.002 -0.016 40% -0.259 -0.644 -0.163 
-17 0.014 0.068 0.001 75% -0.245 -0.577 -0.162 
-16 -0.021 -0.030 -0.018 30% -0.266 -0.607 -0.181 
-15 -0.036 -0.071 -0.027 20% -0.302 -0.677 -0.208 
-14 -0.015 -0.134 0.014 40% -0.317 -0.811 -0.193 
-13 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 30% -0.325 -0.822 -0.201 
-12 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 25% -0.334 -0.834 -0.209 
-11 0.027 0.135 0.000 45% -0.307 -0.698 -0.209 
-10 -0.030 -0.108 -0.011 35% -0.337 -0.807 -0.220 
-9 -0.015 -0.059 -0.004 45% -0.352 -0.865 -0.224 
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-8 -0.014 -0.078 0.003 45% -0.365 -0.944 -0.221 
-7 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 30% -0.376 -0.949 -0.233 
-6 0.003 0.031 -0.005 40% -0.373 -0.918 -0.237 
-5 -0.012 -0.048 -0.003 50% -0.385 -0.966 -0.240 
-4 0.010 0.022 0.007 50% -0.376 -0.944 -0.233 
-3 -0.003 -0.015 0.000 40% -0.378 -0.959 -0.233 
-2 0.001 -0.003 0.002 45% -0.377 -0.962 -0.231 
-1 0.009 0.068 -0.005 40% -0.367 -0.894 -0.236 
0 0.210 0.221 0.207 75% -0.158 -0.673 -0.029 
1 0.071 -0.012 0.092 55% -0.087 -0.685 0.063 
2 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 40% -0.093 -0.685 0.055 
3 -0.006 -0.012 -0.004 45% -0.099 -0.697 0.051 
4 -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 25% -0.109 -0.711 0.042 
5 -0.039 -0.143 -0.013 25% -0.148 -0.855 0.029 
6 0.060 0.238 0.015 50% -0.088 -0.616 0.044 
7 -0.002 -0.016 0.002 45% -0.090 -0.633 0.046 
8 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 35% -0.094 -0.641 0.042 
9 0.008 0.094 -0.013 30% -0.086 -0.547 0.029 
































































8 - -0.17141 -0.51577 -0.08531 
 
 
Table 6.23: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for the target firms in the U.S. in 2010(from the market model with 























































-60 -0.006 -0.025 0.003 35% -0.006 -0.025 0.003 
-59 0.008 0.025 0.001 65% 0.003 0.001 0.004 
-58 0.008 -0.006 0.014 30% 0.011 -0.005 0.017 
-57 -0.016 0.002 -0.024 60% -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 
-56 -0.029 0.000 -0.041 60% -0.034 -0.003 -0.048 
-55 0.040 -0.008 0.060 35% 0.005 -0.012 0.013 
-54 0.007 -0.018 0.017 55% 0.012 -0.030 0.030 
-53 0.007 0.000 0.010 55% 0.019 -0.030 0.040 
-52 0.002 -0.003 0.004 70% 0.021 -0.033 0.044 
-51 -0.010 -0.020 -0.006 25% 0.011 -0.054 0.038 
-50 -0.014 0.001 -0.021 30% -0.004 -0.052 0.017 
-49 0.015 0.006 0.019 65% 0.011 -0.047 0.036 
-48 -0.001 -0.019 0.006 45% 0.010 -0.066 0.043 
-47 -0.011 -0.004 -0.014 40% -0.001 -0.070 0.029 
-46 -0.001 -0.016 0.005 60% -0.002 -0.086 0.034 
-45 -0.006 -0.013 -0.003 40% -0.008 -0.099 0.032 
-44 0.008 0.012 0.006 50% 0.000 -0.088 0.038 
-43 0.000 0.004 -0.002 50% 0.000 -0.083 0.036 
-42 -0.001 0.014 -0.008 45% -0.001 -0.069 0.028 
-41 0.006 0.019 0.000 55% 0.005 -0.050 0.029 
-40 0.000 -0.004 0.002 50% 0.005 -0.055 0.030 
-39 -0.028 -0.022 -0.031 30% -0.023 -0.077 -0.001 
-38 -0.015 0.003 -0.022 55% -0.038 -0.073 -0.023 
-37 0.026 0.034 0.023 65% -0.012 -0.040 0.000 
-36 0.009 0.022 0.004 65% -0.003 -0.018 0.004 
-35 0.016 0.038 0.007 50% 0.014 0.020 0.011 
-34 0.008 0.010 0.007 55% 0.022 0.030 0.018 
-33 -0.035 -0.077 -0.017 25% -0.013 -0.047 0.002 
-32 0.001 -0.002 0.002 50% -0.012 -0.049 0.004 
-31 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 25% -0.021 -0.055 -0.006 
-30 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 40% -0.030 -0.068 -0.013 
-29 0.005 0.025 -0.004 50% -0.025 -0.043 -0.017 
-28 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 55% -0.041 -0.060 -0.033 
-27 -0.002 -0.012 0.003 40% -0.043 -0.072 -0.030 
-26 -0.020 0.030 -0.042 55% -0.063 -0.042 -0.072 
-25 -0.011 -0.019 -0.007 35% -0.074 -0.061 -0.080 
-24 -0.004 0.005 -0.008 45% -0.078 -0.056 -0.088 
-23 0.012 0.033 0.003 55% -0.066 -0.022 -0.085 
-22 0.001 -0.013 0.007 50% -0.065 -0.035 -0.078 
-21 -0.002 0.022 -0.012 35% -0.067 -0.014 -0.090 
-20 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 40% -0.081 -0.025 -0.105 
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-19 0.005 0.056 -0.017 55% -0.076 0.030 -0.122 
-18 0.006 0.017 0.002 45% -0.070 0.047 -0.120 
-17 0.005 -0.010 0.011 65% -0.065 0.038 -0.109 
-16 -0.008 -0.024 0.000 45% -0.073 0.013 -0.109 
-15 -0.005 -0.027 0.004 50% -0.078 -0.013 -0.105 
-14 0.014 0.011 0.016 55% -0.064 -0.002 -0.090 
-13 0.013 0.010 0.014 65% -0.051 0.007 -0.076 
-12 0.012 0.053 -0.005 35% -0.039 0.060 -0.081 
-11 0.005 0.026 -0.004 55% -0.033 0.086 -0.085 
-10 0.008 -0.003 0.013 60% -0.026 0.083 -0.072 
-9 0.013 0.048 -0.002 50% -0.013 0.131 -0.074 
-8 -0.020 -0.037 -0.012 25% -0.032 0.093 -0.086 
-7 -0.006 0.002 -0.009 50% -0.038 0.095 -0.095 
-6 -0.005 -0.024 0.003 50% -0.043 0.071 -0.092 
-5 0.049 0.003 0.069 55% 0.006 0.074 -0.023 
-4 0.010 0.014 0.008 70% 0.016 0.088 -0.015 
-3 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 45% 0.013 0.089 -0.019 
-2 0.006 0.027 -0.003 55% 0.019 0.116 -0.023 
-1 0.046 0.122 0.014 80% 0.065 0.238 -0.009 
0 0.308 0.180 0.362 95% 0.373 0.418 0.354 
1 0.102 0.031 0.132 55% 0.475 0.449 0.486 
2 0.002 0.006 0.000 55% 0.476 0.454 0.486 
3 -0.049 -0.009 -0.066 35% 0.427 0.446 0.419 
4 0.296 -0.006 0.426 40% 0.723 0.439 0.845 
5 -0.024 0.003 -0.035 50% 0.699 0.442 0.810 
6 0.053 0.001 0.075 50% 0.752 0.443 0.885 
7 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 50% 0.750 0.445 0.880 
8 -0.011 -0.002 -0.015 30% 0.739 0.443 0.865 
9 -0.030 -0.006 -0.041 45% 0.709 0.437 0.825 




























































7 - 0.078592 0.062423 0.085592 
 
Table 6.24: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00197 0.001194 -0.00367 40% -0.00197 
-59 -0.00759 -0.00584 -0.00853 25% -0.00955 
-58 -0.01152 -0.00209 -0.01659 40% -0.02107 
-57 -0.00336 -0.00119 -0.00453 35% -0.02443 
-56 0.003134 0.005812 0.001692 50% -0.0213 
-55 0.001227 0.001845 0.000894 55% -0.02007 
-54 -0.01669 0.005981 -0.0289 40% -0.03676 
-53 -0.01448 0.001529 -0.0231 40% -0.05124 
-52 -0.00523 -0.00027 -0.00791 50% -0.05648 
-51 -0.02634 -0.00126 -0.03985 55% -0.08282 
-50 -0.00378 -0.01188 0.000585 45% -0.0866 
-49 -0.00354 -0.00451 -0.00302 35% -0.09014 
-48 0.001724 0.006081 -0.00062 60% -0.08841 
-47 -0.00734 -0.00798 -0.007 35% -0.09576 
-46 0.027357 -0.00061 0.042417 60% -0.0684 
-45 -0.02654 0.008561 -0.04544 55% -0.09494 
-44 0.019536 -0.00433 0.032388 65% -0.07541 
-43 -0.00269 -0.00969 0.001085 35% -0.07809 
-42 -0.00335 0.001513 -0.00597 30% -0.08145 
-41 -0.00187 0.001442 -0.00365 25% -0.08331 
-40 -0.0027 0.004005 -0.00631 50% -0.08601 
-39 0.008245 0.005367 0.009795 45% -0.07777 
-38 0.004559 0.000411 0.006792 55% -0.07321 
-37 -0.00965 0.001833 -0.01584 45% -0.08286 
-36 0.003308 -0.00079 0.005511 60% -0.07955 
-35 8.51E-05 0.00275 -0.00135 40% -0.07947 
-34 -0.00199 -0.01418 0.004581 40% -0.08145 
-33 -0.00314 -0.00422 -0.00256 40% -0.0846 
-32 -0.0043 0.008268 -0.01107 50% -0.0889 
-31 0.005494 0.010732 0.002673 55% -0.0834 
-30 -0.00204 0.003382 -0.00495 45% -0.08544 
-29 0.001654 0.001718 0.001619 55% -0.08379 
-28 0.000283 0.002273 -0.00079 45% -0.0835 
-27 -7.5E-05 0.002445 -0.00143 45% -0.08358 
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-26 -0.00609 0.000291 -0.00953 50% -0.08967 
-25 0.003955 0.006285 0.0027 55% -0.08571 
-24 -0.00427 0.000399 -0.00679 35% -0.08999 
-23 0.001401 -5.2E-05 0.002184 35% -0.08858 
-22 0.001872 0.0095 -0.00224 50% -0.08671 
-21 0.002065 -0.0025 0.004525 35% -0.08465 
-20 -0.00361 -0.00171 -0.00463 30% -0.08826 
-19 0.00446 0.002249 0.005651 40% -0.0838 
-18 -0.00039 0.000607 -0.00093 40% -0.08419 
-17 -0.00158 -0.00036 -0.00224 35% -0.08577 
-16 -0.00332 -0.00347 -0.00323 35% -0.08909 
-15 -0.01586 -0.00068 -0.02403 30% -0.10494 
-14 0.007327 -0.00366 0.013245 50% -0.09761 
-13 0.022126 -0.00136 0.034774 50% -0.07549 
-12 -0.01749 0.003837 -0.02898 50% -0.09298 
-11 0.024329 0.004211 0.035161 65% -0.06865 
-10 0.005707 0.001201 0.008133 65% -0.06295 
-9 -0.00794 0.002521 -0.01357 50% -0.07089 
-8 -0.01924 -0.01593 -0.02103 25% -0.09013 
-7 -0.0001 0.006037 -0.00341 45% -0.09023 
-6 -0.0149 -0.00518 -0.02013 40% -0.10513 
-5 -0.005 -0.00972 -0.00246 25% -0.11014 
-4 -0.00193 -0.00269 -0.00153 40% -0.11207 
-3 0.059629 0.002725 0.090269 70% -0.05244 
-2 -0.00042 -0.00044 -0.00041 55% -0.05286 
-1 0.001358 0.002013 0.001005 40% -0.05151 
0 0.006926 0.009376 0.005607 50% -0.04458 
1 0.011586 0.031401 0.000916 55% -0.03299 
2 -0.00373 0.005194 -0.00854 30% -0.03673 
3 -0.01853 0.002208 -0.0297 45% -0.05526 
4 0.004439 0.002366 0.005555 50% -0.05082 
5 0.006453 0.01314 0.002853 70% -0.04436 
6 0.00353 -0.00526 0.008263 30% -0.04083 
7 0.012362 -0.00246 0.020344 40% -0.02847 
8 0.0003 0.001964 -0.0006 40% -0.02817 
9  -0.00315  55%  
















0.00085817 4.04333E-05 -0.00134 0.4475 -0.07527 
Average 
from 









0.00040803 0.000851507 -0.0011 0.450704 -0.0707 
 
Table 6.25: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.001315 0.002708 -7.8E-05 35% 0.001315 
-59 -0.00112 -0.00698 0.004742 50% 0.000197 
-58 0.005153 -0.00118 0.011481 55% 0.00535 
-57 0.002086 -0.00462 0.00879 40% 0.007436 
-56 -0.00627 -0.00245 -0.01009 40% 0.00117 
-55 -0.00106 0.000441 -0.00255 45% 0.000113 
-54 0.00219 -0.00595 0.010332 50% 0.002303 
-53 -0.00316 -0.00764 0.001325 45% -0.00085 
-52 -5.7E-05 -0.00114 0.001026 45% -0.00091 
-51 0.001162 -0.00336 0.005682 50% 0.00025 
-50 -0.00371 -0.00742 -9.58E-06 45% -0.00346 
-49 -0.00022 -0.00031 -0.00012 50% -0.00368 
-48 0.004856 -0.00591 0.015622 55% 0.001178 
-47 -0.00528 -0.00696 -0.0036 30% -0.0041 
-46 0.006715 0.010838 0.002591 60% 0.002613 
-45 -0.00651 -0.0076 -0.00543 45% -0.0039 
-44 0.001321 0.001309 0.001332 55% -0.00258 
-43 -0.00696 -0.00517 -0.00875 25% -0.00954 
-42 -0.0026 -0.00471 -0.00048 45% -0.01214 
-41 -0.01033 -0.00515 -0.0155 30% -0.02246 
-40 0.010334 0.019757 0.000911 55% -0.01213 
-39 -0.00054 -0.00744 0.006353 45% -0.01267 
-38 -0.00322 -0.00119 -0.00525 35% -0.01589 
-37 0.005504 0.007543 0.003466 60% -0.01039 
-36 -0.00251 0.003792 -0.00881 60% -0.0129 
-35 0.006124 0.001015 0.011234 60% -0.00677 
-34 -0.00252 -0.00032 -0.00473 35% -0.00929 
-33 0.003249 0.001671 0.004827 60% -0.00604 
-32 -0.01131 -0.02278 0.00017 35% -0.01735 
-31 0.008014 0.01231 0.003718 55% -0.00934 
-30 0.001639 -0.00111 0.004391 50% -0.0077 
-29 0.004265 -0.00502 0.013546 60% -0.00343 
-28 -0.00203 -0.00562 0.001567 40% -0.00546 
-27 -0.00072 0.000386 -0.00183 45% -0.00618 
-26 0.004274 0.006387 0.002161 40% -0.0019 
-25 -0.01155 -0.0083 -0.0148 40% -0.01345 
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-24 0.002054 0.007105 -0.003 60% -0.0114 
-23 0.012063 0.016345 0.00778 60% 0.000662 
-22 -0.00293 -0.00706 0.001201 40% -0.00227 
-21 0.006465 0.011856 0.001073 65% 0.004196 
-20 0.002634 -0.0068 0.012067 50% 0.006831 
-19 0.001356 0.002436 0.000277 50% 0.008187 
-18 -0.00413 -0.00927 0.001009 30% 0.004059 
-17 -0.00462 -0.00644 -0.0028 25% -0.00056 
-16 0.001457 -0.00784 0.010752 55% 0.000894 
-15 -0.00854 -0.01658 -0.0005 30% -0.00765 
-14 0.00035 0.002898 -0.0022 45% -0.0073 
-13 -0.01389 -0.02337 -0.00441 35% -0.02119 
-12 -0.00389 -0.01169 0.003915 45% -0.02508 
-11 -0.00263 0.000946 -0.0062 40% -0.02771 
-10 -0.00114 -0.00453 0.002256 50% -0.02884 
-9 -0.00077 -0.00683 0.005289 50% -0.02961 
-8 -0.00084 -0.00855 0.006856 50% -0.03046 
-7 -0.00038 -0.0007 -5.6E-05 40% -0.03084 
-6 0.000244 -0.00632 0.006807 55% -0.03059 
-5 -0.001 -0.00249 0.000498 55% -0.03159 
-4 -0.00123 -0.00814 0.005676 40% -0.03282 
-3 0.002399 -0.0004 0.005196 40% -0.03042 
-2 -0.00434 -0.00374 -0.00493 55% -0.03475 
-1 2.34E-05 -0.00788 0.007929 45% -0.03473 
0 -0.00438 0.005407 -0.01417 45% -0.03911 
1 0.013902 0.01402 0.013785 60% -0.02521 
2 0.005245 0.002537 0.007952 65% -0.01996 
3 -0.00073 0.001484 -0.00293 45% -0.02069 
4 0.003625 0.006595 0.000655 65% -0.01706 
5 0.00525 0.004383 0.006116 65% -0.01181 
6 0.012363 0.017244 0.007482 55% 0.000548 
7 0.001098 -0.00213 0.004324 65% 0.001646 
8 -0.00914 -0.02231 0.004024 35% -0.0075 
9 -0.00515 0.00364 -0.01394 40% -0.01265 




to -6 -0.0005566 
-
























0.002222419 0.001409 - -0.01048 
Average 








Table 6.26: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.01581 -0.01377 -0.02401 40% -0.01581 
-59 0.004113 0.0154 -0.04104 60% -0.0117 
-58 0.002306 -0.00299 0.023491 50% -0.0094 
-57 -0.00603 -0.00887 0.005338 40% -0.01543 
-56 -0.00368 -0.00061 -0.01597 40% -0.01911 
-55 0.013038 0.014415 0.007527 60% -0.00607 
-54 0.002699 0.00618 -0.01123 25% -0.00337 
-53 -0.00331 -0.00531 0.0047 55% -0.00668 
-52 0.005259 0.006028 0.002185 65% -0.00142 
-51 -0.01178 -0.01339 -0.00536 35% -0.0132 
-50 -0.01151 -0.00837 -0.02409 50% -0.02472 
-49 -0.00055 0.001192 -0.00752 45% -0.02527 
-48 -0.00094 -0.00261 0.005721 40% -0.02621 
-47 0.00941 0.009457 0.00922 45% -0.0168 
-46 -0.00032 -0.00028 -0.00047 45% -0.01712 
-45 0.009143 0.008829 0.010402 65% -0.00798 
-44 -0.00982 -0.01043 -0.00738 55% -0.01779 
-43 0.006258 0.003361 0.017847 55% -0.01154 
-42 -0.01026 -0.01343 0.002419 35% -0.0218 
-41 0.012711 0.009432 0.025827 30% -0.00909 
-40 -0.00208 -0.00774 0.02059 45% -0.01117 
-39 -0.00284 0.001177 -0.01892 60% -0.01401 
-38 -0.00057 0.002575 -0.01313 45% -0.01458 
-37 0.010491 0.015082 -0.00787 50% -0.00409 
-36 -0.00459 0.001587 -0.02931 25% -0.00868 
-35 -0.00273 0.006786 -0.04079 70% -0.01141 
-34 0.004362 0.000539 0.019655 60% -0.00705 
-33 0.016086 -0.0048 0.099616 45% 0.00904 
-32 -0.00038 0.00299 -0.01387 30% 0.008659 
-31 -0.01566 -0.00062 -0.07581 55% -0.007 
-30 0.005451 -0.00813 0.059764 40% -0.00155 
-29 -0.01089 -0.01437 0.003034 45% -0.01244 
-28 -0.00287 0.013969 -0.07021 55% -0.0153 
-27 -0.00472 -0.00235 -0.01419 55% -0.02002 
-26 0.003929 0.002495 0.009667 55% -0.01609 
-25 -0.01073 -0.00893 -0.01794 40% -0.02683 
-24 0.002532 0.013491 -0.04131 60% -0.0243 
-23 0.005887 0.0035 0.015436 70% -0.01841 
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-22 -0.00868 -0.00268 -0.03267 60% -0.02709 
-21 -0.00189 -0.00578 0.013666 50% -0.02898 
-20 0.004895 0.004788 0.005323 55% -0.02408 
-19 -0.01731 -0.01217 -0.03788 30% -0.0414 
-18 0.020981 0.002808 0.09367 55% -0.02042 
-17 -0.00533 0.002392 -0.03624 40% -0.02575 
-16 0.010297 0.005297 0.030294 60% -0.01545 
-15 -0.01163 -0.01211 -0.0097 40% -0.02708 
-14 -0.01733 -0.01957 -0.00837 35% -0.04441 
-13 -0.01141 -0.00969 -0.0183 40% -0.05582 
-12 0.001012 0.006719 -0.02181 45% -0.05481 
-11 0.008556 -0.01868 0.117504 35% -0.04625 
-10 -0.03467 -0.01386 -0.11792 45% -0.08092 
-9 0.00517 0.002112 0.017404 75% -0.07575 
-8 0.030696 0.038182 0.000753 75% -0.04506 
-7 0.003761 0.007163 -0.00985 45% -0.0413 
-6 0.000737 0.001026 -0.00042 40% -0.04056 
-5 0.001616 0.003287 -0.00507 55% -0.03894 
-4 0.002611 0.001504 0.007039 55% -0.03633 
-3 -0.01276 -0.01703 0.004319 40% -0.04909 
-2 0.024616 0.005826 0.099776 50% -0.02448 
-1 0.014631 0.01812 0.000675 55% -0.00985 
0 -0.01301 -0.01788 0.006488 45% -0.02286 
1 0.003792 0.011764 -0.02809 50% -0.01906 
2 -0.00507 -0.00965 0.013262 40% -0.02413 
3 0.005875 0.006539 0.003221 55% -0.01826 
4 0.000806 -0.00287 0.015495 50% -0.01745 
5 0.000204 0.001162 -0.00363 40% -0.01725 
6 -0.00252 0.003534 -0.02673 35% -0.01977 
7 -0.00192 -0.00367 0.005063 45% -0.02169 
8 0.024145 0.028423 0.007034 65% 0.002452 
9  0.004528  35%  






































Table 6.27: Daily average returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00537 -0.01682 -0.00155 45% -0.00537 
-59 -0.00627 -0.02764 0.000849 40% -0.01164 
-58 0.001706 0.014275 -0.00248 45% -0.00994 
-57 0.001001 -0.00383 0.00261 60% -0.00893 
-56 0.002146 0.017125 -0.00285 50% -0.00679 
-55 -0.00243 -0.00976 8.18E-06 35% -0.00922 
-54 -0.00315 0.00174 -0.00478 55% -0.01237 
-53 -0.00138 -0.01409 0.002862 50% -0.01375 
-52 0.008647 0.022457 0.004044 60% -0.0051 
-51 0.007067 0.006182 0.007362 45% 0.001968 
-50 0.003213 -0.00645 0.006433 60% 0.00518 
-49 -0.00403 -0.0174 0.000424 60% 0.001148 
-48 0.008811 0.022441 0.004267 65% 0.009959 
-47 -0.00358 0.004111 -0.00614 45% 0.006383 
-46 0.001881 0.000634 0.002297 40% 0.008264 
-45 0.005703 -0.00806 0.01029 60% 0.013967 
-44 0.013044 0.027313 0.008287 60% 0.02701 
-43 0.003543 0.009031 0.001713 55% 0.030553 
-42 -0.00583 0.00027 -0.00787 40% 0.024718 
-41 0.010113 0.032815 0.002545 55% 0.034831 
-40 0.004218 -0.00616 0.007677 50% 0.03905 
-39 0.001013 0.002231 0.000607 50% 0.040063 
-38 -0.004 -0.01149 -0.0015 45% 0.036064 
-37 -0.00819 -0.00358 -0.00973 35% 0.027871 
-36 -0.00024 0.008341 -0.0031 50% 0.027634 
-35 0.000876 -0.00801 0.003837 55% 0.02851 
-34 -0.00324 -0.00223 -0.00357 35% 0.025272 
-33 0.001806 -0.01306 0.006759 60% 0.027078 
-32 -0.00331 0.008877 -0.00737 55% 0.023772 
-31 -0.00361 0.002612 -0.00569 30% 0.02016 
-30 0.006425 -0.0032 0.009635 55% 0.026585 
-29 -0.01091 -0.01139 -0.01075 15% 0.015677 
-28 0.00465 0.010795 0.002602 50% 0.020327 
-27 0.01067 0.015684 0.008999 70% 0.030996 
-26 -0.00235 -0.00905 -0.00011 50% 0.02865 
-25 0.004266 -0.00156 0.006208 55% 0.032915 
-24 -0.00536 -0.01457 -0.00229 45% 0.027552 
-23 -0.00067 0.005521 -0.00273 35% 0.026885 
-22 -0.00396 -0.0039 -0.00398 35% 0.022926 
-21 -0.00242 -0.00201 -0.00256 45% 0.020504 
-20 -0.00086 -0.00554 0.0007 60% 0.019645 
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-19 -0.00292 -0.00293 -0.00291 35% 0.016729 
-18 -0.00719 -0.00361 -0.00839 45% 0.009536 
-17 -0.00648 -0.02128 -0.00154 40% 0.003059 
-16 0.009154 0.00255 0.011356 55% 0.012213 
-15 -0.00824 -0.02026 -0.00424 40% 0.003969 
-14 0.00077 0.000826 0.000752 45% 0.004739 
-13 -0.00232 0.012144 -0.00713 60% 0.002424 
-12 -0.01097 -0.01116 -0.01091 25% -0.00855 
-11 0.003834 0.005774 0.003187 55% -0.00471 
-10 -0.00194 -0.00313 -0.00155 45% -0.00666 
-9 0.012578 0.003042 0.015757 75% 0.005923 
-8 0.000743 0.010072 -0.00237 45% 0.006666 
-7 -0.00205 0.006438 -0.00488 55% 0.004617 
-6 -0.00144 -0.00541 -0.00011 45% 0.00318 
-5 0.000971 -0.00128 0.001721 60% 0.004152 
-4 0.001873 0.005367 0.000709 60% 0.006025 
-3 -0.00084 0.009769 -0.00437 40% 0.005186 
-2 -0.00253 -0.00856 -0.00052 35% 0.002657 
-1 -0.00176 0.004321 -0.00378 40% 0.000901 
0 0.006784 0.004607 0.00751 45% 0.007685 
1 -0.00609 -0.01301 -0.00378 45% 0.001599 
2 -0.00643 -0.01175 -0.00466 20% -0.00484 
3 -0.0069 -0.01588 -0.00391 45% -0.01174 
4 -3.2E-05 -0.00621 0.002026 60% -0.01177 
5 0.001907 -0.00513 0.004252 60% -0.00986 
6 0.000465 -0.0014 0.001084 55% -0.0094 
7 0.00118 -0.01128 0.005335 40% -0.00822 
8 0.006864 0.020232 0.002408 65% -0.00135 
9 -0.00053 -0.00034 -0.00059 40% -0.00188 




to -6 5.76E-05 
-
























to +10 -1.6662E-05 
-
0.000509324 0.000148 - 0.009438 
 
Table 6.28: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 

























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 0.001722 0.005263 -0.00485 40% 0.001722 
-59 0.00096 0.004675 -0.00594 55% 0.002682 
-58 -0.00866 -0.01115 -0.00403 40% -0.00598 
-57 0.003978 0.004203 0.00356 65% -0.002 
-56 0.000746 0.002605 -0.00271 45% -0.00126 
-55 0.006678 0.007815 0.004566 60% 0.005423 
-54 0.00448 0.00513 0.003272 55% 0.009903 
-53 -0.00117 -0.00138 -0.00079 35% 0.008729 
-52 -7E-05 -0.00158 0.002734 50% 0.008659 
-51 -0.00243 -0.00193 -0.00336 45% 0.006227 
-50 -0.00098 -0.00129 -0.00041 50% 0.005248 
-49 0.004631 0.004811 0.004298 65% 0.00988 
-48 -0.00179 -0.00288 0.000232 40% 0.008091 
-47 -0.00354 -0.0047 -0.00139 45% 0.004547 
-46 -0.00045 -0.00237 0.003113 50% 0.004098 
-45 0.003138 0.006714 -0.0035 60% 0.007236 
-44 0.000603 0.00397 -0.00565 55% 0.007839 
-43 -0.00035 0.00088 -0.00262 60% 0.007493 
-42 0.003101 0.000467 0.007993 65% 0.010594 
-41 -0.00311 -0.00127 -0.00652 35% 0.007484 
-40 -0.0061 -0.00589 -0.00648 50% 0.001384 
-39 -0.00104 0.000943 -0.00472 45% 0.000345 
-38 0.002384 -0.00185 0.01024 50% 0.002729 
-37 -0.00321 -0.00096 -0.00741 45% -0.00048 
-36 -0.00865 -0.01032 -0.00556 50% -0.00914 
-35 -0.00239 -0.0057 0.003774 45% -0.01152 
-34 -0.00123 -0.00435 0.004555 50% -0.01275 
-33 -0.00152 -0.00321 0.001614 50% -0.01428 
-32 0.000485 0.001667 -0.00171 50% -0.01379 
-31 -0.00223 -0.0031 -0.00062 30% -0.01602 
-30 0.002416 0.001648 0.003843 65% -0.01361 
-29 0.002834 0.00078 0.006649 55% -0.01077 
-28 -0.00358 -0.0083 0.005196 35% -0.01435 
-27 0.00679 0.01143 -0.00183 45% -0.00756 
-26 -0.00152 -0.00414 0.003344 55% -0.00908 
-25 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0052 55% -0.01188 
-24 0.002502 0.000261 0.006662 60% -0.00937 
-23 0.000396 0.0021 -0.00277 20% -0.00898 
-22 0.003215 0.005996 -0.00195 45% -0.00576 
-21 -0.00653 -0.00523 -0.00894 20% -0.01229 
-20 0.002162 0.002865 0.000855 45% -0.01013 
-19 0.000946 0.000773 0.001267 45% -0.00918 
-18 0.002337 0.001377 0.004122 40% -0.00684 
-17 0.00745 0.009333 0.003953 60% 0.000605 
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-16 -0.00703 -0.00846 -0.00437 30% -0.00643 
-15 -0.00039 -0.00219 0.002951 35% -0.00681 
-14 -0.00205 -0.00353 0.000699 40% -0.00887 
-13 -0.00189 -0.00257 -0.00062 55% -0.01076 
-12 0.008264 0.008662 0.007524 65% -0.00249 
-11 0.001957 0.00704 -0.00748 65% -0.00054 
-10 0.000396 0.000705 -0.00018 50% -0.00014 
-9 -0.00037 -0.00171 0.002112 35% -0.00051 
-8 -0.00194 -0.00036 -0.00487 35% -0.00244 
-7 0.000417 0.001965 -0.00246 50% -0.00203 
-6 -2.3E-05 0.002661 -0.00501 60% -0.00205 
-5 0.000776 0.002471 -0.00237 40% -0.00128 
-4 0.003387 -0.00071 0.010987 60% 0.002112 
-3 -0.0046 -0.00332 -0.00697 35% -0.00249 
-2 -0.00039 0.002538 -0.00584 40% -0.00288 
-1 -0.00076 -0.00203 0.001611 65% -0.00364 
0 -0.00375 -0.0005 -0.00979 35% -0.00739 
1 0.010529 0.01812 -0.00357 50% 0.003138 
2 -0.00061 0.000347 -0.0024 55% 0.002524 
3 0.00259 -0.00101 0.009271 60% 0.005114 
4 -0.00432 -0.00824 0.002967 50% 0.000796 
5 -0.00091 0.006664 -0.01498 45% -0.00012 
6 0.008418 0.010922 0.003767 70% 0.008302 
7 0.00206 0.003319 -0.00028 45% 0.010362 
8 0.006444 0.010868 -0.00177 65% 0.016807 
9 0.002193 0.002093 0.002378 55% 0.018999 






















to +10 0.00023693 0.000648042 -0.00053 - -0.00101 
 
 
Table 6.60: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.S in 2006 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
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UST0601 USB0601 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
UST0602 USB0602 2006 Materials 
UST0603 USB0603 2006 High Technology 
UST0604 USB0604 2006 Financials 
UST0605 USB0605 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
UST0606 USB0606 2006 Financials 
UST0607 USB0607 2006 Consumer Products and 
Services 
UST0608 USB0608 2006 Financials 
UST0609 USB0609 2006 High Technology 
UST0610 USB0610 2006 Healthcare 
UST0611 USB0611 2006 Retail 
UST0612 USB0612 2006 Financials 
UST0613 USB0613 2006 Financials 
UST0614 USB0614 2006 Healthcare 
UST0615 USB0615 2006 Financials 
UST0616 USB0616 2006 Materials 
UST0617 USB0617 2006 Healthcare 
UST0618 USB0618 2006 High Technology 
UST0619 USB0619 2006 High Technology 
UST0620 USB0620 2006 Healthcare 
 
Table 6.61: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.S in 2007 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
UST0701 USB0701 2007 High Technology 
UST0702 USB0702 2007 Financials 
UST0703 USB0703 2007 Healthcare 
UST0704 USB0704 2007 Financials 
UST0705 USB0705 2007 Industrials 
UST0706 USB0706 2007 Energy and Power 
UST0707 USB0707 2007 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
UST0708 USB0708 2007 Financials 
UST0709 USB0709 2007 High Technology 
UST0710 USB0710 2007 Retail 
UST0711 USB0711 2007 Healthcare 
UST0712 USB0712 2007 High Technology 
UST0713 USB0713 2007 Financials 
UST0714 USB0714 2007 Financials 
UST0715 USB0715 2007 Financials 
UST0716 USB0716 2007 Industrials 
UST0717 USB0717 2007 Materials 
UST0718 USB0718 2007 High Technology 
UST0719 USB0719 2007 Consumer 
Products and 
Services 
UST0720 USB0720 2007 High Technology 
 
Table 6.62: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.S in 2008 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
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UST0801 USB0801 2008 Healthcare 
UST0802 USB0802 2008 Healthcare 
UST0803 USB0803 2008 Financials 
UST0804 USB0804 2008 High Technology 
UST0805 USB0805 2008 High Technology 
UST0806 USB0806 2008 Real Estate 
UST0807 USB0807 2008 Industrials 
UST0808 USB0808 2008 Healthcare 
UST0809 USB0809 2008 High Technology 
UST0810 USB0810 2008 High Technology 
UST0811 USB0811 2008 Healthcare 
UST0812 USB0812 2008 High Technology 
UST0813 USB0813 2008 High Technology 
UST0814 USB0814 2008 Consumer Products and 
Services 
UST0815 USB0815 2008 Financials 
UST0816 USB0816 2008 Telecommunications 
Wireless 
UST0817 USB0817 2008 Healthcare 
UST0818 USB0818 2008 Real Estate 
UST0819 USB0819 2008 High Technology 
UST0820 USB0820 2008 Materials 
 
Table 6.63: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.S in 2009 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
UST0901 USB0901 2009 Industrials 
UST0902 USB0902 2009 High Technology 
UST0903 USB0903 2009 Financials 
UST0904 USB0904 2009 Telecommunications 
UST0905 USB0905 2009 Energy and Power 
UST0906 USB0906 2009 Financials 
UST0907 USB0907 2009 Energy and Power 
UST0908 USB0908 2009 High Technology 
UST0909 USB0909 2009 Financials 
UST0910 USB0910 2009 Materials 
UST0911 USB0911 2009 Industrials 
UST0912 USB0912 2009 Telecommunications 
UST0813 USB0913 2009 Consumer Products 
and Services 
UST0914 USB0914 2009 Consumer Staples 
UST0915 USB0915 2009 High Technology 
UST0916 USB0916 2009 High Technology 
UST0917 USB0917 2009 Industrials 
UST0918 USB0918 2009 High Technology 
UST0919 USB0919 2009 High Technology 
UST0920 USB0920 2009 Consumer Products 
and Services 
 
Table 6.64: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in the U.S in 2010 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
UST1001 USB1001 2010 Telecommunications 




UST1003 USB1003 2010 High Technology 
UST1004 USB1004 2010 High Technology 
UST1005 USB1005 2010 Real Estate 
UST1006 USB1006 2010 Industrials 
UST1007 USB1007 2010 Retail 
UST1008 USB1008 2010 Energy and Power 
UST1009 USB1009 2010 Healthcare 
UST1010 USB1010 2010 Telecommunications 
UST1011 USB1011 2010 Healthcare 
UST1012 USB1012 2010 Financials 
UST1013 USB1013 2010 Energy and Power 
UST1014 USB1014 2010 High Technology 
UST1015 USB1015 2010 High Technology 
UST1016 USB1016 2010 Healthcare 
UST1017 USB1017 2010 Healthcare 
UST1018 USB1018 2010 Financials 
UST1019 USB1019 2010 Energy and Power 
UST1020 USB1020 2010 Consumer Staples 
 
Table 6.65: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2006 
 










UST0601 +1 day 0.1647703 9.46 USB0601 Nothing   
UST0603 Nothing   USB0603 Nothing   
UST0604 Nothing   USB0604 Nothing   
UST0613 Nothing   USB0613 Nothing   
UST0606 Nothing   USB0606 Nothing   
UST0618 Nothing   USB0618 Nothing   
UST0614 -41 day -0.082747 -3.23 USB0614 -22 day 0.018881 3.34 
+1 day 0.1866326 8.30 -21 day 0.030609 5.41 
UST0602 -36 day 0.116685 2.78 USB0602 Nothing   
UST0619 +1 day 0.1549818 5.55 USB0619 -8 day -0.06954 -5.48 
UST0612 Nothing   USB0612 Nothing   
UST0605 Nothing   USB0605 Nothing   
UST0611 -48 day 0.09446 2.64 USB0611 +1 day 0.100292 8.41 
-11 day 0.1081841 3.04 
+1 day 0.1725583 5.05 
UST0609 Nothing   USB0609 +1 day 0.135941 6.75 
+5 day 0.091414 4.53 
UST0615 Nothing   USB0615 Nothing   
UST0610 +1 day 0.2094946 6.66 USB0610 Nothing   
UST0607 -42 day -0.048816 -2.39 USB0607 Nothing   
-9 day 0.0817382 4.14 
-5 day 0.0418523 2.12 
+1 day 0.1052927 5.46 
UST0616 Nothing   USB0616 +2 day 0.052754 2.16 
UST0617 -38 day 0.0475973 2.73 USB0617 Nothing   
-29 day 0.0423176 2.49 
-28 day 0.0351221 2.06 
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-25 day -0.034837 -2.04 
+1 day 0.1272702 8.44 
UST0608 +1 day 0.1444263 16.74 USB0608 +1 day -0.06721 -11.79 
+2 day 0.0205882 2.38 +2 day 0.021636 3.79 
UST0620 +1 day 0.4464343 21.03 USB0620 -43 day -0.04575 -3.31 
 
Table 6.66: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2007 
 










UST0709 Nothing   USB0709 -32 day -0.1541 -7.57 
UST0708 Nothing   USB0708 -29 day -0.0530 -7.82 
-26 day -0.0604 -8.91 
-23 day 0.0641 8.16 
UST0710 Nothing   USB0710 Nothing   
UST0716 Nothing   USB0716 Nothing   
UST0707 Nothing   USB0707 Nothing   
UST0701 Nothing   USB0701 -23 day 0.0792 3.78 
-16 day -0.0425 -1.97 
-14 day -0.0532 -2.68 
-13 day -0.0719 -3.61 
-12 day -0.0464 -2.30 
-11 day -0.0559 -2.81 
-10 day 0.0443 2.23 
-1 day -0.0609 -2.89 
0 day 0.0421 1.99 
UST0704 +1 day 1.100967 45.44 USB0704 Nothing   
UST0714 -4 day -0.06128 -3.07 USB0714 -57 day 0.0324 3.01 
-1 day -0.06743 -3.32 -56 day 0.0411 3.84 
0 day 0.210716 10.55 -55 day -0.0348 -3.20 
UST0706 -37 day -0.06008 -2.85 USB0706 Nothing   
UST0702 Nothing   USB0702 -27 day 0.0554 3.67 
-26 day 0.0472 3.11 
-25 day 0.0333 2.20 
UST0713 -16 day 
 
-0.15209 -4.45 USB0713 -14 day -0.0292 -2.66 
-13 day -0.0371 -3.43 
-15 day -0.07924 -2.32 -10 day -0.0417 -3.85 
-3 day 0.069536 1.97 -4 day -0.0358 -3.21 
-2 day 0.084090 2.38 0 day 0.0348 3.12 
+1 day 0.0788 7.84 
+1 day 0.194603 5.82 +3 day 0.0275 2.69 
UST0712 Nothing   USB0712 -24 day 0.0419 2.97 
-23 day 0.0343 2.42 
-20 day -0.0314 -2.22 
UST0703 Nothing   USB0703 Nothing   
UST0719 -9 day -0.12461 -4.32 USB0719 -34 day 0.0476 2.82 
-8 day 0.059353 2.02 -31 day 0.0475 2.81 
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-7 day 1.407552 48.92 +8 day -0.1032 -6.68 
+10 day 0.0566 3.66 
UST0715 -49 day 0.257104 5.13 USB0715 Nothing   
UST0720 Nothing   USB0720 Nothing   
UST0705 Nothing   USB0705 Nothing   
UST0717 -24 day 0.182138 5.43 
 
USB0717 +1 day 0.0704 2.14 
UST0718 -27 day -0.11168 -2.78 USB0718 Nothing   
-21 day -0.10994 -2.91 
-20 day 0.152235 4.03 
UST0711 -53 day 0.444668 6.99 USB0711 Nothing   
-17 day -0.18549 -2.60 
-11 day 0.322263 4.68 
-8 day 0.153370 2.17 
-7 day 0.151526 2.14 
 
Table 6.67: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2008 
 
Target Note for the 
Target 






UST0817 Nothing   USB0817 -28 day 0.0706 2.20 
+1 day 0.0764 2.44 
+4 day 0.0884 2.82 
UST0801 Nothing   USB0801 -23 day -0.1718 -3.53 
-20 day 0.1007 2.10 
UST0815 -18 day 0.083192 3.04 USB0815 +6 day 0.2466 3.70 
 
-6 day 0.098260 3.57 
-4 day -0.06487 -2.33 
UST0816 -21 day -0.18894 -2.09 USB0816 
 
-19 day 0.0579 3.82 
+1 day 0.0289 1.97 
+1 day 1.040067 22.25 +4 day 0.0295 1.98 
UST0810 Nothing   USB0810 -31 day -0.1216 -3.68 
+1 day -0.0982 -3.05 
+5 day 0.1191 3.61 
UST0819 -24 day 0.091505 3.03 USB0819 Nothing   
UST0807 -33 day -0.15727 -2.38 USB0807 -29 day -0.1162 -2.15 
-29 day -0.15884 -2.45 -28 day -0.1770 -3.32 
-25 day -0.14497 -2.17 
-2 day 0.1704 3.22 
-24 day 0.178818 3.45 
-1 day 0.1578 2.91 
-23 day 0.509461 9.82 
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-22 day 0.179107 3.46 
UST0803 -53 day -0.12675 -2.45 USB0803 
 
-4 day -0.1369 -3.95 
-12 day -0.25978 -5.30 
0 day 0.1971 5.80 
-6 day -0.12038 -2.33 
-4 day 0.146694 2.91 +4 day -0.0783 -2.03 
-3 day 0.183142 3.65 
UST0806 -18 day -0.31292 -2.07 USB0806 -46 day 0.1311 2.17 
-17 day -0.59144 -3.90 -39 day 0.1157 2.00 
-14 day 0.390891 2.62 -38 day -0.1300 -2.13 
-13 day 0.651435 4.39 -37 day 0.1930 3.33 
-12 day -0.34822 -2.35 -9 day -0.3161 -6.88 
-8 day 1.29248 10.06 -8 day 0.4590 9.99 
-7 day 0.349656 2.76 -6 day 0.0947 2.08 
UST0802 -47 day 0.379208 17.43 USB0802 +1 day 0.0421 3.11 
+3 day -0.0744 -5.40 
+4 day -0.0477 -3.60 
+5 day 0.0711 4.89 
UST0820 Nothing   USB0820 Nothing   
UST0818 -21 day 0.082885 2.37 USB0818 +1 day 0.1393 4.55 
-20 day 0.124048 3.62 
-19 day -0.17320 -5.35 
-17 day -0.07747 -2.39 +5 day 0.0902 2.92 
0 day 0.107392 2.94 
+2 day 0.100821 2.93 
UST0808 Nothing   USB0808 -37 day -0.0365 -3.34 
-36 day -0.0243 -2.27 
-35 day 0.0599 5.33 
-23 day -0.0358 -3.16 
-22 day -0.0322 -2.84 
UST0812 Nothing   USB0812 +1 day -0.0515 -3.20 
+5 day -0.0523 -3.21 
UST0811 -32 day -0.29302 -7.58 USB0811 -32 day -0.0364 -3.38 
-31 day -0.0244 -2.31 
-30 day 0.131923 3.32 -30 day 0.0595 5.36 
-1 day 0.221429 5.40 -18 day -0.0358 -3.20 
0 day 0.110813 2.70 -17 day -0.0323 -2.88 
+2 day -0.0299 -2.59 
UST0813 -4 day 0.678479 5.94 USB0813 Nothing   
UST0809 -36 day -0.45935 -4.17 USB0809 Nothing   
-6 day -0.55488 -5.18 
-1 day 0.246413 2.14 
0 day 0.642534 6.25 
UST0805 -3 day 0.086960 2.77 USB0805 -38 day -0.0514 -2.74 
0 day 0.270692 8.69 -36 day 0.1384 7.40 
UST0814 +1 day -0.34266 -14.71 USB0814 -16 day 0.0332 1.99 
+2 day -0.06146 -2.64 





Table 6.68: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2009 
 
Target Note for the 
Target 






UST0919 +1 day 0.322801 11.59 USB0919 Nothing   
UST0901 Nothing   USB0901 Nothing   
UST0902 Nothing   USB0902 Nothing   
UST0909 Nothing   USB0909 Nothing   
UST0908 Nothing   USB0908 Nothing   
UST0914 Nothing   USB0914 Nothing   
UST0905 -52 day -0.86227 -5.99 USB0905 Nothing   
-48 day 0.703047 4.76 
-45 day -0.29859 -2.02 
+6 day 1.001762 7.17 
UST0903 -14 day -0.22118 -3.44 USB0903 -49 day -0.1749 -5.58 
UST0906 -48 day -0.27359 -5.96 USB0906 Nothing   
-1 day 0.320714 7.34 
UST0910 +1 day 0.475689 12.60 USB0910 -59 day -0.0744 -1.98 
-58 day 0.0745 1.98 
UST0913 Nothing   USB0913 Nothing   
UST0918 Nothing   USB0918 Nothing   
UST0912 Nothing   USB0912 +6 day 0.0319 2.63 
UST0911 -29 day 1.590638 5.01 USB0911 Nothing   
UST0920 +6 day 0.256558 14.09 USB0920 Nothing   
UST0904 Nothing   USB0904 -41 day 0.1602 8.91 
UST0916 +1 day 0.243317 7.33 USB0916 +1 day -0.0847 -4.00 
UST0915 Nothing   USB0915 Nothing   
UST0917 Nothing   USB0917 Nothing   





Table 6.69: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in the U.S 2010 
 
Target Note for the 
Target 






UST1020 Nothing   UST1020 -31 day -0.0577 -5.32 
UST1001 -43 day 0.036265 2.21 USB1001 Nothing   
-41 day 0.125649 7.67 
-40 day 0.057958 3.54 
UST1014 -12 day 0.304533 9.36 USB1014 -3 day -0.0333 -3.04 
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UST1004 -1 day 0.564801 7.40 USB1004 
 
-57 day 0.0341 2.49 
0 day 0.242175 3.17 
UST1009 +1 day 0.308957 5.08 USB1009 +3 day -0.0390 -2.43 
+4 day -0.0322 -2.00 
+5 day -0.0336 -2.08 
UST1011 +3 day -0.89967 -4.24 USB1011 -36 day -0.2402 -12.02 
+4 day 5.988618 28.25 -35 day -0.1101 -5.51 
+5 day -0.43896 -2.07 -17 day 0.0878 3.25 
UST1005 Nothing   USB1005 Nothing   
UST1006 Nothing   USB1006 -58 day -0.1274 -10.92 
-53 day -0.0300 -2.02 
-48 day -0.0317 -2.14 
UST1002 +1 day 1.569238 12.05 USB1002 Nothing   
UST1003 Nothing   USB1003 -33 day -0.0226 -2.03 
UST1010 Nothing   USB1010 Nothing   
UST1017 Nothing   UST1017 Nothing   
UST1007 -58 day 0.074602 3.50 USB1007 Nothing   
-48 day -0.07729 -3.79 
-46 day -0.07678 -3.76 
-18 day 0.074994 3.56 
-1 day 0.093194 4.50 
UST1016 -44 day 0.248946 8.03 USB1016 +6 day 0.0360 2.89 
-3 day 0.075176 2.20 +7 day 0.0866 6.95 
0 day 0.116901 3.42 +8 day 0.0369 2.95 
UST1015 Nothing   USB1015 +1 day 0.0724 3.27 
UST1013 +9 day -0.07611 -3.58 USB1013 +2 day -0.0549 -4.63 
+3 day -0.0477 -4.04 
+4 day -0.0312 -2.64 
+5 day 0.0736 6.21 
+10 day 0.097601 4.62 +6 day 0.0453 3.38 
+8 day 0.0440 3.27 
UST1012 Nothing   USB1012 +3 day 0.0286 2.26 
+4 day 0.0251 1.98 
UST1008 Nothing   USB1008 +1 day 0.0593 4.10 
UST1018 Nothing   USB1018 Nothing   
UST1019 -33 day -0.40197 -7.95 USB1019 -27 day 0.1475 4.88 
-32 day 0.118456 2.34 
 
 




Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
UST0601/stationary 0.00 USB0601/stationary 0.00 
UST0602/stationary 0.00 USB0602/stationary 0.00 
UST0603/stationary 0.00 USB0603/stationary 0.00 
UST0604/stationary 0.00 USB0604/stationary 0.00 
UST0605/stationary 0.00 USB0605/stationary 0.00 
UST0606/stationary 0.00 USB0606/stationary 0.00 
UST0607/stationary 0.00 USB0607/stationary 0.00 
UST0608/stationary 0.00 USB0608/stationary 0.00 
UST0609/stationary 0.00 USB0609/stationary 0.00 
UST0610/stationary 0.00 USB0610/stationary 0.00 
UST0611/stationary 0.00 USB0611/stationary 0.00 
UST0612/stationary 0.00 USB0612/stationary 0.00 
UST0613/stationary 0.00 USB0613/stationary 0.00 
UST0614/stationary 0.00 USB0614/stationary 0.00 
UST0615/stationary 0.00 USB0615/stationary 0.00 
UST0616/stationary 0.00 USB0616/stationary 0.00 
UST0617/stationary 0.00 USB0617/stationary 0.00 
UST0618/stationary 0.00 USB0618/stationary 0.00 
UST0619/stationary 0.00 USB0619/stationary 0.00 
UST0620/stationary 0.00 USB0620/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 6.77: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.S 2007 
 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
UST0701/stationary 0.00 USB0701/stationary 0.00 
UST0702/stationary 0.00 USB0702/stationary 0.00 
UST0703/stationary 0.00 USB0703/stationary 0.00 
UST0704/stationary 0.00 USB0704/stationary 0.00 
UST0705/stationary 0.00 USB0705/stationary 0.00 
UST0706/stationary 0.00 USB0706/stationary 0.00 
UST0707/stationary 0.00 USB0707/stationary 0.00 
UST0708/stationary 0.00 USB0708/stationary 0.00 
UST0709/stationary 0.00 USB0709/stationary 0.00 
UST0710/stationary 0.00 USB0710/stationary 0.00 
UST0711/stationary 0.00 USB0711/stationary 0.00 
UST0712/stationary 0.00 USB0712/stationary 0.00 
UST0713/stationary 0.00 USB0713/stationary 0.00 
UST0714/stationary 0.00 USB0714/stationary 0.00 
UST0715/stationary 0.00 USB0715/stationary 0.00 
UST0716/stationary 0.00 USB0716/stationary 0.00 
UST0717/stationary 0.00 USB0717/stationary 0.00 
UST0718/stationary 0.00 USB0718/stationary 0.00 
UST0719/stationary 0.00 USB0719/stationary 0.00 




Table 6.78: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.S 2008 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
UST0801/stationary 0.00 USB0801/stationary 0.00 
UST0802/stationary 0.00 USB0802/stationary 0.00 
UST0803/stationary 0.00 USB0803/stationary 0.00 
UST0804/stationary 0.00 USB0804/stationary 0.00 
UST0805/stationary 0.00 USB0805/stationary 0.00 
UST0806/stationary 0.00 USB0806/stationary 0.00 
UST0807/stationary 0.00 USB0807/stationary 0.00 
UST0808/stationary 0.00 USB0808/stationary 0.00 
UST0809/stationary 0.00 USB0809/stationary 0.00 
UST0810/stationary 0.00 USB0810/stationary 0.00 
UST0811/stationary 0.00 USB0811/stationary 0.00 
UST0812/stationary 0.00 USB0812/stationary 0.00 
UST0813/stationary 0.00 USB0813/stationary 0.00 
UST0814/stationary 0.00 USB0814/stationary 0.00 
UST0815/stationary 0.00 USB0815/stationary 0.00 
UST0816/stationary 0.00 USB0816/stationary 0.00 
UST0817/stationary 0.00 USB0817/stationary 0.00 
UST0818/stationary 0.00 USB0818/stationary 0.00 
UST0819/stationary 0.00 USB0819/stationary 0.00 
UST0820/stationary 0.00 USB0820/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 6.79: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.S 2009 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
UST0901/stationary 0.00 USB0901/stationary 0.00 
UST0902/stationary 0.00 USB0902/stationary 0.00 
UST0903/stationary 0.00 USB0903/stationary 0.00 
UST0904/stationary 0.00 USB0904/stationary 0.00 
UST0905/stationary 0.00 USB0905/stationary 0.00 
UST0906/stationary 0.00 USB0906/stationary 0.00 
UST0907/stationary 0.00 USB0907/stationary 0.00 
UST0908/stationary 0.00 USB0908/stationary 0.00 
UST0909/stationary 0.00 USB0909/stationary 0.00 
UST0910/stationary 0.00 USB0910/stationary 0.00 
UST0911/stationary 0.00 USB0911/stationary 0.00 
UST0912/stationary 0.00 USB0912/stationary 0.00 
UST0913/stationary 0.00 USB0913/stationary 0.00 
UST0914/stationary 0.00 USB0914/stationary 0.00 
UST0915/stationary 0.00 USB0915/stationary 0.00 
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UST0916/stationary 0.00 USB0916/stationary 0.00 
UST0917/stationary 0.00 USB0917/stationary 0.00 
UST0918/stationary 0.00 USB0918/stationary 0.00 
UST0919/stationary 0.00 USB0919/stationary 0.00 
UST0920/stationary 0.00 USB0920/stationary 0.00 
 
Table 6.80: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in U.S 2010 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
UST1001/stationary 0.00 USB1001/stationary 0.00 
UST1002/stationary 0.00 USB1002/stationary 0.00 
UST1003/stationary 0.00 USB1003/stationary 0.00 
UST1004/stationary 0.00 USB1004/stationary 0.00 
UST1005/stationary 0.00 USB1005/stationary 0.00 
UST1006/stationary 0.00 USB1006/stationary 0.00 
UST1007/stationary 0.00 USB1007/stationary 0.00 
UST1008/stationary 0.00 USB1008/stationary 0.00 
UST1009/stationary 0.00 USB1009/stationary 0.00 
UST1010/stationary 0.00 USB1010/stationary 0.00 
UST1011/stationary 0.00 USB1011/stationary 0.00 
UST1012/stationary 0.00 USB1012/stationary 0.00 
UST1013/stationary 0.00 USB1013/stationary 0.00 
UST1014/stationary 0.00 USB1014/stationary 0.00 
UST1015/stationary 0.00 USB1015/stationary 0.00 
UST1016/stationary 0.00 USB1016/stationary 0.00 
UST1017/stationary 0.00 USB1017/stationary 0.00 
UST1018/stationary 0.00 USB1018/stationary 0.00 
UST1019/stationary 0.00 USB1019/stationary 0.00 









Chapter 7    Insider trading in domestic China M&As 
from 2006 to 2010 
 
Section 7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 is the analysis of insider trading with China data. The models and method 
used in this chapter are the same those used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The only 
difference is the limitation in the data collection.  Only 18 firms remain in this 
analysis, and 31 firms are dropped. Furthermore, only three filters are applied in this 
chapter. The initiative was to include the news search as a second filter of insider 
trading, however, there is no English news found with Nexis regarding to the Chinese 
firms involved in this study. The reason could be that China is not as open as the 
western countries, and therefore, the information especially the rumours would not be 
as transparent as those of U.K and U.S. 
 
Section 7.2 Data and Model 
The sample and data collection 
In this chapter, a sample of 18 stocks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange was gathered in total for a five year period from 2006 to 2010. The sample 
contains 18 targets and 18 bidders.  Table 7.1 shows the number of firms initially 
collected and the number of firms after adjustment. 31 firms are dropped due to the 
following reasons: (i): some stocks are exchanged in the Hong Kong stock market and 
therefore are exchanged with U.S. dollars. In this chapter, only the stocks exchanged 
with Chinese Yuan remain in the database. (ii): for some firms, some of the daily 
returns are missing. (iii): due to the information limitation, some of the Chinese firms 
are not included in Datastream. The daily turnover is collected with Datastream. 
However, there are still some firms whose daily turnovers cannot be found. This 
might due to the imperfection of the database. 
 
Table 7.1 Summary statistics for the sample of 19 target firms in China acquisitions 
for the period 2006-2010  
 






2006 13 2 2 
2007 9 6 6 
2008 18 7 6 
2009 8 3 2 
2010 2 0 0 
Total 50 19 16 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Table 7.17 in the appendix show the names, announcement dates and industries of the 
18 target firms and the 18 acquiring firms. The data was collected from the same 
source as the U.K and U.S.  
 
Section 7.3 Empirical Results 
Section 7.3.1 The analysis of AR and CAAR before the three-filter 
approach 
 
In this Section, both the AR and CAAR are presented to give a general idea of the 
M&A stocks in the Chinese stock market from 2006 to 2010. Graph 7.1 below is the 


















Graph 7.1: the AR and CAAR in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
 
Graph 7.1 shows the pattern of CAAR and AR from days -60 to +10 relative to the 
announcement date. The AR is fluctuating about 0 before the merger announcement. 
However, in regard to the CAAR, an increasing trend can be observed from the 
beginning of the event window. From -25 onwards, the CAAR decreases sharply until 
day -10 after which a more pronounced increasing trend is observed. Since the plot of 
AR and CAAR show that there is a sign of CAAR buidup prior to the merger 
announcement, insider trading is a potential problem in China. 
 
Section 7.3.2The results of the first filter-the dummy variable 
approach for the targets 
 
Table 7.2 shows the results of the daily average returns (AR) of the total, the 
suspected and the clean firms respectively and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) of the total firms for China from 2006 to 2010. The percent of daily residuals 
which are positive,out of the total firms is also calculated. The results are from the 
market model. The results from the market adjusted model and the modified market 
model are included in the appendix. Although there are slight differences in the results 































Tables 7.2:  Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00518 0.00104 -0.0097 37% -0.00518 
-59 -0.00301 0.006829 -0.01016 37% -0.00819 
-58 -0.0002 -0.00297 0.001807 32% -0.00839 
-57 0.001421 0.003724 -0.00025 26% -0.00697 
-56 0.001129 0.012152 -0.00689 53% -0.00584 
-55 0.010889 0.013636 0.008891 53% 0.00505 
-54 0.001598 0.013188 -0.00683 47% 0.006648 
-53 0.001388 0.00443 -0.00082 47% 0.008036 
-52 -0.00349 -0.00298 -0.00387 37% 0.004541 
-51 -0.00177 -0.00328 -0.00068 53% 0.002767 
-50 0.003824 0.002866 0.004521 42% 0.006591 
-49 -0.00042 -0.00395 0.00214 47% 0.006168 
-48 -0.00359 -0.00386 -0.00339 42% 0.002581 
-47 0.000363 0.003755 -0.0021 32% 0.002944 
-46 0.001889 0.003223 0.000919 47% 0.004833 
-45 0.0013 -0.00537 0.006148 37% 0.006133 
-44 0.006803 -0.00309 0.013999 53% 0.012936 
-43 0.005393 0.010708 0.001527 42% 0.018329 
-42 -0.00513 -0.01022 -0.00142 21% 0.013203 
-41 5.45E-05 0.005844 -0.00416 53% 0.013257 
-40 0.00751 0.004629 0.009605 53% 0.020767 
-39 0.002902 0.010149 -0.00237 53% 0.023669 
-38 -0.00075 0.003103 -0.00355 32% 0.022918 
-37 0.002068 -0.0066 0.008374 53% 0.024986 
-36 -0.00096 0.010128 -0.00903 37% 0.024022 
-35 -0.00588 -0.01377 -0.00014 53% 0.018144 
-34 0.009301 -0.00293 0.018197 68% 0.027445 
-33 0.003559 0.007658 0.000578 47% 0.031005 
-32 0.001174 0.007512 -0.00344 53% 0.032179 
-31 -0.0072 0.003715 -0.01514 26% 0.024976 
-30 -0.01159 -0.01243 -0.01098 26% 0.013384 
-29 0.003629 0.000422 0.005962 37% 0.017013 
-28 0.001323 0.007833 -0.00341 32% 0.018336 
-27 -0.00389 -0.00382 -0.00394 32% 0.014448 
-26 0.01606 0.024826 0.009684 63% 0.030507 
-25 0.008637 0.020024 0.000356 68% 0.039144 
-24 0.010488 0.005508 0.01411 58% 0.049633 
-23 0.004026 0.000603 0.006515 37% 0.053659 
-22 0.011842 0.023391 0.003442 58% 0.0655 
-21 -0.01266 -0.01161 -0.01342 37% 0.052842 
-20 -0.0027 -0.01023 0.002774 42% 0.05014 
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-19 -0.01251 -0.02115 -0.00622 37% 0.037631 
-18 0.001373 0.015189 -0.00867 37% 0.039004 
-17 -0.0098 -0.00914 -0.01029 21% 0.0292 
-16 -0.00504 -0.01036 -0.00117 37% 0.024161 
-15 0.002892 0.001365 0.004002 58% 0.027052 
-14 -0.00516 -0.00523 -0.00511 26% 0.021894 
-13 -0.00302 -0.00934 0.001583 47% 0.018876 
-12 0.003063 0.005887 0.001009 74% 0.021938 
-11 -0.00242 -0.00596 0.00016 37% 0.019522 
-10 -0.00043 0.004167 -0.00378 47% 0.01909 
-9 0.008844 0.007185 0.010051 58% 0.027934 
-8 0.009322 0.01818 0.00288 53% 0.037256 
-7 0.004995 0.014612 -0.002 47% 0.042251 
-6 0.003257 0.00718 0.000403 53% 0.045508 
-5 0.00506 0.014544 -0.00184 47% 0.050568 
-4 0.008014 0.001899 0.012461 53% 0.058582 
-3 -0.00158 0.003606 -0.00535 42% 0.057003 
-2 0.006541 0.020026 -0.00327 42% 0.063544 
-1 0.000639 -0.00238 0.002834 42% 0.064183 
0 0.002138 0.001066 0.002918 47% 0.066322 
1 0.017985 0.025396 0.012596 58% 0.084307 
2 0.037591 0.034175 0.040074 79% 0.121897 
3 -0.00594 -0.0168 0.001965 37% 0.115961 
4 -0.00652 -0.0081 -0.00536 32% 0.109446 
5 -0.00174 0.00139 -0.00402 37% 0.107703 
6 -0.00585 0.000798 -0.01068 37% 0.101857 
7 -0.00054 -0.01231 0.008011 32% 0.101313 
8 -0.01696 -0.00979 -0.02217 16% 0.084357 
9 -0.01151 -0.01088 -0.01196 37% 0.07285 
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Graph 7.2: The % of firms with positive AR relative to the announcement day in 
China from 2006 to 2010 
 
 
According to Graph 7.2, there are more firms getting negative AR than those getting 
positive. The highest percentage appears on +2 day, the second day after the 
announcement day. On that day, 80% of the total firms have positive AR. On day 0, 
less than 50% of the M&A firms are getting positive AR and the evidence might 
suggests inefficiency in the stock market as the stock prices delay in responding to the 
M&A event. 
 
Table 7.3: The codes of the clean and suspected target firms after the dummy variable 
approach in China from 2006 to 2010 
2006-2010  
The code of the clean firms The code of the suspected firms 
CNT0601 CNT0802 CNT0901 CNT0602 CNT0706 
CNT0701 CNT0803 CNT0902 CNT0702 CNT0804 
CNT0705 CNT0807 CNT0903 CNT0703 CNT0805 
































Figure 7.1: Daily average return for China target firms from 2006 to 2010 from the 
Market model 
 
According to Figure 7.1, the ARs of both the clean and the suspected firms have 
spikes before the merger announcement. It is also noticeable that comparing to the 
cases of U.K and U.S, Chinese firms are getting smaller AR but they do in the days 
after the merger announcement. The delay in reacting to mergers suggests (i) there is 
no need for insider trading, just the insiders should be ready to buy on day 0 and (ii) 
there are profits to be made by looking out for merger announcements and buying 
immediately. Moreover, on day 0, neither the clean nor the suspected gets substantial 
AR. Further studies need to be done to support the dummy variable approach.   
 
Figure 7.2 shows the AR for China target firms from 2006 to 2010 based on Table 7.4 
from the market adjusted model. Although Table 7.2 is slightly different from Table 
7.4, when plotting the data, they are identical. Therefore, the discussion of Figure 7.2 
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Figure 1 aily average return for China target firms from 2006 to 2010
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Figure 7.3 gives the CAAR of both the suspected and clean firms in China from 2006 
to 2010 after the dummy variable approach. 




According to Figure 7.3, the CAAR of the clean firms is experiencing ups and dips 
before day -18. From -18 onwards, an increasing trend is observed. For the suspected 
firms, the buildup in the CAAR starts from the beginning of the event window, with 
occasional dips in between. In addition, only noticeable day 0 return is for the 
suspected firms.  
 
Section 7.3.3Results of the first filter-the dummy variable approach 
for the bidders 
 
Table 7.6 in the appendix is the result of the AR and CAAR for the bidder firms in 
China from 2006 to 2010.  Figure 4 gives the AR for the China bidders from 2006 to 
2010 from the market model based on Table 7.6. This thesis focuses mainly on the 
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Figure 7.4: Daily average return for China bidder firms from 2006 to 2010 from the 
Market model 
 
According to Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.4, the ARs of the China targets and 
bidders seem more noisy than those of the U.K and U.S. However, comparing to the 
evidences of the U.K and U.S, the daily average returns are much lower in China. For 
the China targets, the highest daily average returns of both the suspected firms and the 
clean firms appear on day 0. The clean target firms get about 4% abnormal returns on 
day +1 and the suspected target firms get an abnormal return which is slightly lower 
at around 3%.  This again gives evidence that the stock market might be inefficient as 
the stock prices delay in responding the merger event. In the cases of U.K and U.S, 
the lowest abnormal return of the clean target firms on the announcement day is found 
in U.K 2009 at about 2.5%. In other years, the clean target firms can get more than 10% 
on the announcement day. For the suspected firms, the lowest abnormal return on day 
0 is found in U.K 2006 at about 2.5%. The reason why the abnormal returns of the 
China targets and bidders are much more noisy than those in U.K and U.S might be 
attributed to the data used in running the regression. In Chapter 5 and 6, the 
regressions were done year by year while in this chapter, due to the data limitation, 
the data from 2006 to 2010 was combined to run a single regression. The reason of 
the ARs being noisy might be that the Chinese stock market is smaller and less mature 
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Table 7.7 in the appendix give the results of the AR and CAAR of China bidder firms 
from 2006 to 2010 based on the market adjusted model. Although Table 7.7 seems 
different from the Table 7.6, the graphs from the market-adjusted model are identical 
with those from the market model. As a result, the discussion is omitted for the results 
from the market-adjusted model. 
 
Section 7.3.4The CAAR analysis after the first filter for both the 
targets and bidders  
 
Section 7.3.4 is the CAAR analysis of the Chinese M&A firms after the first filter-the 
dummy variable approach for both the targets and bidders. Figure 7.5 gives the 
CAAR of China targets and bidders from 2006 to 2010. 
 
According to Figure 7.5, CAAR of the targets has a positive slope while the CAAR of 
the bidder has a negative slope before -10 day. From -60 day onwards, the CAAR of 
the targets increases gradually and from -10 day onwards, it starts to increase rapidly 
and peaks at 12% on day 0 and afterwards, it begins to decrease. Starting from 0% on 
-60 day, the CAAR of the bidders decreases gradually for a 50 day period. It bottoms 
at about -7% on -10 day. From -10 day onwards, it starts to increase and peaks at 0% 
on the announcement day and afterwards, it begins to decrease. It is noticeable that 
there seems a delayed response of the market to respond to the merger announcement 
The CAAR of the targets peaks on day 2








































-60 -40 -20 0 202
day
CAAR of the targets CAAR of the bidders
Figure 5 The CAAR of China from 2006 to 2010
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because both the CAARs of the targets and bidders peak on day +2. This might be 
attributed to two possible reasons: (i) The Chinese stock market is not efficient; and 
(ii) this is simply the characteristic of a young market. 
 
Section 7.3.5The results of the detection of the outliers  
 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the results of the detection of outliers. Based on the results 
from the first filter, each of the clean and suspected group is examined respectively 
whether they have positive squared abnormal returns equal or greater than 3.5 or 4 
multiplied by the standard error. 
 
Table 7.8: The day(s) on which the clean firms have outliers 3.5*SD or 4*SD in the 
China from 2006 to 2010 
 
The suspected target 
firms 
The day(s) on which the 
squared abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics 
CNT0601 -1 day 3.40*** 
CNT0701 -24 day 3.00*** 
CNT0705 None - 
CNT0801 None - 
CNT0802 -50 day 3.78*** 
-45 day (3.5*SD) 2.93*** 
CNT0803 -4 day 3.44*** 
CNT0807 -55 day (3.5*SD) 2.44** 
CNT0808 None - 
CNT0901 -33 day 1.06 
-43 day (3.5*SD) 0.91 
CNT0902 -45 day 2.20** 
CNT0903 -7 day 2.35** 
-26 day (3.5*SD) 1.99** 
 
Table 7.9: The day(s) on which the suspected firms have positive outliers 3.5*SD or 
4*SD in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
The suspected target 
firms 
The day(s) on which the 
squared abnormal return is 
greater than 4*SD 
t-statistics 
CNT0602 -23 day 4.37*** 
CNT0702 -28 day 3.09*** 
-38 day 3.60*** 
CNT0703 -31 day (3.5*SD) 4.30*** 
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-18 day 4.98*** 
-5 day 5.09*** 
CNT0704 -25 day 3.44*** 
CNT0706 -38 day 3.56*** 
-2 day 3.81*** 
CNT0804 -26 day 4.13*** 
-22 day (3.5*SD) 3.58*** 
-8 day (3.5*SD) 3.66*** 
CNT0805 -47 day 5.80*** 
CNT0806 -3 day 2.40** 
 
 
Section 7.3.6The categorization after two filters-the dummy variable 
approach, and the detection of the outliers 
 
Table 7.10 gives the categorization of the clean, suspected and ultra-suspected firms 
after the dummy variable approach and the detection of outliers. 
 
Table 7.10: The codes of the clean, suspected and ultra-suspected firms after two 
filters in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  
The code of the 
clean firms 
The code of the suspected 
firms 
The code of the ultra-suspected 
firms 
None CN0601 CNT0602 
2007 
The code of the 
clean firms 
The code of the suspected 
firms 
The code of the ultra-suspected 
firms 
CNT0705 CNT0701 CNT0702 CNT0704 
  CNT0703  
  CNT0706  
2008  
The code of the 
clean firms 
The code of the suspected 
firms 
The code of the ultra-suspected 
firms 
CNT0801 CNT0802 CNT0804 
CNT0808 CNT0807 CNT0806 
 CNT0803 CNT0805 
2009  
The code of the 
clean firms 
The code of the suspected 
firms 
The code of the ultra-suspected 
firms 
CNT0901 CNT0902 None 
 CNT0903  
Note: There were no firms from 2010 





Section 7.3.7The Result of the Abnormal Turnover (AT) analysis 
 
Table 7.11: The result of the AT analysis in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006  















The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None CN0601 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
2007 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None CN0705, CN0704, 
CN0701 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
2008 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None CNT0803 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
2009 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None None 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 
2010 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-61day to -11 day 
None None None 
The average of the 
turnover from          
-10day to 0 day 
None None None 




Similar to the results of the U.K and U.S, Table 7.11 shows that in a period from -61 
to -10 day, abnormal high turnovers which are at least 200% higher than the 
benchmark trade volume of some firms are seen. This is a sign that most possible 
cases of insider trading take place one or two months prior to the merger 
announcement. In addition, this is suggestive that insider traders are those closely 
involved with the merger, or in other words, those who are able to get the information 
of a potential merger at a very early stage rather than those who acquire the 
information at a relatively late stage. 
 
Table 7.12: Distribution of firms with respect to percentage of AT increase 
(Benchmark: AT for a period from -180 to -61 day before announcement) 
 
% High of AT 
 
No. & % of firms with higher 
AT from -61 to -11 day 
No. & % of firms with higher 
AT from -10 to 0 day 
2006 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 
Total 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 
2007 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 
Total 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 
2008 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 
Total 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 
2009 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
2010 
125-150% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
150-200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
>200% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Section 7.3.8The categorization after the dummy variable, the 





After applying three filters- the dummy variable approach, the detection of the 
outliers, and the analysis of the AT, the China firms are categorized into four groups-
the clean, the suspected, the ultra-suspected and the ultra-ultra-suspected. 
 
Table 7.13: The codes of the absolute clean, suspected, ultra-suspected and ultra-ultra-
suspected firms after three filters in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
2006 
The code of the 
absolute clean firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
ultra-suspected firms 
None None CNT0601  None 
  CNT0602  
2007 
The code of the 
absolute clean firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
ultra-suspected firms 
None CNT0705 CNT0701 CNT0706 CNT0704 
  CNT0702   
  CNT0703   
2008 
The code of the 
absolute clean firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
ultra-suspected firms 
CNT0801 CNT0802 CNT0803 CNT0805 None 
CNT0808 CNT0807 CNT0804   
  CNT0806   
2009 
The code of the clean 
firms 
The code of the 
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
suspected firms 
The code of the ultra-
ultra-suspected firms 
CNT0901 CNT0902 None None 
 CNT0903   
Note: There were no firms from 2010 

















Figure 7.6: The AR of the four categories of firms in the China from 2006 to 2010 
 
 
According to Figure 7.6, it is very noticeable that the AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected 
firms does not only have several significant positive spikes but also significant 
negative spikes before merger announcement. The highest spike appears on about -28 
day which is slightly less than 10%. Comparing to the results of the U.K and the U.S, 
it seems that the Chinese ultra-ultra-suspected firms gain much less AR through 
insider trading. The AR of the clean firms is stable before day 0. However, on day 0, 
it is the AR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms which reaches the highest figure-
approximately 8% because of the delayed response of the stock market noted before. 
Figure 7.7 presents the CAAR of the four categories-the absolute clean firm, the 
suspected firm, the ultra-suspected firm and the ultra-ultra-suspected firm in China 
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Figure 7.7: The CAAR of the four categories of firms in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
  
According to Figure 7.7, the buildup in the CAAR of the ultra-suspected firm can be 
observed from the beginning of the event window. The increasing trend in the yellow 
curve is very pronounced. The CAAR of the ultra-ultra-suspected firms has several 
‘ups’ and ‘dips’. It increases sharply to 23% before -50 day and then begins to 
decrease. From -33 day onwards, it increases again and then decreases to less than 
10%. From -5 day onwards, a sign of CAAR buildup is observed. The CAAR of the 
suspected firms decreases gradually through the event window. For the clean firms, 
the CAAR increases before -33 day and then starts to decrease afterwards. No 




Section 7.3.9The results of Granger causality test in the targets and 
the bidders 
 
Table 7.14 shows the results of Granger causality test for the targets and bidders in 
pairs in China from 2006 to 2010. Table 7.19 in the appendix gives the results of the 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test for the targets and bidders in China from 2006 to 
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CNT0601/ultra-suspected No 0.76 No 0.13 
CNT0602/ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 5.35 No 0.28 
CNT0701/ultra-suspected Yes (10%) 2.50 No 0.84 
CNT0702/ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 5.48 No 1.99 
CNT0703/ultra-suspected No 0.76 No 2.19 
CNT0704/ultra-ultra-suspected No 0.71 No 0.19 
CNT0705/suspected No 0.13 No 1.27 
CNT0706/ultra-suspected No 0.18 Yes (10%) 3.00 
CNT0801/absolute clean No 0.03 Yes (5%) 4.18 
CNT0802/suspected No 0.88 Yes (5%) 3.77 
CNT0803/ultra-suspected No 0.78 No 0.82 
CNT0804/ultra-suspected No 1.49 Yes (10%) 2.49 
CNT0805/ultra-suspected No 1.11 No 1.77 
CNT0806/ultra-suspected Yes (1%) 49.46 No 1.11 
CNT0807/suspected No 1.32 No 0.25 
CNT0808/absolute clean No 0.01 No 1.41 
CNT0901/absolute clean No 1.73 Yes (1%) 125.77 
CNT0902/suspected No 1.03 No 0.59 
CNT0903/suspected No 2.07 No 0.80 
 
According to the results of Granger causality test, there is evidence that the targets 
Granger cause the bidders, and the bidders Granger cause the targets and mutual 
causality. For the bidders Granger cause the targets, all for cases lie in the ultra-ultra-
suspected firms, and for the targets Granger cause the bidders, among the total five 
cases, two are absolute clean firms, two are ultra-suspected firms and one is suspected. 
This linkage is either suggestive of leaked news or that insider trading involves 
simultaneous trading with both buyer and target stock. 
 
Section 7.3.10The results of the application of the day 0 hypothesis 
 
In this chapter, the day 0 hypothesis is applied using China data. It is calculated after 
each of the three filters. With the China data, it is noticeable that on day 0, the clean 
firms are experiencing negative AR. This needs to be further looked at.  
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Year The clean firms The suspected firms 
2006 -0.0302059 0.0351706 
2007 0.0384399 0.0038034 
2008 -0.0184925 -0.0139526 
2009 0.0259629 - 
2010 - - 
Average 0.003926 0.00834 
Source: Author’s calculation 




Year The clean firms The suspected firms The ultra-suspected 
firms 
2006 - -0.0302059 0.0351706 
2007 0.054705 0.0221747 0.0038034 
2008 -0.0408366 -0.0035964 -0.0139526 
2009 -0.0014645 0.0396766 - 
2010 - - - 
Average 0.004135 0.007012 0.00834 
Source: Author’s calculation 












2006 - - 0.0024823 - 
2007 - 0.054705 -0.0057004 0.0601897 
2008 -0.0408366 -0.0247602 -0.0007817 - 
2009 -0.0014645 0.0396766 - - 
2010 - - - - 
Average -0.02115 0.023207 -0.00133 0.0601897 
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 The numbers in Table 7.14 are the average AR for both the suspected and the clean firms on day 0 
from 2006 to 2010 
35
 The numbers in Table 7.15 are the average AR for the suspected, the ultra-suspected and the clean 
firms on day 0 from 2006 to 2010 
36
 The numbers in Table 7.16 are the average AR for the suspected, the ultra-suspected, the ultra-
ultra-suspected and the clean firms on day 0 from 2006 to 2010 
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2006 - - -0.0039213 - 
2007 - 0.0656421 0.0707875 0.1162262 
2008 -0.0677913 0.0516188 0.0232319 - 
2009 0.1847919 0.1253523 - - 
Average 0.0585003 0.0808707 0.0300327 0.1162262 
 
Section 7.4 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter is to utilize the four filters developed in this thesis to 
detect the possible existence of insider trading prior to the merger announcement with 
China data. However, due to some confidential or political reasons, the news of the 
public rumours and the director’s trading on the shares of China M&As cannot be 
found from the Nexis. Therefore, it is impossible to conduct the second filter-the news 
search with China data. As a result, this chapter only utilizes three filters to 
investigate the existence of possible insider trading. The database is the China 
domestic takeovers whose announcement dates have been during 2006-2010. The 
methodology used is the same with that in chapter 5 and 6.  The AR and CAAR have 
been calculated and shown. The results show that firstly, the Chinese target firms tend 
to have lower AR than the U.K and U.S firms. Secondly, before the three filters, the 
pattern of the AR of the China target firms seems more noisy than that of the U.K and 
U.S, with more frequent ups and downs. After the three-filter approach, the AR of the 
ultra-ultra-suspected firms is found to have many spikes before merger announcement 
while that of the clean firms is much more stable. According to the CAAR, there is no 
sign of pre-merger buildup for the clean firms. The day 0 hypothesis does not work 
very well with China data. It is also very surprising that on day 0, the clean firms are 
getting negative AR. These different characteristics may reflect a young and immature 
market
38
, with relatively few participants, where news of mergers, even when 
announced, is slow to filter out. Chinese stock market was defined as ‘a new market 
                                                          
37
 Because of the delayed response in Chinese stock market, a summations of the AR of day 0, day +1 
and day +2 are calculated. For example, for the clean firms in 2008, firstly, the sum of the three days 
ARs of the clean firms in 2008 are calculated and then the average. 
38
 Literature of Chinese stock market is in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2.  
367 
 
in the shunt period’ by the management of Chinese stock market in 2001 and in recent 
years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission bases the policy making, the 
policy implementation and the policy revolution on the characteristic of this period
39
. 
Equally, it may reflect differences in the culture of the Chinese stock market. If the 
former, these differences will be expected to disappear perhaps over the next decade. 
If the latter, the differences may be more entrenched. In a sample of 19 target firms 
being investigated, 3 are considered to be absolute clean, 5 are suspected, 10 are ultra-
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 China Finance Net (http://www.zgjrw.com/News/2012104/home/476662897600.shtml) and L ZHU 





In the appendix, firstly, the ARs and CAARs for both the targets and bidders in China 
from 2006 to 2010 from the market-adjusted model and from the modified market 
model are presented. Secondly, the names, the announcement dates and the industries 
of both the targets and bidders in China from 2006 to 2010 are presented. Thirdly, the 
names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns in China from 2006 to 
2010 are shown in tables. Then the results of the ADF test in the targets and bidders in 
China from 2006 to 2010 are shown.  
 
Tables 7.4: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 

























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00212 0.001828 -0.00927 33% -0.00212 
-59 0.00044 0.006481 -0.00427 56% -0.00168 
-58 0.002172 -0.00091 0.006136 39% 0.000494 
-57 -0.00056 0.004382 -0.00198 28% -6.2E-05 
-56 0.004589 0.020689 -0.00219 50% 0.004527 
-55 0.007158 0.009783 0.009578 78% 0.011685 
-54 0.001606 0.0153 -0.00835 50% 0.013291 
-53 0.000772 0.000959 -0.00015 39% 0.014064 
-52 -0.00076 -0.0038 0.000839 39% 0.013301 
-51 -0.00156 -0.00511 0.001592 44% 0.011737 
-50 -0.00333 -0.00177 -0.00676 33% 0.00841 
-49 -0.00264 -0.00866 -0.00041 44% 0.005774 
-48 -0.00055 -0.00437 0.000999 56% 0.005221 
-47 0.000376 0.005085 -0.00252 33% 0.005597 
-46 -0.00064 0.001011 -0.00214 50% 0.004952 
-45 0.002533 -0.0028 0.007118 44% 0.007485 
-44 0.005071 -0.00571 0.015639 44% 0.012556 
-43 0.006306 0.012906 0.005535 50% 0.018863 
-42 -0.00113 -0.00533 -0.00131 39% 0.017733 
-41 0.001273 0.006243 -0.00103 44% 0.019006 
-40 0.003206 -0.00012 0.006866 39% 0.022212 
-39 0.002995 0.008283 0.001133 56% 0.025207 
-38 -8.8E-05 0.001505 -0.00221 39% 0.025119 
-37 0.002968 -0.00675 0.012839 28% 0.028087 
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-36 0.000867 0.007334 -0.0041 44% 0.028953 
-35 -0.00176 -0.01334 0.006673 50% 0.027195 
-34 0.003938 -0.0018 0.01237 61% 0.031133 
-33 0.00265 0.002961 0.007102 39% 0.033783 
-32 0.001523 0.005358 0.002149 56% 0.035306 
-31 -0.00112 0.003648 -0.00717 28% 0.034185 
-30 -0.01019 -0.01424 -0.01557 28% 0.023999 
-29 0.000145 -0.00513 0.003386 33% 0.024144 
-28 0.000974 0.008399 -0.00395 39% 0.025119 
-27 -0.00436 -0.01035 -0.00228 22% 0.020762 
-26 0.008986 0.02156 0.010813 44% 0.029748 
-25 0.006578 0.021647 0.001438 61% 0.036326 
-24 0.00855 0.002661 0.019259 44% 0.044876 
-23 0.001127 -0.00288 0.004143 39% 0.046003 
-22 0.008705 0.020446 0.006154 61% 0.054707 
-21 -0.00895 -0.01326 -0.01459 28% 0.045757 
-20 2.97E-07 -0.00619 0.004806 44% 0.045757 
-19 -0.00483 -0.01257 -0.00362 56% 0.040928 
-18 -0.00043 0.010538 -0.00768 33% 0.040501 
-17 -0.00883 -0.01143 -0.01478 22% 0.031667 
-16 -0.00179 -0.00897 0.000645 44% 0.02988 
-15 -0.00057 -0.00119 0.000521 44% 0.029307 
-14 -0.00826 -0.01179 -0.01249 22% 0.021043 
-13 -0.00228 -0.00986 0.002027 33% 0.018762 
-12 0.000376 0.004803 0.000118 61% 0.019138 
-11 -0.00461 -0.00776 -0.0061 22% 0.014526 
-10 -0.0035 0.001627 -0.0101 28% 0.011023 
-9 0.006099 0.004466 0.011371 56% 0.017122 
-8 0.008291 0.018493 0.008334 39% 0.025413 
-7 -0.0008 0.012398 -0.00614 44% 0.024609 
-6 0.0008 0.003789 0.000749 44% 0.025408 
-5 0.004358 0.014454 -0.00067 44% 0.029767 
-4 0.005977 0.001349 0.01395 44% 0.035744 
-3 -0.00094 0.002457 -0.00455 44% 0.034803 
-2 0.004623 0.019061 -0.00299 39% 0.039426 
-1 -0.00013 0.000405 0.000234 39% 0.039299 
0 0.000541 -0.00355 0.005657 50% 0.03984 
1 0.008586 0.023657 0.011866 56% 0.048426 
2 0.024195 0.03435 0.039195 72% 0.07262 
3 -0.00338 -0.0196 0.002559 39% 0.069238 
4 -0.00236 -0.00778 -0.00292 28% 0.066874 
5 -0.00268 -0.00422 -0.0038 44% 0.064195 
6 -0.0075 -0.00109 -0.0183 33% 0.056693 
7 0.001694 -0.01331 0.013994 44% 0.058386 
8 -0.0108 -0.01075 -0.02355 17% 0.047589 
9 -0.00887 -0.01385 -0.01258 39% 0.038724 
10 -0.00456 -0.01565 0.000399 39% 0.034163 
Average 
from 



















to +10 0.000481272 0.001048254 0.000530507 - 0.027948254 
 
Table 7.5: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAR) for the target firms in the China from2006 to 2010(from the market model 





















































-60 -0.005 0.001 -0.010 37% -0.005 0.001 -0.010 
-59 -0.003 0.007 -0.010 37% -0.008 0.008 -0.020 
-58 0.000 -0.003 0.002 32% -0.008 0.005 -0.018 
-57 0.000 0.001 0.000 26% -0.008 0.006 -0.018 
-56 0.001 0.013 -0.007 58% -0.007 0.019 -0.025 
-55 0.010 0.013 0.009 53% 0.004 0.032 -0.016 
-54 0.002 0.013 -0.007 47% 0.006 0.045 -0.023 
-53 0.001 0.004 -0.001 47% 0.007 0.049 -0.024 
-52 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 37% 0.003 0.046 -0.028 
-51 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 53% 0.002 0.043 -0.029 
-50 0.004 0.003 0.005 42% 0.006 0.047 -0.024 
-49 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 47% 0.005 0.042 -0.022 
-48 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 42% 0.002 0.038 -0.025 
-47 0.000 0.004 -0.002 32% 0.002 0.042 -0.027 
-46 0.002 0.003 0.001 47% 0.004 0.045 -0.026 
-45 0.001 -0.005 0.006 37% 0.005 0.040 -0.020 
-44 0.007 -0.004 0.014 53% 0.012 0.036 -0.006 
-43 0.006 0.011 0.002 42% 0.017 0.047 -0.005 
-42 -0.005 -0.010 -0.001 21% 0.012 0.037 -0.006 
-41 0.000 0.006 -0.004 53% 0.012 0.043 -0.010 
-40 0.007 0.005 0.010 53% 0.020 0.047 -0.001 
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-39 0.003 0.010 -0.002 53% 0.022 0.057 -0.003 
-38 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 32% 0.022 0.061 -0.007 
-37 0.002 -0.007 0.008 53% 0.024 0.054 0.002 
-36 -0.001 0.010 -0.009 37% 0.023 0.064 -0.007 
-35 -0.006 -0.014 0.000 53% 0.017 0.050 -0.007 
-34 0.009 -0.003 0.018 68% 0.026 0.047 0.011 
-33 0.004 0.008 0.001 53% 0.030 0.055 0.011 
-32 0.001 0.008 -0.003 53% 0.031 0.063 0.008 
-31 -0.007 0.004 -0.015 26% 0.024 0.067 -0.007 
-30 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 26% 0.012 0.055 -0.018 
-29 0.004 0.000 0.006 37% 0.016 0.055 -0.012 
-28 0.002 0.008 -0.003 32% 0.018 0.063 -0.016 
-27 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 32% 0.014 0.060 -0.020 
-26 0.016 0.025 0.010 63% 0.030 0.085 -0.010 
-25 0.009 0.020 0.000 68% 0.039 0.105 -0.010 
-24 0.010 0.005 0.014 58% 0.049 0.110 0.005 
-23 0.004 0.001 0.007 37% 0.053 0.111 0.011 
-22 0.012 0.023 0.003 58% 0.065 0.135 0.015 
-21 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 37% 0.053 0.123 0.001 
-20 -0.003 -0.012 0.003 37% 0.049 0.112 0.004 
-19 -0.012 -0.020 -0.006 37% 0.037 0.091 -0.002 
-18 0.002 0.016 -0.009 37% 0.039 0.108 -0.011 
-17 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 21% 0.029 0.098 -0.021 
-16 -0.005 -0.011 -0.001 37% 0.024 0.088 -0.023 
-15 0.003 0.002 0.004 58% 0.027 0.089 -0.019 
-14 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 26% 0.022 0.084 -0.024 
-13 -0.003 -0.009 0.002 47% 0.019 0.075 -0.022 
-12 0.003 0.006 0.001 74% 0.022 0.081 -0.021 
-11 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 37% 0.019 0.075 -0.021 
-10 0.000 0.004 -0.004 47% 0.019 0.079 -0.025 
-9 0.009 0.007 0.010 58% 0.028 0.086 -0.015 
-8 0.009 0.018 0.003 53% 0.037 0.104 -0.012 
-7 0.005 0.015 -0.002 47% 0.042 0.119 -0.014 
-6 0.003 0.007 0.000 53% 0.045 0.126 -0.013 
-5 0.005 0.015 -0.002 47% 0.051 0.141 -0.015 
-4 0.008 0.002 0.012 53% 0.058 0.142 -0.003 
-3 -0.002 0.004 -0.005 42% 0.057 0.146 -0.008 
-2 0.006 0.019 -0.003 42% 0.063 0.165 -0.011 
-1 0.001 -0.002 0.003 42% 0.064 0.163 -0.008 
0 0.002 0.001 0.003 47% 0.066 0.165 -0.006 
1 0.018 0.025 0.013 58% 0.084 0.190 0.007 
2 0.038 0.034 0.040 79% 0.122 0.224 0.047 
3 -0.006 -0.017 0.002 37% 0.116 0.207 0.049 
4 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 32% 0.109 0.200 0.044 
5 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 37% 0.108 0.201 0.040 
6 -0.006 0.001 -0.011 37% 0.102 0.202 0.029 
7 0.000 -0.012 0.008 32% 0.101 0.190 0.037 
8 -0.017 -0.009 -0.022 16% 0.085 0.181 0.015 
9 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 37% 0.072 0.168 0.003 

























































































Table 7.6: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 


























(CAAR) of the 
total target firms 
-60 -0.00609 -0.00551 -0.00559 37% -0.00609 
-59 -0.00739 0.001056 -0.00907 32% -0.01348 
-58 -0.00971 -0.00624 -0.00763 37% -0.02319 
-57 -0.00284 -0.00497 -0.0032 37% -0.02603 
-56 0.00182 -0.01398 0.011017 42% -0.02421 
-55 0.003681 0.008323 -0.00405 42% -0.02053 
-54 -0.00077 0.020429 -0.01493 42% -0.0213 
-53 0.002058 0.006336 -0.00102 47% -0.01924 
-52 0.004638 0.015204 0.0001 58% -0.01461 
-51 0.003206 0.014554 -0.0012 47% -0.0114 
-50 0.001116 0.009212 -0.0028 37% -0.01028 
-49 -0.00141 -0.00613 0.003573 37% -0.01169 
-48 -0.00634 -0.00779 -0.00205 42% -0.01803 
-47 0.00633 -0.00316 0.011151 53% -0.0117 
-46 0.00041 -0.00185 0.003724 47% -0.01129 
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-45 -0.00402 -0.00593 0.001172 53% -0.01532 
-44 -0.00263 0.002337 -0.00523 32% -0.01795 
-43 -0.00459 0.016562 -0.01021 42% -0.02254 
-42 -0.00423 0.000741 -0.0036 37% -0.02677 
-41 -0.00146 -0.00246 -0.00338 26% -0.02823 
-40 0.00265 -0.01214 0.008479 58% -0.02558 
-39 0.010776 0.015997 0.004415 58% -0.01481 
-38 -0.00988 0.001505 -0.01333 42% -0.02469 
-37 -0.00245 -0.00318 -0.00347 47% -0.02714 
-36 -0.00615 -0.01139 -0.00219 37% -0.03328 
-35 0.004484 0.01017 0.003964 53% -0.0288 
-34 0.003323 -0.00347 0.00389 47% -0.02548 
-33 -0.00455 -0.0059 -0.0013 42% -0.03003 
-32 -0.0003 0.00493 0.003251 68% -0.03033 
-31 -0.00625 -0.01009 -0.00225 42% -0.03659 
-30 0.001088 0.004434 -0.00345 47% -0.0355 
-29 -0.01022 -0.01708 -0.0069 32% -0.04572 
-28 0.012205 0.006161 0.008948 53% -0.03351 
-27 0.005296 0.022169 -0.00495 42% -0.02822 
-26 -0.00254 0.002653 -0.00364 58% -0.03076 
-25 0.004451 -0.00282 0.008924 42% -0.02631 
-24 0.00537 -0.00525 0.012748 53% -0.02094 
-23 -0.00412 0.011924 -0.00853 47% -0.02505 
-22 0.006348 0.00792 0.003264 53% -0.01871 
-21 -0.0107 -0.00893 -0.00714 32% -0.0294 
-20 -0.01222 -0.01721 -0.00625 26% -0.04162 
-19 -0.0088 -0.00322 -0.00992 42% -0.05043 
-18 -0.00144 0.00691 -0.00263 53% -0.05187 
-17 -0.0085 -0.00829 -0.00936 16% -0.06037 
-16 0.000845 0.000231 -0.00262 32% -0.05953 
-15 0.012629 0.008935 0.006929 63% -0.0469 
-14 -0.00032 0.007368 -0.00466 37% -0.04722 
-13 -0.00573 -0.00448 -0.00694 32% -0.05295 
-12 -0.00597 -0.00529 -0.00189 37% -0.05892 
-11 -0.00037 -0.00685 -0.00042 37% -0.05929 
-10 -0.00699 -0.00621 -0.00843 47% -0.06628 
-9 0.009628 0.014956 0.007301 47% -0.05665 
-8 0.005084 0.00745 0.002984 58% -0.05157 
-7 -0.00056 0.014341 -0.00853 37% -0.05213 
-6 0.001663 0.007106 0.004341 37% -0.05047 
-5 0.000362 0.000187 -0.0006 53% -0.05011 
-4 0.002775 -0.00885 0.006125 53% -0.04733 
-3 -0.00131 0.009986 -0.009 32% -0.04864 
-2 0.002884 -0.01947 0.011844 47% -0.04575 
-1 0.003999 -0.01028 0.010795 53% -0.04176 
0 0.005205 0.005518 0.008601 74% -0.03655 
1 0.008622 0.010743 0.010008 42% -0.02793 
2 0.036013 0.035558 0.030771 68% 0.008085 
3 -0.00961 -0.00582 -0.00589 32% -0.00153 
4 0.002201 0.003307 -0.00437 42% 0.000675 
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5 -0.00242 0.001161 -0.00397 42% -0.00175 
6 -0.00592 0.007731 -0.01182 37% -0.00767 
7 -0.00919 -0.00314 -0.00965 37% -0.01686 
8 0.003877 -0.0074 0.012047 42% -0.01298 
9 -0.00451 -0.01781 0.001554 58% -0.01749 








































0.000641972 - -0.029661127 
 
Tables 7.7: Daily average returns (AR) and cumulative average abnormal returns 

























of the total target 
firms 
-60 -0.0024 -0.00469 -0.00095 39% -0.0024 
-59 -0.00355 0.001368 -0.00668 28% -0.00595 
-58 -0.00582 -0.00737 -0.00483 28% -0.01178 
-57 -0.00174 -0.00403 -0.00028 44% -0.01351 
-56 0.005453 -0.01411 0.017902 50% -0.00806 
-55 0.00107 0.010446 -0.0049 44% -0.00699 
-54 -0.0009 0.016833 -0.01218 44% -0.00789 
-53 0.001449 0.007304 -0.00228 33% -0.00644 
-52 0.005858 0.015008 3.58E-05 56% -0.00058 
-51 0.0058 0.012253 0.001693 61% 0.00522 
-50 -0.0007 0.010108 -0.00758 44% 0.00452 
-49 -0.00269 -0.00521 -0.00108 33% 0.001833 
-48 -0.00109 -0.00833 0.003512 44% 0.00074 
-47 0.0079 -0.00279 0.014702 56% 0.00864 
-46 0.002036 0.00205 0.002026 44% 0.010676 
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-45 0.003761 -0.00378 0.008563 44% 0.014437 
-44 -0.00273 -0.00043 -0.0042 33% 0.011704 
-43 0.002371 0.016945 -0.0069 33% 0.014075 
-42 0.004394 0.004608 0.004258 39% 0.01847 
-41 -0.0012 -0.00396 0.000565 33% 0.017273 
-40 -0.00149 -0.01324 0.005986 44% 0.015781 
-39 0.008957 0.01667 0.004049 44% 0.024738 
-38 -0.0071 0.002661 -0.01331 44% 0.017638 
-37 0.00122 -0.00234 0.003486 50% 0.018857 
-36 -0.00569 -0.00967 -0.00316 39% 0.013166 
-35 0.006229 0.011582 0.002822 39% 0.019395 
-34 0.00245 -0.00575 0.007667 56% 0.021845 
-33 -0.00499 -0.00821 -0.00294 44% 0.016853 
-32 0.005228 -0.00124 0.009343 61% 0.022081 
-31 0.001171 -0.00698 0.006359 44% 0.023252 
-30 -0.00262 0.001724 -0.00538 44% 0.020637 
-29 -0.01622 -0.01958 -0.01408 17% 0.004418 
-28 0.008863 0.010163 0.008036 44% 0.013281 
-27 0.003143 0.023091 -0.00955 39% 0.016423 
-26 -0.00055 0.007281 -0.00554 44% 0.015872 
-25 0.007777 -0.00481 0.01579 44% 0.02365 
-24 0.007394 -0.0039 0.01458 50% 0.031043 
-23 -0.00374 0.007253 -0.01074 39% 0.027303 
-22 0.008121 0.004227 0.010598 50% 0.035424 
-21 -0.00831 -0.00896 -0.0079 33% 0.027112 
-20 -0.00764 -0.01354 -0.00389 33% 0.019471 
-19 -0.00148 0.002686 -0.00413 61% 0.017994 
-18 0.002655 0.005091 0.001105 50% 0.02065 
-17 -0.00834 -0.00247 -0.01207 28% 0.01231 
-16 -1.3E-05 0.002078 -0.00134 28% 0.012297 
-15 0.003204 0.007813 0.000271 50% 0.015501 
-14 -0.00815 0.008052 -0.01845 33% 0.007354 
-13 -0.00551 -0.00446 -0.00618 22% 0.001841 
-12 -0.00221 -0.0049 -0.0005 44% -0.00037 
-11 -0.004 -0.00532 -0.00316 33% -0.00437 
-10 -0.00914 -0.00261 -0.0133 22% -0.01351 
-9 0.00951 0.015825 0.005492 39% -0.004 
-8 0.007588 0.007348 0.007741 44% 0.003586 
-7 -0.00522 0.009914 -0.01484 33% -0.00163 
-6 0.007802 0.01149 0.005454 39% 0.006173 
-5 0.002746 -5.9E-05 0.004531 50% 0.008919 
-4 0.000384 -0.00977 0.006844 44% 0.009303 
-3 -0.00363 0.006264 -0.00993 33% 0.005672 
-2 0.001212 -0.01432 0.011094 44% 0.006884 
-1 0.004796 -0.0059 0.011605 44% 0.01168 
0 0.002899 0.00273 0.003006 56% 0.014579 
1 0.010132 0.011493 0.009266 50% 0.02471 
2 0.031319 0.033347 0.030028 72% 0.056029 
3 -0.00749 -0.00392 -0.00976 39% 0.048537 
4 0.000194 0.003108 -0.00166 39% 0.048731 
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5 -0.0059 -0.00252 -0.00806 39% 0.042828 
6 -0.00578 -0.00158 -0.00845 33% 0.037048 
7 -0.00755 -0.00328 -0.01026 28% 0.029502 
8 0.002758 -0.01342 0.013051 44% 0.032259 
9 -0.00567 -0.01963 0.00321 61% 0.026589 




















to +10 0.000287 0.000778 -2.5E-05 - 0.013658 
 
Table 7.17: The names and announcement dates for both the target and acquiring 
firms in China from 2006 to 2010 
 
Target Bidder Announcement date Industry 
CNT0601 CNB0601 2006 Energy and 
Power 
CNT0602 CNB0602 2006 Energy and 
Power 
CNT0701 CNB0701 2007 Industrials 
CNT0702 CNB0702 2007 Industrials 
CNT0703 CNB0703 2007 Materials 
CNT0704  CNB0704 2007 Industrials 
CNT0705 CNB0705 2007 Consumer 
Staples 
CNT0706 CNB0706 2007 Materials 
CNT0801 CNB0801 2008 Materials 
CNT0802 CNB0802 2008 High 
Technology 
CNT0803 CNB0803  2008 Consumer 
Staples 
CNT0804 CNB0804 2008 Healthcare 
CNT0805 CNB0805 2008 Materials 
CNT0806 CNB0806 2008 Materials 
CNT0807 CNB0807 2008 Materials 
CNT0808 CNB0808 2008 Materials 
CNT0901 CNB0901 2009 Healthcare 
CNT0902 CNB0902 2009 Industrials 




Table 7.18: The firms’ names and the days on which the firms have abnormal returns 
in China from 2006 to 2010 
 














Nothing - - CNB06
01 
Nothing - - 
CNT06
02 
-23 day 0.05589 4.43 CNB06
02 
-16 day 0.06048 4.26 
-22 day 0.03302 2.61 
-21 day -0.02641 -2.09 
CNT07
01 
Nothing - - CNB07
01 
Nothing - - 
CNT07
02 
-46 day -0.0508 -2.17 CNB07
02 
-47 day -0.1127 -3.38 
-29 day 0.04503 2.00 -46 day -0.07486 -2.23 
-28 day 0.06732 2.99 
-26 day 0.05203 2.30 
CNT07
03 
-31 day 0.08894 3.71 CNB07
03 
-54 day 0.11667 4.42 
-8 day 0.06527 2.87 
-6 day 0.05213 2.31 
-5 day 0.10708 4.74 
CNT07
04 
-56 day 0.09975 3.43 CNT07
04 
Nothing   
-38 day -0.10704 -3.98 
CNT07
05 
Nothing - - CNB07
05 
-51 day 0.10222 3.85 
-9 day 0.06286 2.34 
CNT08
01 
Nothing - - CNB08
01 
Nothing - - 
CNT08
02 
Nothing - - CNB08
02 
Nothing - - 
CNT08
03 
Nothing - - CNB08
03 





-26 day 0.12980 3.87 CNB08
04 
-23 day 0.06196 2.24 
-25 day 0.06688 2.00 
-22 day 0.11200 3.27 
CNT08
05 
-47 day 0.09464 5.83 CNB08
05 
-34 day -0.0515 -2.32 
-46 day 0.05620 3.47 
-21 day -0.03748 -2.10 
CNT08
06 
-17 day -0.04816 -2.13 CNB08
06 
Nothing - - 
CNT08
07 
Nothing - - CNB08
07 
Nothing - - 
CNT08
08 
Nothing - - CNB08
08 
Nothing - - 
CNT09
01 
Nothing - - CNB09
01 
Nothing - - 
CNT09
02 
Nothing - - CNB09
02 
Nothing - - 
CNT09
03 
Nothing - - CNB09
03 
Nothing - - 
 
Table 7.19: Augmented Dicky-Fuller test in the targets and bidders in China from 
2006 to 2010 
 
Target/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
Bidder/Status P-value of 
ADF test 
CNT0601/stationary 0.00 CNB0601/stationary 0.00 
CNT0602/stationary 0.00 CNB0602/stationary 0.00 
CNT0701/stationary 0.00 CNB0701/stationary 0.00 
CNT0702/stationary 0.00 CNB0702/stationary 0.00 
CNT0703/stationary 0.00 CNB0703/stationary 0.00 
CNT0704/stationary 0.00 CNB0704/stationary 0.00 
CNT0705/stationary 0.00 CNB0705/stationary 0.00 
CNT0706/stationary 0.00 CNB0706/stationary 0.00 
CNT0801/stationary 0.00 CNB0801/stationary 0.00 
CNT0802/stationary 0.00 CNB0802/stationary 0.00 
CNT0803/stationary 0.00 CNB0803/stationary 0.00 
CNT0804/stationary 0.00 CNB0804/stationary 0.00 
CNT0805/stationary 0.00 CNB0805/stationary 0.00 
CNT0806/stationary 0.00 CNB0806/stationary 0.00 
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CNT0807/stationary 0.00 CNB0807/stationary 0.00 
CNT0808/stationary 0.00 CNB0808/stationary 0.00 
CNT0901/stationary 0.00 CNB0901/stationary 0.00 
CNT0902/stationary 0.00 CNB0902/stationary 0.00 


















Chapter 8        Conclusion  
Being acquired is one of the biggest events in the life of a company. In recent years, 
M&A activities around the world have increased dramatically and not surprisingly, it 
has become one of the most researched topics in finance
40
. Many scholars have found 
that the value of the target stock goes up substantially (e.g. a recent work done by 
Agrawal and Nasser (2012)). This sharp and almost instantaneous increase in stock 
price provides a tempting trading opportunity to corporate insiders who often have 
knowledge of takeover negotiations months in advance of its public announcement. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a great deal of insider trading takes place before the 
merger announcements (see Morgenson, 2006). Consequently, takeovers have been a 
major focus of regulatory efforts against insider trading.  
 
This thesis focuses on developing a feasible methodology for the regulations to 
investigate the possible existence of insider trading. The study is based on three 
countries which can represent three different economic regions-the U.K, the U.S and 
China. The three target countries have different laws in regulating insider trading and 
this study also compares the impacts of the regulation laws in the three countries. In 
addition China’s is a very young market. 
 
Section 8.1 Summary and Discussion 
This thesis has reviewed the literature and developed a four filter methodology to help 
detect insider trading. The first filter is based on Fama Finsher, Jensen and Roll’s 
work in 1969. They have conducted an event study and examined the effect of the 
announcement of a stock split on stock prices. In their study, they calculate the 
Average Abnormal Return (AR) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) and assume that if there are no unusual price movements prior to the 
announcement date, one would expect both the AR and CAAR to fluctuate randomly 
about zero. However, if there is leakage of, and trading on, inside information just 
prior to the announcement date, this should show up in the form of positive daily 
                                                          
40
 Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrel et al. (1988), Andrade et al. (2001), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), 
and Betton et al. (2008) provide excellent reviews of this literature. 
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average residuals as t approaches 0 and a corresponding build up in CAAR. However, 
this commonly applied method can only give a general idea of the possible insider 
trading. As a result, I followed the study of Binder (1998) to include daily dummy 
variables in the regression and formed my first filter of detecting insider trading. 
Through this filter, I categorize the sample firms into two rough groups-the clean and 
the suspected. In this study, the data shows that the bidders do not tend to get a day 0 
AR and hence there is less reason for insiders to try to expropriate gains before day 0. 
Also the laws of both the U.K and U.S require directors to register dealings in own 
company and in the U.K. directors even need to report the transactions on behalf of 
their spouse and children (Hillier and Marchall/2002). The above can be a deterrent to 
insider trading. 
 
The possible link between insider trading and the publication of inside information 
has been recognized in Hirshleifer (1971) and Fama and Laffer (1971). They found 
that those who possess privileged information have an incentive to take market 
positions on the basis of their information and then announce their information 
publicly. This issue is challenging to investigate empirically because isolating trading 
based on private information is difficult (Agarwal and Singh, 2006). The above is the 
inspiration of my second filter-the news search. Because of the difficulty of knowing 
whether the public released news is truly ‘public released news’ or is just the insider’s 
strategy to cover up their insider trading activity, I consider two situations - firstly, the 
public news released before the problematic day and secondly, the public news 
released after the problematic day where the problematic day has been identified as 
some form of abnormal return from the previous filters. For the former situation, I 
name the firms as the ‘obscure firm’ and for the latter, I name them as the ‘obscure 
firm with lagged news’. Through this filter, I re-categorize the sample firms into four 
groups-the clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news and the suspected. 
 
The first filter helps in the detection of insider trading when the trading is done not 
just on one day, but on a number of adjacent days. But it may miss a single spike, if 
on either side of it there are oppositely signed disturbances. This is why we use the 
third filter in the series. The investigation of outliers is used as this third filter in this 
thesis. The positive residuals which are 3.5 or 4 times greater than the standard 
deviation are considered as the outliers. And through this filter, the sample firms are 
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categorized as the clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected and 
the ultra-suspected. It is possible that an upward sloping CAAR could be the result of 
steady small and continuous daily increases, which our methodology would not pick 
up. But in reality the CAAR of the firms classified as clean tend to be flat. In any case 
it is questionable if insider traders would act in a continuous and steady manner, just 
as with any criminal activity they will not wish to linger at the scene of their crime. 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Sanders and Zdanowicz 
(1992) indirectly examine the prevalence of illegal insider trading by examining 
abnormal returns and the abnormal turnovers (AT) prior to takeover announcement 
for the stocks. A recent work done by King (2009) confirms the importance of AT for 
triggering an insider trading investigation. Based on the methodology used by 
Agarwal and Singh (2006), I developed my fourth filter of detecting insider trading-
the analysis of the AT. Consequently, all the sample firms are categorized as the 
absolute clean, the obscure, the obscure with lagged news, the suspected, the ultra-
suspected and the ultra-ultra-suspected. 
 
Apart from the four filters, a day 0 abnormal return hypothesis is proposed and tested 
at the end of the analysis to verify the results from the four filters. The day 0 
hypothesis is an original contribution of this thesis and the hypothesis is that on day 0, 
there will be a substantial abnormal return for the targets due to the substantial trade 
volume in the stock market, however, with the existence of insider trading, the 
abnormal return will be, at least partly, absorbed prior to the merger announcement 
and therefore, the abnormal return will be expected to be lower than in the normal 
situation. The evidence of the empirical study of the U.K. has supported the theory 
with only one exception-the year 2009. The reason for this might be that in the year 
2009, the effect of the economic crisis has been worse and the stock market was badly 
influenced by the crisis and performed abnormally. In addition of course, 2009 
represents a small sample of firms, which may be impacted upon by other factors in 
their day zero returns. The empirical study of U.S. also supported the day 0 abnormal 
return hypothesis with one exception-the year 2006. In other years, the differences 
between the average day 0 abnormal returns of the absolute clean firm and those of 




The empirical study of China, however, does not support the day 0 hypothesis, the 
reasons might be (i) because of the lack of data, the empirical study of China has 
asymmetric results (for some years, there are no absolute clean firms while for the 
others, there are no ultra-ultra-suspected firms) and therefore, the test is done for the 
full sample which may lead to some unexpected bias, (ii) because China is a very 
young market and the government has played an important part in regulating and 
guiding, and therefore, the day 0 hypothesis does not work well. Indeed it appears an 
odd market in other respects, not least the small price gains for any firm, clean or 
otherwise. Gains tend to be small per se relative to U.S and U.K firms, and delayed to 
day +1 and day +2. All this may characterise a young market, with relatively few 
participants and relatively slow information diffusion. It may also reflect culture 
differences, or differences in the nature of takeovers. 
 
After utilizing the four filters to investigate the possible insider trading in the three 
countries, I found that with a sample of 87 U.K. firms in a five years’ period from 
2006 to 2010, 19.5% of the total firms are considered to be absolutely clean. They 
have passed all the four filters and are therefore been considered not to have done any 
insider trading. 11% of the total firms are considered to be obscure. These firms do 
not pass the first filter, however, I found public rumours or news of director’s trading 
on shares before or after the problematic day(s), therefore, the abnormal spikes of 
these firms might be due to the public following the rumours. There is a possibility 
that the insiders choose to announce their information publicly after taking advantage 
of them and so as to cover up their insider trading activities. As a result, these firms 
are labelled as ‘obscure’ because isolating trading based on private information is 
difficult.  71% of the total firms are suspected to different levels depending on how 
many filters they pass. Among the 62 suspected firms 8 of which are considered to be 
ultra-ultra-suspected because they fail all the four filters.  In a sample of 100 U.S. 
firms in a five years’ period from 2006 to 2010, 32% are considered to be absolutely 
clean, 1 is considered to be obscure and 77% are suspected to different levels 
depending on how many filters they pass. Among the 67 suspected firms, 6 are 
labelled ‘ultra-ultra-suspected firms’ for they fail every filter of the four filters. To 
compare the results of the two countries, I found that there was much less public news 
released in the U.S than in the U.K and this might be reflective of a leakier system 
and in part more insider trading in the U.S. Further, for the results of the Granger 
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causality test, 27.6% of the U.K firms show evidence of Granger causality and 31% 
for the U.S. This supports Hillier and Marshall (2002) and Persons (1997) that the 
U.K Code requires much faster reporting of director’s dealings. The directors must 
inform their company of the transaction as soon as possible and no later than the fifth 
business day after a transaction for their own account or on behalf of their spouses 
and children while in the U.S., insiders only have to report their holdings within the 
first ten days of the month following the month of the trade. This could explain why 
there were less instances of Granger causality in the U.K than in the U.S. 
 
The empirical study of China gives a result that with a sample of 19 firms being 
investigated, 16% are considered to be absolutely clean and 82% are labelled to be 
suspected of different levels depending on how many filters they pass. Because China 
is a very young market, some of the news is not shared with the international 
databases such as Nexis. As a result, the public released rumours of M&A of China 
cannot be found and therefore, there are only three filters for China.  
 
Similar to the works done by Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Conrad and Niden (1993), Chae (2005) and Graham, Koski and Loewenstein (2006), I 
find pre-announcement run-ups of the U.K. target firms’ daily trading volume (in this 
thesis, the abnormal trading volume is called the abnormal turnover (AT)). I find that 
the average AT of the U.K. target firms starts to rise several weeks or months prior to 
the merger announcement which is consistent with the previous scholars’ results. 
With the U.S data, I find that the AT of the clean firms is much higher than that of the 
ultra-ultra-suspected firms. I also find that there are some run-ups of the AT of the 
clean firms before the merger announcement and some of which are very significant. 
This might be explained by the fact that it is more likely to see AT spikes with 
irregular trading in small sized firms. In addition, it might be easier to do inside 
trading with large firms as the purchase of shares is less noticeable. It is suggestive 
that the future studies can take the firm size into account. 
 
Section 8.2 Policy Implications and Future Research 
In concluding this thesis, I also look at the implications of the results. This is a 
difficult task because establishing a link between research and policy initiatives is not 
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always straightforward. However, I believe that the implications of the results warrant 
some detailed consideration by the policy-makers. 
 
The analysed AR, CAAR and AT pattern provide a base for the argument that stock 
price run-ups before merger announcement reflect widespread possible insider trading. 
Apart from this, I also consider the possible influence of the publicly released news 
and the change of the day 0 average abnormal return with the involvement of insider 
trading. The four filters developed in this thesis can be applied by the policy-makers 
in helping to investigate insider trading and then verify the results by the day 0 
hypothesis. The four filters approach is so far a thorough investigation of illegal 
informed trading but not too time-consuming as a group of three or four researchers 
can do the job in at most three months for a whole year’s M&A firms from collecting 
data to the final results. Indeed it is possible the process could be partly automated. 
Moreover, the cost of the resources is low-the data can be collected using Datastream 
and Nexis and the analysis can be done using either STATA or E-views. Moreover, 
the knowledge that this type of analysis is being done should in itself be a deterrent to 
insider trading. 
 
This study can also be extended to insider trading investigation under other events. 
(e.g. the stock split, the dividend announcement, the earnings announcement etc.) 
Also, for the future studies, the application of the four filters on the bidders could be 
done. Moreover, another issues that this work raises for the future research are firstly 
the AT pattern before the public released news and secondly, the group analysis of 
firms with different sizes. In other words, to develop five or six filters in addition to 
the four filters approach to distinguish the AT pattern caused by the public released 
news, by the size of the firm and the true insider trading activities. Another concern 
raised by this work is that with the existence of insider trading, who gains and who 
losses? The gainers are obvious. For the losers, those who hold shares throughout the 
entire run up will not lose. Instead the gains will be on both day 0 and earlier. Those 
who sell their shares to the insider trader are definitely possible losers. Also those 
who buy shares after the insider trading spikes and before day 0 are potential losers, 
but it depends on whether they would have bought the shares anyway or whether they 
did so after being alerted by the insider trading spikes. It is complex because the 
existence of insider trading would have changed the whole dynamics of trading in that 
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share as people respond to the inside trading spike. But it is clear that if there are 
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